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duke university
We stood yester- morn on the campus of the  great Duke University, 
amazed at its vastness and magnificence. We thought of the stupendous 
sum of money spent by the Dukes to make this one of Amer i ca’s greatest 
educational institutions. We thought of the tobacco industry and its rise 
to one of the largest business enterprises in the world.
We thought of the blood of Negro men,  women and  children that had 
gone into the buildings to make up Duke University, and we likened 
them unto the bodies of Chinese slaves thrown into the  Great Wall of 
China when it was erected. Like a  great pa norama, this throng of our 
forefathers passed before us. . . . . .  some with stooped shoulders, bowed 
heads and pinched brows made so in order, that a  great institution of 
learning might come into existence. As they trod their weary way, the 
earth shook about us.
We thought of the  great God who sits in judgment over the affairs of 
mankind and thought of questioning him about the justice of permitting 
the blood to be squeezed out of black bodies to build a university for 
white minds . . .  only white minds.— “My Lord what a morning.”
If white  people have labored in the factories of the American tobacco 
industry for less than enough on which to live, they have had the satisfac-
tion of knowing that their  children may reap the benefits in a school that 
provides the very best training. If Negroes have done the same  thing, it 
must pierce their hearts to know that Duke University has been built for 
 every other race  under the sun but theirs. Chinese, Japa nese, Germans, 
Rus sians or any other foreign race may be admitted to the school; but 
the American Negro stands alone as the one  human being on earth, too 
loathsome in the eyes of the American white man to share the benefits 
of Duke University.
Is this the price of humbleness? Is this the price of faithfulness? Where is 
justice? Where is right? Where is God?
We left Duke University at high noon. The sun had reached its zenith and 
was casting its brilliant rays upon the school’s massive buildings. Every-
thing was in contour and detail; but they tell us the sun went down and 
that  there was darkness— black darkness. My Lord, what a night!
L. E. Austin, publisher  
Carolina Times  
May 6, 1939

For The Black STudenTS who Forced duke  
To conFronT iTS Jim crow paST; and For  ThoSe  
who SuSTain The STrug gle For racial JuSTice  
and incluSion aT duke and Beyond
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Introduction
A Historic Encounter
As they arrived on campus, Black undergraduates who entered Duke Univer-
sity in the early years following desegregation  were busy with the tasks all new 
students face.  There  were boxes to unpack in too- small dorm rooms, room-
mates to meet, and tearful, proud parents to send on their way home. Soon 
orientation would be over, classes would begin, and extracurricular commit-
ments would ramp up. Before they knew it, the first semester of their fresh-
man year would be in full swing.
But although their daily activities tracked  those of their white counter parts, 
 these Black students experienced Duke very differently. Gene Kendall, one of 
the first five Black undergraduates, arrived on campus in the fall of 1963. He 
stood on the carefully manicured main quad and surveyed the magnificent 
gothic- style buildings surrounding him. “I was a wide- eyed kid who was fas-
cinated when I looked up at the chapel for the first time,” Kendall recalled. “I 
thought, ‘What in the world am I into?’ ”1 Brenda Armstrong was overwhelmed 
by the transition from the predominantly Black atmosphere of her childhood 
to Duke’s “sea of white.”2 Chuck Hopkins recalled waking up one morning early 
in his freshman year and seeing “all  these Black men raking leaves” outside his 
dorm win dow. “It was like a plantation,” he recalled thinking.3
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Kendall, Armstrong, and Hopkins  were not alone in  these sentiments. They 
 were among a vanguard of talented Black youngsters who, in the early 1960s, 
gained admission to historically white colleges and universities (hwcus) 
throughout the South.
The arrival of  these Black students marked a profound change for  these 
historically white institutions. For de cades, Jim Crow and segregation had 
defined the organ ization and daily operations of  these schools. For whites, 
segregation was a given— both entrenched and pervasive.
Hence, when desegregation occurred at hwcus, it created im mense chal-
lenges for all parties.4 White administrators, faculty, and students, many of 
whom had never interacted with a Black person other than in a ser vice capac-
ity,  were forced to learn how to relate to Black students. Likewise,  these Black 
students, the vast majority of whom had never interacted with white individu-
als as equals, faced their own challenge: how to deal with white administrators 
and faculty, and white students as peers. This was a historic encounter.
How would they live and work together at Duke?  Under Jim Crow, the 
academic and social opportunities offered by Duke  were for white students 
only. The “Duke Experience” was a training ground for advancement in white 
Amer i ca. Theoretically at least, desegregation meant that Black students now 
would have the chance to share in  these opportunities. But how desegregation 
played out depended on  whether Duke was prepared to invest the po liti cal 
capital, as well as economic and  human resources, to allow Black students to 
realize their full potential at Duke. Would the curriculum be changed to re-
flect the rich history of African American life, culture, and thought, now that 
Black students  were a part of the institution? Would the composition of the 
faculty and administration change to reflect the presence of Black students on 
campus? In sum, what resources was Duke willing to reallocate to create an 
inclusive environment that could serve the needs of all students— both white 
and Black?
By the end of the 1960s, college campuses throughout the United States 
 were engulfed in Black student protest.5 At Duke, significant white and Black 
student protests dominated the campus in the last years of the 1960s. As Black 
protest at Duke was accelerating, a group of primarily white students and 
faculty held a “ Silent Vigil” in April 1968 in response to the assassination of 
Martin Luther King Jr. The vigil, with more than 1,500 students and faculty 
eventually occupying the campus’s main quadrangle, demanded that Duke 
University take bold steps to show its commitment to racial and economic jus-
tice. The vigil was followed just ten months  later by the takeover of key areas 
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of the Allen Building, Duke’s central administrative headquarters, by Black 
students. The  Silent Vigil and the Allen Building takeover show the diff er-
ent ways white trustees, administrators, and faculty perceived— and reacted 
to— white and Black student protest. How per sis tent  were the assumptions of 
Duke’s Jim Crow legacy?
Looking back fifty years  later, how should the actions of Duke trustees, 
administrators, and faculty be judged? The school’s basic princi ples “have re-
mained constant,” Duke’s bulletin for the 1963–64 school year declared. The 
school motto, “Eruditio et Religio,” expressed “a fundamental faith in the 
 union of knowledge and religion” and the values of scholarship, freedom and 
truth, tolerance, and ser vice. Through “changing generations of students,” the 
bulletin announced, the objective of the school has been “to encourage each 
individual to achieve to the extent of his capabilities an understanding and ap-
preciation of the world in which he lives, his relationship to it, his opportuni-
ties and responsibilities.”6 It seems fair to ask to what extent Duke leaders  were 
able to embrace  those values and reach for  those objectives as they confronted 
the real ity of Black students in their midst. More simply, when Douglas M. 
Knight, Duke president during this period, and  others said that they  were 
acting in “good faith” to address the needs of Duke’s Black students, did their 
actions meet that standard?
I started my study of Black campus activism at Duke in 1978, when I was 
twenty- three years old.  After a thirty- five- year  career in corporate law prac-
tice, I de cided to return to the subject. As a retired  lawyer who had spent most 
of his adult life in business and social settings  shaped by white privilege, I saw 
Black student protest at Duke during the 1960s very differently. Having sat 
on many law firm “diversity” committees and task forces, I saw how in effec-
tive  these initiatives could be. Without substantial investment of resources 
by the law firm,  little was accomplished to advance the hiring and promo-
tion of  people of color. Being a parent also  shaped how I viewed events when 
I revisited them. “Black activists” I interviewed in 1978 when I was twenty- 
three became for me “kids” by 2016— youngsters who entered college with the 
same swirling mixture of excitement, aspiration, strength, and vulnerability 
that all  children experience at this auspicious moment. As a result, I became 
fascinated by questions I never thought to ask in my twenties. When talking 
to Black activists— most of whom  were now close to seventy— for a second 
round of interviews, I knew more and had diff er ent questions. I wanted to 
know about their families, schools, and communities and how parents and 
other relatives responded to their participation in campus protest. Among 
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Duke leaders, I wanted to understand the attitudes and institutional frame-
work that blocked them from responding to Duke’s new Black students with 
more empathy and professionalism. For Knight, the liberal Duke president, I 
wanted to explore why his progressive attitudes on race did not translate more 
forcefully into leadership on issues he claimed that he cared about. In essence, 
I wanted to come to terms with the  human dimension of  people and events 
that I had previously understood largely as abstractions.
This story challenges the comfortable narrative that has emerged over the 
de cades about the role campus protest played in the history of Duke. That nar-
rative focuses on change— the role Black and white student protesters played 
in successfully forcing a provincial southern school to confront its Jim Crow 
legacy. Although some aspects of this narrative may have merit, it overlooks 
the power ful shape- shifting resiliency of traditional racial attitudes at Duke. 
As this account shows, Duke deployed an array of strategies to resist change, 
even when faced with protest. Change, when it did occur, came very slowly 
 because racial inclusion was never a core value of the university.
From the moment it was established, Duke University aspired to greatness. 
William Preston Few, the president of Trinity College when it became Duke 
University, told students that they would have an impor tant part in “launching 
one of the  great education establishments of the world.” In its “aims,” the new 
university aspired to “advance learning in all lines of truth; to defend scholar-
ship against all false notions and ideals; to develop a Christian love of freedom 
and truth; to promote a sincere spirit of tolerance; . . .  and to render the largest 
permanent ser vice to the individual, the state, the nation, and the church.”7
The events that followed desegregation at Duke expose the conflicting 
forces that converged as a segregated southern institution was forced to con-
front its long history of racial exclusion. They show that race and the strug gle 
for inclusion stand at the center of the university’s story— and the story of the 
nation. Indeed, Duke University could not approach its lofty aims nor achieve 
its national ambitions  until it came to terms with a racial past defined by seg-
regation and exclusion. The story tells us a  great deal about Duke University 
in the 1960s as well as the dynamics that played out following desegregation 
at other hwcus and the country at large. It also illuminates conflicts and chal-
lenges that continue to resonate at Duke, within higher education North and 




When the first class of Black undergraduates enrolled as freshmen at Duke 
University in 1963, less than forty years had elapsed since the gift from James B. 
Duke that transformed Trinity College into a prominent southern university. 
During that time, the university had made  great pro gress in realizing James 
Duke’s vision of creating a school that would attain “a place of real leader-
ship in the educational world.” A magnificent gothic- style “West Campus” had 
been constructed just over a mile from the location of former Trinity College 
in Durham, North Carolina. Trinity’s campus had been reconstructed and a 
 Woman’s College established on the site. Gradu ate and professional programs 
in more than twenty disciplines had been added, the undergraduate college 
had expanded, and the quality of both the faculty and the student body was 
on the rise. One observer noted that Duke’s gradu ate school “was considerably 
beyond that of any other institution in the south” and was ready to become a 
leader nationally in a number of areas.1
Despite  these achievements, Duke’s transformation into a prominent 
national academic institution was a work in pro gress. The school remained 
largely defined by its city, state, and region. In 1963 a significant portion of 
undergraduates  were raised within two hundred to three hundred miles of the 
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school. More than 400 out of a total of 1,199 freshmen came from North Caro-
lina. Alumni  were also concentrated in the South, and fully 75  percent of uni-
versity trustees came from the region, mostly from North and South Carolina. 
President Douglas Knight recalled board meetings during the 1960s charac-
terized by a “high degree of gentility” that was both “southern” and “courtly.” 
Duke was the largest employer in Durham by a  factor of two and a half. If 
Duke’s place in the region’s academic and business communities was chang-
ing, the school remained, in Knight’s view, both “dominant and isolated.”2
Duke’s location in North Carolina gave it a strong geographic foundation 
but also meant that the university embraced the power ful racial codes that 
defined the segregated Jim Crow South. The arrival on campus of Duke’s first 
Black undergraduates in 1963 marked the official end of segregation at the 
school. Although only five in number, the presence of  these freshmen, who 
joined a small number of Black gradu ate and law students admitted a year 
 earlier, meant that Duke’s history of racially exclusive admissions was over. 
Still, this step marked barely a beginning if the university  were to confront the 
Jim Crow attitudes and practices that infused campus life.
The transformation of Trinity College into Duke University occurred in 1924 
with the creation of the Duke Endowment by James B. Duke. The businessman 
 rose to prominence in the “New South” as the region strug gled to replicate the 
economic success of the northern industrial revolution and become more a 
part of the Union and world. President of American Tobacco Com pany when 
still in his early thirties, Duke and his  family also had extensive holdings in 
the textile sector. By 1899 the Dukes began to develop  water power as a means 
of generating electricity for their textile operations. As Duke developed his 
interests in electric power, he began to look for ways to combine his busi-
ness and philanthropic activities. The Duke Indenture— which established 
the Duke Endowment and gave it control of Duke Power Com pany— was the 
realization of this ambition.3
The sums involved in creating the Duke Endowment  were enormous. Se-
curities worth $40 million, primarily in Duke Power Com pany,  were turned 
over to the Endowment with a stipulation that 20  percent of its net income 
would be added to the Endowment  until an additional $40 million had been 
amassed. The beneficiaries of the Endowment fell into four categories— 
hospitals, Methodist Church– related organ izations, nonprofits established for 
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the care of orphans, and educational institutions. By far the most substantial 
of the bequests—up to $6 million— went to the establishment of Duke Univer-
sity. James Duke provided in the Indenture that Trinity would receive this be-
quest, along with an allocation of fully 32  percent of the Endowment’s annual 
net income, as long as the school changed its name to Duke University and 
amended its charter to provide for “perpetual existence.” Duke hoped that his 
largesse would allow Trinity to be transformed rapidly into the first research 
university in the emerging New South.4
In less than three weeks, Trinity’s trustees said yes. “We have found,” the 
board declared  after its historic meeting, “that the University is to be devel-
oped according to plans that are perfectly in line with our hopes for the expan-
sion” of Trinity College. On December 30, 1924, the  legal formalities required 
for the transformation of Trinity into Duke University  were completed.5
Duke did not intend that the university he endowed become a haven for 
 free thought or the exchange of radical ideas. During this time, historian John 
Egerton wrote, “a rigid orthodoxy of thought and opinion governed virtually 
 every discipline and field of study” at southern universities. Like other New 
South business leaders, Duke believed deeply in hard work and success in 
industry as the pathway to a productive life. “ There  ain’t a thrill in the world,” 
Duke once said, “to compare with building a business and watching it grow 
before your eyes.” His aspirations for Duke University  were pragmatic. He 
valued education, he said in the Indenture, “conducted along sane and practi-
cal, as opposed to dogmatic and theoretical, lines,” and considered it, “next 
to religion, the greatest civilizing influence.” As for students, he sought only 
 those “whose previous rec ord shows a character, determination and applica-
tion evincing a  wholesome and real ambition for life.” One writer at the time 
went so far as to comment that what Duke wanted “was a Babbitt factory, a 
mill for grinding out go- get-’em boys in the  wholesale and undeviating fash-
ion in which his Chesterfield plant across the way ground out cigarettes.”6
A novel “dual- governance” structure established for Duke complicated 
 matters.  Under the Indenture, the Endowment trustees could withhold funds 
from Duke University if, in their judgment, the school was not “operated in a 
manner calculated to achieve the results intended.” This created the risk that 
the in de pen dence of the university could be compromised if the Endowment 
trustees withheld funds from the school. Adding to this concern, Endowment 
trustees  were required to provide oversight for Duke Power Com pany, the en-
tity whose stock made up the bulk of the Endowment’s assets. To ensure that 
they could discharge this responsibility, the majority of initial Endowment 
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trustees selected by James Duke  were directors or se nior officers of Duke 
Power Com pany. Given this context, Knight observed that, for the Endow-
ment trustees, “money rather than education was their primary concern.” This 
structure meant that an Endowment board composed of Duke Power execu-
tives and other businessmen held significant leverage over what went on at 
the university.7
With the substantial Endowment funding, Duke grew rapidly. The school 
immediately undertook an ambitious building program. Between 1925 and 
1927, eleven red- brick Georgian- style buildings  were constructed on the origi-
nal Trinity College campus. Soon this became the location for the  Woman’s 
College. In 1926 gradu ate schools of arts and sciences and religion  were added 
to the campus, followed by professional schools in medicine, law, nursing, and 
forestry. Between 1927 and 1930, work was initiated on the new, Gothic- style 
West Campus. The School of Nursing was established in 1931 and the College 
of Engineering in 1938. Over the years, Duke’s gradu ate programs expanded, 
with some gaining a national reputation. Construction of West Campus was 
finished in 1954 with the completion of the Allen Building, which became 
the center of the university’s administrative operations. Faculty salaries and 
morale went up.8
As Duke was growing, the quality of its undergraduate student body also 
continued to change. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, William J. Griffith, 
who served as director of the student  union during this period, remembered 
that Duke had “good students” but the  women students “across the board  were 
of a higher caliber than the male students.” As a result, Griffith recalled, “men 
had an [academic] inferiority complex.” Zoology professor Peter H. Klopfer 
was more candid. He remembered Duke’s male students as predominantly 
southern, “not particularly bright,” and “conformists to a fascinating degree.”9
As the 1950s ended, however, the academic quality of undergraduates began 
to improve. In 1959 Duke president A. Hollis Edens reported “an intellectual 
groundswell . . .  among the students.” Barney L. Jones, assistant dean of Trin-
ity College at the time, called the class entering Duke in the fall of 1959 “po-
tentially the best ever.” Still— despite  these changes— Duke had not achieved 
the level of national prominence it aspired to. Even by the early 1960s, Duke 
had only three departments that  were recognized as being in the top fifteen 
nationally. Its gradu ate programs had been placed, according to one report, in 
a “third group”  behind twenty- two other schools.10
To help chart its path forward, the university formed a long- range- planning 
committee in 1958 to develop goals for the next ten years. At the university’s 
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June 1959 board meeting, the committee presented its initial pro gress report. 
It identified three objectives— higher faculty salaries, improvements to build-
ings and facilities, and investments targeted to bolster the university’s areas of 
strength. Taken together, the committee’s recommendations would cost $76 
million. “It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance” of the report, 
Edens commented. He called the ten- year plan “the most challenging dream 
presented for the University since the dream which created it.”11
Edens was careful to point out to the trustees that the planning commit-
tee’s conclusions  were consistent with the vision of Duke’s found ers. “They 
did not set out to build a provincial University,” Edens noted, “though they 
 were in sympathy with the need to render special ser vice to the South.” Not-
ing the “extraordinary educational developments” that had taken place in the 
postwar era, Edens cautioned that “universities are now more complex and 
the demands more pressing both as to the quality and the quantity of produc-
tion.” He warned that Duke could not “rest at this point without falling  behind 
in the pro cession.” “Duke University was born to lead,” Edens concluded, and 
“not to follow.”12
With all of Duke’s pro gress, one area of university life that remained 
nearly unchanged since the school’s founding in 1924 was race. Although the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill— Duke’s neighbor— had admit-
ted Black students in 1955, Duke’s board resisted desegregation, even given 
the Brown v. Board of Education decision by the Supreme Court in 1954 de-
claring segregated public schools to be unconstitutional. The board voted 
down a resolution in 1957 authorizing the admission of Black students to the 
Duke University Divinity School.13 By the early 1960s, this failure to “lead” on 
racial  matters threatened to derail the school’s ambitious plans for national 
prominence.
Despite its progressive reputation, North Carolina was, as one author put it, 
“a full- blown Jim Crow state.” Described by historian Leslie Brown as a “trou-
bling set of racial codes” ultimately enforced by vio lence, Jim Crow “attempted 
to appropriate black life and  labor by any means necessary.” It portrayed Black 
 people, Brown recounted, as “inhuman, irresponsible, and immoral” and 
“translated antiblack rhe toric into officially administered discrimination in 
the arenas of democracy— employment, education, and elections— and sus-
tained it for over a hundred years.”14
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At the core of Jim Crow  were numerous laws and customs that denied 
Black  people social equality by imposing a strict separation of the races. One 
white officeholder described the dangerous “slippery slope” Jim Crow was es-
tablished to prevent.
If I sit side by side in the Senate, House or the judicial bench with a colored 
man, how can I refuse to sit with him at the  table? What  will follow? If 
we have social equality, we  shall have intermarriage, if we have intermar-
riage . . .  we  shall become a race of mulattoes. . . .  We  shall be ruled out 
from the  family of white nations. So, it is a  matter of life and death with 
southern  people to keep their blood pure.15
“The idea of social equality was so abhorrent,” historian Leon Litwack 
wrote, “so weighted with fears of racial impurity and degeneration, that the 
very suggestion of such equality had to be rigorously rejected and punished.” 
 These attitudes  were anchored in a racial creed based on religious teachings. “It 
is clear that or ga nized religion in the white South was dominated by spokes-
men,” theologian H. Shelton Smith wrote, “who held firmly to the dogma of 
Negro inferiority, and who thus maintained that the system of black- white 
separatism represented the normal development of a divinely implanted in-
stinct.” William C. Turner Jr., a Black undergraduate who came to Duke in 
the mid-1960s, explained that  those who embraced segregation had “imbibed 
the toxic nectars of white supremacy and even more of cosmic disaster [and] 
believed that you are engineering the disaster of the races when you mix them 
or exchange their proper place on the chain of being.”16
Given the perceived “life and death” stakes involved, it is not surpris-
ing that in states living  under Jim Crow— including North Carolina— legally 
mandated segregation permeated all areas of life where white and Black 
 people might come into social contact. In Durham, segregation encom-
passed marriage, housing, public transportation,  water fountains, public 
rest rooms, restaurants,  hotels, theaters, libraries, churches, hospitals, jails, 
swimming pools, public parks, funeral homes, morgues, cemeteries, and 
municipal ser vices such as police and fire stations. Social customs created 
further separation. Black  people  were required to address white  people as 
“mister,” “miss,” or “ ma’am,” while white  people called Black individuals by 
their first names or “ sister” or “boy,” regardless of age. In commerce, Black 
patrons  were required to enter white- owned stores and food establishments 
by the back door, and wait  until all white shoppers had been helped. When 
shopping for clothes, white shoppers  were allowed to try on items of clothing, 
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while Black customers  were required to make their purchases “strictly on 
sight.”17
Growing up in Durham in the early twentieth  century, Pauli Murray noticed 
that “the signs literally screamed to me from  every side,” “for white only, 
for colored only, white ladies, colored  women, white, colored. If 
I missed the signs,” she recalled, “I had only to follow my nose to the dirtiest, 
smelliest, most neglected accommodations. . . .  The world revolved on color 
and variations of color.” Murray continued, “It pervaded the air I breathed. I 
learned it in hundreds of ways. . . .  The tide of color beat upon me ceaselessly, 
relentlessly.” “ These separate and inferior Black facilities,” historian Ibram X. 
Kendi wrote, “fed Whites and Blacks alike the segregationist idea of Blacks 
being a fundamentally separate and inferior  people.”18
Segregated education was a cornerstone of the Jim Crow system. Although 
the North Carolina Constitution  adopted in 1868  under Reconstruction gave 
all  people in the state “a right to the privilege of education,” it also required 
separation of the races in public education. Black schools operating  under Jim 
Crow possessed only a fraction of the resources available to schools attended 
by white students. A review of Black rural schools conducted by white state 
agent Nathan C. Newbold in 1914 concluded that “the average negro school 
 house is  really a disgrace to an in de pen dent civilized society.” According to 
Newbold,  these schools revealed “injustice, inhumanity, and neglect.” For 
Murray, her “seedy, run- down school” in Durham conveyed the message that 
if Black  people “had any place at all in the scheme of  things it was a separate 
place, marked off, proscribed and unwanted by the white  people.”19
Supporters of segregation believed that Black  people  were not only diff er-
ent from white  people but also inferior. Between 65 and 70  percent of white 
survey respondents in Guilford County, North Carolina, in the mid-1950s 
believed that Black  people  were inferior to white  people with regard to “re-
sponsibility,” “morality,” and “ambition.” Fully 75.6  percent of respondents 
preferred segregated schools. “It remained unthinkable” to whites, according 
to historian Melissa Kean, “that any good could come from the breakdown of 
the strict bars that kept  these threatening  people away from whites, especially 
white youth.”20
 Because “in equality and pretense saturated all their interactions,” historian 
Jason Sokol explained, “whites actually harbored a racial animosity [ toward 
Black  people] rooted in a lack of knowledge.” The experience of southern nov-
elist William Styron was typical. “What ever knowledge I gained in my youth 
about Negroes,” he wrote, “I gained from a distance, as if I had been watching 
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actors in an all- black puppet show.” Segregation was so pervasive in the Jim 
Crow South, Sokol noted, that it “inspired  little reflection.” If white  people did 
notice segregation, one observer said, “it was in the way they noticed  water 
flowing from a tap or hot weather in the summertime—it was unremarkable.”21
All  these Jim Crow rules, customs, and attitudes  were in place at Duke 
University  until the early 1960s. No Black students  were admitted to Duke’s 
gradu ate, professional, or undergraduate schools. When Black pastor R. 
 Irving Boone asked President Edens in 1957 if he could complete coursework 
for a master’s degree started at the Union Theological Seminary at Colum-
bia University, the Duke president said no. “No doubt you are familiar with 
the traditional admissions policy of Duke University,” Edens told Boone. As 
“ there has been no change in this policy,” Edens wrote, “I am unable to give 
you a favorable reply.”22 For as long as Duke’s “traditional” admissions policy 
remained in effect, this response, with minor variations, was repeated each 
time a Black student asked about admission.
Duke had no Black faculty members. None served in university admin-
istrative or clerical positions, and none worked in the library. Black work-
ers dominated the “unskilled” subordinate positions, such as working in the 
dining halls and hospitals or as maids for undergraduates in the dormitories. 
They also served as groundskeepers, janitors, and dormitory switchboard op-
erators. But of 1,666 officials, man ag ers, and professionals at Duke in 1964, 
only seven—.4  percent— were Black. In contrast, among 1,230 laborers and 
ser vice workers, 1,059—or 86  percent— were Black.  Labor or ga nizer and 
leader Oliver Harvey, who came to Duke in 1951 to work as a janitor, sum-
marized the situation. “You  didn’t have any equal employment opportunities, 
or anything like that,” he recalled. “ There  were no black  people in the office 
 unless they cleaned it up. . . .  We cooked the food served in the dining hall and, 
daggone it,  can’t eat in the dining hall.”23
Segregation defined all aspects of campus life.  Until 1962, dining facilities 
on Duke’s East and West campuses  were segregated. With no Black under-
graduates, dorms  were all- white, and the rare Black campus visitor was pro-
hibited from staying on campus overnight.24
Duke Hospital had similar policies. The wards  were segregated, and when 
Black patients and visitors attempted to sit in the main lobby, they  were asked 
to move to a smaller, less attractive location. Medical Center Christmas parties 
 were segregated. William G. Anlyan, dean of the medical school, recalled in 
his memoir that “ there  were always two  water fountains and two bathrooms, 
and that this division even went so far as the morgue at Duke Hospital, which 
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came with four subcomponents differentiating sex and color.” “The same was 
true of the blood bank,” Anlyan reported, “where  there was a separate, recog-
nizable stamp to mark blood that had come from black donors.”25
Through the early 1960s, the Southern Conference of the Methodist 
Church, a key Duke constituency, was “overwhelmingly in  favor of segrega-
tion,” recalled divinity school professor W. Waldo Beach. As a result, Duke 
University Chapel was segregated. Seating for Black parishioners was  limited 
to the south transept, and Black  people  were not permitted to preach or other-
wise lead religious ser vices in the chapel.  After learning in Duke’s student 
newspaper, the Duke Chronicle, that Black scholar and educator Benjamin E. 
Mays would be speaking on campus in Page Auditorium, James T. Cleland, 
dean of the chapel, wrote to Duke president J. Deryl Hart in November 1960, 
“I am  doing a slow burn.” He continued, “Sir: If Negroes may speak in Page 
Auditorium  under University sponsorship, then, in the name of God and 
of his Christ, why cannot one preach in the Duke Chapel? I know that the 
Church does not give moral and spiritual leadership on  great social issues. But 
may we not be allowed to catch up with the moral bandwagon?” Almost three 
and a half years would elapse before preacher and theologian Samuel DeWitt 
Proctor became the first Black speaker at Duke Chapel.26
Consistent with the power of Jim Crow, segregation also applied to campus 
activities. At the football stadium, a sign labeled “colored entrance” marked 
off a separate section—in the corner of the end zone— for Black spectators. 
A report prepared in 1962 explained that “the Negro section at the outdoor 
Stadium is predicated on the assumption that Negroes prefer to sit together 
and that such separation avoids ‘incidents.’ ” No such “preferences” or “in-
cidents” could be documented. The Duke golf course gave priority to Duke 
students, faculty, alumni, and staff— all of whom  were white— and Black golf-
ers had their applications to play denied. Journalist Barry Jacobs reported that 
when John McLendon, the Black basketball coach at North Carolina College 
who was  later inducted into both the Basketball Hall of Fame and the College 
Basketball Hall of Fame, asked to see a game at Duke’s indoor stadium, “he 
was told he could attend if dressed as a waiter.” “ Dixie,” the de facto national 
anthem of the Confederacy, was routinely played at sporting events and the 
Confederate flag was displayed.27
Eleven fraternities and two sororities on the Duke campus had clauses 
in their national constitutions prohibiting Black students from joining. The 
constitution of the Kappa Alpha Order, for example, provided that “no in-
fidel; no person of the religion of a Jew; no person of African or Oriental 
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descent . . .  shall be eligible to membership in the order.” Even when  there 
was no written policy excluding Black members, many Greek organ izations 
required that each pledge obtain a “hometown” or alumnus recommendation 
as a condition of membership.  Others required that the national chapter of 
the fraternity or sorority approve each member of the pledge class.  Either by 
express prohibition or application of  these requirements, the vast majority of 
fraternities and sororities at Duke  were open to white students only.28
In Page Auditorium— Duke’s primary per for mance space— tickets  were 
sold to Black patrons only in a circumscribed mezzanine area. In 1955 the 
campus theater group sought permission to allow Black audiences to attend 
its plays at Page with racially mixed seating. Duke administrators said no.29
As a result,  there was rarely if ever any official interaction between white 
and Black  people on the Duke campus. Black academics visited only infre-
quently and, while on campus,  were required to use scarce segregated toilet fa-
cilities and prohibited from eating in campus dining halls. Among  those who 
had to work  under  these restrictions was John Hope Franklin, who became a 
preeminent Black historian and Presidential Medal of Honor winner. While 
researching his groundbreaking 1947 book From Slavery to Freedom, Franklin 
was not permitted to use the public rest rooms on campus.30
Leading Black theologian J. Deotis Roberts learned of Duke’s restrictive 
racial policies when, in 1951, he inquired about attending a summer research 
program on campus on the topic of “Chris tian ity and the Law.” Beach, one 
of the codirectors of the program, responded belatedly to Roberts, explain-
ing that his delay was “due to the necessity . . .  to clear with the University 
administration as to the policies which we  will need to observe for you as a 
negro, should you still be  free and able to come.” Beach reported that while 
all the library facilities, carrel space, and research facilities would be fully 
available to Roberts, “the question of housing and dining facilities has rep-
resented an awkward point.” Beach advised Roberts that, should he come 
to Duke over the summer, “it would be necessary to ask you to make your 
own housing arrangements in Durham,” since the campus dorms  were for 
white residents only. As to the “borderline question of dining facilities,” 
Roberts was told that his campus dining options would be  limited to “vari-
ous snack bars around campus . . .  open for general trade” and lunches in 
the faculty dining room. The segregated university dining halls would be 
off- limits. Beach concluded by assuring Roberts that the limitations “in no 
sense should incon ve nience you or hamper your full participation in the 
program.”31
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Segregation also extended beyond campus. A “restrictive covenant” in the 
deeds for home lots in Duke Forest made available by the university to faculty 
and administrators prohibited the sale, transfer, lease, or rental of the parcel 
to “persons of Negro blood.” The deed included a clarifying “proviso” that the 
restrictive covenant “ shall not be construed to prevent the living upon the 
premises of any Negro servant or servants whose time  shall be employed for 
domestic purposes only.”32
Segregation in off- campus activities was an accepted part of university life. 
University organ izations, including academic departments, fraternities, so-
rorities, and student clubs, routinely held school- related functions at the seg-
regated Hope Valley Country Club. Membership in Hope Valley, the premier 
country club in the area, was highly valued. A list published in 1967 showed 
that many Duke administrators and faculty belonged to the club; moreover, 
the university reimbursed some of its se nior officers for membership dues.33
Consistent with all of this was Duke’s treatment of its Black employees. 
The workers “ were treated as sub- humans,” Harvey recalled. “You worked 
 there ten and twenty years [and] if the supervisor  didn’t like you, he’d tell 
you he  didn’t need you anymore.  People  were absolutely afraid. . . .  I never 
worked at a place as bad as Duke or as racist. You talk about slavery, it was 
absolutely so at Duke  because  people almost had to beg to keep their jobs 
when they  were the least  little aggressive.” Like many  others, Harvey had a 
pointed way of referring to this paternalistic employment structure in which 
the university held unchecked power over the working lives of its nonaca-
demic employees and paid, at best, subsistence wages. “It was,” he said, “a 
plantation system.”34
Duke’s treatment of its all- Black  house keeping staff reflected this same 
mentality. Through the mid-1960s, Duke employed a team of maids respon-
sible for “preparing” the rooms of undergraduate men Monday through Satur-
day during the semester. Work involved routine cleaning tasks such as making 
beds and emptying trash. “Maids would wash win dows, get up on ladders 
and wash walls,” Harvey recalled. In addition to moving dressers and turning 
mattresses, maids “would help carry light furniture and baggage from one 
area to another one.” Working daily from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., each maid 
was responsible for up to thirty- two beds, they  were prohibited from eating 
or drinking on the job, and they had access to only  limited rest room facilities 
near the vari ous  house keepers’ offices.  These rest rooms  were marked with a 
sign stating “Colored  Women.” In keeping with Jim Crow codes of be hav-
ior, maids, as well as other Black workers at Duke,  were required to address 
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students as “mister” or “miss.” Students, in turn, would call  these workers by 
their first names.35
The workload was often overwhelming, especially  after the findings of an 
“efficiency” study conducted for the university in 1966  were implemented. 
“Just too much work for any person to do in five hours time,” one maid com-
mented. “It rushes me too hard trying to do this work,” another said.36
Even more problematic, Duke’s maids, like the university’s Black janitors 
and other ser vice workers, received poor wages.  There was a “plantation- type 
mentality in  labor relations” at Duke, A. Kenneth Pye, dean of the law school, 
pointed out, where “ people  were terribly underpaid.” The “old way of  running 
Duke,” he explained, “was you hired ten Blacks to do the job of two and you 
paid them a tenth of what they should be paid.”  Under this system, Duke’s 
maids  were paid $0.43 per hour in 1951. By the start of 1959, the hourly amount 
was $0.65 per hour, earning maids a paycheck of $19.50 for a standard thirty- 
hour work week. By 1965, wages increased to an average of $0.85 per hour, 
far below the federal minimum wage of $1.25. Maids “had to go from  house 
to  house and clean up for white folks to survive,” Harvey recalled, “or  else 
they went on welfare.” Duke’s all- Black janitorial staff fared  little better. As 
of January 1966, Duke’s highest- paid janitor earned $2,808 per year, almost 
$200 below the poverty threshold. “In addition to low wages,” Harvey recalled, 
Duke’s nonacademic employees “had hardly any fringe benefits at all. No holi-
days, no sick leave.” Maids and janitors could be asked to work more than 
forty hours per week at their supervisor’s discretion and received no increase 
in hourly wage for “overtime” hours. Making  matters even worse, through the 
mid-1960s, Duke’s ser vice employees had almost no recourse to address job- 
related grievances. As the Carolina Times, Durham’s Black newspaper, wrote 
in 1959, Black nonacademic employees at Duke effectively found themselves 
in “peonage.”37
Given how entrenched Jim Crow segregation was at Duke, any change in 
the university’s racially exclusive admissions policy would not come easily. 
At least through 1957, a majority of the university’s trustees supported seg-
regation. All but a handful of trustees  were from the South, affiliated with 
the Methodist Church, and alumni of Duke. A substantial number had been 
serving on the board since the 1920s. Growing up in the Jim Crow South, 
Beach noted, many trustees had a “habit . . .  of accepting the pattern of po-
lite, not vicious, segregation in education, in po liti cal affairs, [and] in cultural 
affairs.” Klopfer agreed, commenting that segregation was “consistent with 
the value systems many trustees grew up with.” The university had “a long, 
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inherited, established practice of accepting segregation,” explained Robert E. 
Cushman, dean of the divinity school, and  there was “an inertia that had to 
be overcome.”38
 Those who favored desegregation at Duke faced the challenge not only of 
changing the votes of trustees but of  doing so  under a decision- making pro-
cess requiring civility and consensus. In his book Civilities and Civil Rights: 
Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black Strug gle for Freedom, historian Wil-
liam H. Chafe explained that civility— “courtesy, concern about an associate’s 
 family,  children, and health, a personal grace that . . .  obscures conflict with 
foes”— was the cornerstone of the “progressive mystique” that defined racial 
attitudes in North Carolina. For Chafe, civility was “a way of dealing with 
 people and prob lems that made good manners more impor tant than substan-
tial action.”  Because of the importance of civility, North Carolina progressives 
believed that “conflict is inherently bad, that disagreement means personal 
dislike, and that consensus offers the only way to preserve a genteel and civi-
lized way of life.” Since conflict “ will permanently rend the fragile fabric of 
internal harmony,” Chafe explained, “pro gress can occur [on  matters such as 
race] only when every one is able to agree— voluntarily—on an appropriate 
course of action.”39 The requirement that a consensus favoring desegregation 
emerge on the board before any change in policy could occur  shaped Duke’s 
consideration of the issue over many years. It also gave  those who favored the 
status quo a strong platform from which to resist change.
The 1950s saw no change in Duke’s racially exclusive admissions policy. Ap-
proached by external constituencies seeking a change during this period, 
Edens simply counseled patience. When urged in 1953 by Methodist minister 
and Duke alumnus Bill Wells to desegregate “in the name of Jesus Christ!” 
Edens responded, “It is difficult to judge the proper timing in the hesitant 
steps of social pro gress.” He cautioned that “a University is a highly complex 
organ ization and changes in pattern of thought and activity  will have to come 
slowly.” Alumna Helen Morrison also urged a change in policy in 1953. The 
Duke president replied, “It would be impossible for me to predict how soon a 
change  will take place.” Identifying himself as a “gradualist,” Edens told Mor-
rison that it was his “firm conviction that Duke University can and should 
admit negroes only when the community and constituency are prepared for 
it”—an example of the power of civility and the “progressive mystique.”40
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While Edens gave  little indication to external constituencies that Duke’s 
restrictive admissions policy was a topic of discussion, the gears on desegre-
gation had in fact started to move. The issue was raised initially in 1948 when 
divinity school students presented a resolution asking that the school consider 
desegregating. Welcoming the “fellowship, stimulation, and fuller Christian 
cooperation” that would exist if “Negro students  were to join us in our com-
mon Christian study,” the students put forth a “request” that  those in charge 
of the school give “serious consideration” to the admission of Black students 
to the divinity school “without affecting the general university policy.” Other 
petitions, expressing what  future provost R. Taylor Cole described as a “Chris-
tian concern for the segregation policy,”  were presented in 1949 and 1951.41 
Still, no action was taken.
Through the 1950s, trustee opposition to desegregation remained strong. 
Barney Jones recalled that “the generally conservative and provincial outlook 
of the Board was nowhere more evident than in its studied, southern- styled 
avoidance of the integration issue.” The board, according to Jones, was “de-
termined to keep Negroes out of the university—at least as long as pos si ble.” 
Edens shared this view of the board, telling Cole,  after discussions with key 
trustees, that desegregation faced “the determined opposition of a large ma-
jority of the Trustees.”42
In late 1956, a group of students wrote letters directly to board mem-
bers advocating for desegregation. One such letter was written to trustee 
Edwin L. Jones by undergraduate Anne Corpening. She expressed the hope 
that Jones would “keenly feel the necessity of revising, as quickly as pos si ble,” 
racial policies that “speak of intolerance, retrogression and moral indiffer-
ence.” The response Jones sent to Corpening shows just how unima ginable 
he found the prospect of desegregation to be. Stating that Corpening’s letter 
“could be answered intemperately,” Jones instead responded by raising “a 
few questions.”
1. Should the Trustees of Duke University permit conditions at Duke 
that are not permitted in the homes of the students who comprise the stu-
dent body of Duke?
2. Do your  father and  mother practice social and racial equality with the 
Negroes in your home?
3. Why should Duke discriminate against the qualified white students 
who are clamoring to get into Duke University so as to admit Negroes who 
would create prob lems, prob ably impossible to solve?
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4.  Aren’t the Trustees charged with the responsibility  toward white stu-
dents for whom the University was founded?
5. Why should the Trustees begin to practice discrimination against the 
white race?
In Jones’s opinion, Duke had been founded to serve the needs of white stu-
dents. Desegregation meant social equality between the races. This would be 
unthinkable in any Duke  family home and amounted to reverse discrimina-
tion against the “white race.”43
In early 1957, divinity school students published a petition addressed directly 
to the board requesting that the school’s racially restrictive admissions policy be 
eliminated. Although he knew he did not have a consensus, Edens de cided that 
the time had come for the trustees to go on rec ord on desegregation. To but-
tress the case for desegregation, Edens provided the trustees with a letter from 
James Cannon III, dean of the divinity school at the time, who insisted that the 
“standing of the university” would suffer if Duke retained its racially exclusive 
admissions policy. It was an “embarrassment” for a national institution such 
as Duke to be “out of step” with its peer schools, Cannon argued, pointing out 
that its divinity school was one of only two in the South that had not eliminated 
segregation or announced plans to do so. “The prob lem of assimilating the few 
Negroes who would be eligible for admission to the Duke Divinity School,” 
Cannon concluded, “is a minor one compared to the prob lem of further delay.” 
On this basis, Edens asked for “discretionary authority . . .  to admit negroes to 
the Divinity School if and when properly qualified applicants should apply.”44
In response, the board voted to keep the divinity school segregated. When 
the newspapers reported the trustees’ action, Edens received multiple letters. 
“I wish to commend you and your Board for the stand you have taken with 
reference to admitting negroes to the Divinity School,” Whiteville, North 
 Carolina, attorney J. Bruce Eure commented. “The races are separate and dis-
tinct and should stay that way.” E. J. Burns, a member of the Duke class of 
1927 and law school gradu ate in 1929, was “delighted” that “no Negroes  will be 
admitted to Duke Divinity School.” Again, racial mixing was the key concern. 
“It seems so unnecessary and unwise that our young white and negro students 
be mixed up socially and in our educational institutions,” he commented, ex-
pressing his desire “to send my  daughter to Duke . . .  provided we can keep 
Duke for the white students.”45
The volatility of the race issue became even clearer at the racially mixed 
North Carolina Mock Student Legislature meeting in November 1957. At the 
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opening of the two- day session, the student del e ga tion from Duke’s  Woman’s 
College proposed to rescind laws prohibiting racial intermarriage in North 
Carolina. The bill passed the legislature, which drew harsh criticism from 
North Carolina congressman Harold Cooley. “I do not know of anything that 
has happened in the Student Bodies of the vari ous colleges of this State that 
has aroused as much unfavorable criticism as that bill,” Duke trustee P. Huber 
Hanes Jr. wrote to Edens. “I cannot conceive of any self- respecting young girl 
being a party to endorsing a bill of that kind.” T. Conn Bryan, a double Duke 
gradu ate, told Edens that the resolutions, even if proposed in jest, “are abhor-
rent to everyone who has even a modicum of personal and racial self-re spect.” 
Another alumnus told the Duke president that several of his friends “who 
now have  daughters at Duke have ‘blown their tops’ to me and have been so 
incensed that they have threatened to take their  children out of school.”46
In response to the furor, Edens wrote a low- key letter to the trustees and 
faculty to defuse the situation. While “sorry the incident occurred,” the Duke 
president saw it as part of students with “immature and half- reasoned ideas 
and actions” growing up.47
 After the February 1957 board vote on desegregating the divinity school, 
Edens ceased any further efforts to address desegregation with the board. 
Edens had concluded, Cole recounted, that “moral suasion . . .  would not 
move [the board]  toward gradual desegregation.” He knew where the board 
stood and was, according to Barney Jones, “determined that a wedge not be 
driven between himself and his Board.” In fact, Edens soon resigned from the 
Duke presidency following an internal power strug gle involving the Endow-
ment in February 1960. He was replaced on an interim basis in April 1960 by 
J. Deryl Hart, a respected member of the medical school faculty.48
Meanwhile, concern over Duke’s racially restrictive admissions policies 
continued to crystallize on campus. The Duke Chronicle published regular edi-
torials condemning segregation.  Under the headline “Barbaric Tradition,” the 
student newspaper declared in late 1955 that segregation “is anti- democratic, 
anti- Christian, harmful propaganda to the rest of the world and incompat-
ible with the idea of a university.” A growing number of gradu ate and under-
graduate organ izations and faculty joined the divinity school in pressing for a 
change in university policy. In 1959 the Men’s Student Government Associa-
tion and the students and faculty of the Gradu ate School of Arts and Sciences 
pushed publicly for desegregation; and in 1960 law students, students on West 
Campus, and incoming gradu ate students also made known their opposition 
to the school’s racially restrictive admissions policy.49
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When the Duke trustees fi nally voted to end the school’s racially exclusive 
admissions policy in 1961, however, the decision was not made  because of 
pressure from internal or external Duke constituencies. Rather, desegrega-
tion was approved only  after a majority of trustees came to believe that the 
continuation of segregation at Duke would threaten the school’s pro gress and 
block its path to national prominence.
In other words, the primary reason was money, not ideology. Increasingly, 
the federal government and national foundations  were making clear to Duke 
and other southern universities that grants would stop if they refused to admit 
Black students. By the early 1960s, the federal government began to advise 
schools that to be eligible for  future government contracts, private universities 
would be required to have in place nondiscriminatory admissions policies. 
The Ford Foundation and other national philanthropic organ izations also 
made it known that they would limit grants to segregated schools.50 Once 
fully implemented,  these policies would destroy Duke’s aspirations to become 
a leading national research university.
In 1961 Hart determined that opening the university’s gradu ate programs 
to Black students was essential if Duke was to realize its national ambitions. 
To pre sent the case most effectively, Hart directed three se nior university of-
ficers to prepare a memorandum for the board outlining the impact continued 
segregation would have on Duke. The memorandum covered three areas: the 
perception of external constituencies, the impact on the medical school, and 
the consequences, especially on faculty morale, for the rest of the university.
In the memorandum, Cole argued that Duke’s racially restrictive ad-
missions policy had “created barriers to the fullest development of Duke 
University and . . .  resulted in a decline in its prestige.” The university’s 
segregation policy, Cole concluded, “is a major barrier to attaining the na-
tional and international recognition which Duke University deserves.” On 
the impact in the “Medical Area,” Barnes Woodhall, vice provost, listed 
seven potential sources of federal financial support for Duke Medicine. This 
support— totaling $16 million over the “foreseeable  future”— could well be 
jeopardized, he argued, if the university remained segregated. In the final 
section, Marcus E. Hobbs, vice provost, focused on “destruction of the gen-
eral morale” that would occur if Duke failed to address segregation. He pre-
sented a detailed chart showing that the university received approximately 
$7 million in federal grants and contracts from 1959 to 1960, money that 
would be put at risk  unless Duke changed its racial policies. Hart and the 
three university officials asked the trustees to allow Duke’s gradu ate and 
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professional schools to accept “the small number of obviously well- qualified 
Negro applicants.”51
In response, on March 8, 1961, the trustees approved, with no discussion, 
a change in university policy to allow the admission of students to Duke’s 
gradu ate and professional schools “without regard to race, creed or national 
origin.”52 In September of the same year, two Black law students matriculated 
at Duke.53 In June 1962,  after further education and persuasion, the trustees 
voted to desegregate Duke’s undergraduate colleges. Duke’s first Black under-
graduates arrived in September 1963.
This decision achieved the results Hart and  others anticipated. Just  after the 
board voted to desegregate the gradu ate and professional schools, Thomas L. 
Perkins, Duke Endowment chair, wrote to the president of the Ford Founda-
tion, the president of the Car ne gie Foundation, and the vice president of the 
Rocke fel ler Foundation to notify them of the decision. All three responded 
with approval.54
More generally, the board’s changes to Duke’s racially restrictive admis-
sions policies  were widely praised. “The Board of Trustees deserves hearty 
congratulations for its action,” the Duke Chronicle editorialized. It declared 
that in desegregating the gradu ate and professional schools, the trustees had 
“set a commendable example for other Southern institutions and increased 
the University’s prestige from a national standpoint.” The next year, A. T. 
Spaul ding, one of Durham’s most prominent Black leaders and chief execu-
tive of the Black- owned North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Com pany, 
wrote the Duke president to say that the trustees’ decision to desegregate the 
undergraduate schools “marked a monumental milestone along the highway 
of Duke’s history.” The step “ will be looked upon as a reckoning point in the 
years ahead,” he asserted, and “a point of reference in mea sur ing Duke’s  future 
pro gress and achievement at an ever accelerating rate.”55
Without diminishing the significance of the board’s actions, three points 
about desegregation are impor tant to note in order to understand what was 
to occur. First, as at other private hwcus such as Emory, Rice, Tulane, and 
Vanderbilt, the decision to desegregate was not voluntary. While Bunyan S. 
Womble, university board chair, wrote at the time that the decision to admit 
Black students “did not come as a result of any pressure or petitions, but only 
 after careful and intense consideration over the past few months,” the real ity 
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was quite diff er ent. In fact, Womble himself wrote a fellow board member 
that “if we had been  free to follow our own inclinations many of us would not 
have favored the change.”  After private meetings with a group of trustees in 
Charlotte and Winston- Salem discussing gradu ate school desegregation, Hart 
reported to Womble: “I believe they hated to see it come, . . .  and although it 
was contrary to what they had hoped would be the case they would go along 
with it.” One trustee told Cole of his profound concern over racial mixing by 
describing a medicine dropper and a glass of  water. If one drop of ink passed 
into the  water, the trustee told Cole, it would color it all. Cushman observed 
that for trustee Edwin Jones, it was “inconceivable” for Duke to seat Black 
and white students in one room. Again, the concern was racial mixing. Jones 
feared the “intermarriage of Black and white,” according to Cushman, “more 
than anything  else.” Woodhall was told by a trustee that his wife would leave 
him if he voted in  favor of desegregation.56
Second, desegregation was not approved  because of moral or  human con-
cerns but due to the adverse consequences the university would suffer if seg-
regation  were maintained. While Cole on the one hand argued that any claim 
that the desegregation decision was based “exclusively on economic consid-
erations” was “wrong,” he nevertheless agreed that the “economic argument” 
was critical to achieving desegregation “at the earliest pos si ble time.” Noting 
that the board acted to desegregate “on prudential grounds,” Barney Jones 
wrote, “Prob ably one would have to concede that integration at Duke was pro-
voked more by economic than moral considerations. We integrated  because it 
became necessary rather than  because it was right.” Indeed, Jones looked back 
with regret that Duke “did not base our action on higher ground.”57
Fi nally, the board vote to desegregate did not mean that long- standing 
racial attitudes among white leaders at Duke had vanished. If an individual 
viewed white  people as superior prior to the vote to desegregate, this attitude 
almost certainly continued  after the vote. For example, when Womble wrote 
to reassure  those upset by the desegregation decision, he pointed out that the 
relative abilities of Black and white students would mitigate the impact of the 
policy change. “On account of the very high standard of requirements for 
admission, I am sure very few Negroes  will be admitted,” he wrote. “With the 
thousands of white students being turned down each year for lack of space,” 
Womble observed, “I  shall be surprised if any Negroes applying  will possess 
qualifications entitling them to be admitted any time soon.” An unnamed fac-
ulty member struck a similar note, predicting in the Duke Chronicle that “the 
search for a qualified Negro applicant may be more difficult than convincing 
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the Trustees to admit Negroes.”58 Contending with  these attitudes would re-
main a profound challenge.
With the decision to desegregate, Duke had fi nally removed a major ob-
stacle to realizing its national ambitions. With financial support solidifying, a 
strategic plan in place, and the morale of most university constituencies im-
proving, Duke’s leaders had good reason for optimism. Only one further step 
remained to position Duke for rapid growth— se lection of a new president 
to lead the university into the  future. The November 1962 choice of Douglas 
Knight illustrated how far the board was prepared to go to realize its national 
vision.59
Chosen to be president when he was only forty- one, Douglas Maitland Knight 
brought to Duke qualities of mind and spirit that had helped propel his rapid 
rise to the highest levels of academia. By the time he reached Duke, Knight’s 
 career had already combined scholarship, teaching, and college administra-
tion. Although some might won der  whether he was ideally suited to lead a 
large, southern university, none could claim that Knight was not an accom-
plished individual of presidential stature.
Born on June 8, 1921, in Cambridge, Mas sa chu setts, Knight did not have an 
easy childhood as an only child whose  father died when he was five years old. 
Stability was hard to come by for the Knight  family. They moved several times 
a year; indeed, by the time Knight entered ju nior high school, he had attended 
thirteen diff er ent elementary schools. Pushed ahead by school administrators 
who recognized his academic aptitude, Knight entered ju nior high school at 
age ten.60
By the time Knight turned fourteen, a wealthy  family friend arranged for 
him to attend the prestigious Philips Exeter Acad emy in New Hampshire. At 
Exeter, Knight found a “sense of intellectual community [he] had never expe-
rienced before” and within a few months he was “hopelessly in love with the 
place.” Finding that Washington DC, his home at the time, had no “magic” for 
him, Knight cut short his first vacation from Exeter and returned to school 
early. The elite private school had become the place where Knight felt most 
comfortable.61
College and gradu ate school at Yale University soon followed. Knight earned 
his PhD in En glish in 1946 and was immediately appointed to the Yale faculty 
as an En glish instructor. Soon his first book appeared, a scholarly study titled 
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Pope and the Heroic Tradition. Within a  couple of years, he was promoted to 
assistant professor of En glish. A score of scholarly articles soon followed and, 
by the age of thirty, Knight’s  career in academia was well established.62
In 1953 Knight’s professional life changed dramatically when he was cho-
sen to become president of Lawrence College in Appleton, Wisconsin. At 
thirty- two, he was the youn gest college president in the nation. The po-
sition at Lawrence was impor tant, not only for the experience it offered 
Knight but  because of the college’s reputation as the training ground for 
major university presidents. Lawrence boasted a remarkable statistic: in 
the thirty years prior to 1953, eleven of Knight’s pre de ces sors had gone on 
to hold the presidencies of prominent universities, including Brown and 
Harvard.63
Knight spent almost ten years at Lawrence, a school he recalled fondly as 
“that wonderful  little place.” This was a happy time for Knight and his  family. 
He recalled his tenure at Lawrence as “a golden few years in which every-
thing seemed to work.” A college with around 1,100 students and 100 faculty 
members, Lawrence suited Knight perfectly. “ There was the simplicity of the 
administrative structure,” he recalled, “which allowed prob lems to be met inti-
mately and immediately.” In addition, the college’s small size “allowed working 
intimacies of  every sort— often evolving into increasingly close friendships.” 
Although Knight kept up a frenetic pace, he still found time at Lawrence “to 
rejoice in the excitement of all of it, and time to enjoy that texture of activity 
in all its richness.”64
Knight’s tenure at Lawrence proved to be a  great success. During his presi-
dency, the book value of the college’s physical plant increased by 100  percent 
and the value of the school’s endowment by 150  percent. Six major buildings 
 were constructed, and Knight secured the two largest gifts in the 150- year 
history of the college. In the course of his tenure, he also built a national repu-
tation. He served on more than a dozen national committees for education 
and religion, often traveling up to eighty days a year. Given  these accomplish-
ments, it is not surprising that by the early 1960s, Knight was one of the two 
or three college presidents most major universities considered when their 
presidencies came open.  After more than nine years in Appleton, Wisconsin, 
Knight was ready to move on. He expected it of himself, and  others expected 
it of him.65
In 1962 Knight was offered jobs at Duke and Cornell almost si mul ta-
neously. With a strong sense that  there was “something fated and inescapable 
about the choice,” Knight accepted the Duke presidency. Knight found the 
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chance to be a transformational figure at Duke compelling. “Duke, it seemed 
to me,” Knight recalled, “had always played  under its feet rather than over its 
head. It had opportunities . . .  to be much more of a place than it was. . . .  And 
the opportunity that I saw was for the university to push as hard as it could 
and then find out what would happen.”66
Knight’s se lection as Duke president was announced in November 1962. 
But having committed to remaining at Lawrence  until a successor was found, 
he did not arrive in Durham  until August 1963. One can only imagine the 
sense of limitless possibility that Knight— soon to be inaugurated as a major 
university president at only forty- two years of age— must have felt as he and 
his  family “stepped in by station wagon [to Duke] late one August morning, to 
find an official  house crammed with our boxes and furniture.”67
In Knight, Duke had a president with youthful vigor, an Ivy League 
pedigree, and a national reputation that personified its aspirations. Knight’s 
se lection as Duke’s fifth president was met with almost universal acclaim. 
Wright Tisdale, chair of the trustees’ Presidential Search Committee, pre-
dicted that  under Knight’s “warm and inspired leadership . . .  Duke  will 
attain an ever higher and more distinguished position in the educational 
world.” The Duke Chronicle saw Knight as a man who could bring greatness 
to the university. Observing that  there are  those who believe “ there is too 
much nostalgia and re sis tance to change for the South to take the lead in 
intellectual spheres,” the Duke Chronicle found that “the se lection of a man so 
obviously dynamic, who at 41 already has  behind him nine years at the helm 
of a distinguished college, is the greatest single step taken in recent years 
 toward enhancing this university’s position.” Combined with other  factors, 
Knight’s se lection gave Duke the ingredients for a “juvenescence which  will 
soon lead this university to new heights of achievement.” Perkins and Tisdale 
suggested that copies of the Duke Chronicle’s glowing write-up on Knight be 
forwarded to all alumni.68
Knight, in fact, did bring an array of strong qualities to the Duke presi-
dency. He had passion, vision, intellect, tremendous energy, the humanism 
of an En glish professor, and administrative experience gained from his suc-
cessful tenure at Lawrence. Lost in the excitement over Knight’s se lection, 
however,  were aspects of his background that made him, in retrospect, an 
unlikely pick to lead Duke in the early 1960s. For one, Knight was hardly an 
ideal cultural fit for a southern university that had only recently desegregated. 
In 1963 Duke was still very much a conservative southern school and Knight 
was a northern liberal. He was Duke’s first president from outside the South 
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and almost every thing about him— including dress and personal style— spoke 
of the Ivy League, not the Atlantic Coast Conference.69
Knight recalled his  mother telling him “I knew you  were in for trou ble” 
when she saw the Durham paper’s headline describing the new Duke presi-
dent as “Yankee Born and Yale Educated.” Knight wrote, with at least some 
overstatement, that “when the Duke trustees de cided to look outside their 
own region for a president . . .  they  were taking a step as new and contro-
versial as the admission of Black students had been. It called forth some of 
the same reservations, and it would have some of the same disruptive conse-
quences in the turbulent years to come,” he observed.70
Alumni reaction to Knight reflected how geography  shaped  people’s per-
ceptions. Although “looked upon pretty generally in [North Carolina] as a 
villain,” Roger L. Marshall, director of alumni affairs during Knight’s tenure, 
recalled, “he was looked on as a  great leader in other areas,” such as New York 
and California. A fellow guest at a faculty wedding reception at Hope Valley 
Country Club told Knight how one southerner viewed the Duke president. He 
“stood  there in the  middle of a social gathering,” Knight remembered, “and 
said,  ‘I just wanted to tell you that from the first time I met you I knew you 
 weren’t one of us.’ ” Knight found it deeply frustrating that  because he was a 
northerner, some at Duke considered him lacking sufficient commitment to 
traditional values like  family and community. “New En glanders have as much 
a sense of tradition as most folk in the South do,” Knight explained. “I was 
not . . .  in a mood to accept the idea that I would be regarded as an uprooted 
interloper, in short, as a carpetbagger of the 1960s.”71
Some also saw Knight’s religion as an issue. He was a Congregationalist 
leading a school with long- standing ties to the Methodist Church and a board 
of trustees composed almost entirely of Methodists. “It was suggested to me 
by the then chairman of the board that I [change my religion],” Knight re-
membered. “He just said, ‘It’s perfectly easy to do.’ I had to say, ‘But Bunyan, 
I  don’t do that.’ ”72
Given suspicions about Knight’s northern, liberal background, the tim-
ing of his arrival on campus— just weeks before the university’s first Black 
undergraduates enrolled— could hardly have been worse. Feelings on racial 
issues at Duke remained extremely unsettled following the board’s decision 
to desegregate. The arrival of the first Black undergraduates guaranteed that 
race would remain a complex prob lem for the university for years to come. 
“I was joining a university with  great potential stature and a major role to play 
both nationally and in its own quadrant of the country,” Knight explained. He 
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continued, “[Duke] was not equipped, by nature and location, to absorb sud-
den change of any kind, let alone disruptive challenges. Its admission of the 
first Black undergraduates had not yet been digested, nor had the complexity 
of  doing justice to their needs been faced.”73
National and local events also kept race in the spotlight. In the thirteen 
months between Knight’s se lection as Duke president in November 1962 and 
his inauguration in December 1963, George Wallace became governor of Ala-
bama; civil rights protests in Durham escalated dramatically; Medgar Evers 
was assassinated in Jackson, Mississippi; Martin Luther King Jr. delivered his 
“I Have A Dream Speech” to the March on Washington; and President John F. 
Kennedy was assassinated. When racial issues emerged, Knight’s background 
deepened the concerns of some that he was not sufficiently aware of white 
southern racial attitudes and practices. Knight “was not sensitive, he was not 
aware of the real attitudes and ideas and values of the  people in this part of the 
country,” Marshall recalled. Marshall also thought that Knight misread— and 
misunderstood— southern character. “He could see rednecks and lynching 
parties in  every thicket,” Marshall remembered.74
If Knight lacked experience dealing with white southerners on racial issues, 
he also had  limited experience engaging with Black  people. At the start of 
World War II, Knight remembered watching a Black platoon in Glenn Mill-
er’s Air Force Band perform on the Yale campus. Tremendously impressed 
by the group’s “dance- march drill,” Knight deemed onlookers like himself, as 
well as members of the white platoons who performed, “earthbound clods 
by comparison.” But the point of the story for Knight lies in what he did not 
say, think, or even consider— “that this was a segregated unit. . . . I felt myself 
thoroughly emancipated in the  matter of color,” Knight wrote, “while in fact 
I was merely blind to all it meant in barriers or limitations.” Once ensconced 
in university life, Knight’s view of race, like  others in his cohort, remained 
detached and  limited. Knight recalled:
It would be pleasant to write that the American academic community was 
aware of a  great need to educate blacks in the country’s universities and 
that we  were busily devising programs to that end. Of course, such was not 
the case and never had been. . . .  Most of us in northern colleges  were not 
opposed to black students—if they appeared in the normal course of  things 
and  were qualified. We  were not blocking anyone’s entry; we felt comfort-
able about our racial attitudes and the way we implemented them—or not, 
as was the case for most of us.75
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Knight’s tenure at Lawrence provided  little opportunity to advance his 
thinking or sensitivity on  matters of race. While the school admitted its first 
Black students since the 1920s during his tenure,  there  were few conversations 
about them other than a brief encounter with a  couple of se nior trustees who 
asked, “Why  here and why now?”76
Duke’s size may have also challenged Knight’s leadership skills. For one 
 thing, although he had developed a national profile as a successful college 
president, Knight had only nine years of administrative experience when 
he became president of Duke.  Because he made the leap directly from his 
Yale professorship to the Lawrence presidency, Knight never served in lesser 
academic administrative positions, such as dean, provost, or even depart-
ment chair. Knight’s  career had offered him the chance to think a  great deal 
about the nature of liberal education, and he wrote that his convictions on 
this impor tant topic “had reached a high level of coherence during the Law-
rence years.” Knight’s training and experience  were “based in a concept of 
the university and of liberal education totally grounded in mediation, critical 
discourse, civility and the restraint of uncontrolled dogmatism.” He saw uni-
versities as “places of civility and debate rather than insult and confrontation.” 
While  these words may have described Lawrence during his tenure  there, they 
did not describe Duke. Knight did not fully appreciate the difference, and 
he worried some of his new Duke colleagues with his pronouncements that 
the administrative prob lems at Duke “would not be diff er ent [than  those] at 
Lawrence.”77
While Lawrence may have been only a fraction of the size and complex-
ity of Duke, it had been a perfect fit for Knight’s analytical approach. “I had 
treated my Lawrence and Duke relationships in a highly committed and to-
tally personal way,” Knight recounted. “I ignored the po liti cal issues once 
I had made up my mind about the best course of action for myself as the 
servant of the place,” he wrote.78 But Duke, when he arrived, was “a univer-
sity  under stress and also in inevitable transition.”79 Leading a large institu-
tion with many competing constituencies would require a new and diff er ent 
kind of po liti cal skill than he needed at Lawrence. In this context, Knight’s 
approach to Duke was too passive. Knight wrote  later that when conflict 
erupted at Duke in the 1960s, he sought to be “evenhanded” in his treat-
ment of issues and movements, not to “attempt at leading and guiding them. 
As a result,” Knight observed correctly, “the issues themselves provoked ex-
treme responses [and] our own attempts to avoid  these extremes  were largely 
misunderstood.”80
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One person who found Knight’s approach unacceptable was history profes-
sor John W. Cell. Knight was “the wrong man for that time,” Cell contended. 
“He was a leader for an intellectual community [but had] tremendous inse-
curity, [and] lack of confidence, and inability to face a crisis situation. Knight 
wanted to do the right  thing but was indecisive.” Hobbs agreed. Knight “tended 
to be a very agreeable person,” he explained. “Unfortunately, major administra-
tors, sometimes . . .  have to say ‘no’  either pleasantly or indirectly. . . .  That is a 
degree of po liti cal sensitivity” Knight did not have. Robert Ashley, managing 
editor of the Duke Chronicle during the late 1960s, was most succinct. “Tragi-
cally,” he commented, Knight “had none of the skill set to deal with the seismic 
changes that  were shaking society, particularly universities, and particularly 
Duke.”81
Griffith, by 1967 the assistant dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, 
who found Knight “good to work with,” wondered if Duke’s president was not 
simply too sensitive to succeed in the rough and tumble of university admin-
istration. “His happiest moments, I think,  were sitting out  under a tree with a 
class,” Griffith observed. “Doug was . . .  a humanist,” Anlyan commented, and 
“was too gentle a person to deal with the turbulent Sixties.”82
What ever challenges Knight would face, he brought  great confidence to 
his work at Duke. He had a bold vision for the school. The university, Knight 
told a large Found ers’ Day audience days  after being elected president, faced 
an unpre ce dented opportunity. It could, in the years ahead, move from being a 
leading southern educational institution to becoming a premier national uni-
versity. Three reasons made the attainment of national greatness a possibility. 
One was the “tradition of responsible freedom in the university. . . . This we 
do not have to create,” Knight stated, “and we have the rare chance to extend 
it, to use it in the ser vice of  great  causes and high ambitions.” Another was 
the enormous resources Duke had to call upon. “No  great university ever has 
every thing it wants,” Knight acknowledged, but “the fact remains that much 
has been given us, and much  will be expected.” For Knight, Duke’s vast fi-
nancial resources also offered a challenge: “we dare not be satisfied,” Knight 
proclaimed, “ until we are a national force in  every field which legitimately 
concerns us.” The third reason offered by Knight was perhaps the most sig-
nificant. It captured the central contradiction facing Duke and its president 
and mirrored the challenge facing the entire southern region. “It is rare,” the 
president- elect stated, “for a university to be able to draw upon so deep a tradi-
tional knowledge of the humane life and at the same time to be a focus for the 
emerging national strength of a  whole region. . . .  It  will be our  privilege . . .  in 
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the years ahead,” Knight told the Duke community, “to make tradition new as 
no university in the south has done it before.”83
Appropriately, Knight’s vision for Duke encompassed both an emphasis on 
bold new initiatives and a deep re spect for tradition. But many questions re-
mained unanswered. How amenable to change was Duke, given its traditional 
ways? How would the arrival of Black undergraduates and the per sis tence at 
Duke of long- standing racial attitudes and practices complicate the univer-
sity’s efforts to expand its sights? And could it do so without slighting the re-
gion with which it was identified? How effective would Knight be at  handling 
this transformation? Answers to  these questions would begin to unfold even 
as Duke’s first Black undergraduates stepped onto campus in the fall of 1963.
CHAPTER 2
Like Bare Skin and Putting Salt on It
First Encounters
When five Black freshmen entered Duke University in the fall of 1963, it rep-
resented a profound change for the university. For the first time, Duke would 
have Black undergraduates as participants in all aspects of campus academic 
and social life. Significant in its own right, desegregation also required the uni-
versity to address aspects of its racially exclusive past, especially if the school 
 were to move  toward a  future of multiracial equality, ac cep tance, and re spect. 
“You have a Southern way of life,” Black undergraduate William C. Turner Jr. 
explained, “where every body has their place [and] where every thing [is] 
tiered.” For Turner and many  others, the key question was  whether, follow-
ing desegregation,  people would come to Duke to “learn how to . . .  perpetu-
ate this Southern orthodoxy and tiered society. Or,” as Turner asked, would 
Duke become a place “where  people can come and participate in the opening 
of society?”1 The hwcus that  were desegregating throughout the South at this 
time all confronted this central issue.
The first encounters between Duke and its new Black students thus loomed 
large in defining the school’s racial  future. Would  these initial contacts lead to 
greater communication and ac cep tance between white administrators, faculty, 
and students and the new Black students on campus? Or would they serve to 
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reinforce, or even accelerate, historic antagonisms? What  factors would deter-
mine the path the school would follow? A careful look at how Black and white 
students perceived and interacted with each other as they made this historic 
step helps illuminate  these impor tant questions.
Called the “chosen few” by some members of Durham’s Black community, 
the Black students who came to Duke during the early years of desegregation 
shared a common background. Almost all  were from the South. Born in the 
1940s and early 1950s,  these students had spent their childhoods in segre-
gated communities. As Turner noted, the first Black students at Duke “grew 
up in an all- Black setting. . . .  We came up in all- Black churches, all- Black 
schools, all- Black communities— all- Black every thing,” he said. Growing up 
in this environment,  family, school, and church helped determine one’s sense 
of self- worth and advancement. In rural Ayden, North Carolina, “the entire 
Black community was united,” law student Charles L. Becton recalled. “It was 
a  family.  People would always call your  mother or your parents if you  were not 
 doing what you  were supposed to be  doing. The teachers would spank you and 
call your parents and you would get spanked again.  People  were looking out 
for each other  because no one in the white community at that time . . .  cared 
much about Black youth.”2
The first Black students at Duke grew up in “protective Black commu-
nities,” Brenda E. Armstrong explained, “that had [an] incredible history 
[and  people who] demonstrated by example the dignity that our ances-
tors had been able to call on to . . .  convince themselves that they  were real 
 people and they  were good  people.” Armstrong learned that history from 
her  father, Dr. Wiley “Army” Armstrong, a prominent Rocky Mount, North 
Carolina, physician and civic leader. Driving to the country to see patients, 
Dr. Armstrong would take his  daughter along. Only three generations re-
moved from emancipation, he taught his  daughter during  these long car 
rides about Black history in North Carolina and shared stories about the 
courage, resiliency, and faith of their  family. He told “ these stories with 
such passion,” Armstrong recalled. “Even though I was young, I never for-
got them.” When she talked to her friends at Duke, Armstrong found that 
“they had the same experiences.” Almost all had learned about their ances-
tors and their  people through power ful stories communicated by  family 
members.3
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Janice Williams, a Black undergraduate at Duke in the late 1960s, learned 
of the courage and stoicism of her great- great- grandmother: “My grand-
mother told us the story [of] her grand mother. She had been a slave.  Because 
she would not cry when she was whipped, the slave master cut her thumb off. 
So what she did, was slung her thumb, and the blood, and walked off, and still 
did not cry.” “The moral you got,” Williams remembered, was “ ‘ You’re gonna 
be beat,  you’re gonna be strong, and you are not gonna cry.’ ” For Michael R. 
McBride, hearing the price his  father paid for refusing to follow dehuman-
izing Jim Crow codes of be hav ior had a power ful impact. McBride’s  father 
was a county agent for the segregated farmer’s extension ser vice in Alabama. 
“I resented that my  father had to flee Alabama when my  mother was pregnant 
with me,” McBride recounted, “ because he  wouldn’t say ‘Yes Ma’am’ to a white 
 woman who handed him his checks. I came to Duke with that resentment.” 
While in college, Turner was told by his  father about the brutality his great- 
grandfather suffered based on the false claim that he had  violated Jim Crow 
social norms. He was lynched in Person County, Turner was told,  after being 
accused of consorting with a white  woman. “Social mixing was not a  thing to 
be done in the pre– Civil Rights South,” Turner explained, “on pain of losing 
your life.”4
When learning about their ancestors, Duke’s first Black students heard 
about the paramount importance  these men and  women placed on the value 
of education. This focus became apparent immediately following emancipa-
tion. “Virtually  every account by historians or con temporary observers,” his-
torian James D. Anderson commented, “stresses the ex- slaves’ demand for 
universal schooling.” “To a school official in  Virginia, trying to convey his 
thoughts about the freedmen’s enthusiasm for education,” historian Leon F. 
Litwack wrote, “the phrase ‘anxious to learn’ was insufficient; ‘they are crazy to 
learn,’ . . .  as if their very salvation depended on it.” “Few  people who  were not 
right in the midst of the scenes,” Booker T. Washington observed, “can form 
any exact idea of the intense desire which the  people of my race showed for 
education. . . .  Few  were too young, and none too old, to make the attempt to 
learn.” “If I nebber does do nothing more while I live,” one freedman declared, 
according to Litwack, “I  shall give my  children a chance to go to school, for I 
considers education next best ting to liberty.”5
The passion felt by freed slaves for education did not arise externally from 
white philanthropists, northern missionaries, or federal government largesse. 
In fact, as historian Herbert G. Gutman observed, “the ex- slaves’ educational 
movement was rooted deeply within their own communal values.” Ex- slaves 
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“have within themselves,” Freedmen’s Bureau superintendent John Alvord 
wrote in July 1866, “a vitality and hope, coupled with patience and willing-
ness to strug gle, which foreshadows with certainty their higher education as a 
 people in the coming time.” Even as early as 1866, Alvord could see “that the 
incipient education universally diffused as it is, has given  these  whole four 
millions an impulse onward never to be lost. They are becoming conscious of 
what they can do, of what they ultimately can be. . . .  Self reliance is becoming 
their pride as it is their responsibility.”6
Passion for education in the Black community endured, even as Jim Crow 
policies and practices became entrenched throughout the South. “When the 
lights went out in the 1890s,” theologian Samuel DeWitt Proctor wrote, “when 
the po liti cal currents swirled against black pro gress, . . .  hope still bloomed 
within the black community. We learned that the key to the  future was educa-
tion. Somehow we believed that we, too, could bloom, darkness notwithstand-
ing.” Faith was the key. Proctor’s grand mother, who was born into slavery, 
possessed “intrepid confidence,” he said, that “rested on a  simple uncompli-
cated notion: God created all  people; any inequalities among us  were due to 
unequal opportunity.” From his grand mother, Proctor learned that “hatred 
and vindictiveness  were always destructive. ‘No use fretting or crying,’ ” he 
recalled her saying. “ ‘If you do your part, God  will do the rest.’ ” Elders “spoke 
to us  children in the subjunctive mood,” Proctor recollected. “Not what is, but 
what may be, when our faith flowered into real ity.”7
The values embraced and transmitted through the generations by their 
forebears  were reflected in the communities where Duke’s first Black students 
grew up. Education was of primary importance. We  were fortunate, Arm-
strong wrote, to attend “strong but segregated primary and secondary educa-
tion systems” defined by “caring, protective, high- achiever teachers.” Teach-
ers  were “always supportive and encouraging,” Becton remembered. “ Every 
teacher I had cared about us and what we could become.” Many of the schools 
 these students attended covered grades 1 through 12 and traced their roots 
to private academies established for Black students during Reconstruction 
throughout the South. Even in the 1950s, Turner explained, “ these schools 
operated in the shadow of Reconstruction.”8
Mary Mitchell Harris and Nathaniel White Jr., two of the five Black 
students in the first class  after Duke desegregated, attended Hillside High 
School in Durham. Tracing its roots to the Whitted School, founded in 1887, 
Hillside was the only Black high school in Durham. Parents, grandpar-
ents, other relatives, and members of the community had also attended the 
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school. “The  people in my church, the  people in my community,” Hillside 
alumna Minnie Forte explained, “ were all Hillside gradu ates. My dentist, 
my doctor and my pediatrician  were all Hillside High gradu ates. [Hillside 
was] intertwined with every thing I knew.” “ There was not a Black student 
in Durham who did not know every body,” Hillside gradu ate and language 
teacher Jeanne Lucas remembered: “We knew  every community,  every stu-
dent,  every neighborhood, most of the families. . . .  We knew every body 
who went to  every church, so  there was the community neighborhood. . . . 
The teacher, the church, the community and the home [ were] so connected 
that you  couldn’t fail.”9
Despite the fact that Hillside used hand- me- down books from the all- white 
Durham High School and lacked the financial resources of other schools, its 
students never doubted the quality of their education. “I never felt inferior,” 
Forte recalled. “I knew that I was getting the best education that was avail-
able to me. . . .  I  wasn’t worried about  going to college and I  wasn’t worried 
about the sat exam. . . .  I knew that I was well equipped to do what ever I 
wanted to do.” This confidence came from the Hillside teachers. To ensure that 
they knew  every student and  every  family, Hillside teachers visited the home 
of  every student before the school year began. “If they had 150 kids,” Lucas 
explained, “they would visit 150 homes.” The message that Hillside students 
received from  these teachers, according to Forte, was that “you could be all 
that you wanted to be,  there  were no limits. . . .  There  were  people [at Hillside] 
that would help you gain and rise to what ever level you wanted to go, regard-
less of your resources and your background.” Hard work was the key. “One of 
the  things [the teachers] said,” Jacqueline Williams, a 1965 Hillside gradu ate, 
recalled, “is that the white man’s skin color was  going to get him over so you 
as a Black person had to work twice as hard.”10
Teachers taught students, Hillside gradu ate Sterlin Holt recounted, that “as 
African Americans, we come from a long history of achievements . . .  against 
a lot of odds and a lot of adversity.” Lucas explained that Hillside “protected, 
educated, nurtured, prepared, groomed— oversaw— the total growth of stu-
dents.”  Because the pastor in her church was committed to seeing Hillside 
students in his congregation go to college, virtually all did so.  Doing so re-
quired  great sacrifice. “Even though our parents  were maids and dry- cleaning 
 people,” Lucas recounted, “worked for the university professors, [ were] fac-
tory  people, they borrowed money from the bank to educate us.” “We  were 
all poor,” she reflected, “but we knew that we  were  going to have a college 
education.”11
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The teachers in the schools  these Black students attended  were extraordi-
nary. “We grew up in segregated times,” George Creed, a childhood friend of 
White, explained. “The big advantage for students was [no  matter] how much 
education a person had, about the best you could do was be a teacher.  Because 
our smartest  people could not do anything  else,” he described, “they taught 
us.” “ You’ve got folk all over the South with PhDs and master’s degrees [teach-
ing] in the Black high schools,” Turner recalled. “So you have the best teachers 
in the Black schools.”  These teachers, Williams explained, stressed not only 
strong academics but also a specific life philosophy. “That philosophy,” she 
recounted, “was that in order to be Black and to achieve,  you’ve got to be bet-
ter than the next person.”12
Armstrong, who came to Duke in 1965 as a member of the third class of 
Black undergraduates, attended Booker T. Washington High School in Rocky 
Mount, North Carolina. Tracing its history back to the Rocky Mount Graded 
School for Colored  Children that started in 1901, Booker T. Washington High 
School opened as a separate high school fa cil i ty for Black students in 1927. 
Although its resources and regular weekday curriculum  were not on a par 
with the white high school in Rocky Mount, Booker T. Washington students 
knew they  were getting an excellent education. The tone was set at the start of 
the school day. “The teachers met us as we walked into school,” gradu ate Otis 
Cooper described. “They  were  there to help and set the tone each morning 
when we arrived.”  Because school board rules required that courses in Black 
schools be taught at only a basic level, teachers found ways to compensate. 
Most remarkable was a “Saturday Acad emy.” Armstrong explained:
What we could not be legally taught Monday through Friday, we  were 
taught on Saturday. . . .  Living about 70 miles from Raleigh, [we would 
pool our money so] we could go to the state capitol, museums, concerts. 
We even went over to the University of North Carolina campus to see what 
the possibilities  were. . . .  Even though the school board  wouldn’t let them 
teach the  things we needed during the week, they taught us on Saturday. 
And nobody complained.
“Who would ever think,” Armstrong asked, “that  people who worked five days 
a week in a substandard fa cil i ty would come back on Saturday to create . . .  a 
Saturday Acad emy?”13
Teachers at Booker T. Washington  were deeply involved in their students’ 
lives. “They  were part of our life at home,” John H. Perry recalled. “They 
knew our parents and they knew us outside of the classroom.” “Teachers 
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visited our  houses,” gradu ate Tolokun Omokunde remembered. “I would 
go home and the teachers would be sitting at the kitchen  table— eating up 
my peach cobbler!” This caring was expressed in myriad ways. If a daily as-
signment was not finished, Guion C. Davis would meet his teacher at her 
 house and together they would complete the work. “She would feed me just 
to make certain that I was cared for,” Davis recalled. “The teachers did what 
they had to do.” Another teacher would give any needy student money and 
send them “downtown to buy what ever you needed.” Teachers  were role 
models. “They built a strong  family among us,” Delores  Battle Powell ex-
plained. “We respected them and they respected us.” Being a “ family” meant 
students looked out for each other. “If  there was a student who was not 
 doing well, [fellow students] would come together as a group to help,” re-
counted Helen Mercer Dixon. “And while we  were helping one another, we 
 were learning from one another.”14
Booker T. Washington High School had a lasting impact on its students. 
Teachers communicated that Booker T. Washington students  were as good as 
anyone. Although “some said our education was ‘substandard,’ ” Armstrong 
pointedly recalled, “we knew our education was not substandard . . .  because 
of the adaptations that the communities we came from made. . . .  The kids in 
the public and private schools that  were segregated—we had the same educa-
tion, we just had to go about it a diff er ent way.”15
What was not addressed at school  were the increasingly dramatic chal-
lenges the civil rights movement was making in the South to segregation and 
other aspects of Jim Crow. Otis Cooper recalled that while his teachers cer-
tainly knew what was happening in the United States, “they  couldn’t speak 
out against the system for fear of losing their jobs.” Instead, teachers “worked 
within the system” teaching students to navigate a segregated world.” The 
teachers instilled strength,” Cooper remembered. “We knew of the injustices 
and  were prepared to face an unjust society.” One teacher told Omokunde 
that education “would get [him] through anything— even Jim Crow.” Looking 
back, Omokunde said, “she was right.”16
It was at home that the most direct discussions of social injustice and so-
cial change occurred. Lenora Bradley’s teachers did not talk about segregation 
much in class, “ because we learned that at home. Our parents  were teaching 
us what to do out in society. The teachers and parents  were working together.” 
For Armstrong, home was a place of intense focus on civic  matters. Deeply 
involved in the voting rights movement,  unions, and the Black churches in 
Rocky Mount, her parents made the civil rights movement a constant topic 
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of conversation. And Armstrong’s exposure was not  limited to  family discus-
sions, however frequent and intense. “Every thing they did, and everywhere 
they went, they took the  children.”17
On November 27, 1962, Martin Luther King Jr. visited Rocky Mount and 
spoke to a crowd of almost two thousand  people in a packed Booker T. Wash-
ington gymnasium. At the time, Armstrong’s  father was vice president of the 
Rocky Mount Voters and Improvement League— the organ ization sponsoring 
King’s visit to Rocky Mount. In the late after noon, Armstrong’s  father told her, 
“ ‘I’ve got a meeting to go to, and I want you to come with me. I want you to sit 
and listen.’ ” The meeting was with King and a handful of other attendees. At 
the meeting, King’s speech that eve ning and the upcoming March on Wash-
ington  were discussed. Armstrong had a chance to shake King’s hand. “This is 
history,” her dad told her. She told her  mother  later in the eve ning, “I’m never 
 going to wash my hand again.”18
Armstrong’s  father was seated on the dais  behind King during the speech. 
Before  going on the platform, he found the tallest person he could and asked 
if his  daughter could sit on his shoulders. King’s speech that evening— “Facing 
the Challenge of a New Age”— was notable  because it was among the early 
times he used “I have a dream” as a cadence in his talk. In the speech, King 
noted the many young  people in the audience and implored them to be ready 
to take advantage of the changes happening around them.
Opportunities are coming to us,  today’s young  people, that did not come 
to our  mothers and  fathers. The  great challenge is to prepare ourselves in 
order to be ready to face  these challenging opportunities. . . .  We must 
work hard. We must realize that  because of conditions of oppression . . .  we 
may have to work a  little harder than other  people. . . .  A challenge comes 
to us to do a good job. And to do that job so well that the living, the dead, 
or the unborn,  couldn’t do it better.
For Armstrong, propped on a man’s shoulders, the speech was a “transforma-
tive moment.” Even at thirteen, her  family, her church, her school, and her 
community had prepared her to take in King’s words. Looking back, Arm-
strong realized that she grew up “in the presence of geniuses,  people who 
figured out how to compensate for the viciousness of racism. And not to be 
so angry that it made us angry. It made us proud.  Because they  were able to 
use their genius to make  things available to us. Every thing they said to us was 
couched in ‘ you’re  going to have opportunities that we  didn’t have and you are 
not  going to waste  those opportunities.’ ”19
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Five years  later, Armstrong was off to college. Like the other Black students 
at Duke, she was sent to college by her  family, teachers, church, and commu-
nity to take her place as one of the “most successful, well- exposed, ambitious, 
and focused group of  people to benefit from the earliest successes of the civil 
rights era.”20
The Black students matriculating at Duke in the early 1960s benefited 
richly from the strong families, schools, and communities that produced 
them. All  were among the most gifted students at their schools, each with 
excellent grades, strong sats, and impressive rec ords of leadership. Many 
 were National Merit or Achievement scholars. “The [Black students] who 
came . . .  were go- getters,” Becton recounted. “They  were all hard workers. 
 There  were no ‘legacy admits’— people who came  because their parents 
went [to Duke] and think they can just sail through.” R. Taylor Cole, the 
Duke provost, told the board that the five Black undergraduates admitted 
for the fall of 1963 “would have merited admission to almost any college or 
university in this country.” A good example was Wilhelmina M. Reuben, 
who arrived at Duke as one of the first Black undergraduates in 1963, hav-
ing completed high school ranked at the top of her class. Her  father was 
the president of Morris College in Sumter, South Carolina, and her  mother 
was on the faculty. Gene Kendall was recruited by mit and Prince ton but 
came to Duke  because he got a full scholarship. Kendall’s community was 
“ecstatic” when he chose Duke. A superb student, Brenda C. Brown was 
one of the first Black students to desegregate the public high schools of 
Greensboro, North Carolina, in 1963. Brown came to Duke  because her 
high school guidance counselor advised her not to. “He had a fit,” Brown 
recounted. “He said, ‘If you go, you’ll flunk out.’ ” Brown, who graduated 
from Duke  after only three and a half years, responded, “If I flunk out, I’ll 
have done what I could do, so I’m  going.” Turner attended high school in 
Henrico County,  Virginia, where he was a standout student and athlete. 
Although Turner had planned on attending a historically Black college like 
Howard, Morgan, or  Virginia State, he ended up at Duke, he explained, 
 because the math teacher and football coach who had “cultivated and 
trained” him “put the application in my hand. He got it. He had it. And 
he told me to fill it out,” Turner remembered. “And he had made such an 
investment in me I would do anything he told me to do.” Armstrong, who 
arrived at Duke in 1966, was a National Merit Scholar and a finalist for the 
university’s prestigious Angier B. Duke scholarship. Accepted at Michigan 
and Radcliffe, her first preference was to go to a historically Black university 
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such as Shaw or Meharry. She came to Duke  because it was her  father’s 
preference and to be close to home.21
Duke’s first Black students arrived at the school having prepared for a 
unique historical moment. “You . . .  had a generation of elders around you 
[that] . . .  were uncanny in their prescience, their knowledge of the times,” 
Turner explained. “They knew that  things  were  going to change— had to 
change. . . .  They had a sense of what time it was in history.” Turner and 
his colleagues  were among a cadre of young men and  women from segre-
gated communities in the South who  were ready to take advantage when 
doors started to open. “It was in the atmosphere,” Turner recalled, “the way 
you  were nurtured and trained and counseled and advised. It’s not some-
thing that we sat around and talked about,” he remembered. “It’s just the 
way we had been groomed . . .  just been formed, developed, and  shaped that 
way.”  These students entered college  under the weight of  great expectations. 
“When I went to Duke,” Joyce A. Hobson described, “I went with the bless-
ing and the responsibility of the  whole community. Personal advancement 
was what I sought to do,” she recalled, “but it was very closely linked with 
advancement for my entire race.” “We  were  there,” Constance Jackson Car-
ter recounted, “to allow students  after us to go to schools wherever they 
wanted to.” Asked why he and other Black students chose to come to Duke 
in the first wave of desegregation, Turner explained that it had to do with 
the notion of “responsibility to your race. . . .  You do it for your  mother, your 
 father, your  people, your community, your church. This is your duty.”  These 
talented students arrived at Duke, Armstrong observed, “with the purpose 
to take our places as the next generation of Black leaders.”22
For most of the Black students arriving at Duke in the early 1960s, the adjust-
ment to campus life was extremely difficult. Turner recalled  going from the 
all- Black setting of his precollege years to the “complete antithesis” at Duke 
as “almost as complete a shock as you can encounter.” Even though he grew 
up in Durham just four miles from Duke, White had no frame of reference 
once he got on campus. “ There was no relationship,” he said. “It was complete 
discovery. I  can’t express . . .  how much the town that I lived in as Durham and 
the town that I moved to as Duke  were such separate enterprises.” “The expe-
rience was surreal,” Mary Mitchell Harris, another Black student who grew up 
in Durham, explained. “It was like another world altogether.”23
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This is not to say that  every Black student arriving at Duke in the early 
1960s experienced campus life in the same way. Some students, including 
many matriculating in the first years following desegregation, had  little prob-
lem adjusting. Reuben, for example, came to campus in the fall of 1963 feel-
ing a “responsibility to create the environment you desire” and quickly be-
came involved in an array of academic and social activities. “Duke made [this 
engagement] a comfortable possibility for me,” Reuben remembered, “and 
it was fun!” Mary Mitchell Harris, also a member of the first class of Black 
undergraduates, remembered being treated as a “curiosity” upon arrival. “It 
 wasn’t unnerving at all,” she recalled. “It was  great receptiveness.” Having been 
among the first Black students to attend a desegregated high school in Greens-
boro, Brown quickly acclimated to life on campus. “I had  people threaten [me] 
in high school,” she recalled. “Duke . . .  was a real big step up from what I 
had experienced. . . .  My expectation was for a lot worse.” White saw the small 
number of Black undergraduates immediately following desegregation as a 
reason that fewer prob lems occurred. “The numbers  were so small, we  were 
fairly negligible,” he recalled.24 Despite such positive experiences, however, the 
vast majority of Duke’s small number of Black students in the early years fol-
lowing desegregation faced a difficult transition. The reason was the Jim Crow 
racial attitudes and practices that continued to pervade Duke.
Encounters with faculty and deans over academic  matters presented an ini-
tial challenge. “Some teachers  were hostile, overtly so,” Turner remembered. 
“Some  were more subtle with it, but  there was a tension you could feel in 
almost  every class.” During his freshman year, Michael LeBlanc encountered 
a po liti cal science professor who was openly racist. The professor would talk, 
LeBlanc recounted, “and he would say, ‘the “nigra” over  there, what do you 
think?’ ” For the first two or three classes, LeBlanc, the only Black student 
in the class, “took it.” The next time, however, he confronted the professor. 
With sweat pouring down, LeBlanc stood and said, “Excuse me Profes-
sor Simpson, . . .  I’m a Negro.” The professor responded, “Nigra, sit down.” 
LeBlanc again said, “No, I’m a Negro.” “We had a  battle . . .  for the  whole 
semester  every time he said ‘nigra,’ ” LeBlanc recalled. “To be seventeen years 
old, that was not easy.”25
Charles W. “Chuck” Hopkins recalled one episode in a freshman composi-
tion course that illustrated “a ste reo type of Black students that they  weren’t 
supposed to be able to write.” The professor had been open with Hopkins that, 
in his opinion, “Black  people are not smart enough to be successful at a school 
like Duke University.” Hopkins recounted that  after he produced a strong 
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paper in En glish class, this professor accused him of having his roommate do 
his essays. “He just  couldn’t believe I could write,” Hopkins recalled. Bertie R. 
Howard had a similar experience. Her freshman En glish teacher “would be 
surprised when I wrote a good paper, but would never find a reason to give me 
an A. . . .  At one point [when] I wrote what I thought was a very good paper, 
he was  really surprised [and asked], ‘Did I go to a tutor?’ ” For Clarence G. 
Newsome, one of Duke’s first Black scholarship athletes, his En glish lit er a ture 
professor’s comments required no interpretation. As Newsome was leaving 
class one day, the professor  stopped him. Looking directly into his eyes, the 
professor told Newsome, “Blacks  can’t write. And especially Black males.” “It 
was an attempt to pierce my spirit and my soul,” Newsome thought. Arm-
strong remembered that she got her first freshman En glish paper back marked 
with a D+. Devastated, she sent the paper to her  mother, asking, “Mom, is this 
right?” Armstrong’s  mother, an En glish teacher with gradu ate degrees from 
Columbia University, saw the quality of the paper, telling her  daughter, “You 
 didn’t write this well when you  were with me!” Marguerite Armstrong wrote 
to the Duke administration on her  daughter’s behalf, demanding an apology 
and a revised grade and threatening  legal action. Armstrong never got the 
requested apology, but she did get an A on the paper.26
Discriminatory grading practices  were so common that Brown tended 
to steer  toward science and math classes, where “ either you could answer a 
question or you  couldn’t. I definitely felt the professors, especially En glish 
and history . . .  graded us differently,” she remembered. Yet sometimes, even 
courses with a quantitative focus provided no protection from overt prejudice. 
As a freshman, Claudius B. “C. B.” Claiborne and three of his fellow Black 
students took an engineering class together. Uncertain about the homework 
assignment, they asked the professor for clarification, telling him, “We want to 
get an A on the assignment.” “I’ll never forget it,” Claiborne recounted. “This 
guy who was an old professor . . .  said, ‘ Don’t worry about it, you  won’t get an 
A.’ He  didn’t know anything about us. . . .  We all came from [strong academic] 
backgrounds; we  were expecting to do well.”27
White also experienced grade discrimination. In one case, a professor went 
so far as to change the grading system for the entire class to justify giving 
White, the only student to earn a perfect score on the midterm, a C. Turner 
recalled that some students even devised ways to test the integrity of the grad-
ing pro cess: “They would write a paper in one night, then write another paper 
and spend a week or two on it. No  matter what paper they wrote, what the 
quality of the paper was, they got a C. Always. One friend of mine said he 
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actually took a paper from a white fellow who had received an A on it. He 
turned that paper in and got a C.” Discriminatory grading “happened to all of 
us,” Armstrong remembered. Soon, a consensus evolved among Duke’s Black 
students: “If  you’re Black,  you’re a C student.”28
“Most of my professors  were indifferent,” Hopkins remembered. “They 
had not been sensitized to the special needs of the Black students.” Samuel 
DuBois Cook, Duke’s first Black professor, shared this perception. White 
professors “can often be unwittingly insensitive,” he observed. “They  can’t 
empathize, they  can’t see what Black students have gone through, [and] what 
they have experienced.”  Because of this lack of empathy,  these professors 
do  things that are “utterly insensitive,” according to Cook, “ because Blacks 
are just outside the orbit of their experience. And often [outside] of their 
compassion.” Without empathy, Cook explained, “they just  can’t reach out, 
just  can’t perceive what it means to be Black and the kind of hurt that Blacks 
may have.”29
Academic deans and other university personnel exhibited similar attitudes. 
In the early weeks of her freshman year, for example, Armstrong went to her 
dean. She explained: “My En glish achievement scores should have allowed me 
to place out [of freshman En glish]. But when I found out, it was too late. So I 
went to the dean and asked if it was still pos si ble to place out. Her comment 
was, ‘Well, you need to be in first- level En glish.’ ”  Because of her plan to attend 
medical school, Armstrong also sought “guidance and counseling [from her 
dean] on being a premed.” Her attempt met with frustration. “I was virtually 
written off,” Armstrong recalled, “as possibly being a premed.” White’s interac-
tion with an athletics administrator communicated a similar message. When 
White urged the administrator to start recruiting Black athletes to Duke, he 
received a lecture about how Duke had high academic standards. “I told him,” 
White remembered, “I  didn’t think I’d gotten in without meeting  those aca-
demic standards.”30
Years  after graduating, Armstrong described the attitudes Black students 
faced.
We  were the objects of the worst kind of racism in the classroom, where we 
started out at a deficit. It was incomprehensible to have been considered 
smart enough for “A” work, especially when subjective grading of essays or 
term papers, or  theses  were concerned. The few of us in science battled the 
results of that isolation even in areas where subjective grading would have 
been harder. We  were not given the benefit of old tests, or the lab assistant’s 
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tutelage. We  were thought of as “dumb” when we asked for help. The white 
students  were characterized as “competitive” for the same request.31
 These academic issues contributed to one of the biggest prob lems faced by 
Duke’s Black students— a chronically high attrition rate. Armstrong recalled 
that during the years 1966 through 1968, almost 50  percent of Duke’s Black 
students left school  after one or two semesters. Of the fifteen Black men in 
Armstrong’s freshman class, for example, only ten remained  after the first year. 
Given their academic per for mance in high school, the academic difficulties 
 these students faced at Duke  were a shock. “Every one was  under real pressure 
to do well,” Howard remembered. “I just  didn’t realize that every one  here was 
from the top of the class and that somebody was  going to be on the bottom,” 
Brown explained, “and most likely it was  going to be you.” Students came to 
refer to dismissal from school as having been “punched out.” For some, de-
parture from school had life- or- death consequences. Brown remembered her 
close friend Warren Franks, who lost his student deferment when he dropped 
out of Duke  after his sophomore year. “He was killed [in Vietnam] a month 
before our graduation,” Brown recalled.  Because of the likelihood that they 
would face the draft, Armstrong recalled feeling “awful terror” when male 
students left Duke.32 Despite  these prob lems, the university initially created no 
programs to prepare Black students for the academic challenges they would 
face and provided  little support when they encountered academic difficulties.
Contacts with Duke’s campus security added to the picture. Black students 
 were frequently  stopped on campus and asked by campus security to produce 
university ids. This often happened in the university gymnasium. “Apparently 
it was just assumed,” Turner explained, “that anybody Black down  there play-
ing was not a Duke student and should be asked to produce an id on the 
spot.”33
The contempt certain members of campus security had for the Black stu-
dents is reflected in a memo from W. C. A. Bear, the chief of campus secu-
rity, to Cole. While the purpose of the memo was to transmit to the provost 
a report on a campus altercation involving a Black student, Bear used the 
exchange as an opportunity to express his feelings  toward Black students at 
Duke generally. Stating that the report pertains to a “negro student,” Bear told 
Cole that he wanted the provost to see the report so that he may be familiar 
with “what our men must put up with from  these  people.”34
Other encounters with university personnel  were also problematic. 
“I know of instances,” Becton reported, “where you would go into the Dope 
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Shop [the campus snack bar] and the  people  there would go out of their 
way to wait on every one  else except the Black kids.” Howard recalled times 
when she was first in line at the Dope Shop but sixth to be waited on. As a 
result of  these practices, Becton remembered, “you go into the [Dope Shop] 
and it takes you twenty minutes to eat  because  they’re serving every body 
 else first.” Becton did not take this treatment passively. At the cafeteria, 
when the cashier would attempt to help a white student  behind him in line, 
Becton would say, “No, no, no, I was in line first, I’m giving you money.” 
“I was six- four and I  wasn’t menacing in any way,” Becton recalled, “but I 
would just simply speak up. And the person would typically defer.”35 The 
absence of a Black barber was another issue. Although the university main-
tained a campus barber shop, no one  there was able to cut hair in the styles 
popu lar among Black students. Consequently, they went into Durham if 
they needed a haircut.
Certain university practices  were also deeply disturbing. Among  these was 
the long- standing tradition at Duke athletic events of playing “ Dixie.” White 
remembered that “ Dixie” was “practically like the national anthem  because 
every one would stand up [and sing along].  People went wild over that song.” 
White refused to participate. “I never stood for ‘ Dixie’ at any time, anywhere,” 
he recounted. In fact, White, along with other students, “would or ga nize sit- 
downs.” White recalled that eventually they had “a  whole section that  wouldn’t 
stand when it was played.” During a football game in 1968, the Georgia Tech 
marching band started playing “ Dixie.” When the  music started, Turner re-
called, “two Black students had a Confederate flag that they unfurled [and] set 
it on fire. One man de cided that this was an affront to him, so he came down 
and jumped in the flames and put it out. Some white students joined him. 
It was a  little altercation. When the police arrived, only the Black students 
 were removed.” “If  there was something  going wrong between white students 
and Black students,” Turner recounted, “it was assumed . . .  the Black students 
 were at fault.”36
Howard’s reaction to tangible symbols of racism at Duke like the playing of 
“ Dixie” and displays of the Confederate flag is typical. While she understood 
them as “part of accepting  going to a white school in the South,” she found 
them to be “repulsive.” Ernie Jackson was a consensus All- American football 
player at Duke. But the  thing he recalled “more than anything  else,” he said, 
was walking “through the dorms on the way to practice  every day.” “Most of 
the football players,” Jackson recalled, lived in fraternities. “When you saw the 
Confederate flag hoisted out of their dorms all the time,” Jackson remembered, 
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“it was extremely difficult to have to go to war with  those guys and play with 
them from a teammate perspective.”37
Duke’s practice of holding school- sponsored events at local facilities with 
racially restrictive policies, such as Hope Valley Country Club, was also prob-
lematic. Many Duke administrators and faculty  were members at Hope Valley 
and campus organ izations had, for de cades, hosted events at the segregated 
club. But as the Black student population at Duke grew, this practice would 
become increasingly controversial.
Social and cultural issues confronting Black students at Duke added to 
the prob lems. The most dramatic issues involved overt physical harassment. 
“Once [fraternity men] found out that Black students  were sensitive,” Hopkins 
reported, “it was fun for them to provoke stuff. [You’d] walk past dorms and 
somebody would throw a plastic bag full of  water— drop it on you. . . .  Silly 
stuff like that.”38
But other interactions  were not at all “silly.” “I was in the laundry room 
one night,” Hopkins remembered, “and something moved in the corner of my 
eye. I turned  toward the win dow, and just as I turned . . .  this big rock came 
and hit me in the chest.” “I had friends,” Turner reported, “who told me  there 
 were incidents in which they would literally be told . . .  ‘All right, Nigger, let 
me see you run. Somebody pull out a switchblade. Make him run.’ ” Occasion-
ally,  these incidents would escalate into fights. “ There  were almost  little mini- 
wars,” Turner noted. “Black students and white students against each other 
and  they’d be armed.”39
For Turner, attempts at physical intimidation did not create serious prob-
lems  because of his size and the aggressive stance he  adopted. “If somebody 
both ered me, I’d let them know something right quick,” Turner recalled. “I’d 
have  people [slip] up and call me ‘boy.’ I’d say, ‘You see a boy, you slap him.’ 
And it  wasn’t likely they  were  going to do it. Back during  those days I bench- 
pressed over three hundred pounds, and anyone who saw me could tell it. That 
was just my way of taking up for myself.”40
But not all students had Turner’s physical strength to fall back on. Asked 
how  others responded to intimidation, Turner responded, “With knives, with 
screwdrivers, staying together in groups. Literally fighting.” Duke’s female 
Black students felt especially vulnerable in the face of the overt hostility they 
encountered from some segments of the campus. “We needed the  brothers to 
literally escort us to the basketball games to protect us from the racial slurs 
that effused from the [Kappa Alphas] as we walked by their  house on the 
way to the indoor stadium,” Armstrong remembered. “ Those  were some crazy 
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 people” who lived on Animal Quad, Howard recalled. “The rednecks of Duke 
 were in [Kappa Alpha]— and they made threats.  There had been lots of intimi-
dation of Blacks by  those  people. . . .  I had a lot of  people proposition me, or 
[make] a lot of lewd remarks.”41
Other interactions with the Duke community  were less overt but com-
municated an equally clear negative message. Armstrong recalled what it “felt 
like when we sat down at a  table in the dining room and every one  else got up. 
On the bus and even in the classroom every one  else moved over.” Cassandra 
Smith had similar experiences. “Some of the students would cross the quad 
rather than speak to me,” she recounted. “Or they would look the other way 
when they walked past.” Like other Black students who attended Duke, Smith 
had grown up in a “very sheltered environment.” “It  really hurt,” she recalled. 
“I  hadn’t ever been treated like that. For a long time, I put it out of my mind 
 because it was so unpleasant.”42
The dormitory provided no respite. “The dormitory life . . .  was the worst 
part of my experience at Duke,” Armstrong explained. “I had a Black room-
mate my first two years. She and I clung to each other  because I  couldn’t talk 
with anyone  else. No one  else understood anything,” she remembered. “They 
had . . .  de cided that my . . .  experiences . . .  were so diff er ent from them that 
they looked on us as unusual  people.”43
In the dorm, Black students  were the objects of stares, giggles, offensive 
name- calling, and unimaginable isolation. So many dorm mates stared at 
Armstrong and her roommate “ going about their business” that “you got the 
feeling that something was wrong with you.” Overt acts of racism  were also 
not uncommon. Armstrong explained, “Some of us came back to our dorm 
rooms to find Confederate flags on the doors with ‘nigger go home’ written 
over it.” On her first day of classes, Armstrong was in her dorm bathroom, 
washing her face and brushing her teeth before class. A white dorm mate ap-
proached and, touching Armstrong’s face, announced, “This is the closest I 
have been to a colored person, and I wanted to see if it came off.” Armstrong 
was deeply offended. “If you put your hand on me,” Armstrong warned the 
young  woman, “one— it’s assault; and two— you are  going to have a hard time 
getting up off the floor  because I’m  going to hit you.” Turner recalled ver-
bal harassment. “Football players and fraternity men would get drunk out on 
the quad,” he remembered, “and just holler: ‘Ahhhh you niggers, cut out the 
lights.’ ” Harry DeMik, a white student, remembered a heckler at a basketball 
game shouting, “ ‘Get out of the game you dumb Nigger’ ” to a Black Duke 
player who was having an off night. Hopkins recalled that he and two other 
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Black students  were approached one eve ning by a “white guy living down the 
hall from us. He came to us,” Hopkins recounted, “and asked us to procure 
a Black  woman for a fraternity party he was having.” We said, “ ‘Wow, that’s 
crazy.’ We almost got in a fight with the guy.”44
Other dorm interactions highlighted the racial insensitivity of many white 
students. “The  woman who worked downstairs at the desk [in our dorm] was 
Black,” Armstrong recalled, “and they always called her by her first name. 
 After three months of that we fi nally revolted and said at one of the  house 
meetings: ‘That person is old enough to be our  mother. You have no right 
to call an older  woman “Mildred” when she is Mrs. Jones. She is someone’s 
 mother. She is someone’s wife.’ ” Armstrong remembered that her fellow stu-
dents responded, “We  didn’t think we  were insulting her” and “She likes it 
that way.” But when Armstrong and her friends asked their dorm mates if 
they had ever asked Jones her preference, the question was met with silence. 
“It was patronizing,” Armstrong explained. Maybe they let you get away with 
that in your neighborhood, she told her dorm mates, “but if I called [an adult] 
by their first name, my  mother would stop the conversation and beat me. 
We  were always taught to re spect adults.” “You could see them turn pale,” 
Armstrong remembered. Hopkins was shocked to discover that older Black 
 women  were employed by Duke as maids to clean dorm rooms. “Duke is an 
upper- class southern gentleman type  thing,” he recalled. “You had all  these old 
Black  women waiting on  these white male students hand and foot. . . .  Some 
of us— those  were the kinds of  things our  mothers  were  doing back home.”45
Even when friendships developed between Black and white students, issues 
of race could intrude. Once, Armstrong was invited to dinner with a friend 
and her  family.  After meeting Armstrong, the  family “made some excuse for 
not being able to go.” Armstrong learned  later that it was  because the group 
had planned to go to a restaurant or to visit friends at Hope Valley Country 
Club, where segregationist policies would not allow her to attend.46
Duke’s dynamic fraternity and sorority scene— a key social ave nue for 
many students— provided no such outlet for the university’s Black students. 
Even  those fraternities and sororities that did not expressly prohibit Black 
members found ways to ensure that they remained segregated. In the case of 
fraternity Sigma Chi, for example,  there was no express  legal prohibition in 
the organ ization’s charter documents on admitting Black members. Still, ac-
cording to Barney Jones, the fraternity’s “ Grand Proctor” “made clear . . .  that 
race is an absolutely decisive criterion for membership.” To enforce this prohi-
bition, the  Grand Proctor required that racial data, along with corroborating 
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photo graphs, be submitted to the national office for all prospective members. 
Many national sororities prevented Black students from joining local chapters 
by requiring that each prospect obtain a “favorable” recommendation from 
a sorority alumna. In the event of a negative recommendation,  there was no 
right to appeal or to learn the basis for the rejection. Several years  after de-
segregation, a Pi Phi representative told Mary Grace Wilson, dean of under-
graduate  women, that “several Negroes in this year’s freshman class . . .  were 
‘good sorority material’ ” but that no sorority chapters on the campus “could 
get the necessary (required) clearance as to recommendation.”47
While not publicized,  these exclusionary policies  were known by Duke’s 
Black students. “When it came to [sorority] rush,” Armstrong reported, “we 
obviously  weren’t wanted.” To Howard, it was clear that  there was no reason 
for her to participate in sorority rush, and she told the  woman in charge of 
the se lection pro cess that she did not think “ there is any sorority that is will-
ing to admit a Black.” Howard recounted that the  woman encouraged her to 
participate, telling her, “It’s a  great way to get to know  people, you never can 
tell.”  After  going through two or three days of sorority rush, however, Howard 
was told by the  woman that “every one  really likes you, but we  can’t get refer-
ences so  there is no way to admit you.” Understandably, Howard came away 
from the experience feeling that many Duke  people she encountered would 
say, “We  really welcome Black  people to Duke” but that “you take step one and 
then  there is no room for advancement.”48
In the background of  these racially charged experiences was the significant 
socioeconomic gap that existed between Duke’s Black students and their col-
leagues. White students at Duke  were generally affluent. “We  were a totally 
diff er ent sort from the average Duke student,” Turner explained. “Most of 
us  were kids from the South . . .  from very modest financial and social back-
grounds. . . .  And we had a totally diff er ent mentality and a totally diff er ent 
approach both by virtue of being Black and by virtue of our background.” 
Marcus Hobbs, who was appointed provost in January 1969, saw  little “com-
monality of interest or background” between the Black students and their 
white colleagues. “ After all,” he commented, the Black students “ hadn’t spent 
the summer at Newport or what ever the hell have you.” Besides inhabiting 
diff er ent worlds at Duke, most Black and white students had no significant 
interracial contact before college. “We  didn’t grow up together,” Turner ex-
plained. “The only contacts we had with white youngsters was in fights” or 
the occasional football or basketball game. Even then, Turner remembered, 
“the white boys would come to your community; we  wouldn’t go to theirs.”49
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Compounding all  these issues was the profound isolation most Black stu-
dents experienced. Not only did  these students stand apart from the main-
stream of the university but, during this period, they remained largely cut 
off from each other.  Until the fall of 1966, the main reason for this was lack 
of numbers. Five Black undergraduates enrolled at Duke in 1963, eleven ma-
triculated in 1964, and fourteen joined the freshman class in 1965, a minis-
cule number on a campus with almost five thousand undergraduates. Mak-
ing  matters worse, Duke was divided into two campuses located about a mile 
apart— West Campus for men and East Campus for  women. Further, the small 
number of Black students was spread out in vari ous dorms. “Duke thought 
the best way to bring us  here,” Hopkins recounted, “was to keep us isolated 
from each other.” “To this day,” he said in 2019, “I  don’t know why that was 
their policy.”50
“Seems like you could go on for months without seeing another Black per-
son,” Brown recalled. “I never had a class with other Black students,” White 
remembered. Turner felt “loneliness and isolation at  every point” and likened 
the experience to “being cast into a foreign, alien world.” “I was the only Black 
student in my dormitory,” he explained. “ There was nobody to go to. No Black 
staff, no Black faculty. . . .  And [ there was] the frustration of a college under-
graduate in the first  couple of years with no one to turn to. . . .  If you have 
another Black student in a class with you, it’s strange and unusual. . . .  That’s an 
experience that almost defies description. It’s more than you can describe.”51
Before college, Williams recalled, she could always find refuge by coming 
back to “a Black community, and a Black home, and very familiar cultural 
surroundings.” At Duke, she explained, “the difference was I never left. I never 
went back and got recharged. I could never let my guard down. I never could 
just relax and be myself and not worry about what [I] said or what [I] thought 
or . . .  what [I] did.” Intensifying  these feelings was the fact that undergradu-
ates at Duke, like  every other college student,  were still young. “If you are talk-
ing about dealing with adolescents— which is what you are— there are certain 
identity needs, certain cultural needs, certain emotional needs that you have,” 
Williams explained, “in addition to the intellectual enrichment they  were try-
ing to provide.” To Armstrong, her experience at Duke was “like bare skin 
and putting salt on it. We  were  there in the  middle of a  whole bunch of white 
folks,” she explained. “We  weren’t ready for them and nobody had any idea 
how to deal with it.”52
 These experiences at Duke led most Black students to conclude, as Hop-
kins did, that Duke “was not ready to have Black students  here. They  didn’t 
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realize that integration meant they had to make some changes, too.” Accord-
ing to Hopkins, the administration’s view was that “bringing us [to Duke] was 
like bringing the natives into civilization.” For Turner, the university’s attitude 
was “Look—we have granted you the privilege of coming to this  great school. 
You are on scholarship, financial aid, what ever. What  else do you want? What 
 else can we give you?” Brown’s view was similar. She saw the administration’s 
stance toward the Black students as “Shut up.  Don’t make waves. And get 
out. . . .  You’re  here  because we need some Black spots on campus to make 
 things look right. Other than that, we  don’t want to hear from you.”53
In the depths of her freshman year, Armstrong called her  mother to talk 
through her college experience. Hearing her  daughter’s despair, yet know-
ing from life experience how difficult it would be to change Jim Crow at 
Duke, Marguerite Armstrong encouraged her  daughter to take the long view. 
“Somebody has to do this,” she told her child. Alienated from Duke and likely 
wishing she had ignored her  father’s wishes and instead gone to an all- Black 
school, her response was brief— “Why us?”54
Duke’s Black students  were correct that the university was not ready for them. 
Although undergraduate desegregation may have marked in some ways a sig-
nificant turning point in the history of Duke, the university made only  limited 
efforts to plan for the arrival of  these students or to understand and anticipate 
their needs. As William Griffith, who by 1963 served as assistant to the pro-
vost, recalled,  there  were planning meetings over the arrival of Black students 
“but not in a  really in- depth kind of way.” Duke, he said, “ didn’t make a lot of 
changes.”55
This university failure extended to Jim Crow policies and practices that 
remained in place at Duke even  after the Black students arrived. Although 
the classrooms, dorms, dining halls, and football stadium  were desegregated, 
separate wards for white and Black patients remained in place at Duke Hos-
pital. No effort was made to require fraternities and sororities to eliminate 
provisions in their charter documents prohibiting Black members. University 
organ izations remained  free to hold off- campus events at segregated facilities. 
The university continued to use racially restrictive covenants for its Duke For-
est homesites.56
In the view of President Douglas Knight, the university’s failure to plan 
was due to the deep ambivalence many felt about desegregation. According to 
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Knight, many at the university believed that “once we have admitted Blacks, 
what more do they want?” Administrators also felt that by admitting Black 
students, Duke’s primary work on race had been accomplished. “We had 
worked fairly hard to get the decision” to admit Black students made, Griffith 
explained. “ There was a feeling— ‘we’ve climbed that mountain,  you’re over 
it, now you can rest a  little’ . . .  having accomplished what seemed to be the 
main goal.”57
The fact that significant relationships did not exist between Duke officials 
and Black professionals made it pos si ble for this attitude to persist. In 1963, 
Duke had no Black faculty or administrators and just one Black secretary. As 
a result, Waldo Beach noted, “Blacks had no part in the academic life of the 
school,” and faculty contacts across the color line “ were  limited to  those be-
tween [white] faculty and their wives and Black help.” Off- campus, adminis-
trators lived segregated lives. “Housing [in Durham] was entirely segregated,” 
Beach recalled. “ There  were no Blacks in the all- white neighborhoods.” As a 
result, the men who ran Duke had no one in their immediate professional or 
social circles to call on for insight into the needs of Black undergraduates. 
Although Durham had a thriving Black business community and since 1910 
had been home to the all- Black North Carolina College at Durham (ncc), no 
effort was made to reach out to local Black leaders for insight on the needs of 
Duke’s new students. The university approached desegregation passively and 
without preparation. “I’m not sure that anybody  here . . .  knew what to ex-
pect,” Griffith remembered. “ There was no one in the Black population to call 
on,” Griffith noted incorrectly, and “we did not know what the Black experi-
ence was or what prob lems they would face— except every one knew . . .  for a 
Black student who came from a predominantly Black school it would be quite 
a diff er ent experience.” “In retrospect,” Griffith reflected, “one of the  things 
one might have wanted to do was to go to some institutions that had already 
been through” desegregation.58
Having failed to educate themselves on issues and challenges likely to be 
faced by Black students arriving on campus, Duke’s leaders simply assumed 
that the new enrollees would adjust to campus life.  After the board’s decision 
to desegregate, William L. Brinkley Jr., director of undergraduate admissions, 
visited a number of Black high schools in the South scouting for solid candi-
dates, talking about Duke, and attempting to communicate the school’s “sin-
cerity of purpose.” At Atkins High School in Winston- Salem, North Carolina, 
Brinkley met with six top- ten students who raised frank questions with him 
about “integration in the first year.” Brinkley was unequivocal in his response, 
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giving the students “complete reassurances concerning the climate at the Uni-
versity and that we anticipated very  little difficulty with the  matter.” Griffith 
had the same view. “ There was a general feeling,” he recalled, that the Black 
students would “go right into the student body.” Many in the administration 
felt that Duke was not “ going to set up specialized situations  because a per-
son is a diff er ent color.  We’re integrated now.” It was expected, according to 
Griffith, that Black students would take their place as members of the Duke 
community through a “natu ral kind of amalgamation.” We thought it was “a 
 great opportunity for that student to get a good education and [we] lost con-
tact with the . . .  prob lems that student would face.”  These assumptions car-
ried significant consequences. “You  don’t just accept Black students . . .  with-
out trying to sit down and think about what effect it is  going to have on them 
and . . .  on the university,” Brown explained. “I remember feeling . . .  that with 
a  little bit of forethought, Duke could have avoided most of what happened.”59
Once Black students arrived on campus, Duke neglected to establish any 
internal mechanisms to elicit feedback from them on how they  were manag-
ing. Initially, the Black students did not come forward with concerns. They 
“did not raise a lot of questions,” Griffith recalled, and Robert Cushman, dean 
of the divinity school, said  there  were “no prob lems”  after desegregation. “The 
Black students came in,” he recounted, “they  were received, and they  were 
part of the community.” From the university’s perspective, Griffith recounted, 
 these years  were the “easiest as far as not being challenged by any prob lems.”60
As with the decision to admit Black gradu ate and undergraduate students 
initially, Duke evaluated the success of desegregation only from its own per-
spective.  Because few prob lems  were articulated publicly by the students, the 
university assumed that desegregation was proceeding smoothly. With re-
spect to gradu ate and professional school students, Cole reported to the board 
of trustees soon  after their arrival: “So far,  there have been no reports of any 
major prob lems which have been created by the presence of negroes in the 
gradu ate and professional schools. They have rather melted into the ranks of 
the student body, as we had hoped and expected they would.”
The university’s attitude was also reflected in a memo written in Febru-
ary 1964 by the assistant dean of Trinity College reporting on the first semester 
of one of Duke’s Black undergraduates.  After reviewing the student’s academ-
ics, the assistant dean advised that the student “has been a good citizen” and 
that “to this point  there is no evidence of any prob lem connected with [the 
student’s] residence in the College.” The assistant dean concluded that the stu-
dent’s “affairs have gone so smoothly that it has required a special effort on our 
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part to remember that the student is  here as [one of] our first Negro[s].” His-
tory professor Richard L. Watson learned how  little he knew about the Black 
students’ experience when he commented once to a group of  these students 
that “you certainly did not experience any overt antagonism or hostility on 
campus.” “I made that as a kind of affirmative statement,” Watson recalled. 
“And the [Black students] who  were  there laughed when I said that.”61
Even when potential prob lems came to light, no follow-up occurred. 
Griffith remembered that he was “aware of [episodes of physical harassment] 
only from what they told me. I never saw  things  going on. . . .  But  there  were 
prob lems of harassment, some subtle and not so subtle.” Griffith heard of stu-
dents carry ing screwdrivers for self- defense but was not “physically aware” 
of such be hav ior. “Nobody ever pulled out something and said, ‘Hey, look— 
this is what I am carry ing to protect myself.’ ” Even  these reports, however, 
prompted no administrative action. If the Black students “had prob lems, I was 
certainly unaware of them,” recalled Marcus Hobbs.62
“We looked at it from a white perspective,” Griffith explained. “We  didn’t 
know what the black experience was or what the prob lems that they would 
face  were.” “We  were . . .  far too simplistic about [the Black students’] pres-
ence,” Knight wrote. “We tended to feel that once we had . . .  overcome the 
admissions hurdle, the rest would be easy. In making this assumption,” he ex-
plained, “we  were . . .  saying ‘Come in, be white,’ and that was not what  these 
young  people wanted.” In Knight’s view, “much too much was expected from 
the  simple act of admitting relatively few Black students, and much too  little 
thought was given to what it  really means to have black citizens of this country 
be part of the institution.”63
 Because of their isolation from teachers, administrators, fellow students, and 
each other, Duke’s Black students searched for connections elsewhere. A first 
source of comfort was Duke’s Black nonacademic employees. For Joyce Hob-
son, Oliver Harvey and his wife, “Mrs. Louise,” a maid in Hobson’s dorm, 
became her “parents away from home.” Hobson remembered spending “many 
hours in [the Harveys’] home and attending church with them on Sundays.” 
Armstrong had the same experience. “The  people who treated us with any 
re spect,” she remembered, “ were the  people who worked in the cafeteria, 
worked in the dorms, kept up the grounds. They had that quiet pride [in us] 
that we could detect . . .  that, for many of us, kept us  going.” “My  Daddy told 
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me, ‘Son— find your  people,’ ” Turner remembered. “In the [men’s dorms] you 
had maids. And I remember this one in par tic u lar . . .  Beatrice Spencer. She 
belonged to West Durham Baptist Church between East and West Campus. 
And  she’d just say, ‘Be ready Sunday to go to church.’ [I’d say,] ‘Yes Ma’am.’ 
 These are  people like your  mother, your aunt— the same kind of  people you 
had grown up with and are accustomed to. So they treated you just like that,” 
Turner recalled fondly. “They would just take you to church.”64
The “vast city of Durham,” as Turner described it, offered a second critical 
connection as Duke’s Black students came to know the city’s vibrant Black 
community and storied history. Drawn by the opportunities to work in the 
flourishing tobacco— and  later, textile— industries, thousands of Black  people 
had migrated to Durham between 1890 and 1930. Over half of  these new arriv-
als settled in the Hayti neighborhood, an all- Black community. By the first half 
of the twentieth  century, Hayti had more than one hundred in de pen dently 
owned Black businesses, including theaters, beauty parlors, restaurants, and 
stores. North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Com pany, which became one of 
the largest Black- owned companies in the world, was established in 1905 and 
provided capital for significant business and residential development in the 
city’s Black neighborhoods.  Because of its level of commercial activity, Hayti 
came to be known as the Black Wall Street, and by the mid-1920s, a leading 
sociologist had designated Durham the capital of the Black  middle class.65
Although Hayti’s best days  were over by the early 1960s, the neighborhood 
remained a hub of activity for the Black community. It was  there that Duke’s 
Black students  were able to escape the alienation they felt on campus and ob-
tain needed ser vices. Turner remembered an area that was “teeming, thriving, 
full of life.” If you got over  there, he recollected, “ you’re back home.”66
Hayti’s churches  were also an impor tant touchstone. White Rock Baptist 
Church was or ga nized in 1866, holding prayer meetings in homes, a cotton 
gin, and a ware house before a permanent structure was completed around 
1877. In 1891 the cornerstone of a brick structure for St. Joseph’s Church was 
laid. From 1965 to 1976, St. Joseph’s was led by the Reverend Philip R. Cousin, 
a towering figure active in the civil rights movement. When we got to church, 
Turner recounted, “we found out that the  people who  were  there had  children 
just like us and they understood us implicitly.” Howard remembered church as 
a group activity. “That’s a  thing a lot of  people did together,” she recalled: “go 
to church together, go to the community meeting together.”67
Another magnet was ncc. Every one had “homeboys or homegirls” over at 
ncc, Turner explained. Claiborne, who was from Danville,  Virginia, counted 
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eleven  people from his graduating class attending ncc. “I used to go over  there 
 every day,” Claiborne recalled. “It was like  going back home for me.” Claiborne 
even had a payment card in the ncc cafeteria and would eat  there regularly. 
Turner went to ncc “ every weekend.” Social life was a draw—he would go for 
parties and to take girls out.  Because the Black students had no “space [they] 
controlled” on Duke’s campus, Turner explained, “whenever we socialized, es-
sentially we had to leave campus.”  Because Duke had done so  little to accom-
modate the needs of its Black students, heading into Durham was essential. “The 
world was still segregated,” Claiborne explained. “ There  were two Durhams. 
Once you caught that bus and headed out  toward Duke, you  were entering a 
diff er ent world.”68
Given the many contacts Duke’s Black students developed in Durham, it 
is not surprising that they became involved with community organ izations. 
One that became particularly significant for Duke students was Operation 
Breakthrough, an affiliate of the North Carolina Fund. Incorporated in 1963 
and established by then governor Terry Sanford, the fund represented an in-
novative approach to attacking poverty and educational deficiencies in North 
Carolina.69 Operation Breakthrough, an antipoverty program located in Dur-
ham, was one of the first initiatives undertaken by the fund.
The North Carolina Fund and Operation Breakthrough became impor-
tant to Duke’s Black students for a number of reasons. At the suggestion of 
Sanford, the fund established a domestic ser vice corps composed of college 
students called the “North Carolina Volunteers.” Operation Breakthrough 
also established a program in which Duke students on financial aid could sat-
isfy work- study requirements through employment in the Durham commu-
nity. Through  these programs, Duke students  were provided the opportunity 
to work in Durham’s poorest neighborhoods and to develop orga nizational 
skills. Perhaps most significantly,  these activities allowed volunteers to wrestle 
with “issues of meaning in their personal lives” while “making direct connec-
tions to the civil rights movement and strug gles over the nation’s values and 
moral purpose.”70
The impact of Operation Breakthrough on its student volunteers was 
magnified by Howard Fuller, who was hired in May 1965 to coordinate the 
program’s community organ izing efforts. Fuller’s physical presence was, ac-
cording to historian Christina Greene, imposing. He was “tall, dark, and hand-
some,” Greene described, and his “six foot four inch frame . . .  made a last-
ing impression on Durham.” Sally Avery was among  those inspired by Fuller. 
Meeting Fuller for the first time in the spring of 1966, Avery recalled that he 
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was “one of the most charismatic  people I have ever met.”71  Because he was 
the leader of Operation Breakthrough, many of Duke’s Black students came 
to know and work with him. A power ful local and national voice on Black 
empowerment, over time Fuller became an impor tant sounding board and 
adviser for many of Duke’s Black students.
Although isolated and alienated from the university, Duke’s Black students 
spent the first few years following desegregation developing deep personal 
connections with members of Durham’s Black community and gaining ex-
posure to social and po liti cal activities in the city. “Durham was unique 
in the United States at that time,” Hopkins commented,  because it had 
“one of the most conscious and well or ga nized Black communities. So as 
a young person . . .  we immediately had older  people who we could lean on, 
learn from, who  were interested and supportive of what we  were  doing. . . . 
Looking back,” Hopkins reflected, “we  were lucky that we ended up in Dur-
ham.” Their experiences during  these years provided a crucial context for the 
actions Duke’s students would take in the coming years.72
The racial attitudes held by Duke faculty and administrators  were not altered 
when Black undergraduates arrived on campus. Beliefs about Black inferiority 
persisted in some and  were expressed in be hav ior  toward Black students that 
ranged from passivity to overt hostility.  Those who did not hold  these beliefs 
operated in an institutional context that narrowly defined acceptable modes 
of relating to the new Black students. One former dean and college president 
described university communities as “like country clubs— interdependent, in-
tentional communities, characterized by autonomy and a shared value system.” 
Proactive outreach, engagement, and follow-up with Black students  were not 
part of that “shared value system.” As a result, Black undergraduates, while 
physically pre sent on campus, experienced a racial climate that left them iso-
lated from each other and alienated from the university. Although Duke had 
joined the ranks of desegregated southern private universities, Black students, 
as a group, almost immediately became psychologically resegregated.  Because 
of this separation, many Duke administrators and faculty ignored the new 
Black students, for the most part dismissing them. With few exceptions, they 
avoided developing personal relationships with  these students and made no 
attempt to understand the values, expectations, and needs they brought to 
campus.
Like Bare Skin and Putting Salt on It 59
According to historian Jason Sokol, white southern author William Styron 
hoped that the civil rights movement would make it the “moral imperative of 
 every white southerner . . .  ‘to break down the old law’ and ‘to come to know the 
Negro,’ his real desires and fears, in fact rather than myth.”  Those who ran Duke 
did not meet this moral imperative. The Black students who arrived at Duke 
 were the best and the brightest in their communities with remarkable rec ords of 
achievement. Turner observed, however, that the university “ didn’t  really know 
who they had admitted.” Turner believed “that a lot of  people [at Duke] thought 
they had just gone up and down the street and just snatched some street urchins.”73
University leaders  were unable to move beyond their entrenched belief in 
“white exceptionalism.” They could not fathom that Black students did not 
come to Duke hoping to assimilate into white culture. “One of the biggest prob-
lems during this time,” Turner commented, was the presumption among Duke 
administrators and faculty “that whites had the best  thing  going, [and that] once 
 we’ve [created] opportunities for  others, they  will be glad to come in to this 
superior  thing that we have already fashioned. They did not have a clue,” Turner 
explained, “of how much [Duke’s Black students] enjoyed our life. . . .  It’s not 
like we  don’t have brilliance, excellence, intellectual, culturally,  etc. It  ain’t like 
we  don’t enjoy our churches and our singing. No, none of that’s true. So you 
are dealing with  people,” he concluded, “who had no clue as to who we  were.”74
Viewed from the perspective of the escalating conflict that followed, the 
university’s failure to relate empathetically to its new Black undergraduates 
was at best a lost opportunity. It was also a grave  mistake. Perhaps the prospect 
of engaging with Black students as equals—in the classroom, in the dorm, in 
the dining hall, on the athletic field— was too threatening at a university where 
many continued to view Blacks as inferior and segregation as a necessary part 
of the social order. In this context, it is pos si ble that the psychological isola-
tion imposed on Blacks following desegregation was a way for the university 
to mitigate the perceived threat  these students represented.
What ever the explanation, the absence of meaningful contact between 
white Duke administrators and faculty and the school’s Black students was 
a significant contributing  factor to the events that followed. Without the per-
sonal relationships that could result from such interactions, racial issues at 
Duke became increasingly difficult to resolve. “I was naive,” Knight remem-
bered. “I believed that the university had made its way  toward a time of mul-
tiracial ac cep tance of the world,  toward a triumphing over the past that the 
War Between the States represented. I honestly underestimated the force that 
[race] could still have when the pressure was on.”75
CHAPTER 3
Rights, as Opposed to Privileges
Race and Space
The Black students who came to Duke and other historically white colleges 
and universities in the early 1960s did not arrive on campus intent on launch-
ing a movement. Like their white peers, they arrived at college hoping to ben-
efit from positive academic and social experiences and to use their undergrad-
uate years as a springboard for personal and professional growth. The product 
of families, schools, and communities that had groomed them for success, 
Duke’s Black students looked forward to entering a professional world where 
opportunities  were expanding dramatically.
Like all freshmen, each of Duke’s Black students arrived on campus with 
a set of unique experiences, skills, and aspirations. Some had participated 
in the civil rights movement. For Bertie Howard, the movement had been 
a part of her childhood. “Many days my grade school was interrupted,” 
she recalled, “as we stood and applauded students from a local historically 
Black college as they marched downtown to picket local stores that would 
not hire African- Americans.” Howard’s sophomore homecoming football 
game was canceled, she remembered, “ because most of the [football] team 
was in jail for boycotting segregation.” “I have what is now a tiny  little scar,” 
Michael LeBlanc recounted in 2019, pointing to his forehead. “As a 135–40 
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pound thirteen-year-old, I got beat by the police for sitting down at Wool-
worths back in 1963 or 1964.”1
However, even with  these experiences, few of Duke’s first Black stu-
dents  were focused on protest or confrontation when they arrived on 
campus. Some arrived with feelings of gratitude toward the university for 
the chance to attend Duke. “We came in as the most benign, ineffectual 
 people they could possibly bring in,” Brenda Armstrong recalled. “ People 
who  were so afraid and so frightened by Duke, that we’d be overwhelmed 
by it. Thankful for being allowed to come  there.” C. G. Newsome de-
scribed the Black students entering Duke in the early years following 
desegregation as “the model kids in the communities they came out of. 
 These  were not troublemakers,” he stressed. Looking at  matters from the 
administration’s perspective, William Griffith, appointed vice provost 
and assistant dean of Arts and Sciences in the mid-1960s, also sensed that 
 these students did not come to Duke as activists. “I  don’t think we  were 
 really getting the militant student— out of the ghetto,” he recalled. “We 
 were getting the middle- class Black who almost had to discipline himself 
or herself to be a militant.”2
By 1966 several Black student leaders had emerged at Duke. One was Chuck 
Hopkins, who had arrived at college having been po liti cally active in high 
school. “I was  really influenced by stuff that was happening at other places,” 
Hopkins remembered. “Before I even got active dealing with the Black issues, 
some of my white friends [and I]  were  going downtown for vigils against the 
war. . . .  And the incidents right  here at Duke— all of  those  things  were having 
an impact and making me say to other students, ‘Hey—we need to be  doing 
something.’ ”3
Law students Charles Becton and J. Lee Hatcher  were also leaders. Both had 
been undergraduates at predominantly Black Howard University and “knew 
the kind of camaraderie that was  there.” They saw “none of that on Duke’s 
campus.” “Not only  were  there few of us,” Becton recalled, “but [the Black 
students] did not . . .  associate together . . .  to any  great degree.” Duke’s Black 
undergraduates, in Becton’s view, “faced the danger of being assimilated into 
a society without thoughts of their roots. . . .  I thought at least they needed 
to start meeting as a group to discuss common prob lems.” Stef McLeod also 
assumed an early leadership role. Studying to be an electrical engineer and, 
in the fall of 1966, president of the sophomore class in the School of Engineer-
ing, McLeod was seen by colleagues like Becton as someone who “had a good 
 handle on  things” developing on campus.4
62 Chapter three
Starting in 1966,  these students, along with a handful of  others, tried to or-
ga nize a meeting of Duke’s Black students. Although Black student groups had 
already formed on other campuses,  these initial organ izing efforts at Duke 
 were unsuccessful. Duke’s Black students  were simply not ready to meet as 
a group. “Chuck Hopkins, Stef McLeod, Charles Becton— they all had their 
heads at a place it took us all a year to get to,” Armstrong explained. “They had 
already de cided that Duke  didn’t want us at Duke. . . .  They had found that 
although Duke was willing to accept us, they had in no way changed the so-
cialization pro cess that goes on in college to accommodate Black students. . . . 
They had already seen that Duke had no intention of changing to meet what 
we thought  were our needs. We had to get to that point,” Armstrong said.5
The first group meeting of Duke’s Black students occurred in March 1967. 
By that time, circumstances had converged to make the students ready for 
such a gathering. One key  factor was a controversy over “race and space” that 
began in the fall of 1966 and focused on Duke’s long- standing practice of using 
segregated off- campus facilities for events sponsored by administration, fac-
ulty, student, and alumni groups.6
In the early years following desegregation, President Douglas M. Knight 
had been able to convince the Duke University board of trustees to eliminate 
certain vestiges of Jim Crow such as segregation at Duke University Hospital 
and a racially restrictive covenant in newly granted deeds to property in Duke 
Forest. Even  these changes, however, had not been easy. “I think the feeling 
[among board members] was that they had made a major concession in per-
mitting Black students to come to the university at all,” Knight recounted. 
“But  these other  matters  were not of a piece with that. The question of mixed 
wards, the question of housing— take the  whole list.” The view was, according 
to Knight, “ ‘we’ve let them in, now what’s the  matter?’ ”7
Despite this incremental pro gress, by 1966— four years  after Black gradu-
ate students first enrolled at Duke— the university had still not issued any 
policy restricting or other wise addressing the use of segregated off- campus 
facilities by university groups. Focused initially on university events hosted 
at nearby Hope Valley Country Club, the dispute soon broadened to include 
demands that Knight resign his membership in the segregated club. The seg-
regated facilities controversy provided both a backdrop and an initial focus 
for the emerging Black student movement at Duke. It also reignited the fears 
of many at Duke and in the Durham community that the admission of Black 
students to the university would inevitably disrupt the privileged social order 
existing outside campus. For de cades, Hope Valley Country Club had been 
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a haven for Durham’s white academic, business, and social elites. Members 
relished the chance to mix business with plea sure by hosting events at their 
club. They believed, director of alumni affairs Roger Marshall explained, that 
as members of a private club, they had the right to determine the membership 
policies and guest criteria “on any basis we want.”8 For them, the segregated 
facilities controversy represented a challenge to this “right.”
By any mea sure, Hope Valley Country Club was impressive. Founded in 
1926, its club house was constructed in a “classic Tudor design,”  today en-
compassing fifty- two thousand square feet of recreational facilities, includ-
ing dining, swimming, and tennis. Noted architect Donald Ross designed 
a championship eighteen- hole golf course for the country club. The Hope 
Valley residential district, Durham’s first “full- fledged country club suburb,” 
was developed with the course as its centerpiece. The country club and com-
munity sought to attract the young white professionals who, in 1926,  were 
thriving in Durham’s tobacco, textile, and health- care industries, as well as 
faculty members and administrators from recently endowed Duke Univer-
sity and the rapidly expanding University of North Carolina (unc).9 Hope 
Valley also turned out to be a perfect fit for the young physicians recruited to 
Duke following the completion of the Duke hospital in 1927. As the growth 
of the surrounding community accelerated, hundreds of Durham’s business 
and academic leaders joined the country club and enjoyed its many privi-
leges of membership.
Established only two years  after Trinity College had become Duke, Hope 
Valley Country Club essentially served as a social and recreational “annex” 
for the university. Duke administrators, faculty, students, and alumni took full 
 advantage of the many resources at the club, located about four miles from 
campus. As early as March 1928, for example, a Duke “ju nior social” was 
planned at the club. When Duke’s academic school year began in the fall of 
1928, the Duke Chronicle noted that  horse back riding would now be offered as 
a hobby for the school’s coeds at Hope Valley Country Club. In 1931 the club 
was the site for Kappa Kappa Gamma’s sorority social and Delta Delta Delta’s 
installation ceremony. At least as early as 1932, the Duke golf team used Hope 
Valley’s golf course for practice and tournaments. Over the years, university 
events such as commencements and alumni reunions routinely included 
 activities at Hope Valley.10
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Despite the variety of events at Hope Valley Country Club, all had one 
 thing in common: participation was open to white  people only. “Only per-
sons of good character and reputation who are of the Caucasian race  shall 
be qualified for membership in the Club,” its by- laws stated. As membership 
was  limited to whites, so too  were guest privileges. The only Black  people 
on the grounds  were  those providing landscaping, caddy,  house keeping, por-
ter, kitchen, and other ser vices to white members and guests. Black ser vice 
workers accessing the majestic Hope Valley club house  were required to enter 
through a back door.11
Given the club’s close connections to Duke, it was natu ral that Knight 
would become a member of Hope Valley. His application for membership 
proceeded smoothly.  After he was admitted, Knight told the club president 
that he and Mrs. Knight “look forward very much to the privilege of mem-
bership.” Duke reimbursed Knight for his $600 membership fee and paid his 
annual dues.12
Neither the school’s practice of holding events at segregated off- campus 
facilities nor Knight’s membership in Hope Valley drew much comment.13 
 Until 1966, the contradiction posed by a desegregated university holding 
off- campus events at a segregated location went largely unnoticed, at least by 
white administrators, faculty, and students.
C. B. Claiborne, Duke’s first Black basketball player, came to the univer-
sity in the fall of 1965. Growing up poor in Danville,  Virginia, Claiborne 
was a star player on a high school basketball team that rarely lost. He per-
formed well on precollege standardized tests and began to receive interest 
from schools around the country, including the Ivy League. “C. B. could 
have gone to any school in the country,” his high school coach Hank Allen 
commented. “ Whether he played anything or not, they still wanted him 
academically  because he was a brilliant kid.” Recruited by Duke basketball 
booster Al Newman, Claiborne received a National Achievement Schol-
arship for Outstanding Negro Students as well as financial support from 
Duke. “None of us ever thought about  going to a white school,” Claiborne 
recalled. “I was the first one in my community to go.” Still, choosing Duke 
“ wasn’t a hard decision,” Claiborne explained, “ because this is what I was 
expected to do. . . .  No one had ever had this opportunity before. . . .  You 
 don’t say no to it.”14
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Claiborne performed well both academically and on the basketball court. 
His play as a freshman earned him a “letter,” to be given out at the athletic 
department awards banquet scheduled for the spring of 1966. At the time, 
Eddie Cameron, Duke’s director of athletics, had just completed a term on 
the Hope Valley Country Club board of governors. Given the club’s close 
relationship with Duke, Hope Valley must have seemed ideal when it was 
chosen as the location for the awards banquet. Not for Claiborne, however. 
 There  were no exceptions to Hope Valley’s segregation policy. Actively re-
cruited, a standout on the basketball court, and a fine student, Claiborne 
was prohibited from attending the awards banquet. “I  couldn’t even go to 
receive my letter,” Claiborne recalled. “One of my teammates, Fred Lind, 
had to bring my sweater and my letter to me. But it  wasn’t just me. Duke 
University still had a bunch of functions at Hope Valley when it was still 
segregated.” Becton recalled this episode as a “catalyst” for many Black stu-
dents on campus.15
Duke’s nursing school had also de cided to hold its annual Christmas dance 
at Hope Valley in 1966. According to the Duke Chronicle, the committee was 
not aware of Hope Valley’s segregation policy when plans for the dance  were 
finalized. At almost the same time that the nursing school was making its 
plans, the  Women’s Student Government Association (wsga) was looking for 
a venue for its 1966 winter coed ball. Also unaware of the club’s segregation 
policy, the wsga reserved Hope Valley for its upcoming party.16
As the fall 1966 semester began, racial  matters continued to attract atten-
tion on campus. In September the school announced the appointment of visit-
ing po liti cal science professor Samuel DuBois Cook as its first Black faculty 
member. Soon, Cook was offered a permanent teaching position in the de-
partment, despite concerns expressed by Knight. When told by department 
chair John H. Hallowell that the department wanted to keep Cook at Duke, 
Knight responded, “Oh no, we  can’t have Sam  here.” As reported to Cook, 
Knight said, “It hurts fund rais ing,” among other  things. When Hallowell per-
sisted, telling Knight that the po liti cal science department “unanimously and 
enthusiastically” wanted to keep Cook at Duke, the Duke president was un-
moved. Hallowell was then very direct with Knight. “Well, you tell him,” he 
said. “I’m not  going to tell Sam we  don’t want him  here  because we do.” Cook 
never heard from Knight and soon became a permanent member of the Duke 
faculty.17
In early October 1966, the Duke Chronicle reported that a white Duke stu-
dent protester had been attacked and injured at a local Ku Klux Klan rally. The 
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episode occurred  after imperial wizard Robert Shelton urged that “subversive 
ele ments” be purged from the crowd.18
Perhaps most significant, the Duke community learned in early Octo-
ber that Knight had sent a letter to Duke’s fraternities and sororities direct-
ing them to eliminate all racial and religious restrictions to membership by 
September 1, 1967. The groups  were also asked to sign a nondiscrimination 
pledge. In his letter, Knight appeared to take the high ground, explaining that 
Duke could not permit the use of university property by any organ ization 
that, through its orga nizational documents or practice, bars members based 
on “race, creed or color.” Left unsaid by Knight was that the university acted 
to end discriminatory requirements only when the federal government threat-
ened to cut off funding if it failed to do so. Therefore, even as the nondiscrimi-
nation requirements  were announced, the university sought to reassure  those 
concerned. “Above all,” university vice provost Frank T. de Vyver stated, “this 
does not require integration at the local level.” The vice provost also declared 
that the university had no plans to monitor  whether sororities and fraternities 
had, in fact, met the new requirements.19 Thus, while Duke seemed commit-
ted on one level to a nondiscriminatory policy, on another, more basic level, it 
refused to follow through with direct action.
At almost the same time, final arrangements  were being made for wsga’s 
coed winter ball. To confirm that Hope Valley’s segregation policy would not 
be challenged, T. F. Brovard, man ag er of the club, contacted the wsga, in-
forming the group that a Black band could not play at Hope Valley and seek-
ing assurances that no Black students would attend the dance. Having now 
been made aware of Hope Valley’s segregation policy, the wsga de cided to 
move its coed winter ball to another location. The Duke Chronicle commented 
on the development, urging “President Knight and the other members of the 
faculty and administration who are members of the club to work to have the 
rules of the club changed.” The paper wanted university club members to “as-
sure that  there is never another such affront to the University community.”20
However, predictably, another “affront” was not long in appearing. As the 
nursing school was making final plans for its Christmas dance, it too was ad-
vised by Brovard that the dance could not be hosted at Hope Valley if any 
Black  people attended. At the time, no Black students  were enrolled in the 
nursing school and it was considered unlikely that a Black person would be 
invited to the dance as a guest. Still, the Nursing Student Government Asso-
ciation considered  whether the dance should be moved to another location. 
Significantly, the university remained neutral on the question. “Our student 
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government association is in a position to make decisions,” Mary Jane Burch, 
assistant dean of the nursing school, commented, “and it is their responsi-
bility.” When the association’s Executive Council met to consider  whether to 
move the Christmas dance, it de cided not only to relocate the upcoming event 
but also to prohibit the use of segregated facilities for all  future social events. 
The student body of the nursing school quickly voted overwhelmingly to af-
firm  these decisions.21
Stef McLeod wrote about the nursing school’s actions in an article pub-
lished in the Duke Chronicle titled “The Half- Student.” Perhaps the first widely 
distributed commentary on the racial climate at Duke published by a Black 
student, McLeod’s article detailed that the situation confronting the nursing 
school had served to point out “how . . .  the Negro student [at Duke] suddenly 
finds that he is a ‘half- student,’ discriminated against and offended daily in 
several aspects of this institution.” Calling the idea of using a segregated fa cil-
i ty “pathetic,” McLeod expressed relief “that the nurses, as a  whole,  were . . . 
committed enough . . .  to stand firm against” segregation. McLeod condemned 
the “hy poc risy and discrimination” that would allow a segregated fa cil i ty to 
even be considered as the venue for a dance sponsored by a Duke college.22
The controversy over segregated facilities continued to gain momentum 
during the final weeks of the fall 1966 semester. Just  after the action by the 
nursing school and the publication of McLeod’s article, the Men’s Student 
Government Association (msga) came out against the use of segregated facil-
ities for off- campus events. It also asked Robert B. Cox, dean of undergraduate 
men and associate dean of Trinity College, to remove five facilities known to 
be segregated from Duke’s “approved” list of off- campus venues.
Focus then shifted to a Duke- Durham Alumni Association dinner at Hope 
Valley planned for December 1. Although invitations to the dinner had already 
been sent to all “local alumni and friends of Duke,” the Hope Valley location 
precluded Black “alumni and friends” of Duke from attending. Questioned by 
the Duke Chronicle about the choice of location, M. Laney Funderburk, execu-
tive secretary of the Department of Alumni Affairs, informed the paper that 
the question of race prob ably never entered the minds of  those organ izing the 
dinner. What would happen if a Black person tried to attend? he was asked. 
“ We’ll cross that bridge when we come to it,” Funderburk responded. In an 
editorial, the Duke Chronicle expressed embarrassment that the Department 
of Alumni Affairs was unconcerned about an “affront” to Duke’s Black gradu-
ate school alumni and friends and called on Marshall to issue a statement of 
policy regarding “the use of segregated facilities for any alumni function.”23
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The Department of Alumni Affairs served as the front line of communica-
tion between Duke and its thousands of alumni, a segment of whom  were 
vocal in opposing recent changes at Duke. Many local alumni  were members 
of Hope Valley Country Club. Getting an alumni group to consider restrict-
ing its use of Hope Valley would be extremely difficult. As Knight observed, 
the  people working in alumni affairs “took on the color of the alumni.”24 Ac-
cordingly, even with segments of the university moving to a more progressive 
stance on race, alumni affairs continued to be very sensitive to the conser-
vative racial attitudes of former Duke students, particularly  those in North 
Carolina.
Compounding this dynamic, Marshall appears to have harbored attitudes 
 toward Black  people that made him resistant to changes in Duke’s racial poli-
cies.  These  were highlighted in a January 1966 exchange of letters with Wil-
liam M. Werber, a standout baseball player at the university who was also the 
first Duke basketball player to be named an All- American. In December 1965, 
the Duke Alumni Register, the school’s alumni magazine, published an article 
titled “Reason against Racism.” In response, Werber wrote a letter to the editor 
to put forth certain facts regarding “the coming clash between the white and 
colored races.” He said that he embraced “love thy neighbor” and similar con-
cepts “in theory,” but not in the case of race relations where your Black “neigh-
bor happens to be your dedicated  enemy” who has “sworn to bury his hatchet 
in your skull whenever you turn your back.” “Blacks, wherever found, . . .  have 
a demonstrated inability to compete in any society,” Werber wrote. “Wherever 
you find them in numbers you  will find illiteracy, poverty, disease and crime.” 
“You most certainly have my permission to publish this letter,” he told the edi-
tor, “for I believe it to be an expression of convictions held by the vast majority 
of Duke alumni.”25
Marshall responded to the letter. “I know that you have all the courage in 
the world,” he told Werber, “and that you are not reluctant to set forth your 
opinions firmly and emphatically, but I think always fairly.” Marshall wrote 
Werber that he had vetoed publication of his letter to the editor, however, 
 because he was worried about the reaction it would “excite among  people 
who, in their attachment to the opposite side of the cause, are perhaps less 
tolerant and more vituperative.” “Criticism of the Negro race, or even the 
toleration of such criticism, at the moment is most unfashionable on vir-
tually  every college campus in this country,” Marshall said. “I  don’t mind 
admitting,” Marshall concluded empathetically, “that I think it is most unre-
alistically unfashionable!”26
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As the alumni dinner approached, a committee of students and faculty was 
formed to coordinate picketing at the event. The University Caucus, an ad 
hoc group of undergraduates, gradu ate students, and faculty formed in Octo-
ber 1966 to consider campus issues outside the existing student government 
structure, endorsed the protest. While some caucus members worried that a 
public stand on the segregated facilities issue could cost the fledgling group 
support, one student saw the Hope Valley issue as a bellwether for  future con-
troversies. “ Those who are alienated by taking a stand on this,” Randy Shan-
non declared, “ will be alienated by our taking a stand on anything.”27
On November 30, the wsga joined the msga in opposing the use of off- 
campus segregated facilities by campus groups. Like the msga, the wsga 
sought to implement the policy by asking Cox to remove segregated facilities 
from the approved “social list” maintained for the  Woman’s College. At the 
same time, the wsga passed a resolution urging that all university events be 
held at desegregated facilities and “remonstrated” the Duke- Durham Alumni 
Association for hosting its upcoming dinner at Hope Valley.  These views  were 
communicated to Marshall.28
On December 1, the day of the alumni association dinner, Marshall re-
sponded to the student newspaper’s demand for a statement of policy. Sug-
gesting that the Duke Chronicle had implied that members of his department 
and Durham alumni “keep pointed hoods in the deeper recesses of their clos-
ets,” he assured students that “this is scarcely so.” Marshall pointed out that 
the permissive stance of the alumni affairs department on the use of segre-
gated facilities was “entirely consistent” with that of the university. Like  others 
who resisted change, Marshall characterized the segregated facilities issue as 
one involving “freedom of choice,” not discrimination. “I should think that 
anyone so concerned with the philosophy of in loco parentis on the campus,” 
Marshall patronizingly told the students, “would . . .  be entirely sympathetic 
with the opinion that it is neither practical nor desirable for the University to 
select the meeting places of all of its vari ous groups of alumni and friends.” 
Most Duke alumni are “sane, balanced, and considerate  people,” Marshall 
explained, who can be depended upon to “move quickly and gracefully in 
the right direction when circumstances become awkward.” Thus, it was up to 
Duke’s alumni and “well- intentioned . . .  Durham friends” to make a change 
“when, in their good judgment, conditions make their occasional meeting 
place of more than twenty years inappropriate.”29
The Duke Chronicle called Marshall’s explanation “unsatisfactory.” In an 
editorial, the paper explained that protesters at Hope Valley that eve ning  were 
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 there to demonstrate that “many within the University . . .  do not agree with 
 those practicing or supporting discrimination by attending the dinner.”30
A group of almost two hundred Duke students, with some faculty, picketed 
outside Hope Valley Country Club to protest the alumni association dinner. 
Both Black and white students joined the protest, including the leaders of the 
msga, wsga, and a number of other student groups. One protester carried a 
sign stating simply “ There are Negro Alumni” to communicate the contra-
diction posed by holding a Duke alumni event at a segregated club. Inside, 
attendees saw the co- captains of the football team honored and all graduat-
ing se niors on the team receive wrist watches. When reporters tried to enter 
the club, Brovard turned them away. Afterward, protest organizers called the 
demonstration a success. “Our public rejection of racial discrimination  will, 
hopefully, restrain further participation in segregated situations by any organi-
zations associated with Duke,” Harry Boyte and Clint Wilson declared.31
The nursing school, msga, and wsga had gone on rec ord opposing the use 
of segregated facilities by campus groups. The protest at Hope Valley Country 
Club had been well attended and had generated considerable local publicity. 
Thus, it is easy to see why some believed that the controversy over the uni-
versity’s use of segregated facilities could well be moving  toward resolution.
But such optimism was premature. In January, a local paper ran a picture 
of W. P. Budd, president of the Blue Dev ils Club, and basketball coach Vic 
Bubas at a club luncheon at Hope Valley, the Duke Chronicle observing that 
“it is disappointing that Bubas . . .  would be a party to embarrassing the Uni-
versity in this way.” Clearly no change in policy or practice had occurred. The 
msga and wsga  were similarly distressed to learn that their request to Cox 
that segregated facilities be removed from the university’s “approved list” for 
off- campus events would have no practical impact. Cox explained that while 
the university maintained a list of “suggested” facilities for off- campus events, 
it was not binding on campus groups. “I  couldn’t say, you  can’t go  here, you 
 can’t go  there,” Cox explained. “We do not want to be put in a position of being 
paternalistic.”32 As the fall 1966 semester ended, the segregated facilities issue 
remained unresolved.
Given his role as university president and his hands-on management style, 
Knight almost certainly would have signed off on actions taken by Marshall, 
Cox, and  others in his administration on the segregated facilities issue. He 
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likely knew that he would eventually be drawn into the controversy— not an 
inviting prospect. Knight risked badly damaging his relationship with what-
ever side of the dispute he ended up disappointing. Complicating  matters fur-
ther, Knight believed that much of the controversy was being “fabricated” by 
internal factions “who saw that  there  were fascinating games to be played.” 
“ There was as much push on one side as the other,” Knight recalled, “to try to 
get the university into a situation where it would have to make  great po liti cal 
noises that would be very happy noises for one group and very unhappy noises 
for another.” Students, Knight believed incorrectly, “went out of their way to 
pick a fa cil i ty that would pose an issue.”33
Initially, Knight looked for a practical solution to the prob lem. He asked 
his se nior management team to collect, on a very confidential basis, “infor-
mation about the restrictive regulations of private clubs which the University 
may want to use for meetings from time to time.” Knight believed that the ad-
ministration could “avoid a good bit of trou ble if we know this beforehand and 
quietly get the information out to groups that are likely to have large meet-
ings  here.” Knight understood that he was dealing with an “extremely delicate 
 matter.” “We could be construed as supporting the restrictive policies of the 
clubs,” he told his colleagues, “while on the other hand private organi zations 
must continue to have a right to select their own members.” Knight had “no 
desire,” he said, “to be backed by the Chronicle into a reactionary position on 
this one.”34
William Anlyan, dean of the medical school, responded to Knight’s re-
quest in a letter dated the following day, telling the Duke president that nei-
ther Hope Valley nor the Tobac Club admitted Black  people as members or 
guests. Anlyan also shared his view on the use of  these facilities. “It is, indeed, 
a shame,” Anlyan told Knight, “that the occasional Negro guest makes it nec-
essary not to use  these two facilities.” For the dean, the issue was a pragmatic 
one. “The message we need to get across to any critics,” he explained, “is that 
we have to get along with all segments of our society, and we cannot please 
every body all the time.” In a handwritten note, Anlyan added, “We have to 
maintain our ‘access’ to all  people.” Knight agreed with Anlyan’s view, re-
sponding, “Absolutely.”35
In December, university secretary Rufus H. Powell provided Knight 
with detailed information on the racial restrictions at local clubs. Powell’s 
report confirmed Anlyan’s information on Hope Valley and the Tobac Club; 
neither allowed Black members or guests. As to  whether Asians could be 
admitted as guests at the two clubs, Powell noted in his comments about 
72 Chapter three
Hope Valley: “Orientals? Dr. Luke Lee, Chinese, attended Dean Latty’s re-
ception, held  there.” He also told Knight that the Ambassador Club “prob-
ably  will accept Negro guests,” the Elks Club allowed use of its hall on an 
unrestricted basis but would not rent the fa cil i ty to “all- Negro groups,” and 
the Key Club at the Holiday Inn would only allow Black  people if they  were 
“guests of the Inn.”36
 There is no rec ord of  whether Knight tried to use this information to di-
rect university groups to the few desegregated Durham clubs. In any event, 
campus groups continued to use Hope Valley and other segregated facilities 
as 1967 arrived.
At the same time that pressure was building on Knight to clarify Duke’s 
policy on segregated facilities, he was challenged over his personal member-
ship at Hope Valley. The first communication came in a letter from under-
graduate Doug Adams, described by the Duke Chronicle as a “clean- shaven 
midwest Republican with deep religious convictions” who is both “a seri-
ous scholar and a committed activist.” “I know many Negroes (students and 
employees) and Jewish students and faculty,” Adams wrote to Knight, “who 
are greatly hurt by your continued support (however minimal) of a segre-
gated club which has upon several occasions insulted members of the Duke 
community.” Although acknowledging that resigning from the club “ will 
cause difficulties in your relations with the Durham community,” Adams 
argued that the action would “greatly improve [Knight’s] relations in the 
Duke community.”37
Soon thereafter, the University Caucus presented Knight with its own 
resolution. While the resolution acknowledged that Knight’s membership 
in Hope Valley “may be valuable to the University in terms [of] community 
relations,” it nevertheless called on him to resign. “We believe that,  because 
of his office,” the resolution stated, Knight “uniquely represents the Uni-
versity in the community, and his underwriting of the policies of this Club 
jeopardizes the seriousness with which the stated policies of the University 
can be taken.”38
Knight knew that he would have to respond. The challenge to his per-
sonal membership at Hope Valley was even more problematic for Knight 
than the related dispute over the university’s use of segregated facilities. If 
forced to resign, Knight knew that his relationship with the many Duke and 
Durham leaders who  were Hope Valley members would be severely dam-
aged. In responding to Adams, Knight tried to buy time by warning about 
the need to avoid publicity. “If I  were put  under any public pressure to 
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resign,” he wrote, “I would then be in a situation where I’m afraid I  couldn’t 
do a good job of discussing the prob lem, let alone finding a constructive 
answer to it.”39
Shortly  after the adoption of the University Caucus resolution, two student 
representatives of the Council of the Methodist Church at Duke University 
weighed in as well. Emphasizing the university’s religious roots, the students 
wrote that “Duke University has a unique responsibility in as much as its motto 
is ‘Erudito et Religio.’ ” The students asked how this tradition was manifested 
in its pre sent life. They recognized that “too often the distinction is blurred 
between Dr. Knight, the President of Duke University, . . .  and Dr. Knight, the 
man.” Regretting “the conflicts this blurred distinction must often bring,” the 
students told Knight that they felt “in this situation, Dr. Knight the symbol 
should take pre ce dence.”40
Before the semester ended, Knight tried to or ga nize his thoughts on 
the resignation demand by scribbling notes on the back of an envelope. 
He was clearly attempting to rationalize his continued membership in 
Hope Valley. First, he rejected the argument that his position as univer-
sity president required that he limit the choices he made in his “private” 
life. “What about referencing other restrictions,” he asked testily. “Should 
[the] president belong to a par tic u lar church, or no church (since his mem-
bership is offensive to some)[?]” “Should he live by the codes of  others?” 
More broadly, Knight did not accept the argument that his membership in 
a segregated club meant that Duke University, as an institution, practiced 
discrimination. “The university is not as such the espouser of this or that 
cause,” Knight wrote, “ unless the cause stands at the center of  human free-
dom or the center of the university’s own action.” Knight apparently did 
not see Hope Valley’s “Caucasian only” membership policy as “standing at 
the center of  human freedom.” Although the school paid his Hope Valley 
dues and Knight routinely used the club for university business, the Duke 
president did not view his connection to Hope Valley as standing “at the 
center of the [university’s] own action.” Clearly, Knight seemed ready to 
engage in elaborate  mental gymnastics to avoid taking the po liti cally costly 
step of resigning from the club.
Notably, Knight’s analy sis did not account for the rights or needs of the 
school’s Black students. His approach was more tactical than substantive. 
Concerned that a backlash could tie his hands, Knight wrote, “The cause in 
question would be damaged by the action called for.”41 Knight was clearly frus-
trated, and he saw the Hope Valley issue as increasingly perilous. This was 
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an accurate perception. By the spring semester, Duke’s Black students would 
emerge as a power ful voice in the controversy.
Although by 1967 a number of long- standing traditions at Duke had been 
set aside, the annual practice of crowning a “May Queen” endured. Se lection 
of the queen was a centerpiece of popu lar May Day cele brations, a holi-
day whose origins date back to the ancient world. Villa gers throughout Eu-
rope would collect flowers and participate in games, pageants, and dances 
throughout the day. It became customary to crown a young  woman May 
Queen to oversee the festivities. During the early twentieth  century, se-
lection of a May Queen became common at  women’s colleges in the United 
States and had acquired a special meaning in the South. “The crowning of 
the May queen as the ritual incantation of Southern society’s ideal of femi-
ninity,” historian Christie Anne Farnham wrote, “was a traditional event at 
Southern female schools. . . .  The queen was usually elected by the students 
on the basis of ‘sweetness’ and beauty,” Farnham explained, “although the 
 father’s status often played a role.”42
May Queen traditions at Duke dated back to 1921 when the school was still 
known as Trinity College. The Trinity Chronicle reported that two thousand 
spectators attended May Day festivities that first year and that the two- day 
cele bration was spent “in gaiety and amusement.” Undergraduate Martha 
Wiggins was crowned May Queen that year. The school newspaper wrote 
that she “wore a lovely costume of shimmering white, bearing a corsage of 
white roses with her golden hair cascading in waves down her back, making a 
charming picture of perfect grace and absolute loveliness.”43
Given this context, it was newsworthy when Wilhelmina Reuben, a mem-
ber of Duke’s first class of Black undergraduates, was selected as the  Woman’s 
College’s May Queen in the spring of 1967. As runners-up in the voting, white 
coeds Mary Earle and Jo Humphreys  were designated to serve as Reuben’s 
“court.” The Associated Press picked up the news, reporting that “Mimi, as she 
is known to her friends, is a Negro— the first of her race to receive the honor 
at the  women’s college of the university.” Chosen for her character, leader-
ship, campus ser vice, and beauty, Reuben had been selected May Queen by 
a vote of students in the  Woman’s College. A fact sheet on Reuben prepared 
by Mary Grace Wilson, dean of  women, described her as “warm, friendly, 
perceptive and sensitive to the feelings of  others.” Wilson called her “one of 
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the most admired and highly respected students on the campus.” Reuben was 
a member of the freshman honor society and was elected to Phi Beta Kappa 
as a ju nior. A student intern at the State Department, she was listed in “Who’s 
Who Among Students in American Universities and Colleges.” For her part, 
Reuben was pleased by her se lection. “I’m still trying to adjust to it,” she told 
the Associated Press. “I’ve been walking around in a delightful haze of disbe-
lief and excitement.”44
Many at Duke  were pleased with the news. Randolph C. Harrison Jr., an 
alumnus from Richmond,  Virginia, wrote to Knight that the “undergraduates’ 
choice of Miss Reuben as May Queen attests once more to Duke’s greatness. 
What a step  towards inter- racial accord.”45
If Reuben’s election represented pro gress to some, however, the prospect of 
a Black May Queen flanked by two white members of her “court” felt like a vi-
olation of the established social order to  others. Jonathan C. Kinney, president 
of the Associated Students of Duke University (asdu), the unified student 
government, saw the reaction when he had the responsibility of “crowning” 
the queen and her court. “I kissed all the rest of the panel,” he recalled, “so I 
kissed [Wilhelmina Reuben].  There  were a lot of boos in that stadium at that 
time.” An anonymous alumnus sent the Duke president pictures of the “pretty 
May Queens chosen at Peace, St. Mary’s, and Meredith Colleges,” all of whom 
 were white, along with a picture of Reuben, “a colored girl who was chosen 
May Queen at our Dear Ole Duke University.” The alumnus noted the “de-
plorable contrast between the May Queens of other colleges and the stunning 
representative from Duke.” He told Knight that “Duke Alumni everywhere 
 were stunned and several in South Carolina had strokes.” One correspondent, 
identified as a “lifelong, respected citizen of Wilmington, North Carolina,” 
outlined with exasperation the prob lems that Reuben’s election was creating 
at the city’s annual Azalea Festival where May Queens from throughout North 
Carolina  were invited to attend: “The Sprunt’s annual garden party at Orton 
[Plantation] for the college queens (held for the past 20 years) has been can-
celled; the Coastguard Acad emy, which was supposed to furnish her escort, 
says they  don’t have a colored boy available; the private home in which she was 
supposed to stay is not now available; and  there are all sorts of complications. 
The crowd who elected her has done a disser vice to her,” the writer opined, 
“and placed a no doubt nice girl in an embarrassing situation.”46
Fi nally, two trustees weighed in. C. B. Houck told Knight that he liked and 
respected “the colored  people” and wanted them to have “ every opportunity 
that the white  people have.” Still, he thought Reuben’s election was in “bad 
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taste” and that the “East Campus girls  were leaning over backwards to be nice.” 
For Houck, the symbolism was deeply troubling. “To select a colored person 
for May Queen and have white maids of honor flanking her on  either side,” 
he concluded, “makes for poor and critical relationship [sic] among many 
 people, particularly in the South.” Trustee George M. Ivey Jr. was also deeply 
concerned. Writing from Bangkok, Thailand, he called Reuben’s se lection “very 
upsetting to me.” Even if the se lection was by Duke’s coeds, Ivey regretted “that 
the University has attracted the type of students that would vote for a Negro girl 
as a ‘beauty’ to represent the student body. It is nauseating to contemplate.”47
Although Knight responded to almost  every letter, he was not unaware that 
the May Queen episode damaged him po liti cally in the eyes of some board 
members and alumni. Knight  later wrote that Reuben “became known among 
board members as ‘Doug’s dusky beauty queen,’ ” and he believed that George 
Ivey, among  others, held him responsible for Reuben’s election. “Black un-
dergraduates  were new at Duke,” Knight wrote, “and a strong minority of the 
Trustees had been opposed to their admission. The same, alas, turned out to 
be true of the alumni during  these trou bles; each critical event compounded 
those before it, and I found myself riding a historic wave, which— according 
to my constituents— I should have been able to control.”48
Knight viewed such opinions as “an absolute bit of my thol ogy” but ac-
knowledged that “ there was no way to  free myself. If I had not chosen her 
myself, I had created a climate in which she could be chosen.” From that point 
forward, Knight explained, Ivey was always disaffected: “He had been trou-
bled enough before, but that just finished it off.”49
The attitudes expressed in the letters to Knight about Reuben’s election 
are also impor tant. To Knight’s credit, by the spring of 1967, Duke had elimi-
nated most of the school’s de jure discriminatory policies and practices. Reu-
ben’s election as May Queen could be seen as another positive sign of racial 
 pro gress. But the episode also shined a spotlight on the depth of attachment 
some still had to traditional racist ideas.  These attitudes would become even 
more pronounced as Black students at Duke began to assert themselves.
By the spring of 1967, a core of self- conscious and effective Black student lead-
ers like Hopkins, McLeod, Becton, and Hatcher had emerged on Duke’s cam-
pus. While Duke’s Black students  were far from monolithic, many  were now 
developing a deeper understanding of the consequences of the university’s 
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failure to fully acknowledge— and prepare for— their presence on campus. 
William Turner recognized that Duke had not “come to terms with what it 
meant, practically speaking, to have a significant Black student population 
on campus.” Janice Williams came to see that Duke was trying to “mesh two 
cultures and actually negating one.” The university did not, according to Wil-
liams, realize that Black and white students “truly do come from a diff er ent 
background.” Duke’s Black undergraduates, in addition to seeking a good 
education, had “certain identity needs, certain cultural needs, and emotional 
needs” that could not be forgotten. Armstrong put it most simply: “We came 
in thinking we should be thankful. Around about February, we  didn’t know 
what we should be thankful for.”50 Clearly, any feelings of gratitude Duke’s 
Black students felt for the chance to attend the university  were disappearing.
 Until the fall of 1966, the small number of Black undergraduates at Duke, 
and their isolation from one another, made establishing a cohesive group dif-
ficult. In September 1966, however, eigh teen Black freshmen enrolled at Duke. 
As Armstrong described it, this established a “critical mass of ‘us’ ” sufficient 
to forge a collective identity.51
Just as Duke’s Black students  were increasing in number and gaining insight 
into their situation at the university, a long- simmering generational schism in 
the civil rights movement exploded into the open. Martin Luther King Jr. had 
offered Black and white citizens a miracle born of nonviolent protest that held 
the promise of ending racial in equality in Amer i ca and integrating Black  people 
into mainstream society. But ever since the sit-in movement of 1960, a younger 
generation of leaders had started to see the prospects for change very differently. 
Frustrated by the slow pace of change in the civil rights movement and assaulted 
by the deaths of civil rights workers like Andrew Goodman, Michael Schwerner, 
and James Chaney in Mississippi in June 1964; the assassination of Malcolm X 
in February 1965; and the widely covered carnage of “Bloody Sunday” on the 
Edmund Pettus Bridge in Birmingham, Alabama, in March 1965, new, more 
militant leaders began to emerge.  These new leaders had found, according to 
one historian, that “history could not be eradicated so easily, nor could the cen-
tral significance of race to all American institutions and culture be rooted out 
simply through warm feelings.”  These young leaders “concluded that white in-
stitutions and white  people could not be trusted, and that their promises  were 
simply another effort to control and define what black Amer i ca was all about.”52
The most prominent of the new leaders was Stokely Carmichael, a gradu ate 
of Howard University who was elected head of the Student Nonviolent Coor-
dinating Committee (sncc) in May 1966. “A striking thinker and speaker,” 
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Ibram X. Kendi wrote, “the courageous, captivating, and charismatic Carmi-
chael embodied the new defiant young Black generation that Malcolm X had 
seen approaching around history’s corner.”  After his arrest at the June 1966 
March against Fear in Mississippi, Carmichael injected the words Black Power 
into the national conversation. Speaking to a crowd in Greenwood, Missis-
sippi, Carmichael told his audience that “the only way we gonna stop them 
white men from whuppin’ us is to take over.” For Carmichael, taking over 
meant “Black Power.” “We been saying ‘freedom’ for six years and we  ain’t got 
nothin’, ” Carmichael exclaimed. “What we gonna start saying now is Black 
Power!” “Almost immediately,” historian William Chafe observed, the Black 
Power “slogan became a rallying cry for blacks as well as a justification for a 
white backlash against the civil rights movement.”53
In Black Power: The Politics of Liberation, Carmichael and po liti cal scientist 
Charles V. Hamilton described Black Power as “a call for black  people in this 
country to unite, to recognize their heritage, to build a sense of community. 
It is a call for black  people to begin to define their own goals, to lead their 
own organ izations and to support  those organ izations. It is a call to reject the 
racist institutions and values of this society.” Carmichael and Hamilton saw 
group solidarity as the key. For them, the fundamental premise of Black Power 
was that “group solidarity is necessary before a group can operate effectively 
from a bargaining position of strength in a pluralistic society.” As Chafe ex-
plained, Black Power “required that blacks— not ‘good’ whites— control their 
own institutions, their own programs, their own demands.” It also rejected 
the integration of Black  people into a nation dominated by white values and 
institutions as the appropriate goal for the civil rights movement. Significantly, 
Black Power questioned the view that nonviolence was the only acceptable 
strategy in the Black freedom strug gle. “Black Power spokespersons,” histo-
rian William L. Van Deburg wrote, “felt that a beleaguered minority could 
hope to survive in the violent milieu of late- twentieth- century Amer i ca only 
by developing the  will and the ability to retaliate against outside attacks.” As 
Carmichael explained, “nothing more quickly repels someone bent on de-
stroying you than the unequivocal message: ‘O.K., fool, make your move, and 
run the same risk I run—of  dying.’ ”54
On September 27, 1966,  under the front- page headline “ ‘Black Power’ In-
terpretation Due,” the Duke Chronicle announced that community or ga nizer 
Howard Fuller would be speaking on the Duke campus that eve ning. Hopkins 
was struck by the description of Fuller in the article as a “moderately militant 
Black Power advocate.” “That blew my mind,” Hopkins recalled. “I said, ‘Who 
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is this guy?’ . . .  In 196[6], to be a Black Power advocate was enough to make 
you a radical, if not a revolutionary. And  here was this guy who was supposed 
to be a ‘moderately militant Black Power advocate.’ So I went to the seminar.”55
That eve ning, Fuller addressed ideas at the center of the evolving concept 
of Black Power. Fuller told his audience that “integration at this time can-
not be the answer when all of the power is in the hands of the white  people.” 
He identified or ga nized Black po liti cal and economic strength as a necessary 
prelude to meaningful integration. Fuller derided the incremental pro gress 
 toward integration achieved by the civil rights movement and emphasized 
that for Blacks to achieve an equal share of power, “the black man must begin 
to be proud of his blackness.” He also rejected the contention made by some in 
the white and Black communities that Black Power had led to vio lence. “You 
 don’t get  people to come out and burn  things  unless they see . . .  nothing but 
dead roads ahead,” Fuller explained. His talk impressed Hopkins. “ After that 
we got together,” Hopkins remembered. “We became good, good friends.”56
Fuller was not the only speaker on Black Power at Duke during this pe-
riod. As the most prominent Black Power advocate in the country, Stokely 
Carmichael spoke at dozens of community rallies and as many as twenty- five 
college campuses during the 1966–67 academic year. In March 1967, Carmi-
chael visited Duke at the invitation of Lee Hatcher, who had known the sncc 
leader when both  were undergraduates at Howard University. Carmichael 
spoke before a packed crowd in Page Auditorium. Hatcher introduced him, 
calling Carmichael a “historic figure” who has “made a  great,  great impact on 
American Black  people and . . .  is destined to bring our  people to freedom.”57
In his prepared remarks and the question- and- answer session that fol-
lowed, Carmichael used trenchant po liti cal analy sis, provocative rhe toric, 
and wit to challenge long- standing assumptions held by both Black and white 
members of the audience. Carmichael critiqued the tactics and goals of the 
civil rights movement while arguing that the development of in de pen dent 
Black culture and institutions was essential to achieving change. Carmichael 
argued that “to bring about changes in the status quo, one needs power— not 
love, not non- violence, or morality— that’s when you are developing a reli-
gion. When you want to bring change, you need power.” “I’m not a pacifist,” 
Carmichael explained. “If somebody tries to kill me, I’m  going to shoot them 
before God gets the news. Dr. King would be willing to die to prove his point,” 
Carmichael observed. “I would rather live and prove my point.”58
Carmichael rejected integration as the goal of the Black freedom strug gle. 
Integration was based, Carmichael argued, on the “assumption that  there was 
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nothing of value in the Negro community and that  little of value could be cre-
ated among Negroes.” The civil rights movement was not seeking, according 
to Carmichael, to achieve pro gress for Black  people as a group. Rather, “its 
goal was to make the white community accessible to ‘qualified’ Negroes” so 
that “each year a few more Negroes armed with their passport— a  couple of 
university degrees— would escape into middle- class Amer i ca and adopt the 
attitudes and lifestyles of that group.” Instead of integration, the focus of the 
Black freedom strug gle, Carmichael said, should be to “return to the ghetto to 
or ga nize  these communities to control themselves.”59
Carmichael also challenged the white educational system. “I do not be-
lieve that the educational system in this country is perpetrated to help Black 
 people,” Carmichael noted. “It is perpetrated to help white  people and rein-
forces white supremacy without even many of the white  people noticing it. . . . 
It reinforces and gives validity to the values and institutions of this society. . . . 
That is the prob lem with education. One is given technical skills but one is 
[also] given an ideology . . .  [that] warps the mind of Black  people in this 
country.” More broadly, Carmichael argued that white  people should have no 
direct role in the Black freedom strug gle. Instead, whites should return to 
their communities, or ga nize poor white  people, and attack institutional rac-
ism “so that Black Power become[s] a real ity without bloodshed.”60
Carmichael’s critique of the civil rights movement, institutional racism, 
and the contradictions faced by Black students attending a white university 
resonated powerfully with Duke’s Black students. “Stokely Carmichael just . . . 
brought it home,” Armstrong recalled. “All of a sudden,  there was someone 
who knew nothing about Duke who came in and just . . .  described in a very 
graphic way exactly what was happening to us [on campus].  Things that we 
had tried to neglect.” Armstrong’s reaction to Carmichael was not uncommon. 
 After Carmichael spoke at Tougaloo College outside Jackson, Mississippi, the 
student newspaper reported “a new awareness in the minds of the students. 
 There has been a lot of thinking  going on since he left, and  these have been 
profound thoughts about US Black  people.” Aaron Dixon commented  after 
hearing Carmichael speak at his Seattle high school that “the way I looked at 
myself and Amer i ca changed.”61
Carmichael’s visit to Duke reignited discussions about organ izing Duke’s 
Black students. Charles Becton remembered a conversation with Lee Hatcher, 
campus visitor Samuel Shoots, and undergraduates Stef McLeod and Charles 
Hopkins  after Carmichael’s speech at the law school. We  were “walking out . . . 
talking about the need to get together as a group and stay together as a group,” 
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Becton explained, “and Samuel was telling us  there was an [or ga nized Black 
group] at Tennessee State [University]. Almost si mul ta neously we said, ‘Why 
 don’t we do that  here at Duke?’ ” With that, Becton and Hatcher asked Hopkins 
and McLeod to round up Duke’s Black undergraduates for a meeting. Now, when 
Hopkins approached his colleagues about getting together, their response was 
positive. Within a week of Carmichael’s visit, the first group meeting of Duke’s 
Black students was held. That meeting, Becton observed, “was the beginning.”62
Virtually all Black students at Duke attended the first meeting, although 
some came with misgivings. Armstrong, for example, remembered “being 
awfully afraid.” For her, the meeting “represented . . .  a real revolutionary 
move . . .  because I always associated it with a certain form of militancy.” Bec-
ton remembered one student speaking out against the formation of a Black 
student group. “He came to the first meeting saying,” according to Becton, 
“ ‘we’ve got to all live together. We  can’t be holding separate meetings. What 
can you accomplish? You  can’t live in a separate society.’ ”63
With Becton, Hatcher, McLeod, and Hopkins leading the conversation, 
Duke’s Black students got to know one another. “ There  were Blacks on cam-
pus we  didn’t know  were on campus,” Becton recalled. “Basically, studying by 
themselves.” “Some of the  people that the undergraduates thought  were . . . 
janitorial staff,” Brenda Brown remembered, “turned out to be gradu ate 
students.” A key step at the first meeting was the decision to establish the 
Duke Afro- American Society (aas). In so  doing, Duke’s Black students 
joined counter parts at other colleges and universities who had formed simi-
lar organi zations. Scholars have recognized the key role  these Black student 
organ izations played in the Black activism that developed on many campuses. 
Sociologist William Exum described such student groups as “exclusively 
black in membership, monolithic in appearance, highly self- conscious, and 
motivated by sociopo liti cal concerns.” Education professor Joy Ann William-
son noted that such groups “worked  towards providing Black students with 
a structured and legitimate power base from which to force change at their 
institutions.” While some student leaders at Duke viewed the aas in  these po-
liti cal terms, most students, at least initially, had more practical goals in mind. 
“We de cided to make some formal structure,” Brown recalled, “to make sure 
we  didn’t all get scattered and out of contact with each other.” Accordingly, the 
initial focus of the aas was to foster interpersonal connections. “The po liti cal 
evolution of the Afro- American Society came  after the social evolution,” Arm-
strong observed. Looking back, she remembered “a tremendous amount of 
needing to be with Black  people on campus.” The first proj ect undertaken by 
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the group was the preparation of a Black student directory listing the names, 
addresses, phone numbers, and major areas of study of all Black students on 
campus. With that contact information, “we had a  couple of parties,” Becton 
remembered, “just to get together.”64
The early meetings of the aas  were not expressly “po liti cal.” “Helping each 
other out— that’s what it was all about at first,” Becton recalled. Once Black 
students started to interact, individual experiences started to emerge as pieces 
of a broader pattern. “We talked about  things that concerned us,” Becton re-
membered. “We realized that a lot of  things  were happening that we just  didn’t 
know about.”  These interactions  were crucial  because they eased the isolation 
many Black students  were experiencing. Isolation was “disorienting,” Chuck 
Hopkins explained. “You  were at Duke, but before something happened to 
you [personally], you knew something was wrong but you had no overt expe-
rience of [it]. When you fi nally got to know another Black student and you sat 
down and talked about experiences—it was a relief.”65
As personal connections multiplied, a sense of community began to 
emerge. Common experiences, Armstrong explained, “served as the impetus 
for making the Black students who  were at Duke at that time a very cohesive 
group.” “We . . .  became  family,” Janice Williams explained. “You needed some-
one to catch you, someone to fall back on, someone who understood all  those 
 little  things.”66
The initial student leaders remained highly vis i ble during the early aas 
meetings. Becton, Hatcher, Hopkins, and McLeod “ were such strong individ-
uals,” Armstrong explained, “that they provided a protective umbrella for all 
of us.” “We spent a  great deal of time just talking to the kids,” Becton recalled, 
“letting them know  there was no reason they  were being treated this way.” 
Discussions also focused on the changes needed at Duke. “Once we started 
talking to  people, we found out all sorts of prob lems—we needed tutors, we 
needed all sorts of  things,” Becton remembered.67
In April, Hopkins was elected the first chair of the aas. “It was a consensus,” 
Armstrong remarked. “Chuck was . . .  elected  because he was the most vocal, 
he was the most vis i ble, he seemed to have the politics right, and he seemed to 
be much more familiar with the ‘ins and outs’ of Duke than we  were.” Hopkins 
embraced his leadership role. “It was something that I thought was right, it 
was something I felt strongly about,” Hopkins explained. “I wanted to move 
 people to [a higher] level of thinking.”68
Just as regular aas meetings began, the segregated facilities controversy 
reignited. Sigma Alpha Epsilon (sae) fraternity de cided to hold its pledge 
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formal at Hope Valley Country Club on April 8, 1967. The Duke Chronicle 
reported the location and time of the dance and publicized plans by an ad 
hoc committee to picket the event. The ad hoc committee explained that the 
purpose of the picketing was to “protest and to express the insult to black 
students . . .  brought about by the University’s lack of clearly stated policies 
concerning the patronage of segregated facilities by [university] groups.” One 
member of sae described  matters very differently. In a letter to the editor of 
the Duke Chronicle, he asserted that the choice of Hope Valley had nothing to 
do with race. Describing Hope Valley as a “nice establishment,” he explained 
that several members of the sae pledge class had  fathers who  were mem-
bers of Hope Valley. The fraternity had simply “de cided to take advantage of 
the opportunity to have our formal  there.” In an editorial, the Duke Chronicle 
compared sae unfavorably to the nursing school and wsga: a year  earlier, 
they had “had the guts to say no to Hope Valley Country Club which they 
realized would discriminate against fellow students.” Sarcastically, the paper 
urged sae members to “hold your heads high, men.”69
On the same day as the sae formal, the Duke Chronicle published a list 
of Duke administrators and professors who  were members of Hope Valley 
Country Club. The list was extensive—in addition to Knight, it included 
Duke’s president emeritus, vice president for business and finance, provost, 
vice provost, university counsel, university librarian, director of physical edu-
cation and athletics, head basketball coach, dean of the law school, and five 
law professors. The Duke Chronicle also noted that more than fifty members 
of the university’s medical school and hospital staff  were members of the seg-
regated club.70 Some noted that the list of Hope Valley members included 
many of the Duke se nior administrators directly involved in setting university 
policy on the use of the fa cil i ty by campus groups.
The renewed attention to the segregated facilities issue soon became a topic 
of discussion at aas meetings. “Without  those meetings, we  wouldn’t have 
known where fraternities had their parties,” Brown remembered. “I  wasn’t even 
interested that they had them.” Armstrong explained how the perception of 
the issue evolved. “It  wasn’t  until the end of my freshman year [in the spring of 
1967] or the beginning of my sophomore year,” she recounted, “that we could 
understand what Hope Valley was. To condone Hope Valley and yet take in 
Black students was an obvious contradiction. Mutually exclusive views.”71
Aware that the school year would be ending in a few weeks, aas leaders 
 were seeking an issue that could be used as a catalyst for group action while 
publicizing that Duke’s Black students had gotten or ga nized. With the sae 
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pledge formal and a roster of Hope Valley members now attracting publicity 
in the Duke Chronicle, aas leaders de cided to publish an “open letter” to the 
many Duke administrators and faculty members who  were members of the 
club. “It was definitely an orga nizational tool,” Chuck Hopkins remembered. 
“We had just started so we wanted to pre sent ourselves in some form. . . .  It 
was a chance to get out and do something active.”72
Drafted by Hatcher and published in the Duke Chronicle on April 25, 1967, 
the open letter was signed by thirty- eight of the university’s approximately 
fifty- two Black students. While recognizing “the right of any individual at 
[Duke] to belong to any private organ ization,” the letter highlighted the con-
flict presented when a university publicly committed itself to racial equality 
yet allowed dozens of its administrators and faculty to participate in a private 
segregated club. “It is one  thing,” the letter asserted, “for the Administrators of 
this institution to say that we accept you Negro students  here at the University 
on the same basis that we do other students, and quite another to smack us 
in the face by indicating in your private lives that you  will not treat Negroes 
equally with  others. The two are directly contradictory and must be consid-
ered irreconcilable.”73
The open letter cast the Hope Valley memberships as part of a broader pat-
tern of indifference to the needs of Black students at Duke. “We, as a group of 
Negro students, are fairly convinced,” the letter explained, “that our sole pur-
pose  here at the University is confined to that of being con spic u ous.” In sup-
port, the letter cited Duke’s failure to act in the interests of its Black students 
in areas such as gradu ate school housing, social life, and the hiring of Blacks 
in administrative positions. “For the school to continue sanctioning the use 
of segregated facilities by the vari ous groups in the University community,” 
the letter stated, “is an arrogance so flagrant as to suggest contempt for our 
well  being.” Despite using strong language, however, the letter made no ex-
press demand that Duke’s Hope Valley members resign from the club. Rather, 
the open letter simply expressed “dismay” at Duke administrators and faculty 
who  were Hope Valley members. It ended by warning  these individuals that 
they would “receive ample rewards for your misdoings.”74
That thirty- eight of Duke’s Black students signed the open letter reflected 
the orga nizational strides the group had made by April 1967. The letter also dis-
played an advancing level of po liti cal analy sis about the university’s use of seg-
regated facilities as well as other significant issues faced by the Black students 
at Duke. Still, the open letter demonstrated caution and restraint. Armstrong 
characterized the tone of the letter as “strongly pleading.” The message, she said, 
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was “please do this so we  won’t have to do something  else.” “That’s not to say 
 there  weren’t  people who felt much more strongly. . . .  It reflect[ed] the over-
whelming majority Black student view,” she explained, “that we  ought to be a 
 little more conservative about approaching this type of prob lem.” Even so, sign-
ing the letter was not taken lightly. “All of us came from pretty sheltered types of 
environments,” Armstrong noted, “and most of us  were  really afraid of what this 
represented. We knew this was just a first step— all of us realized that.”75
Knight was coming to the end of a very difficult school year. His leadership 
was  under increasing scrutiny, not only by students. The “Fifth De cade Plan,” 
Knight’s ambitious roadmap for transforming Duke into a leading national uni-
versity, had been announced to wide acclaim a  couple of years  earlier. Now, the 
$187 million plan had started to generate opposition, especially from Endow-
ment trustees. Race played a role. “Trustees who other wise would have stepped 
up to the plate [to support the Fifth De cade Plan]  were so . . .  both ered by racial 
issues,” Knight reflected, “that one could no longer keep the lines clear.”76
Traveling constantly, the Duke president was exhausted. “ Every day in the 
 later sixties,” Knight wrote in his memoir, “I was burning more energy— more 
of myself— than I could replenish. . . .  I was using up the capital of my mind 
and body, with no reasonable hope of protecting and restoring  either one. 
Life had become relentless and I could do nothing to change it.” When Duke 
students returned for the fall semester, they learned that Knight had been 
hospitalized over the summer with a case of hepatitis and faced a “lengthy 
period of recuperation.”77
In the fall of 1967, the sense of community among Duke’s Black students con-
tinued to grow. Their exploration of the cultural and po liti cal aspects of Black 
Power deepened, and the aas began to develop strategies to force change at 
the university.
One impor tant development was the arrival of forty Black freshmen. 
The larger number of Black students in the fall of 1967— now sixty- seven 
undergraduates— made fostering connections easier. “Once  there got to be 
more and more of us  there,” Brown observed, “you felt like  there was someone 
 there to reach out to.” “You  couldn’t very well [develop your own society] with 
twenty  people,” Howard explained. “You needed numbers.”78
With the influx of Black students, recruiting freshmen to join the aas now 
became a priority. Beginning with the fall of 1967, Armstrong recalled, “we 
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took it upon ourselves to meet all of the new Black students . . .  and to get 
them interested in what we  were  doing.” As a result, “it  didn’t take six months 
for all of us to find each other.” Social events played a key role in the pro cess. “I 
can remember distinctly,” Armstrong commented, “some kind of get- together 
in back of my dorm, the first week of my sophomore year [in September 1967]. 
From that time on, every body knew every body.”79
As they got to know the incoming freshmen, upperclassmen learned 
that  these students  were markedly diff er ent from  those who had come be-
fore them. For Hopkins, who matriculated at Duke in 1965, the pro cess of 
becoming politicized had been gradual and organic. “I was . . .  indifferent to 
the  whole  thing [when I arrived at Duke],” Hopkins explained. “Duke’s racism 
and oppressiveness assaulted me and made me respond.” “The two or three 
classes that came in  after me,” he recounted, “came to Duke angry . . .  because 
stuff was happening by then.” Brown agreed. “The class that came  after me was 
just a more militantly minded class than some of us who  were ahead of them. 
They got  here and they encountered some of the frustrations we had encoun-
tered . . .  but they  were [quicker] to react to them than we  were.” One reason 
is that  these freshmen arrived at Duke  after searing national events, like the 
Watts Rebellion in 1965 and the Newark uprising in 1967, had drawn intense 
national attention.  These members of the class of 1971 also came to Duke  after 
the aas had been established. “When they came in, all of  these issues had ac-
celerated so rapidly,” Armstrong explained. “They came in at a time when the 
slope of the curve was  going up exponentially. . . .  We came in at a time when 
 things  were brewing.”80
With more Black students on campus, better methods of intragroup com-
munication  were necessary. One approach was to schedule more frequent get- 
togethers. “ There  were regular meetings by the time the classes  after us came 
in,” Brown recounted. “Kids just had the chance to sit down and  really make 
an effort to talk about what this place was like, what was  going down, and 
what we could change to make  things better for the  people who came  after 
us.” Meetings  were not the only setting for group interaction. “The classes that 
came  after us,” Howard remembered, “ were more socially oriented. They  were 
into having a lot of parties so we saw each other more. That helped a lot,” she 
explained.81
As the pace of events accelerated, ways of sharing information between 
meetings and other gatherings  were also needed. One approach was to estab-
lish a  simple but highly effective communication network, the “Drum.” “You 
know what the grapevine is,” Armstrong explained. “We called it the Drum.” 
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Through the Drum, information could be passed among Duke’s Black stu-
dents with remarkable speed. “No one could understand how all of us knew 
about each other . . .  and could get word to each other in such a short period 
of time,” Armstrong recalled.82
In addition to communicating through the Drum, Black students created 
a meeting place called the “Block.” “Between classes, . . .  where the [student] 
 union is,” Armstrong recounted, “ there is a block of cement next to the gar-
bage can. We used to call it ‘the Block.’ ” As Armstrong described it, “all of the 
Black  people would congregate  there in between classes and around lunch-
time. It used to be like a magnet. . . .  That’s how word got passed a lot of times.” 
Meals  were also an opportunity for group interaction. Continuing a practice 
started in the spring, Duke’s Black students ate a majority of their meals to-
gether, meeting daily at the same designated  table in the dining hall.83
As hostility over race seemed to increase both at Duke and in the country 
at large, Duke’s Black students looked increasingly to each other for support. 
“We  were frightened” when we came to Duke, Armstrong recalled. “ There is 
no question about it. But it frightened us into a collective sense of needing 
each other. We needed each other more than anyone needed each other. We 
 were such a cohesive group. . . .  We  were a community within a community,” 
Armstrong described, “and we  were a very separate community.”84
This sense of collective separateness—of “community”— led directly to the 
development of the Black student movement at the university. In addition 
to providing friendship and emotional support, closeness afforded  these stu-
dents the psychological and emotional space needed to achieve, as historian 
Lawrence Goodwyn described in The Populist Moment, a “heretofore cultur-
ally unsanctioned level of social analy sis.”85 As they adapted the ideology of 
the Black Power movement, Duke’s Black students began to challenge as-
sumptions not only of the dominant white culture at Duke but also of their 
parents and the communities that had raised them.
An interview with Hopkins published in September 1967 illustrates how 
the aas had  adopted key ele ments of the Black Power program. Emphasiz-
ing the need for “self re spect” among Black students, Hopkins stated that the 
purpose of the aas was to develop and maintain “Black consciousness” on 
campus. Hopkins argued that Black students at Duke “by and large [ were] 
obtaining a white education” and cited as evidence the many history classes at 
the school where Black contributions to society  were “noticeably neglected” 
and “black  people are not emphasized.” The purpose of the aas, according 
to Hopkins, was to promote “Afro- American history and culture” as well as 
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a closer connection between Duke’s Black students and the Durham com-
munity, especially in the area of open housing. Hopkins described the Black 
student at Duke as facing a choice between preparing to “ ‘go north,’ get a job 
and  settle down into a comfortable living” or  going back to his or her home 
community to “help his  people.” The aas hoped to encourage Duke’s Black 
students, Hopkins explained, to work in their own communities.86
Racial issues continued to be at the forefront in the fall. In September the 
university took action to eliminate segregation in off- campus housing. Duke 
required that the  owners of all off- campus housing units listed by the uni-
versity as available for students sign a nondiscrimination pledge. As was the 
case with the decision to desegregate and the requirement that fraternities and 
sororities eliminate discriminatory membership requirements, the immediate 
cause of the policy change was pressure from the federal government.87
In October 1967, the segregated facilities issue moved rapidly to the fore, 
with Duke’s Black students playing a pivotal role. Soon, the issue divided the 
campus. Initially, asdu was the primary actor. On October 17, 1967,  after “long, 
sometimes heated debate,” the asdu legislature voted 27–15 to prohibit the use 
of segregated facilities by all university- related organ izations. Debate focused 
on  whether asdu had the jurisdiction to prohibit private groups— such as 
fraternities and sororities— from holding events at segregated facilities. Ac-
cording to a report in the Duke Chronicle, most legislators who voted in  favor 
of the resolution agreed with one student who said that asdu had to “accept 
responsibility for the moral issue at hand.” Although two motions demanding 
a student- wide referendum on the resolution  were defeated, asdu legislators 
asked that Duke undergraduates be informed of their right to force a student 
vote on the action.88
Immediately following passage of the resolution, Hopkins and McLeod is-
sued a statement on behalf of the aas “emphatically demand[ing]” that the 
university publish a clear policy on the use of segregated facilities. “The era 
of toleration of . . .  lack of re- affirmation of policy is over,” the statement read. 
“We as black students in this integrated community await a clear affirma-
tion . . .  from the University administration on this vital issue.”89
Yet not only was  there no statement of policy by the university, but dif-
fer ent opinions arose among undergraduate constituencies. Almost immedi-
ately, two petitions calling for a student referendum on the asdu resolution 
began circulating on campus. As petition signatures  were being collected, the 
msga, voting 6–2,  adopted a resolution proposed by Interfraternity Coun-
cil representative Bob Pittman condemning asdu’s segregated facilities ban. 
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Pittman’s primary concern, he said, was to affirm the “basic right of the in-
dividual organ ization to decide for itself on the  matter.” Days  later, the wsga 
cabinet voted 11–0–2 to support asdu’s stance and to prohibit the use of seg-
regated facilities by all  Woman’s College groups.90
Other groups also weighed in. The Interfraternity Council voted 13–4 
against banning the use of segregated facilities by its constituent members. 
The Men’s Freshman Council voted to condemn the asdu resolution as well, 
concluding that “while segregation is morally wrong, it is up to individuals 
and individual organ izations to address the situation.” Sigma Nu fraternity 
objected to the asdu action as legislative overreach but also voted to prohibit 
the use of segregated facilities for  future Sigma Nu events.91  Women  were gen-
erally more progressive than men and fraternity members more conservative 
than  those men who lived in in de pen dent groups.
Meanwhile, university leaders seemed more indecisive than ever on the 
issue. In September the school released a policy that only confused  matters 
further. The new policy,  adopted by the University Policy and Planning Advi-
sory Committee (uppac), prohibited the use of segregated facilities in connec-
tion with “official activities sponsored, financed, and controlled by University 
personnel and campus organ izations.” University administrators then seemed 
to contradict themselves, with the university Administrative Council stating 
that the policy was applicable only to Duke administration, faculty, and staff 
and not to students “except where  there is overlap.” Unable to answer ques-
tions on the precise scope of the new uppac policy, Cole explained that his 
public comments had been left “purposefully vague.” When asked if the policy 
could be understood to prohibit student groups from using off- campus segre-
gated facilities, Robert L. Price, dean of Trinity College, responded opaquely, 
“It may be interpreted that way.”92
The segregated facilities issue had now taken center stage. Vari ous student 
groups, citing, among other arguments, “freedom of choice,” “moral consid-
erations,” and “legislative overreach,” had come down on diff er ent sides of 
the issue. The administration had issued a seemingly expansive prohibition 
on the use of segregated facilities but excluded student groups from its reach. 
The final twist occurred when advocates for a student referendum on the 
asdu ban announced that they had collected the seven hundred student sig-
natures needed to force a campus- wide vote. The referendum was scheduled 
for November 7.
Faced with the upcoming student referendum, the aas voted to boycott 
the vote. In a resolution addressed to the university, the aas declared that it 
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would refrain from participating in a pro cess “designed to determine  whether 
the black student on this campus should be recognized as a  human being.” As 
ballots on the referendum  were being cast, twenty- five of Duke’s Black stu-
dents stood in front of the voting  table on West Campus in  silent protest. At 
1:20 p.m., they ripped up their ballots and walked off. “We oppose the fact that 
students are trying to decide something that is our inherent right as members 
of this University,” an aas spokesperson commented.93
When the votes  were counted, fully 60  percent of students voting came 
down against asdu’s resolution prohibiting the use of segregated facilities by 
student groups. Asked for a comment, Kinney stated that the “vote was reveal-
ing to many  people, and in many ways.” He also commented on the decision 
by the aas to boycott the vote. “The fact that some Negroes did not vote is to 
be respected,” Kinney said, “yet is a potential sign of danger.”94
The aas met soon  after the referendum. The segregated facilities controversy 
had now been escalating for twelve months with no clear statement of policy 
by the administration. With their fellow students having now rejected asdu’s 
prohibition,  there was  little confidence that the university would make a 
policy change in the near term. Also, the aas had by then been meeting for 
more than seven months. Interactions at  these meetings caused a fundamen-
tal change in how Black students perceived the segregated facilities issue. The 
meetings of the aas, Becton explained, had led to the “increased realization 
that . . .  things [like a change in the segregated facilities policy]  were  things 
that  were due us, rather than  things we  ought to be requesting.” As Becton 
described it, the changes sought  were “rights, as opposed to privileges.”95 With 
this perspective, Duke’s Black students de cided to take action to force a policy 
change.
In Becton’s view, the Black students had more power than they realized. 
To illustrate his point, he described how university housing office personnel 
had reacted when he and Hatcher sought their help in finding suitable off- 
campus housing.  Because almost all rental units near campus  were available 
to white tenants only, Becton and Hatcher de cided that “the university had 
an obligation to find us some housing.” Their approach was  simple, Becton 
explained. “We walked into the housing office one day and . . .  told them that 
we had spent two days down  here looking for a  house. . . .  We indicated that 
we  were [prepared to go public with the university’s failure] to find housing 
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for Black kids.” The results  were dramatic, Becton recounted. “In one hour, we 
got a phone call and got a  house right  behind East Campus . . .  just a  great 
place to live.” This story helped the Black students “realize that the power was 
 there,” Becton noted. Soon, most aas members agreed with his assessment 
that “the more active we  were, the more likely we  were to have some of our 
demands met.”96
The students considered three strategies to put pressure on the university. 
“One, [we could] take over [a] building;” Armstrong remembered, “two, [we 
could] go and ask for a meeting with Dr. Knight; and three, [we could] do 
something that would not obstruct justice but would bring attention to the 
university.” The first option— a building takeover— was quickly dismissed. “At 
that time, we did not feel that the issues  were sufficient to prompt that kind of 
action,” Armstrong explained. “We [also lacked the] po liti cal savvy to be able 
to pull that off. And most of us  were scared at that time.” The second option, 
a meeting with Knight, would allow the students to convey the urgency of the 
issue directly to the Duke president. Such a meeting, however, would repre-
sent  little more than “strongly pleading” for a policy change, a course that had 
already been attempted without success in the “open letter” published in the 
spring. Discussion turned to direct action. Armstrong remembered “every one 
talking about the fact that Duke hated bad publicity.” The students began to 
consider forms of protest, she recalled, that would “bring attention to Duke 
without being violent.” In the end, the group settled on a “study-in” in the 
anteroom directly outside President Knight’s office as the “most po liti cally 
expedient way” to accomplish  these objectives. “We needed to bring some 
national attention to our demand,” Becton explained. “Basically, power con-
cedes nothing without a demand. . . .  That is what it was about.” Brown held 
a similar view. “We felt that this was the only  thing that would have some 
impact,” she recalled.97
The strategy also garnered support from aas members  because it was 
seen as less threatening to the university than other options. Since the stu-
dents would be studying, the protest would be orderly and quiet. “To ‘study-
in,’ ” Armstrong explained, “meant in the pro cess of us getting our education 
we  were also trying to be heard. It was an acceptable  thing  because Duke 
students  ought to be studying.”98 The students came from families that had 
taught them to follow the rules. Notwithstanding agreement that direct ac-
tion was necessary to force a policy change, they settled on a strategy that 
would apply pressure to the university while causing as  little disruption as 
pos si ble.
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Before initiating the protest, Hopkins, Joyce Hobson, McLeod, and Becton 
presented the university with a resolution demanding that it clarify its policy 
on the use of segregated facilities and threatening disruption if it failed to do 
so. The resolution framed the segregated facilities issue as part of a broader 
pattern of university disregard for the needs of its Black students. “It is now 
obvious that a true sense of . . .  responsibility  towards us . . .  as a part of this 
University community is lacking,” the resolution declared, “and that a willing-
ness to defend our rights  here . . .  is even more lacking.” On behalf of Duke 
Afro- Americans, the resolution demanded that “our administration imme-
diately announce and explic itly institute a policy of total prohibition of 
patronization of segregated establishments by any official University organ-
ization.” If the demand  were not acted upon on or before 6:00 p.m. on No-
vember 12, the resolution concluded, “we . . .  will enact . . .  plans to disrupt 
the functioning of the University  until our demands are met!” Looking back 
a de cade  later, Hopkins remained impressed by the urgency of the resolution. 
“Boy, I was crazy in  those days,” he commented. “The sky was the limit evi-
dently. . . .  Telling  people we  were  going to disrupt the university.”99
Knight’s response was unequivocal. In a memorandum dated Novem-
ber 12, the Duke president made it “absolutely clear that the University  will 
accept no ultimatum” and threatened “major disciplinary action” if the Black 
students disrupted the campus. Knight also dismissed the demand for imme-
diate action, noting that a review of the university’s use of segregated facilities 
was in pro cess and “cannot be resolved hastily.” Making clear that Duke would 
not circumvent established decision- making channels, he suggested that the 
Black students express their “opinions to the appropriate deans,” so they may 
be given “consideration during discussions of the issues.”100
Knight was now precisely in the situation he had hoped to avoid. He had 
concluded months  earlier that he “could never have approved of university 
groups using segregated facilities.” Yet attempts to resolve the issue without a 
confrontation had failed. Faced with the threat of disruption, Knight almost 
certainly recognized that any opportunity to resolve the issue without conflict 
was now gone.101
On Monday, November 13, at 8:30 a.m., thirty- five members of the aas 
walked into the Allen Building and sat down just outside Knight’s office for a 
“study-in.” Photo graphs of the event show smartly dressed student protesters 
sitting closely together on the floor. Some smoked, and a handful of the men 
wore dark sunglasses. All read quietly or did other homework. “ People  really 
did work,” Howard remembered. “We  were all reading something about Black 
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history. I remember in the press picture, Stef McLeod had Black Power by 
Stokely Carmichael.” Brown recalled “a very good sense of group cohesive-
ness.” A poster propped against the wall declared, “We Are Studying In For: 
 Human Dignity,” and another said, “Black  Sisters Together with Our Soul Men 
to the End.” The students asked to speak to Knight but  were told that he was 
in New York.102
Members of the administration talked to student leaders both before 
and during the protest to prevent a physical confrontation. “I was very in-
terested in keeping some semblance of egress and ingress in the situation 
which then kept us from having to impose any kind of sanction,” Griffith 
commented. “We  didn’t want to move on it,” he remembered. “We  were 
looking for excuses not to move on it in a hard- line kind of way.” Although 
access to the president’s office was completely blocked for almost three 
hours, no direct confrontation occurred. The administration, however, was 
prepared for any contingency. Nine Durham policemen equipped with hel-
mets and nightsticks  were “on- call” in the campus security office through-
out the protest.103
Around midday, a group of white students arrived and asked to join the 
protest. The offer was rejected, and when several white students refused to 
leave voluntarily, they  were forcibly carried out. “I think most of us felt like 
we had to go inside and stand up on our own, first,” Becton explained. “At that 
point, it had to be about us getting together.” “We always had a strong  thing 
with the liberal white students,” Hopkins recounted, “who just wanted to come 
over and support us. . . .  We  were uncomfortable with that. . . .  We  were say-
ing, you got prob lems too. So let’s all deal with our [own] prob lems and come 
together on that.” For participants in the early civil rights demonstrations, the 
move away from multiracial protest was stark. “It was not ‘Black- and- white 
together,’ ” movement veteran and Duke professor Jack Preiss recalled. “It was 
a self- identification by Blacks that was exclusive. Whites  were not accepted as 
part of it.”104
Students remained outside the president’s office for seven hours. Discus-
sions between the university and the aas took place on and off throughout 
the day. An audio recording of internal aas deliberations makes clear that 
the substance of Duke’s segregated facilities policy was never addressed in 
the course of  these discussions. Instead, the talks focused exclusively on the 
university’s demand that the Black students suspend their protest  until uppac 
had the opportunity to meet and consider a policy change. The university 
explained that uppac was not scheduled to meet for nine days and Knight 
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would need two additional days to consider any policy change the committee 
recommended. The university asked for suspension of the protest for eleven 
days.
On a divided vote, the protesters initially de cided to accept the univer-
sity’s request for additional time. Just as they  were notifying university rep-
resentatives of their decision, however, the students learned that another 
significant university committee— the Student Faculty Administrative 
Committee (sfac)— was scheduled to meet that very after noon. Believing 
that sfac should be able to make a definitive policy recommendation on an 
issue that had been in the spotlight for almost a year, the students reversed 
their  earlier decision to stand down for almost two weeks. They demanded 
an answer from the university within two days. In a response that only a 
bureaucrat could comprehend, the students  were told that their proposed 
timetable was unworkable, and the sfac only had jurisdiction to make pol-
icy for Duke’s undergraduate colleges. To change the segregated facilities 
policy for the entire university, the students  were told, uppac action would 
be necessary. Why an emergency uppac meeting could not be convened in 
less than nine days was never explained.
The students met to consider a response. They found the university’s rigid 
stance unacceptable. Recalling the decision by the aas to refuse participation 
in the undergraduate referendum on segregated facilities, one student argued 
that “this is the same  thing as . . .  boycotting the polls. . . .  No one has the right 
to vote on  whether you are  human.” A change in the university’s segregated 
facilities policy, one student argued, would never happen if considered  under 
the school’s normal decision- making procedures. “It’s like Stokely Carmichael 
says,” he explained. “We are hoping the university  will act in good faith. But 
when push comes to shove,  there is no such  thing as good faith. They  will give 
us the run- around as long as they can. You can put it off 10 days from now, you 
can put it off 20 days from now, you can put it off ‘ever’ from now.”105
In the end, all agreed that the university’s request for an additional eleven 
days to consider a policy change was unacceptable. “Why should we have to 
wait for sfac or uppac or any kind of ‘fac’?” one student asked. “I’d like 
to hear a justification,” another declared, “for why uppac, in a  matter of 
emergency— and this is obviously an emergency— cannot get themselves to-
gether in less than eleven days.” “ These  people can act when they get ready 
to act,” another student insisted.106 Clearly, the university’s efforts to use bu-
reaucratic procedures as a way to delay action on a moral issue was no longer 
acceptable.
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By a unan i mous vote, the students de cided to suspend further protest  until 
6:00 p.m. on Wednesday, November 15. This would give Duke two days to 
respond. The scheduled sfac meeting could convene  later in the day, and 
Knight would have twenty- four hours to consider any recommended policy 
change.107 The aas representatives left to advise the university of the students’ 
position.
As they prepared to disperse, the student protesters checked the radio to 
see  whether reports of the study-in had been picked up by local or national 
news outlets. Within moments of turning on the radio, they heard, “Protesting 
Negro students lay down in the hallway  today in the office of Duke University 
President Douglas Knight. They said they  were protesting a student body ref-
erendum which supported the patronization of segregated places.”108
The goal of creating pressure on Duke to act by generating unfavorable 
publicity for the school had been achieved. Before leaving, the protesters had 
one additional  matter to attend to. “Let’s leave this place just like we found it,” 
one student admonished. Although participants in the study-in would now 
be seen as “militants” by many in the university community, their parents had 
clearly taught them to never leave a mess  behind.
Soon  after learning of the students’ position, a university representative 
delivered a prepared statement. Formal in tone and substance, the statement 
spoke only to “pro cess” issues and failed entirely to communicate any sen-
sitivity to the feelings of hurt, frustration, and urgency that had prompted 
the students to protest. “The University cannot and  will not take action 
 under the threat of an ultimatum,” the statement said. “Serious efforts  were 
made  today by appropriate officials of the University and by spokesmen of 
the group of students  here  today to agree on a procedure” for the university’s 
reconsideration of its segregated facilities policy. “Unfortunately,” the state-
ment concluded, “agreement on  these questions of procedure could not be 
reached.”109 Thus, the university’s statement made clear that the school— not 
the students— would determine how and when any change in the segregated 
facilities policy would occur.
The sfac met that after noon. The segregated facilities issue consumed the 
entirety of the committee’s four- hour meeting. Working with sfac representa-
tives to craft the resolution to be voted on at the meeting, Knight had compet-
ing goals. He wanted to show movement by the university on the issue while 
avoiding the appearance that the study-in had forced him to act. To downplay 
the impact of the protest, Knight wanted any change in the university’s stance 
on segregated facilities to be framed as a “clarification” of the current policy, not 
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a new pronouncement. The sfac did as the president desired. The committee 
recommended that the university “promptly” reiterate its existing policy with 
re spect to segregated facilities and, “if indicated, rephrase the statement so 
as to include student organ izations and groups.” With this recommendation, 
Knight concluded that he had the internal authorization to announce a policy 
change, even without uppac input.110
Between his strong letter to the Afro- American students on Sunday night 
and the university’s refusal to make any policy change in the face of an ulti-
matum, Knight could fairly claim by Monday eve ning that the university had 
gotten the better of the student protesters. Local papers the next day carried 
headlines like “Defeat of Sit- In” and “Dr. Knight, Not Protesting Group, Still 
President of His University.” Responding to a story on Knight’s strong actions 
in the Charlotte News, trustee Edwin Jones wrote, “This is wonderful and is 
the sort of stand I have been hoping you would take. . . .  Congratulations!”111
But events had yet to play out fully. On Wednesday eve ning, Hopkins 
took the step Knight had insisted upon. He withdrew any aas ultimatum. 
“At this point we have not planned any further action,” the aas chairman an-
nounced. “We are waiting peacefully for a  couple of days for a statement from 
the administration.”112
Now that the threat of protest had been removed, at least temporarily, 
Knight felt that he could announce a new policy without violating his pledge 
“to accept no ultimatum.” On Friday, November 17, less than four days  after 
the study-in ended, Knight announced that Duke’s “stated practice on dis-
crimination and the use of segregated facilities, which has applied to faculty 
and staff organ izations since late September,  will in the  future apply also to 
student organ izations.” Knight said that the announcement would have been 
made “in the normal course of events,” even claiming that the consideration 
of the asdu resolution, along with the “threat of disruption” made by the aas, 
had delayed action. “To have accepted such an ultimatum would have been a 
major step  toward anarchy,” Knight said, “and it is now clear . . .  that decisions 
cannot be based on ultimatums and disruptive action, rather than . . . princi-
ple.” A few days  later, the Duke Alumni Association announced that it would 
no longer hold events at segregated facilities.113
For the moment, the aas was satisfied. The policy gives “Negro students 
something that should have been  there” all along, Joyce Hobson commented, 
“something necessary.” Hopkins saw significance in the policy change. “The 
action of Dr. Knight has shown that Duke has accepted its role of responsibil-
ity to all members of its community,” he commented. “The statement means 
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that black students can now have a meaningful identity with Duke as their 
school.” In private, members of the aas saw the study-in as a major victory. 
“It made us realize the power we had,” Becton recalled, “ because it was the 
first massive  thing . . .  that produced some action. [It] showed the kids what 
coming together was all about.” “What it represented to us  wasn’t the end; 
it was the beginning,” Armstrong remembered. “We felt like if we could get 
them to listen to us on that issue, then it was time to get them to listen to us 
on other issues.”114
Some trustees and many alumni reacted to the events on campus with 
anger and dismay. For them, the study-in showed that Black Power had made 
its way to the Duke campus. They feared that the racial vio lence engulfing 
many parts of the country would soon follow. Perhaps even more concerning, 
trustees and alumni saw the change in the university’s segregated facilities 
policy as capitulation to Black student protesters. Trustee Edwin Jones, who 
had written initially praising Knight for his strong stand, was not happy about 
Duke’s “clarification” of the segregated facilities policy. “Regardless of prior 
statements in the newspapers the Administration of Duke University gave in 
to the Afro- American students and gave them all they asked for,” he wrote. 
“I suppose they are to be criticized for not asking for more. This, of course, 
shows who is  running the University.” Board member George V. Allen par-
ticularly rejected the “revolutionary methods” used by the protesters. Other 
alumni  were equally critical, urging Knight to expel the protesters, calling the 
study-in “repugnant,” and warning that support for Duke was fast diminish-
ing “in light of the apparent appeasement attitude of Duke officials . . .  in al-
lowing the continued actions by  these ilk.”115
Knight responded to  every letter. He defended his actions by explaining 
that he had successfully established two princi ples: “1) to  settle the question 
of ultimatums, which we did, and 2) to verify the University’s position on 
non- discrimination.” To  those who said he had given in to the students, he 
countered that “only  after the threat of destructive action on campus was re-
tracted did we take our firm position against discrimination.” The university 
had “no intention of giving in to any group of students,” he said, “no  matter 
what their color, if they try to make their point by disrupting the operation of 
the University.”116
Despite  these explanations, Knight knew that the segregated facilities con-
troversy had further damaged his standing with conservative ele ments of the 
university community. “ People on both sides  were getting so strenuous on 
 these issues that  there was no way to get to any kind of reasoned position that 
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 wouldn’t be assailed,” he explained. During the entire period, Knight saw a 
“series of alternations between the pressure on the ‘left’ and the unyielding 
re sis tance of the ‘right.’ ” “The left delivers the ultimatum, the right ignores it,” 
the Duke president explained. “And then if you happen to be caught in the 
 middle where you have to make real decisions in what the computer  people 
call ‘real time,’ why you are faced with impossible issues.” Asked if he tried to 
resolve conflicts by moving  those with widely divergent views to more reason-
able positions, Knight responded soberly: “with every body, and unsuccess-
fully all the way around.”117
Knight was certainly correct in believing that the segregated facilities con-
troversy presented him with an impossible po liti cal dilemma. His po liti cal 
capital would be diminished no  matter what course he took. Hence, he saw 
himself as the victim of larger historical forces playing out at Duke in the late 
1960s. Caught in the  middle of colliding parties that would not act “reason-
ably,” the Duke president became a lightning rod for fear, anger, and mistrust. 
But in fact, Knight himself was a key actor in the segregated facilities contro-
versy. Indeed, the actions he took—or failed to take— reveal a  great deal about 
his capacities as a leader when faced with racial conflict.
Knight knew that Duke’s continued use of segregated facilities was unten-
able. “If you forced yourself to the ultimate issue,” he said, “ there was no doubt 
about where the university would need to be.” Yet he did every thing he could 
for as long as pos si ble to avoid taking a principled public stand on the issue. 
“I hoped for some months,” he recounted, “that we  wouldn’t . . .  be forced to 
the ultimate issue . . .  because, frankly, I  didn’t think that [was] good enough 
ground to do real  battle on.”118 Despite escalating protests by Duke’s Black stu-
dents and expressions of deep concern by  others in the university commu-
nity, Knight concluded that it was not worth investing his po liti cal capital in a 
 battle over the university’s segregated facilities policy.
How did he reach  these conclusions on an issue where his view of the “ulti-
mate issue” was clear and required a change in university policy? One answer 
lies in how Knight viewed his role as the leader of an academic community. For 
him, the university was a place defined by mediation, critical discourse, and civil-
ity. In such a setting, disputes are resolved through rational discussion with the 
“leader”  gently pressing opposing sides to reach consensus. This approach had 
worked spectacularly well at Lawrence. In a controversy such as the one over 
the use of segregated facilities at Duke, however, Knight confronted a dispute 
that was considered “existential” by both sides. For Black students, Duke was 
 either committed to embracing them as equal members of the university com-
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munity or it was not. For conservative ele ments, on the other hand, Duke was 
 either committed to the right of white members of the university community to 
exercise “freedom of choice” in deciding where to socialize and with whom or 
it was not.  There could be no consensus reached on  these opposing positions. 
As Knight acknowledged, “reason and moderation no longer defined the forces 
you  were working with.” He came to feel that “what ever you did was wrong” in 
such a situation “ because the constituents  were so divided among themselves.”119
Knight’s approach to leadership was rooted in his personality. “Doug al-
ways wanted to go to bed at night thinking that he had pleased 100  percent 
of the  people he had dealt with during the day,” Anlyan commented. “Un-
fortunately, this was not pos si ble in that era (or in any other).” Knight was 
also accustomed to deference. “He was completely unprepared by background 
and temperament,” Bob Ashley, managing editor of the Duke Chronicle, com-
mented perceptively, “to have his authority challenged.”120
Knight was not passive on all issues. Indeed, where leadership was required 
to protect a value he considered “core” to the university, he could act with alac-
rity. Academic freedom was one such core value. In 1966, for example, trustees 
and alumni  were highly critical when Marxist historian and po liti cal activist 
Herbert Aptheker was permitted to speak on campus. Knight was unapolo-
getic. To one trustee, he wrote: “At the level of princi ple we have to defend 
the unpop u lar opinion; at the level of politics we have to be smart enough to 
expose gentlemen whom we would make more attractive if we denied them 
the chance to speak.” Knight saw the exploration of unpop u lar ideas or po-
liti cal positions as “an essential university duty” and not an issue that can be 
avoided when raised. In addition to communists, he defended the right of 
Black Power leaders, antiwar activists, and atheists, among many  others, to 
speak on campus.121
Unlike academic freedom, however, Knight saw the segregated facilities 
issue as one that could— even should—be avoided when raised. He did not see 
racial inclusion as a value that was “core” to the university. This was  because 
of his attitudes on race. The Duke president held racial views that some would 
call “progressive,” but he did so without deep personal conviction. He was fine 
with Black students attending historically white universities as long as they 
 were “qualified” and played by Knight’s notion of the “rules.” But he did not 
see it as his responsibility to investigate, understand, and address the prob-
lems Duke’s Black students encountered on campus. Hence, the Duke presi-
dent could not grasp the growing outrage Duke’s Black students felt about 
the school’s strong connections to Hope Valley, including his own personal 
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membership in the club. “Country club issues and the like  couldn’t have been 
less impor tant to me,” Knight said in 1988. “I looked on [the students’] point 
as very well taken. [But] po liti cally [resignation] was a very unwise  thing to 
do  because it offended a lot of  people in the community.”122
What ever the cause, Knight paid a huge price for his failure to lead 
on the segregated facilities issue. Not only did his passivity prolong the 
controversy, but it also impaired his ability to lead on controversial issues 
that would arise in the  future. Perceived as reactive on all sides, and chal-
lenged over a myriad of issues, he was increasingly marginalized in  future 
decision- making.
By the end of 1967, Duke had been desegregated for more than four years 
and the first class of Black undergraduates had graduated in the spring of 1967. 
Against the backdrop of national events, even a benign protest like the No-
vember study-in was deeply threatening to conservative ele ments of the Duke 
community. The gap in perception on racial issues was growing, not narrow-
ing. Two differing views on the segregated facilities issue illustrate the point. 
“Once they de cided to have Black  people  there, they should have known they 
 didn’t need to be having  things at segregated facilities,” study-in participant 
Brown reflected. “What are they  going to do with their Black students if one of 
them belongs to one of  these [organ izations] and they want to have something 
at a segregated fa cil i ty? That’s just common sense, but nobody thought about 
what it meant to have us [at Duke] and [nobody] cared.”123
Knight, of course, saw  matters differently. Asked if the men who ran Duke 
“should have known” that the continued use of segregated facilities following 
the arrival of Black students was an obvious contradiction, Knight responded, 
“I’m not sure they are quite right to say, ‘They should have known.’ . . .  That’s 
too  simple.”
If they would say instead, “How tragic that they  didn’t know. How 
sad that they  didn’t know. Why  don’t  human beings understand  these 
 things?,” I would agree. I  don’t think they can say, “They should have 
known.”  Because . . .  you’ve got to remember where  these . . .  folks  were 
coming from. . . .  It would be quite unrealistic to assume that . . .  the 
university, in that location, with  those characters playing their roles, 
could remotely have understood that if you meant to admit Black stu-
dents you meant  there should no longer be segregated facilities related 
to the university, and no longer a president that belonged to that [seg-
regated] country club.
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According to Knight, “ People  didn’t remotely think of that.” He acknowledged 
that  these failures of insight are “no exoneration.”124
By the end of 1967, Knight fi nally recognized that any hope of finding a 
path forward for his administration and the Black students required opening 
a direct line of communication with them. Just a week  after the segregated 
facilities controversy was resolved, Knight wrote to Griffith, asking, “When 
would it seem wisest to you to try to sit down with that group of Negro stu-
dents? I am sure you have a good many thoughts about it, and I’ll welcome 
your judgment.”125
CHAPTER 4
We  Were Their Sons and  Daughters
Occupation of University House
In the spring semester of 1968, student activism at Duke sharply intensified 
almost as soon as the semester began. In late November 1967, Douglas Knight 
had asked William Griffith for suggestions on the best time to “try to sit down 
with that group of Negro students.” Griffith must have recommended “very 
soon”  because, on January 9, Knight met for the first time with representatives 
of the aas. At the meeting, Knight asked for a list of Black student “prob lem 
areas.” Although no specific time frame was set, the students agreed to provide 
him with their list.1
During the same week, the university issued, for the first time, regula-
tions on pickets and protests. The new rules sought to distinguish between 
“legitimate forms of picketing and protesting” and “illegitimate” protests 
that “disrupt the orderly operations of the institution” or “jeopardize public 
order or safety.” In the event that “proper University authorities” deter-
mined that an “illegitimate” form of protest was underway, they  were in-
structed to direct protesters to “cease and desist” within a specified period 
of time. If the protesters failed to do so, they would be subject to discipline 
by the university as well as pos si ble arrest and prosecution  under applicable 
criminal laws.2
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Through the mid-1960s, Duke was hardly known as a hotbed of student 
activism. Indeed,  until April 1968, one observer noted, “white students had 
not been motivated to demonstrate en masse over any issue.” In a March 1968 
Sports Illustrated article on the student climate at Duke University, sociology 
professor Jack Preiss went so far as to label students at the school as members 
of the “timid generation.” If activism was not widespread at Duke, however, by 
this point, the university had a core group of thirty to forty student activists 
who considered themselves part of the New Left. Members of this group im-
mediately began to test the new pickets and protests regulations. Small dem-
onstrations  were held when army recruiters came to campus on January 9, 
navy recruiters on January 11, and representatives of Dow Chemical Com pany 
in early February. Although one student was found guilty of violating the new 
rules, the pickets and protests regulations proved difficult to enforce. Most 
problematic was the “waiting period” provided for in the regulations.  These 
 were being “abused,” Knight said, “in such a fashion as to aggravate congestion 
and disorder.”  After a  couple of months, Knight announced that the “waiting 
period” in the regulations was “suspended.”3
As members of the New Left protested against the war, the aas held elec-
tions for new leadership. Although Chuck Hopkins sought reelection as 
chairman, his candidacy turned out to be controversial. He faced opposi-
tion from  those who favored a less confrontational approach to the admin-
istration. “ There was one faction,” Brenda Armstrong explained, “that had a 
very acute sense of how Duke was mistreating . . .  and acting against Blacks. 
[They] wanted to do something about the  things that  were  going on. Then 
 there was a faction,” she described, “that felt as strongly, but was not willing 
to [take] action. [They] wanted to talk about it, . . .  to give the administra-
tion a chance.”4
As the election approached, Hopkins and his supporters worried that con-
trol of the aas might be lost to the more conservative group. Faced with this 
possibility, Hopkins withdrew his candidacy and threw his support  behind 
Armstrong; she then became a consensus candidate. “We had reached a point,” 
Hopkins recalled, “where I was over  here, Stef was over  here, somebody  else 
[was over]  there. . . .  Brenda had a lot of re spect from every body. She was voted 
in to pull every body together.” When the votes  were counted, Armstrong pre-
vailed. In her, the aas had a leader who could bring the group together. “I was 
[conciliatory] to the conservative faction that  couldn’t fight me,” Armstrong 
recalled, “as well as acceptable to the more radical ele ment.” Hopkins agreed. 
“She did a good job,” Hopkins said. “She held  people together.”5
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On February 8, 1968, national events rocked Black students at Duke and 
throughout the nation. State highway patrolmen fired on a crowd of students 
on the campus of South Carolina State University in Orangeburg, South Caro-
lina, following a protest to desegregate a local bowling alley. Three students 
 were killed and twenty- seven other protesters wounded in what came to be 
known as the Orangeburg Massacre. Forensic reports showed that many of 
the victims had been shot in the back. The Orangeburg Massacre “hurled le-
gions of students to the left,” historian Ibram X. Kendi observed. Soon, a wave 
of sympathy protests by Black college students swept the country.6
With racial activism increasing, the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. 
had a profound impact on the university and the country. King, who had spo-
ken at Duke in 1964, was in Memphis, Tennessee, at the time of his assassina-
tion, supporting Black city sanitation workers who  were striking to protest 
unequal wages and working conditions. His murder intensified all the racist 
terror the civil rights movement had been fighting against for years.7
The night  after the tragedy, a group of 250 Duke students— almost all of 
them white— occupied University House, Knight’s official residence. They re-
mained for almost two days.  After leaving, the group reassembled on Duke’s 
main quadrangle. With their number increasing eventually to more than 
1,500, they held a four- day sit-in that brought the university to a virtual stand-
still and came to be known as the “ Silent Vigil.” Participants demanded that 
Duke respond to the King assassination with immediate, concrete actions that 
would clearly demonstrate the institution’s commitment to racial justice. They 
called on the university to grant its nonacademic employees a significant wage 
increase and, even more importantly, the right to bargain collectively. Further, 
the students demanded that Knight resign from the segregated Hope Valley 
Country Club.
The events at Duke following King’s assassination illuminate the racial 
dynamics in place at the university in the spring of 1968. Caught between 
stasis and change, they show how far the university was willing to go to dis-
mantle the “plantation system” that had circumscribed employer- employee 
relations at Duke for de cades. Occurring just five months  after the aas 
study-in on segregated facilities— and only ten months before the Black stu-
dent takeover of the Allen Building— the April 1968 protests highlight the 
diff er ent ways that Black and white Duke students experienced protest. They 
also expose the role that race played in how the university perceived— and 
responded to— demands for change. In the end, the University House oc-
cupation and the  Silent Vigil dramatized how a white institution strug gled 
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with its racial past even as it aggressively continued to pursue its dream of 
national prominence.
Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination on Thursday, April 4, 1968, sent a coun-
try already reeling from conflict to a new level of crisis. “In Chicago,” histo-
rian William Chafe observed, “twenty blocks of the downtown business area 
burst into flame, set afire by rioters, as Mayor Daley ordered police to ‘shoot 
to kill’ arsonists. More than one hundred American cities witnessed vio lence. 
Soldiers garbed in  battle gear set up a machine- gun emplacement atop the 
nation’s Capitol. More than 5,500 troops  were fi nally required to quiet the 
weeklong expression of screaming fury.”8
For Duke’s Black students, the assassination was a stunning moment of 
truth. “I remember that eve ning so well,” Armstrong recounted. “It was 6:30 
and I was studying on the floor of the dormitory. The girl who lived next 
door came in and said, ‘Did you know Dr. King was killed?’ and I laughed 
at her. I thought she was being funny. And then I turned the tv on.” Soon, 
Armstrong’s shock turned to anger. “No one could understand how I felt,” 
she explained. “That was the angriest I’ve ever been. . . .  I  hadn’t gotten to 
the point,” Armstrong recalled, “where I [believed] that  there  were  people 
who  didn’t like me  because I was Black or [who  were] unwilling to give 
me a chance. . . .  There  were  people in my dorm that just said, ‘Somebody 
would have shot him anyway’ and ‘He deserved to be shot.’ Then I knew,” 
Armstrong remembered.9
Other Black students responded with similar rage. In a po liti cal science 
class on the morning  after the assassination, a Black student said that she was 
“sickened” by liberal white Americans who “never did more than talk about 
how liberal [they] are.” Bertie Howard, like other Black students at Duke, ex-
perienced fear when she heard the news. “I was baby sitting at [po liti cal sci-
ence professor John H. Strange’s]  house the night King was killed,” she recol-
lected. “I just remember being afraid,  because Strange had done a lot with 
 people in the Black community. If the Klan would get anybody, they would 
come and get John. I remember locking the doors.” For many, the feelings of 
grief  were overwhelming. One Black student attending class the morning  after 
King’s death “began crying as he tried to explain how he felt when he saw his 
 mother come home  after working all day scrubbing  people’s floors and clean-
ing up  after a white  family.”10
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Like so many of her colleagues, Armstrong knew that King’s death would 
alter the strug gle for civil rights. “They just killed the spirit of anything that 
Black  people wanted to do peacefully,” she remembered thinking. “They took 
our prince.”  These deep feelings of anger and loss led many Black students to 
turn inward. “Our initial reaction,” Hopkins explained, “was to separate our-
selves from what was happening.”11
Among white members of the Duke community, reactions varied. Some 
 were unfazed by the news. “ There  were a  great many members of the Duke 
constituency who  didn’t care  whether Martin Luther King lived or died,” 
Knight recounted. “They felt he was disruptive.” The Duke Chronicle described 
“students who clapped or yelled from their win dows in ecstasy at the news 
of Dr. King’s death.”  Others, like the Duke president, showed more concern. 
Knight was on his way home from a dinner in Winston- Salem, North Caro-
lina, when his Black driver, George Gilmore, shared the news. “Dr. King has 
been shot and I’m afraid,” Gilmore told Knight. Knight knew that Gilmore 
was concerned not only about how the Black community in Durham would 
respond but also how white  people would react. “He knew better than I that, 
even as we drove,  there  were a good many white  people rejoicing over that 
vio lence,” Knight wrote. “I was as worried as he.” Griffith focused on how 
the Black community in Durham would react. “The assassination of Martin 
Luther King was traumatic,” he explained. “ There was concern that the Black 
community would go berserk.”12
The assassination had a power ful impact on many white students. King’s 
visit to campus in 1964 loomed large in their minds. “Martin had spoken in 
Page Auditorium a few years  earlier,” David M. Henderson recalled. “Many 
of us who heard him . . .  knew we  were in the presence of a godly man. We 
 were touched by his life and his death.” John C. “Jack” Boger remembered the 
speech as “one of the most prominent events of our freshman year.” Boger was 
attending the symposium “The Theology of Hope” when he learned that King 
had been shot. “The theology of hope seemed instantaneously irrelevant,” he 
wrote  later. “I left, stunned at the news.” But even  those who had not seen 
King  were deeply moved. “I wept. I was afraid,” one student remembered. “I 
 don’t think I could capture the atmosphere of  those days,” observed another 
student, who was a freshman in 1968. “ There are no words to describe . . . 
how it felt to try and face a black student and look him in the eye in  those first 
hours  after the assassination.” David K. Birkhead, former editor of the Duke 
Chronicle, summarized the feelings of many: “The world just did not seem the 
same  after the death of Dr. King.”13
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A small coterie of members of the New Left at Duke saw the King assas-
sination as a call to action. This was a chance to recruit other students to join 
their movement. Around midnight on Thursday, a group met in Birkhead’s 
dorm room to discuss their response. “It was the hard core,” Henderson com-
mented. “We would have been the ones who said, ‘ We’re  going to do some-
thing. If other  people come along, that’s fine.’ ”14
Soon, the group in Birkhead’s room learned that individuals active in the 
University Christian movement  were meeting separately to discuss how to 
respond to King’s murder. At around 2:00 a.m. the two groups began meeting 
jointly. The University Christian movement had already planned a Memorial 
Vigil for King at noon on Friday and flyers for the event had been distributed. 
They agreed that a candlelight march on Friday eve ning would be held, with 
the details for the march announced at the Memorial Vigil the next day.15
Discussion then turned to the destination for the march.  After much de-
bate, it was de cided that the march would head to Hope Valley, what Hen-
derson called “the symbol of wealthy white dominance” in Durham. While 
in Hope Valley, marchers would split into groups, canvasing the area to ask 
residents to sign a “statement of concern” that was being drafted.16
The Memorial Vigil at noon the next day lasted only a short time due 
to rainy weather. Soon, discussion turned to plans for the eve ning. At this 
point, both Griffith and Strange joined the discussions. Griffith was trusted 
by many of the student leaders, while Strange had become an informal ad-
viser to many of the protesters. Henderson described him as “liberal,” not 
“personally radical, just effective.” Both  were uneasy about the planned 
march to Hope Valley. Griffith’s primary concern was safety. “At that time,” 
Griffith recalled, “citizens in Hope Valley and other areas  were making sure 
they had guns and ammunition in their  houses.” Learning of plans for stu-
dents to go door- to- door in Hope Valley to solicit signatures, Griffith wor-
ried that  these residents “ weren’t about to have  people come off the streets 
into their homes. They  were afraid.”17
Griffith suggested that the march should instead head to Duke Forest, a 
neighborhood populated by many Duke faculty members and administrators. 
Griffith even suggested University House as a pos si ble destination. “I felt that 
if they  were  going to carry any message,” Griffith explained, “they  ought to 
carry it to the Duke community.” Strange suggested that students obtain sig-
natures in Duke Forest for a petition on racial justice as well as an advertise-
ment scheduled to appear in the Durham Morning Herald supporting racial 
equality and pro gress. Once Duke Forest was settled upon as the destination 
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for the march, Griffith provided the group with a map of the area and pointed 
out the location of faculty residences and University House.18
 Because it continued to rain, a group of about ten students and faculty went 
inside to discuss the eve ning’s plans. They  were joined by Peter Brandon, the 
Durham or ga nizer for Local 77, the  union that had been seeking to represent 
Duke’s nonacademic employees in collective bargaining with the university. 
The group then de cided that the destination for the march would be Knight’s 
 house. The demands would be framed as “an approach to Knight for a ‘positive 
action’ ” and would ask the Duke president to take specific steps to advance 
the cause of racial justice at Duke. Brandon suggested that the demands focus 
specifically on the plight of Duke’s nonacademic employees and his proposal 
was quickly accepted. Support for  these workers had been slowly growing 
among Duke students and faculty since the mid-1960s. A Student- Faculty 
Committee had formed in late 1966 to support the nonacademic employees 
and, in April 1967, two hundred students joined the workers on a picket line 
to pressure the university to accept impartial arbitration of employee griev-
ances. A number of students and faculty actively supported early efforts by 
the university’s nonacademic employees to  unionize.  There was “very much a 
pro– working class sentiment among the core group” of activists, Henderson 
commented. “As soon as we started formulating demands,  those demands re-
garding the workers  were among them.” The group also agreed that march-
ers who wanted to do so would sit-in at Knight’s  house  until their demands 
 were met.19
By eve ning, the students had crystallized around four demands. The first 
requested that Knight sign a Durham Morning Herald advertisement that 
would be circulated for additional signatures in Duke Forest that eve ning. 
The ad said, in part, that the murder of King had presented each citizen a 
stark choice “between the promise of Amer i ca the  Free or a harvest of death 
and inhumanity which is the result of continued oppression of black Ameri-
cans.” It stated that “we are all implicated” in allowing a society to flourish that 
“could take the life of a man who asked only for the freedom of his  people” 
and outlined specific steps it urged white Americans to take to support racial 
pro gress.20
The next two demands took aim at the “plantation system” at Duke. The 
first of  these supported the nonacademic employees in their ongoing strug gle 
to gain the right to bargain collectively with the university. It asked Knight to 
establish a committee of students, faculty, workers, trustees, and administrators 
to “consider” collective bargaining and  union recognition for  these workers. 
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The second of  these two demands asked Duke to establish $1.60 per hour as 
the base level of compensation for Duke’s nonacademic employees— the na-
tional minimum wage for “for- profit” organ izations. It requested that Knight 
make finding the funds for  these raises a first priority for the university— 
ahead of any building programs.
The final demand was directed at the university’s continuing relationship 
with the segregated Hope Valley Country Club. It called on Knight to resign 
his membership in the club. Knight, of course, had heard this demand before.21
Identifying negotiators for the group was the next step. Margaret “Bunny” 
Small, Birkhead, and Jonathan Kinney  were chosen by a vote of the group. 
All three  were active in campus politics, held leadership positions in student 
organ izations, and  were well known to Duke administrators. Kinney was the 
president of asdu, Birkhead had served as editor of the Duke Chronicle, and 
Bunny Small had been elected president of the Pan- Hellenic Council before 
resigning soon  after the start of her term.22
In the late after noon, a flyer for the 7:00 p.m. memorial pro cession to Duke 
Forest was distributed on campus. To emphasize the solemnity of the occa-
sion, students  were instructed to “wear clothes appropriate for mourning” and 
“bring candles to carry.”23
 Until Friday eve ning, April 5, Henderson noted, the core group of po liti-
cally active students at Duke had found it “extremely difficult to or ga nize a 
demonstration of any size.” “When we did decide to go to Knight’s”  house, 
Henderson recalled, organizers thought, “ ‘Well, we might get 20  people to 
go.’ ” Therefore, they  were “ecstatic” when 450 students and faculty converged 
on the Alumni Lounge on a rainy night to receive instructions for the pro-
cession. The emotions aroused by King’s assassination, plus the fact that “the 
issues  were not new ones,” explained the turnout, Henderson recounted. 
Seeing the size of the group, he “knew we had seized a moment in history.” 
What ever the cause— especially given the small number of po liti cally active 
students at Duke— the large turnout meant that most of the marchers had 
 little, if any, prior protest experience. Many  were also unaware that a sit-in at 
University House was planned.24
Strange addressed the marchers before they headed out. He sought to forge 
a connection between the predominantly white protesters and the life and 
work of King. Describing the slain civil rights leader’s commitment to non-
violence, Strange spoke of King’s belief that the “Black man cannot be  free 
 until the white man is  free.” He recalled King’s “regrettable conclusion” that 
“the white moderate who is more devoted to order than to justice” posed “the 
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Negro’s  great stumbling block in his [d]rive  towards freedom.” King called 
for “you and me, who prob ably are moderate,” Strange told the marchers, 
“to walk in the rain for a long distance— past dark woods—to pre sent a list 
of grievances to the president of the university. . . .  We are gathered  here to-
night,” Strange said, “to express our conviction that [King]  shall not have died 
in vain. . . .  Let us stand and act now,” he concluded.25
It took about forty minutes for the pro cession to reach Knight’s  house. 
Given that King, a minister, had preached the power of Christian love as a 
weapon for social change, it is not surprising that the march had a strong re-
ligious dimension. “It was like a pilgrimage, a crusade,” Henderson said. “We 
could have as easily been singing ‘Onward Christian Soldiers’ as what ever it 
was we  were singing.” Small observed that many of the leaders came from 
religious backgrounds. “The  whole development,” she explained, “came 
from a circle of  people who [had] religious affiliations— the University Chris-
tian movement, the ywca—so  there was a shared framework.”26
While the vast majority of protesters  were white, some of Duke’s Black 
student leaders joined the march, including Armstrong (the chair of the aas 
at the time), Hopkins, Stef McLeod, and Howard. If Duke’s white students 
felt passion born from protest for a noble cause, Black students experienced 
the march differently. According to Armstrong,  these students  were still reel-
ing from the assassination of King. They remained confused about the moti-
vations and commitment of their white colleagues. On the march, Howard 
wondered  whether the planned sit-in at Knight’s  house would actually occur. 
“I remember . . .  saying,” she recounted, “ ‘Well, let’s see what they are  going to 
do ’cause we  don’t think  they’re  going to do it.’ ”27
When the marchers arrived at Knight’s driveway, Henderson wrote, 
“Dr. Strange announced that some of the group would stay and that he would 
take  those who would not stay to canvass the neighborhood for signatures 
and contributions for the advertisement.” Griffith had called Knight to warn 
him that the students  were marching to his  house. “Mrs. Knight and I went 
to the door of University House to meet them,” Knight wrote  later. “I started 
to try to talk with them, but it was dark outside and both of us invited them 
in.” A few marchers had trickled into University House before the Knights is-
sued their invitation. Soon their numbers increased and, eventually, about 250 
students entered the  house. “It was dusk” when we reached the  house, student 
Peter Neumann recalled, “and he  couldn’t see the crowd. The news that he 
had invited us into his  house went like lightning to the back of the line. We 
 couldn’t believe our luck, but . . .  Knight’s beginning road to hell was paved 
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with his good intentions.” Neumann saw the shock Knight was experiencing. 
“By the time I entered his  house,” he reported, “Knight, standing at the door, 
was in a state of near catatonic immobility.” Another student observed that 
Knight was “speechless” when he came through the front door of his  house 
and found 250 “students sitting quietly in his living room.” The moment was 
power ful. Sally Avery remembered entering Knight’s  house as “the moment I 
became a radical.”28
Knight  later acknowledged “what a wild  thing it must have seemed” to 
open his  house to the marchers. His reasons for  doing so  were complicated. 
For one  thing, the Duke president viewed University House, completed  under 
his direction in 1966, as both his personal residence and as a university build-
ing constructed to entertain large groups.  Because the students did not at-
tempt to enter the Knight  family’s living quarters, the Duke president saw 
them as occupying public— not private— space. A second reason may have 
been that Knight, always confident in his powers of persuasion, thought that 
talking with the protesters might bridge differences and defuse an emotional 
situation. Perhaps most importantly, Knight knew a number of the protest-
ers personally, having worked with them on university  matters. He felt em-
pathy for the  others. Knight hoped that hospitality and conversation could 
ease the pain he knew the students  were experiencing. “We did not see  these 
distraught young  people as demonstrators,” Knight wrote, “nor did we— even 
at moments of  great tension as the eve ning wore on— see them as invaders of 
our privacy.” Knight explained  later that he felt “very close” to the students 
and “wanted as  little distance as pos si ble between them and [himself] when 
the impor tant questions turned up.” “ There  were a lot of [students] who  were 
hurting,” Knight emphasized. “On a rainy night, if  there was a possibility of 
getting in out of the rain to talk, why then let’s do it.”29
Knight’s empathy for the students and sympathy for their cause would be 
sorely tested as the eve ning wore on.
The 250 students occupied a large living room. “I had never seen a living room 
so big,” student Avery wrote: “brand- new, very modern, with almost no furni-
ture on the . . .  plush beige carpeting.” One student commented that the room 
“looks like a Howard Johnson’s Motor Lodge.” Designed to accommodate 
large groups, “the living room stretched out the full width of the back of the 
 house,” Avery recalled, “with a glass wall rising two stories high.” Even this 
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 grand space, however, soon became cramped. “The crowd at Knight’s  house 
got very large,” one student remembered. “We  really covered the floor.”30
Kinney, Small, and Birkhead told Knight that they wanted to discuss the 
four demands. The three joined Knight in his private study, where negotia-
tions went on for several hours, without pro gress. Throughout his Duke ten-
ure, Knight had always been equivocal on the sensitive racial and po liti cal 
issues under lying the demands. “Birkhead would ask a point blank question, 
like ‘Do you believe in collective bargaining?’ ” one student described, “and 
Knight would respond in typical fashion that the question  couldn’t be an-
swered except in the ‘proper frame of reference.’ ” Asked to add his name to 
the signatories for the Durham Morning Herald ad, Knight refused  because 
the text said that “we are all implicated” in the King assassination. Knight 
explained that he could not make such a statement on behalf of the university 
since “some of [Duke’s] trustees . . .  did not feel implicated.” Knight also felt 
that he could not agree to a wage increase for Duke’s nonacademic employees. 
“I had to explain that I could not take such a step even if I would, and . . . 
why the option was not available to the university in any case.” Looking back, 
Knight acknowledged that his “earnest efforts to make both of  these points . . . 
 were guaranteed to be baffling and frustrating to the negotiators.”31
 Every fifteen minutes or so, one of the student negotiators would emerge 
from the study to brief the larger group on the status of discussions. According 
to Henderson, “this was a pre- arranged signal [for protest organizers] to lead 
the cry that we  were not leaving  until we got the four items.” Henderson re-
ported that at one point, when the group started shouting, “Hell no, we  won’t 
go,” the  house “shook” and Knight was “visibly shocked.” As to the four de-
mands,  every update was essentially the same— the Duke president was being 
“absolutely intransigent.”32
Despite the lack of pro gress, the protesters remained upbeat. They sang 
protest songs throughout the eve ning, including “We  Shall Not Be Moved,” 
the American folk song that was a standard in the  labor and civil rights move-
ments. “ There was a  great deal of camaraderie,” student Steven Burke recalled, 
and “pride that a gesture had been made.” Along with  these reactions, how-
ever, Burke also remembered “anxiety resulting from the continual whispers 
that Knight had de cided to call in the police— which seemed unlikely.”33
During the eve ning, some of the participants watched tele vi sion coverage 
of the vio lence erupting in scores of American cities. At  these times, exhilara-
tion gave way to concern. “We  were all sitting  there with the tv on,” Boger 
recalled, “watching buildings burning in Washington and rioting in cities and 
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 there was a real feeling that this was an apocalyptic age.” “We heard reports 
that  were frightening,” Jeff Van Pelt wrote  later: “riots in city  after city, violent 
police response, machine gun emplacements on the Capitol steps.” “The ef-
fect of watching the nation’s capital burn,” Henderson wrote, “intensified our 
determination to make the ‘system’ work.”34
Armstrong had a diff er ent reaction to the tele vi sion coverage. She could 
relate to the actions of the rioters. “I watched the riots on tv,” she recalled. 
“ People  were saying how they  couldn’t understand how  people could do that. I 
thought, ‘How could they not?’ I want to do that. But I  don’t have enough guts; 
or, I’d been socialized to believe that’s just not the appropriate way of express-
ing your anger.”35 Despite vio lence in many other American cities, Durham 
remained quiet on Friday night.
Negotiations continued  until 11:00 p.m., when Mrs. Knight interrupted to 
insist that her husband eat something. At this point, Knight spoke to the stu-
dents. Introduced by Kinney over shouts of “Hell no, we  won’t go” and fidget-
ing with a matchbook, he addressed the protesters from a balcony overlook-
ing the living room. Any hope that the Duke president would simply accept 
the four demands quickly evaporated. While Knight expressed sympathy for 
the goal of advancing racial justice, he told the protesters that he lacked the 
authority and willingness to make concessions in such a polarized environ-
ment. “If you think I can, sitting  here, make many sorts of promises for an 
institution,” Knight explained, “all I can say is that I simply  don’t have that 
power.” For Knight, caution was the mode of the day, even in the face of a ra-
cial crisis that was exploding across the country— not to mention in his own 
living room. Acknowledging the need to “keep our society together,” Knight 
nevertheless refused to make concessions  under duress. “I  don’t think pushing 
one another is the answer,” he commented. “I’m not setting out to push you, 
[and] I  don’t want to feel that I myself [am] pushed.”36
Knight was scheduled to address a memorial ser vice for King the next day 
in Duke Chapel. He told students that he planned to use  these remarks to 
“suggest some concrete  things that I feel that we have been  doing in the uni-
versity [and] some of the  things we can do beyond it.” He continued: “If we 
 don’t try to meet the frustrations of this world with vio lence . . .  I still believe 
 there are some  things we can do,” but “ we’ve got to have enough order so that 
we can accomplish them.”37
By now, the students in University House  were insisting on immedi-
ate action. They  were unsympathetic to Knight’s plea for “order” and his 
request for time to pursue unspecified further steps. Would pro gress have 
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been made in the civil rights movement  after Selma, one student asked, if 
not for pressure from  people who  were willing to “get up and say,  we’re not 
 going to take this any more? That’s what  we’re saying,” the student insisted, 
“and you  don’t seem to understand it!” Knight felt that he had supported 
racial pro gress at Duke. “One  thing that I regret more than any of you know,” 
he told the students, “is that . . .  you  don’t  really believe that I have fought 
for some of  these  things that you are talking about.” Knight wrote  later that 
the students “ couldn’t imagine how much I agreed with them.” “I trust that 
you fought for  these  things,” Boger responded, “but I think that  there comes 
a time when we  can’t temporize, when we  can’t wait, when we have got to 
take a stand now.”38
“What about your country club?” a student shouted. Despite demands that 
he resign from Hope Valley as early as November 1966, Knight seemed not to 
get it. Instead, he told the students that he “ hadn’t looked upon [Hope Valley] 
as the impor tant issue.” Knight argued, as he had previously, that he preferred 
to “work with members of my community who may not see the  matter of 
country club membership as you do.” Knight  didn’t consider it “wise” to cut 
himself off from the chance to work for change from inside the club.39
For Boger, however, time had run out on Knight’s gradualist approach. 
“To night, tanks are in Washington; machine guns on Capitol Hill,” he said. 
The country was “polarized” and Boger feared that without decisive action 
by men of good conscience, it would become even more divided. “When you 
say that you must stay in this country club to deal with interests in this com-
munity,” he argued, “it may be that we have come to the time when we are 
 going to have to start working in opposition to . . .  some of the aims of some of 
 these  people in the community.” “That is not a fair repre sen ta tion,” Knight re-
sponded, once again not seeming to comprehend the urgency of the students 
nor the national moral crisis to which they  were responding.40
Asked by gradu ate student Huck Gutman if the university would be willing 
to make a wage increase for nonacademic employees a higher funding priority 
than Duke’s aggressive building program, Knight objected. Salaries for non-
academic employees had increased by 50  percent in the past five years, Knight 
pointed out, and “the money for the buildings  doesn’t come from the same 
sources” as the money for wages. Knight acknowledged twenty years  later that 
his comments  were not helpful. “That’s the sort of rational response that’s not 
appropriate to that eve ning,” he said. “It  didn’t have any impact.”41
Boger spoke for the entire group when he described the urgency of the 
moment. “I  really feel that an old order has changed in the United States of 
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Amer i ca,” Boger declared. “I think that the tanks that are right now rumbling 
down the streets of Washington [are] witness [to] this change.” Boger continued:
One of the  things that we as young  people  will not allow in the  future are 
institutions that remain . . .  immoral. Good men involved in all levels of 
Duke University somehow cannot take moral stands  because of vari ous 
forces seemingly beyond anyone’s control. . . .  In this new order we have 
to stand up morally as institutions. We have to make stands . . .  that meet 
the situation at hand. We cannot [face] a situation in which the country 
[is] falling apart with “maybes,” “might happens in the  future,” and, “ we’re 
very concerned.”
“I have no doubt of your deep concern,” Boger told Knight, “but we have come 
 here non- violently, as students of this university, to say we must do something 
impor tant now. Duke University, we must do it now. We are non- violent, but 
we  will not be moved.”  After Boger spoke, the Duke Chronicle reported, stu-
dents “exploded into cheering and applause.” “ We’ll stand  behind you if you 
take a stand,” they shouted at Knight.42
Although the “reasonable  middle ground” Knight had tried to claim at 
Duke was disappearing before his eyes, he persisted. When students began 
another chorus of “hell no, we  won’t go,” the Duke president responded, “I 
 don’t think  we’re  going to  settle the questions that torment us and tear us apart 
by your operating as though you  were a mob, which I  don’t believe you are.” 
Knight repeated that he could not act in response to a “mandate” or a “de-
mand.” “I think you have to understand,” he told the students, “how we try to 
do our best in light of the other  things we have to do in the University. I’m not 
trying to pussyfoot with you,” he said. “I’m just telling you the truth about it.”43
Knight’s interaction with the students totally failed to have the calming 
effect he hoped for. In fact, his remarks only exacerbated an already tense 
situation. “He has a way of talking down to students that can be most antago-
nistic,” Henderson commented. “Knight was terribly inept,” another student 
observed, “and was rudely harangued by the crowd.” Knight saw the discon-
nect. “Communication just went to hell in a hat,” he observed  later.44
 After the confrontation with Knight, the protesters began to discuss 
 whether they would stay overnight. Birkhead argued that remaining at 
Knight’s  house was a small sacrifice given events occurring in the country. 
Kinney was concerned about the impact that leaving might have on the Black 
students at Knight’s  house. Van Pelt had a somber recollection of why students 
stayed. “In a collapsing world,” he wrote, “holding together in the name of 
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what was right seemed the only sane  thing to do.” Ultimately, approximately 
90  percent of the 250 students who entered University House Friday eve ning 
chose to remain overnight.45
Learning that the students  were discussing the overnight occupation of 
University House, Knight told them he thought it was counterproductive. “My 
reaction . . .  is that this very much limits my freedom to do the very  thing that 
you are asking that we do together,” he said. “It’s as  simple as that.” Asked by 
a wdbs radio reporter what he would do if the protesters refused to leave, 
Knight made clear that he would not initiate a confrontation. “I certainly 
 don’t feel that removing them by force is an answer to our prob lems,” he com-
mented. “Yes, they may stay.”46
The  women who wished to occupy Knight’s  house overnight faced a prob-
lem—in April 1968, female Duke undergraduates who planned to spend the 
night off campus  were still required to sign out of their dorms to a specific lo-
cation. In a contradiction that captures the ambiguity of the protest, a substan-
tial number of coeds  were concerned about violating this rule. To applause 
from the students, Knight gave permission for Duke women to sign out to 
University House for the night.47
Meanwhile, negotiations resumed in the kitchen. Knight had an antago-
nistic relationship with Birkhead dating back to his time as editor of the Duke 
Chronicle. Knight asked that Birkhead be removed from the negotiating team. 
This request was accepted and Strange took his place. Still, no pro gress was 
made. According to Knight, by around 1:30 a.m., the group “could at least 
agree that nothing more would be accomplished that night.” Exhausted, 
Knight went to bed. Avery remembered the Duke president “on his way to his 
bedroom, carefully stepping over the sleeping bodies, followed by his basset 
hound.” Bob Ashley recalled Knight “looking beaten.”48
By the end of the eve ning, protest leaders realized, according to Small, that 
Knight “was not  going to negotiate with us; he  wasn’t  going to do anything. 
That’s where he was  really a ‘wuss,’ ” Small reflected. “He should have done 
something. [But] it  wasn’t in his character to step out on a limb.”49
Both the atmosphere and the physical set-up in University House made 
sleep difficult. It was “a pretty tense situation,” the student narrator of a  Silent 
Vigil audiotape commented. “It was hard to stay calm and cool about the  whole 
 thing.” The excitement also made sleep elusive. “ There was a party atmosphere 
in that  there was a bunch of  people who  were  doing something that felt good,” 
Burke remembered. Henderson called it a “festive atmosphere.” Another stu-
dent described the mood as one of “exhilaration” and “uncertainty.”50
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Black students in University House had mixed reactions to the unfolding 
events. Armstrong was concerned that Knight was setting a “trap” for the students 
and worried that police might still be called to evict the demonstrators. Deeply 
grieving King, she felt disconnected from the “festive atmosphere” she saw around 
her. Howard doubted  whether the demonstration would succeed. “I  don’t think 
 there  were a lot of  people who had any experience with activism in that group,” 
she remembered, and “I’m not clear the sense of ‘groupness’ was  there.” Howard 
was also concerned about the level of commitment of the white students. “Part of 
it was ‘stick- to- itiveness,’ ” she explained. “Even  after they bedded down, I  didn’t 
think they  were  going to stay. . . .  It was just a fun  thing for a lot of  people  there.”51
Griffith came by University House around 2:00 a.m., relieved that the stu-
dents  were safe. Griffith agreed with Knight’s decision to allow the protesters 
to stay through the night. Knight “very carefully, and rightfully so,” Griffith 
recalled, “never said ‘leave,’ which would have been a  mistake. . . .  He would 
have had to produce—[ either to] have them leave or be reversed.” Support for 
the president’s decision, however, was far from unan i mous. “The trustees, gen-
eral public, and alumni felt” that allowing the protesters to stay “was a weak 
response,” Griffith recounted, many  people believing that Knight “should have 
kicked them out.” “ People  were calling us from the University community and 
outside,” Knight remembered. They  were saying, “Now, do you want us to get 
force to put them out?”52
Pressure on Griffith and other administrators to end the occupation would 
build rapidly once morning arrived. To cover any contingency, a security force 
was stationed near the  house.53
Before leaving for campus on Saturday morning to speak at the memorial 
ser vice for King, Knight spoke to the protesters for about twenty minutes. 
He again stated that he had not realized how impor tant a symbol his Hope 
Valley membership was. He told them he would do something about it “not 
 today, but certainly not in 18 months.” Knight claimed credit that Duke was 
the first white southern university to prohibit the use of segregated facilities 
by campus groups, not mentioning the role the study-in by Black students 
had played in forcing the policy change. Reiterating that he could not respond 
 under pressure, he told the students that he would form a committee consist-
ing of administrators, faculty, students, and trustees to discuss the  labor situ-
ation at Duke.54 Taking no questions, he then left for campus.
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At around 10:00 a.m., a group of se nior Duke administrators, all white 
men, met to discuss the rapidly unfolding events. Presided over by Cole, 
attendees included Griffith, vice president Charles B. Huestis, vice provost 
Barnes Woodhall, director of information ser vices Clarence E. Whitfield, vice 
president for institutional advancement Frank L. Ashmore, and university 
counsel Edwin C. Bryson. This group formed the core of an “administrative 
working team” that would participate, according to Cole, in a “continuous and 
expanding meeting of administrative and faculty colleagues . . .  to decide on 
an appropriate course of action.”55
When Knight joined the working team on Saturday morning, four courses 
of action  were  under consideration. Among them, according to Cole, was 
“the use of force for removal.” The final decision was left to Knight. He de-
cided against the use of force. Instead, the Duke president would proceed with 
his planned chapel remarks, which, he hoped, would help resolve the crisis. 
Knight told his fellow administrators that, in his talk, he would commit “the 
university to certain efforts to improve relations in the Duke community and 
to appoint a committee composed of both Black and white members to exam-
ine prob lems in the Duke community.”56
The students spent part of the morning cleaning up the public spaces they 
had occupied in University House. Throughout Saturday and the days that 
followed, the protesters  were careful to pre sent themselves as a moderate, 
respectful group motivated by morality and conscience. They  were not ex-
tremists ready to use vio lence to force changes at the school. “We  didn’t see 
ourselves as radical,” Bunny Small explained. “We  weren’t destroying property 
or burning cities; we  were a moderate voice of reason. We  weren’t challeng-
ing the university’s power; we  were challenging the university to play the role 
universities in liberal socie ties are supposed to play.” This message was re-
ceived. “Even in their times of vigorous protest,” Knight wrote, “they  were a 
surprisingly polite and civilized group. . . .  They  were at one level antagonistic 
 because they  were determined to make demands . . .  yet they  were restrained 
and disciplined along with their passionate sense of outrage.”57 Cleaning up 
University House reinforced this perception.
Knight spoke at the King memorial ser vice in Duke Chapel just  after 1:00 
p.m. In remarks he  later called “an outburst against the vio lence and social 
injustice of our society,” Knight talked about the need for healing while cau-
tioning that change would take time. Noting that he and Mrs. Knight “are 
prob ably the only ones  here with 200 guests in their  house at the moment,” 
the Duke president said he hoped that the student protesters  were listening 
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to him. “The mixture of feelings and emotions among  those of us  here and 
among the men and  women of this country are beyond rational description at 
this moment,” Knight said. “To be honest with you, I cannot say  either to you 
or to my friends at home that all of the losses, tragedy, [and] bafflement of this 
moment can be resolved in a weekend.”58
Knight alluded to only one of the four student demands in his speech— the 
establishment of a committee to study  labor issues. Acknowledging the im-
portance of the university’s treatment of its nonacademic employees, Knight 
said that, in the next two or three days, he would speak about bringing to-
gether members of the board of trustees, faculty, student body, employees, 
and administrative staff to look “in common purpose . . .  at  those develop-
ments which  will serve us best in this  great University.” In all of this, Knight 
was intentionally unspecific. Rather, he spoke of the need for each individual 
and institution to assume their share of the “burden” for the vio lence and de-
struction in the world. He suggested that the protesters in University House 
 were attempting to absolve themselves of guilt by making demands on  others. 
“If I have one criticism . . .  of the righ teous indignation of some of my young 
friends of the moment,” Knight observed, “it is that they have felt that some-
how we could pass the burden of responsibility to  others. No man is guiltless,” 
he argued. Knight ended with a call to work together to find solutions to com-
mon prob lems.59
While acknowledging in general the dimensions of the crisis Duke and 
the country  were facing, Knight failed to respond to the issues that had mo-
tivated the protest. Having been told by Knight that he would address their 
concerns at the memorial ser vice, the protesters  were disappointed with what 
they heard. Not only had just one of their four demands been mentioned, 
but the Duke president had characterized their attitude as one of “righ teous 
indignation.” Henderson described Knight’s decision not to take a dramatic 
stand on the issues as a “drastic  mistake.” He cited Knight’s attitude as pivotal 
in contributing to the “determination” of the protesters. Once again, Knight 
knew that his efforts at communication had failed. He wrote  later that his 
speech had “satisfied no one— including myself.”60
 After the memorial ser vice, Knight went to Cole’s home.  Later in the after-
noon, William G. Anlyan, dean of the School of Medicine and Knight’s per-
sonal physician,  stopped by to examine him. Anlyan concluded that the Duke 
president was near collapse and seemed at risk of suffering a relapse of his 
recent hepatitis. Anlyan ordered Knight into seclusion for forty- eight hours. 
“He and the provost looked at me,” Knight recalled, and said, “ ‘ You’re not 
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 going back to your  house.  You’re  going out to the lake and  you’re  going to be 
away from this.’ They meant it,” Knight remembered. Although he  later wrote 
that “part of me felt like a draft dodger,” Knight did not protest. “ There comes 
a time when the physical self just comes apart,” he remarked. With Knight 
sidelined, board chair Wright Tisdale designated Cole acting chief executive 
officer of the university.61
As Saturday passed, demands to end the occupation grew ever stronger. 
“Calls  were flooding in from alumni,” according to Griffith, and they were say-
ing, “Get  those damn  people out of the  house. How can you allow them to stay 
in  there another minute?” Over and over, according to Griffith, members of 
the administration heard the same refrain: “Why are they in Douglas Knight’s 
home? We’ve lost control. The university has no leadership.”62
 These reactions  were, of course, colored by perceptions of Knight. At board 
meetings, Griffith recounted, the Duke president would try to make sense of 
the student activism emerging on campus to the trustees: “He interpreted why 
they  were  doing  things and what they  were  doing.”  After a point, however, 
a number of board members had heard enough. “ Those  people would say,” 
Griffith remembered, “ ‘Doug Knight’s been making excuses for  those students 
for five years and  we’re no longer [wanting] to hear any more excuses, it’s time 
to get them  under control.’ . . .  Many  people eventually said he’s just an apolo-
gist for the students. . . .  He  can’t control [them] so he’s trying to validate what 
they are  doing.”63
Thus, Knight found himself in an impossible position. He was perceived as 
a “wuss” by the student protesters  because of his refusal to agree to their de-
mands and as weak by trustees and alumni  because of his inability to control 
the students.
Members of the administration’s working team “ were very concerned,” 
Griffith recalled. “We  were sensitive to what was taking place. We knew we 
had a  limited amount of time. . . .  The pressure [from the general public] was 
tremendous.” Even some on the working team questioned  whether the univer-
sity’s moderate course of action was the right one. “I disagree with the position 
taken by President Knight,” Cole wrote  later, that  people in University House 
could be considered “guests . . .  rather than . . .  uninvited occupants. . . .  Had 
the president given his approval,” Cole commented, “I was prepared, together 
with Ed Bryson, to . . .  use force . . .  to try to dislodge the occupants.”64
Ultimately, force was not used. One reason is  because the situation in Dur-
ham made such a move risky and difficult. “It was continually feared that an 
explosion in Durham would be sparked by events at Duke,” Cole wrote  later. 
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“The Durham Police force at the time was over taxed and over extended.” Cole 
believed that “this fact was never appreciated by  those . . .  who demanded a 
policy of throw the rascals out.”65
A second reason, however, was equally impor tant. Although the 250 stu-
dents in University House  were perceived as an occupying force by many 
trustees, alumni, and faculty, members of the administrative working team 
continued to view them sympathetically. “ Those of us who  were  here . . . 
knew the  people involved,” Griffith recounted. “ These  were  people who had 
leadership responsibilities. Many of them we had gotten to know very well.” 
Ashmore described the leaders directing events as “ people . . .  with whom we 
have worked, and for whom we all had a  great deal of re spect.” Administrators, 
Griffith explained, felt that “we should attempt to work in a reasonable kind 
of fashion with  people who  were our students, they  weren’t our enemies. They 
 were part of our . . .  University  family. . . .  You  don’t kick your  family out of 
someplace, you try to understand,” he explained. Kinney described the con-
nection between administrators and protesters much more succinctly. “We 
 were their sons and  daughters,” he explained.66
Griffith remained in regular contact with Strange by phone throughout the 
day. Around 8:00 p.m., Griffith and Anlyan visited University House to brief 
Kinney, Small, and Strange on Knight’s health. They told them that the Duke 
president was exhausted, would not be returning to the  house, and would be 
incommunicado  until 4:00 p.m. on Monday.67
The news that Knight would be sidelined  until Monday after noon pre-
sented the leaders with what Henderson called the “first real crisis” of the 
protest. “Not only did we not know where to direct the demonstration,” he 
wrote, but “we did not know if we could hold the demonstration together.” 
The students  were also genuinely concerned about Knight’s health. “We  were 
afraid that he might  really be sick,” Henderson remembered.68
Unable to decide what to do next, the three leaders asked the students to 
designate seven additional representatives for consultation. Known collec-
tively as the Committee of Ten, this group would lead the protest  going for-
ward. All  were white.69
 After further discussion, the expanded leadership group de cided that the 
best course would be to move the demonstration to Duke’s main quadrangle 
in the morning. Griffith was approached about the idea and he was very sup-
portive. “My feeling was that  there was not a  whole lot of room in that  house 
for more  people,” Griffith explained. To gain additional support for the four 
demands, Griffith believed, “it was impor tant to take [the protest] to the Duke 
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community.” Moreover, Griffith believed that the Duke campus was the right 
place for the four demands to be addressed. “I guess my feeling . . .  is that 
Duke is a  family, and if you want to change  things, you should try to work 
with your  family first before  going externally.” Protest leaders asked Griffith 
if Duke  women who joined the protest would be allowed to sign out of their 
dorms to the quad overnight. He “immediately jumped at the idea,” according 
to Henderson, “and called the deans to tell them about it.”70
If Griffith quickly embraced the prospect of a move, many of the protesters 
camped out in Knight’s living room  were wary. Even before the plan could 
be fully explained, “dissension spread,” according to Henderson. Although 
most of the students in University House had  little experience participating 
in demonstrations, the prior twenty- four hours had made a strong impact. “A 
number of  people who had never questioned the authority of the university 
before,” Henderson explained, “suddenly found themselves in an occupying 
force in the  house of the university President. They  were pleased with their 
boldness, and many did not want to give up the position of power.” Writing 
 later, one student commented that for him, the sit-in at Knight’s  house had 
been a turning point. He said, “I had asserted myself for the first time in my 
life.”71
The group discussion that ensued was highly charged. Some students  were 
concerned that a sit-in by two hundred or so students on the main Duke quad-
rangle would get lost, with the protest seen as “nothing but a joke.” Local 77 
or ga nizer Peter Brandon argued vehemently that the protesters should remain 
at University House. He said that preliminary discussions  were underway for 
a strike by Duke dining hall workers but that any planning was predicated on 
Duke students having seized “a key installation on the Duke campus.” Leaving 
University House, he told the demonstrators, “ will be judged a retreat by . . . 
Duke employees.” Bunny Small, who favored a move to the quad, worried 
that Knight’s illness would cause  those on campus who  were already skeptical 
about the occupation of University House to become even more antagonistic.72
As discussions dragged on, tempers flared. Late in the eve ning, the increas-
ingly tense discussions  were interrupted by a student who told the group that 
Durham was imploding. “The police station reports police cars are burning in 
the police garage lots,” the student reported. “Marcels supermarket is burning, 
condemned  houses all over Durham are burning, cabs started burning when 
the police changed shifts.” “Right  after that,” a student described, “ there was 
the most tremendous hush I’ve ever heard that fell across the  whole place.” 
By Sunday, a 7:00 p.m. curfew had been declared in Durham and the sale 
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of explosives, firearms, ammunition, gasoline, alcoholic beverages, and other 
items considered dangerous was prohibited. The National Guard was mobi-
lized to keep the peace. Tension at University House increased with news of 
the evacuation of Aycock Hall on the Duke campus following a bomb threat.73
Sleep was again difficult for  those occupying University House Saturday 
night. By Sunday morning, however, a consensus had formed around the plan 
to move to the main quad. When a vote was taken, 90  percent of the protesters 
supported the move.74
Saturday eve ning, Brandon had suggested that a strike by Duke’s nonaca-
demic employees was  under consideration. Early Sunday morning, he con-
firmed that planning for a strike had begun. The leaders of Local 77 saw the 
student protest as a way to gain student and faculty support for higher wages 
and collective bargaining. News of the potential strike raised the stakes for 
the students. “If the protest failed,” Gutman warned, “some  people . . .  may 
get fired and find it very difficult to get work in Durham. . . .  By involving 
the [workers and the Durham] Black community,  we’re giving them expecta-
tions,” he explained.75 The protest was no longer just a statement by Duke stu-
dents and faculty to their university. Now events had real- world consequences 
for Duke workers.
Howard had been at University House since Friday night and was con-
cerned. On Sunday morning, with the protest about to move to the quad, she 
commented on the “generally festive atmosphere” at Knight’s  house during the 
sit-in. Having participated in the aas study-in outside Knight’s office in No-
vember 1967, she was “quick to point out the difference in the organ ization and 
discipline of the two demonstrations,” Henderson wrote. He recalled Howard 
pointing out that “whites put so much store in individuality that they  were al-
most incapable of self- enforced unity and discipline.” If the group went to the 
quad with the same attitude, Howard predicted, they would be “ridiculed for 
being so poorly disciplined.” “It was too loose for me,” Howard remembered. 
“I  didn’t think they cared. It was like ‘how cute,  here we are spending the night 
at Dr. Knight’s  house.’ And I  didn’t think  there was a seriousness of purpose.” 
Howard was direct with the group. “This  ain’t  going to be worth nothing,” she 
remembered telling the group, “ because you just  don’t have it— unorganized, 
undisciplined  people just  don’t seem to be serious about it at all.”76
Howard’s comments made a difference. Through a pro cess of “collective 
decision making” but based largely on Howard’s remarks, the decision was 
made that the protest on the quad would be a “ Silent Vigil.” No talking would 
be permitted, except during breaks and at mealtime. In addition, a group of 
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monitors would be established and instructed on how to keep the group to-
gether. Reminded that her comments gave rise to the idea for a “ silent” vigil, 
Howard was surprised. “I would have never thought that silence was a part 
of it,” she commented wryly, “ because that  ain’t me.” As for the monitors, “of 
course they  were  there for discipline,” Howard recalled, “but the  whole busi-
ness about the monitors was a safety feature.” “The lessons of my youth par-
ticipating in demonstrations  were applied to the vigil,” she recalled, “as much 
for survival (how not to get beaten by the police) [as to provide a]  recipe for 
a successful protest.”77
With “trepidation” and no sense of how they would be received, the pro-
testers started marching to West Campus around 10:30 a.m., accompanied by 
a police escort. Henderson’s thoughts  were racing as he left Knight’s  house. He 
recalled questioning “if we had made the right decision, wondering if Knight 
was sick, thinking that we had lost our power base, [concerned that the] strug-
gle would get very diffused.” A small “cleaning crew” of students remained 
 behind at University House.78
Griffith and other members of the administrative working team  were re-
lieved that all but a handful of the protesters had vacated the president’s home. 
By labeling the students as “guests” and treating them as “ family,” Duke ad-
ministrators  were able to end the occupation without using force. Oliver Har-
vey wondered, however,  whether race had played a role in the administration’s 
restraint. “Naturally, 250 white students, the university is  going to respond to,” 
he commented  later. “Had we as Black  people gone to Knight’s  house, they 
would have tear- gassed us out, gone in and drawn injunctions on us. That’s 
law. But with 250 or 260 white students, no. Black students saw that as well as 
we did. . . .  Duke is  going to re spect their whites, not us. They re spect nobody 
Black, students or employees,” Harvey remarked.79
When they arrived on the quad, the protesters assembled in rows. Church-
goers leaving Duke Chapel on Sunday morning  were “somewhat surprised” 
at the reception waiting for them when ser vices  were over.80 The  Silent Vigil 
had begun.
CHAPTER 5
Hope Takes Its Last Stand
The  Silent Vigil
The 250 students who had occupied University House arrived on Duke’s 
main quadrangle on Sunday morning and made essentially the same four de-
mands of Douglas Knight that they had been insisting on since Friday. One 
asked Knight to sign a newspaper advertisement committing the university 
to pursue racial justice. The second asked that the Duke president resign his 
membership in the segregated Hope Valley Country Club. Two demands per-
tained to Duke’s nonacademic employees; one requested that Knight “press 
for a $1.60 minimum wage for all Duke employees” and the second asked him 
to “appoint a committee . . .  to make recommendations concerning collective 
bargaining and  union recognition at Duke.” Eventually, the demand for col-
lective bargaining became the paramount issue for the vigil. While protesters 
accepted that the mechanics of any arrangement would have to be finalized 
 later, they insisted that the university accept in princi ple the right of Duke’s 
nonacademic employees to bargain collectively.
Collective bargaining was crucial for  these employees. As  matters stood 
in 1968, Duke management set wages for workers with no input from  labor: 
the terms of employment  were set forth in a personnel handbook prepared by 
the university. While Duke permitted its workers to join voluntary employee 
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groups, it refused to bargain with  these organ izations or to enter into any 
legally enforceable collective contract. As described by the faculty committee 
established during the  Silent Vigil to investigate collective bargaining, “the 
provisions of the Personnel Handbook [are] subject from moment to moment 
to unilateral revision by the university,” and the university alone.1 As the larg-
est employer in Durham, this gave the university almost unfettered power to 
dictate wages and working conditions for its employees.
 Under collective bargaining, this situation would be transformed. Labor- 
management issues at Duke would be resolved through negotiations between 
representatives of the nonacademic employees and university executives. 
Terms of employment would be set forth in a legally binding agreement be-
tween the workers and the university. While collective bargaining can take 
many forms, at its core, this right would require the university to cede at least 
some of its power to unilaterally establish the terms of employment for its 
nonacademic workers. Duke employees had been pursuing the goal of col-
lective bargaining since 1965. They saw gaining this right—in some form—as 
essential to ending the paternalistic “plantation system” that had prevailed at 
Duke for so many de cades. With the students at the  Silent Vigil supporting 
this demand, Local 77 hoped to accelerate pro gress  toward this key goal.
The  Silent Vigil had multiple dimensions, but the university’s nonacademic 
employees  were central to the entire effort. What limits, if any, would the uni-
versity accept on its unfettered power to establish wages and working condi-
tions for  these workers? In the fraught climate following the assassination of 
Martin Luther King Jr., who had made the rights of the poor pivotal to racial 
equality, the university could  either respond to the crisis by taking meaningful 
steps to advance the cause of economic justice or it could stick to the “planta-
tion system.” Duke’s response would reveal how willing it was to move beyond 
attitudes that had  shaped its Jim Crow past to become a leader in the quest for 
social and economic justice.
A flyer signed on behalf of “the 200+” circulated through campus Sunday 
morning. “join US on the West Quad in Front of [the] Chapel” for a rally at 
2:00 p.m., it announced. “ Those students and faculty sitting in at the Presi-
dent’s residence,” the flyer declared, “have de cided . . .  we  will continue our 
vigil on the University campus. . . .  The American crisis demands that all 
institutional leaders . . .  demonstrate moral commitment to eliminate racial 
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dissensions and inequities.” Another flyer emphasized the connection between 
King’s work for economic justice and the goals of the  Silent Vigil. “Dr. King 
died in Memphis as he was preparing a march on behalf of striking garbage 
men,” the flyer stated, that is, “workers whose  union was ignored by their 
employers. We protest on behalf of Duke’s non- academic employees, whose 
wages are far below the poverty level and whose  union the University refuses 
to bargain with.”2
The Sunday rally was attended by 1,100 students, faculty, and other mem-
bers of the Duke community. Logistics for the event  were improvised and or-
ga nized on the fly. “Can anyone  here play the guitar?” a student leader asked. 
“We are looking for someone who can play ‘Blowin’ in the Wind.’ This is your 
last chance to sing and  we’ve got to make our presence felt with our voices so 
that the  whole darn community and the  whole darn world can hear us!”3
None of the Committee of Ten leading the vigil had ever directed a pro-
test of this size. They  were being carried along by events. It was “a period of 
radicalization for  those of us who  were radicalizing  others,” David Henderson 
observed. As for participants, a survey found that fully 77  percent of  those who 
joined the vigil  were taking part in their first “demonstration,” including po liti-
cal rallies. As a result, participants in the  Silent Vigil  were not jaded about their 
prospects for success. “American society is much more cynical  today,” Bunny 
Small commented many years  later. “It’s much harder for  people to believe in 
their own actions; they get discouraged before they even try.” But this was not 
the case for  these  Silent Vigil participants. “We had an optimism,” Small re-
flected, “in that we believed if we worked together we could change  things.”4
Small told the rally what an “amazing,” “ really fantastic” experience the 
sit-in at Knight’s  house had been. “We  didn’t know if we would be booted 
out, arrested, [or] suspended,” she explained, “but we felt we had to commit 
ourselves. . . .  If white Amer i ca,  those of us who come from nice middle- class 
homes, could not make the ‘system’ work for us,” she asked, “what chance 
would our Black  brothers have?” Small made clear that the purpose of the 
 Silent Vigil was to compel concrete action by the university. “Every one is for 
freedom, every body is for justice,” she shouted, “but  we’re gonna get some-
thing [done],  we’re gonna get it  here, and they  ain’t gonna move us one inch 
 until we get it!”5
Black students at Duke and members of the Black community in Durham 
 were skeptical of white leadership, another speaker said. “Many Blacks have 
already de cided that  there is no hope for this society,” he explained. One reason 
for the  Silent Vigil was to restore that hope. Black  people  were looking to see 
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if white students could cause an institution like Duke to make “the impor tant, 
the dramatic, the meaningful changes,” he said. If Black  people did not believe 
such changes  were pos si ble, the speaker warned, “they  will be in the streets in 
guerilla warfare and they  will try to bring the country down.”6
Watching events on the quad, William Griffith thought the demonstra-
tors  were pursuing worthy goals while behaving respectfully. “I’m just very 
impressed with the manner in which  those who are participating are express-
ing themselves,” he told wdbs radio, “and I’m very moved by the expression 
myself.” Although many in the administration agreed with Griffith, the trust-
ees  were another  matter. University and Endowment board member Marshall 
Pickens spoke for many when he wrote to two students: “My reaction to the 
so- called vigil is that it is a form of blackmail which should not be used in a 
civilized community.” With Knight sidelined, board chair Wright Tisdale de-
cided that he would come to Durham to be closer to events.7
On Sunday night, five hundred  people, the vast majority of them white 
Duke students, slept on the main quadrangle of the university. “We expect no 
trou ble,” Kinney told the protesters, “and we are being protected by both the 
Durham and the campus cops.” Still,  there was no way to know what nightfall 
might bring.  There  were rumors, according to Henderson, “of trou ble from 
some of the more reactionary [students] including some of the football play-
ers.” Of greater concern  were outsiders intent on disrupting the protest. “We 
are watching for firebombers,” W. C. A. Bear, chief of campus security, com-
mented. “ There have been lots of threats. We have been having men standing 
by . . .  in case  there is any outside interference.”8 Other than a few firecrackers 
 going off, Sunday night passed uneventfully.
Meanwhile, once Tisdale arrived in Durham on Sunday, he started meeting 
with members of the administrative working team immediately. The board 
chair told the team that he did not  favor the hands- off approach taken  toward 
the protest thus far. “Let’s straighten this out,” Tisdale told them. “Let’s not 
have this  going on at Duke University.” Tisdale had his own idea of how to 
proceed. “When Wright Tisdale flew in,” Charles Huestis recalled, “his first 
announcement was that he was  going to close the university down. That  really 
got us tied up in knots.”9
“I still have a feeling of awe when I think about waking up that first morning 
on the quad,” Bertie Howard recalled years  later. “I did not believe the number 
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of students who had joined the vigil during the night. It was incredible how 
the amount of space we used up had multiplied.”10
As the  Silent Vigil grew in size, it also became more highly or ga nized. 
Upon joining the vigil, participants  were seated in rows of exactly fifty  people. 
They  were provided with printed “Ground Rules for  Those Participating in the 
Vigil.”  These rules  were strict. They included “No talking. . . .  No eating except 
at group snack and meal breaks. . . .  No sunbathing” and “No singing except at 
specified periods  under the direction of the song leader. . . .  The monitors are 
in charge so please listen to them.”11
As instructed, protesters sat in silence. “They have a break  every 45 min-
utes,” Small told a reporter on Monday, “to stand and sing.” “We are a self- 
regulated bunch,” history professor Thomas Rainey commented. “Before 
joining us,” he explained, “all students agree to abide by the rules.” In case 
of rule violations, monitors  were quick to respond, although some thought 
 these efforts at maintaining order went too far. Hutch Traver, among the more 
militant students at Duke, remembered the monitors saying, “ ‘Please be quiet, 
Stay in your Vigil lines’ over and over again. ‘Raise your hand if you need to go 
to the bathroom.’ I thought it was very stupid,” he recalled.12
Other aspects of the vigil  were also well or ga nized. By Monday, monitors had 
been recruited, a sound system set up, and a press operation was  running around- 
the- clock. Information  tables  were set up for  those who had questions. A lost- 
and- found center, transportation pool, trash pickup, and banking ser vice  were all 
quickly established. The protest even had a poet laureate— activist John Beecher— 
who was elected early in the demonstration. Bertie Howard remembered “discus-
sions about our bank account—we had raised $6000 or so for the  union strike 
fund in a few days, and suddenly  there was talk about a tax id number and invest-
ment strategies.” The vigil had “superb organ ization,” one researcher commented 
accurately, that was put in place with a speed that was “truly impressive.”13
The elaborate structure of the vigil emerged organically. “The organ ization 
[was not] planned out beforehand,” po liti cal science professor John Strange 
commented. “It was serendipitous,” he reflected years  later. “As it evolved it 
was magic, it was beyond any of us.” “The vigil was a classic case of middle- 
class college kids using the skills they had to or ga nize something,” Small re-
called. Griffith shared the same sense. “If you look at pictures, it was so regi-
mented. They had cleanup detail. . . .  They had  people to walk the gals to the 
rest room facilities at three  o’clock in the morning.” Marveling at the organ i-
zation, Griffith described the students  running the protest as “potential tech-
nocrats, potential presidents of business concerns.”14
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Cleanliness was a priority. Monday morning, the small cleaning crew left 
 behind at University House was, according to Strange, “polishing it from top 
to bottom.” They  were “sweeping down the [rugs], scrubbing the garbage cans, 
vacuuming all the floors.”15 Out on the quad, trash was collected and hauled 
away at regular intervals.
Although operating on  little sleep, vigil leaders even found time to send a 
note to the Knights. “Please accept our sincere thanks,” Small, Strange, and Kin-
ney wrote the Knights on Monday, “for your welcome and hospitality and our 
apologies for any incon ve nience during our stay over this weekend.”16
The nonviolence, order, and good manners so evident at the vigil served 
multiple purposes. One was to garner support from  those who viewed the stu-
dent protest with concern. “We wanted to give the impression that we  were . . . 
responsible,” the student narrator of a Silent Vigil audiotape commented. At 
 every turn, “the idea of making a good impression held sway. . . .  We  were 
trying to not only affect  people on campus but outside of it,” he explained, es-
pecially “the moneyed, respectable  middle class of Durham. We felt that being 
neat and clean was very impor tant in this re spect.”17
A second purpose was more strategic. Demonstrators hoped to pressure 
the school to meet their demands while communicating to trustees and ad-
ministrators that they remained loyal members of the Duke “ family.” “I do give 
us credit for being smart enough to [be] not threatening,” Kinney recalled. “To 
try to be effective and [non]threatening is a very hard needle to thread.”18
This disciplined approach also helped recruit new vigil participants. “The 
order that we  were able to maintain,” Henderson wrote in his journal, “un-
doubtedly contributed to . . .  the support we got from faculty and other stu-
dents.” Another student described the dynamic in a more personal way. “We 
 were cautious,” Serena Simons commented. “ There was a real feeling of mod-
eration in our radicalism. It was a very culturally controlled event in that we 
 were all ‘good’ kids.”19
Vigil participants also hoped that their tactics would send a message to 
Black students at Duke and in Durham. “Almost to the individual,” a re-
searcher who interviewed participants  after the event reported, “the mem-
bers of the Vigil view their action as the last opportunity to [show] the Black 
Community that peaceful means can . . .  bring about results.” Strange made 
that point at a Monday press conference. “The militant Black community 
was prob ably somewhat amused by the tactics which  were being used” at 
the vigil, he commented. Both students and the broader community “have 
been amazed by the support which we have garnered both from faculty and 
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students by a very deescalated type of approach” and “are reassessing their 
attitudes about the ways in which you approach  these prob lems.” However 
well intentioned,  these comments by white protest leaders  were not always 
well received. Brenda Armstrong recalled  later that at least some of the Black 
students found them “condescending.”20
Meanwhile,  little contact between vigil negotiators and the administrative 
working team was occurring. Monday after noon, the Committee of Ten was 
informed that Knight would be remaining in seclusion “for several days or 
longer.”21
At the same time, Local 77 was moving forward with a strike. At a 5:00 p.m. 
Monday meeting, Duke dining hall workers voted to strike, effective at 12:01 
a.m. Tuesday morning. They approved two demands: the right to collective bar-
gaining and an end to “poverty wages” through the establishment of a $1.60 per 
hour minimum wage for all Duke workers. Significantly, the vigil participants 
asked only that the university establish a committee to “consider collective bar-
gaining and  union recognition for Duke’s non- academic employees.” Local 77 
demanded specific action. “The University must recognize that Local 77 rep-
resents Duke workers,” a flyer for the strike meeting asserted, “and that Duke 
 will negotiate a contract that  will be voted on by the  union membership and 
signed by both the  union committee and the Duke administration.” While vigil 
protesters supported recognition for Local 77, Small explained, “our goal was to 
get the university to do anything that would be [a move] in [that] direction.”22
For Local 77, recognition as the “exclusive bargaining agent” for Duke work-
ers was essential. Agreement by the university only to the “princi ple” of col-
lective bargaining could allow other  unions to compete with Local 77 for the 
right to represent segments of Duke’s nonacademic employees. Should such 
a competition result in more than one  union representing diff er ent groups of 
Duke workers, the negotiating leverage nonacademic employees  were seeking 
could have been significantly reduced. Still, when told about the strike, vigil 
participants voted overwhelmingly to support the workers.
With King’s funeral to be held the next day, vigil leaders announced a 
class boycott starting at 8:00 a.m. on Tuesday. The school canceled third- and 
fourth- period classes, “as a part of the university’s participation in the memo-
rial to Dr. Martin Luther King.”23 The university wanted to acknowledge the 
sense of loss felt by many on campus while maintaining, to the extent pos si ble, 
normal university operations.
Starting on Sunday, vigil participants had declared a boycott of the West 
Campus dining facilities. While the boycott continued, vigil organizers  were 
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responsible for feeding the growing number of protesters. A distribution 
system staffed by faculty wives, nonacademic employees, and East Campus 
coeds was quickly established. Claiborne Tapp, man ag er of the Chicken Box, 
an iconic Black- owned restaurant in Hayti, proved instrumental in feeding 
the protesters. On Monday, the Chicken Box provided five hundred meals for 
vigil participants at its cost of fifty cents per plate. “If you need anything,” Tapp 
told protest organizers, “just call me.  We’re with you all the way. We appreciate 
what  you’re  doing for us.” “Good meals . . .  from the Chicken Box,” Howard 
recalled, opened up “a  whole new world to white students who had not ven-
tured into the world of African- American cuisine.”24
Meanwhile, faculty support for the vigil continued to grow. Some joined 
students on the quad while  others helped with food ser vice. Faculty also 
showed support in other ways. At their regularly scheduled meeting on April 8, 
for example, the faculty of the divinity school voted unanimously to suspend 
any annual increment in faculty salary. They requested that “the resultant sav-
ings be transferred to the bud get of the non- academic employees for the rais-
ing of their minimum wage.”25
“It was obvious from the beginning” of Monday, Henderson reported, 
“that support for the Vigil was growing.” Not only  were more students join-
ing the protest, but the campus had become “polarized” between  those who 
supported the demonstration and  those who opposed it. “One of my students 
told me,” Samuel DuBois Cook recalled, “that his fellow students had to ‘jus-
tify’ to themselves their nonparticipation. How in ter est ing and significant!” 
“An atmosphere of decency, morality, civility and social, racial, and economic 
justice permeated the campus,” creating a “ great and proud moment in Duke 
history,” Cook remembered.26
The hundreds of students who joined the vigil did so for a myriad of rea-
sons. Some  were moved by the assassination of King. For other students, 
the vigil was a direct way of responding to racial prob lems at Duke and in 
American society. “Eulogizing Martin Luther King did not seem enough,” one 
student recounted. “For me, the main issues  were recognizing the rights of 
workers and recognizing that the University had a responsibility to the com-
munity.”  Others joined for reasons that had nothing to do with politics or 
the “four demands.” Asked why she joined the vigil, Simons said that she was 
“wildly in love with this person who was real po liti cal. . . .  I was dating him 
at the time.” Most participants joined the vigil for a combination of  these rea-
sons. “The Vigil attracted me,” a student recalled, “ because it embodied many 
of the values I find impor tant— democracy, [the] right to assem ble,  human 
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justice, and dignity, and equality. . . .  I also remember I had a big paper due,” 
he continued, “and the Vigil gave me an extension  because the class  didn’t 
meet (All motives are mixed!).”27
What ever their reasons, by Monday, vigil participants had created a sepa-
rate community on the main quadrangle of Duke University. This community 
operated outside the cultural and social norms of the school. Students sang 
together, slept together, and ate together. Once classes began to meet on the 
quad, they studied together. Security, banking, transportation, and medical 
care  were all provided. Jeff Van Pelt described the “separateness” experienced 
by the vigil community. “One by one our numbers grew,” he wrote, “but only 
in one way: only as each person stepped onto the quad, stepped over the line 
that divided our ranks from the world as it had been before.”28
The vigil community offered participants the social space to reflect on their 
values, politics, and goals in a new way. “You have levels of understanding, 
intellectual and emotional,” history professor John Cell explained, “and an 
experience like [the vigil] deepens, intensifies, focuses. It’s not that you  hadn’t 
thought about  these  things,  hadn’t known  these  things, or maybe  hadn’t even 
understood  these  things,” he said. “But you understand them [now] in diff er-
ent ways and they become personal.” For many, the experience was transfor-
mative. “The  Silent Vigil was a noble event and a sacred or divine experience,” 
Cook commented on the thirtieth anniversary of the protest, reflecting that 
it was “historical, institutional, symbolic, existential, and personal.” Cook re-
membered the protest as “one of  those supreme and unforgettable mountain-
top experiences in which the ‘Word was made flesh.’ ” It was “a magical mo-
ment,” Huck Gutman recalled, “when you think the world can be transformed 
and you can be a part of it.” “I was transported in a way unequalled for me 
 either before or since,” another student explained. “I suppose it was as close as 
I ever came to a religious feeling.”29
The dozens of letters written to Provost Cole by vigil participants on Mon-
day expressed the passion and moral clarity that many at the vigil  were feel-
ing. “We do not want trou ble,” one student warned, “but we are sick of apathy, 
sick of injustice. We want equality and we want peace now, at any cost to our 
personal  futures.” Another student wrote poetically about the power ful sense 
of rebirth and renewal he was experiencing, calling it “a new Genesis. It is my 
sole hope,” this student wrote, “that Duke University can, in like manner, arise 
to the re nais sance which it has under gone.”30
Cole and  others in the administration  were receiving a very diff er ent mes-
sage from alumni. Despite efforts by vigil participants to pre sent themselves as 
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moderate, many alumni viewed the protesters as out of control. Letters from 
alumni called participants “hoodlums,” “mob- like,” “impressionable adoles-
cents,” “complainers,” “malcontents,” and “beasts.” Almost all alumni urged 
the university to take a hard line against the protesters. “This is not the time to 
let the animals run the zoo,” an alumnus wrote, urging the administration to 
“take a firm stand against  these misguided youths.” Letters “poured in like the 
snow,” Roger Marshall recalled. “At one point, I had 3,000 unanswered letters 
on my desk.”31
Alumni  were not alone in opposing the vigil. Many students also did not 
approve of the protest. “The Vigil could have only occurred in the scholas-
tic environment,” one student wrote critically, “a totally artificial arena where 
the participants can devote themselves to idealism with no concern for the 
mechanics of existence— food, shelter, birth, death.” Christopher Edgar, an 
economics major, opposed  union recognition and a wage increase for nonaca-
demic employees: “I felt that the administration had a duty to its students to 
provide the highest quality education at the lowest pos si ble cost.”32
As time passed, Wright Tisdale became increasingly concerned about 
events. By Monday eve ning, the board chair had been in Durham for twenty- 
four hours. Almost all that time had been spent in intense discussions with 
the administrative working team. Cole, Huestis, and Griffith, among  others, 
 were trying to explain to Tisdale “what the students  were trying to say to us” 
and “that it was a peaceful demonstration and not out of control.” But with 
the protest growing in size by the hour, dining hall workers heading out on 
strike, a class boycott scheduled for the next day, and at least some faculty 
rallying to the cause, Tisdale was not persuaded. Noting that “feelings ran 
high at times,” Cole wrote that on Monday eve ning he was “ordered [by Tis-
dale] to dismiss summarily from the University a number of the leaders of 
the Vigil  under threat of his resignation in case I failed to do so. I gave my 
strong reasons for refusal,” Cole explained, and “answered by promising my 
own resignation if the action by administrative fiat  were taken.” The dismiss-
als never occurred  because, as Cole recounted, “cooler counsels eventually 
prevailed.” Still, Cole’s relationship with Tisdale became irrevocably strained. 
“The Chairman always considered me to be too sympathetic in my dealings 
with the students,” Cole wrote, “and I in turn felt that he was emotionally 
unpredictable and too far removed . . .  from the ‘firing line’ . . .  to make re-
sponsible judgments.”33
Tisdale then proposed even more aggressive action. On Monday night, 
Huestis reported, “Tisdale said he’d heard enough and was  going to close down 
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the university.” His intent, according to Huestis, was “simply to . . .  demonstrate 
that Duke was . . .  not  going to put up with this kind of [nonsense]. We argued 
vehemently [with Tisdale] on that,” Huestis recalled. “I remember saying, . . . 
‘Wright,  will you explain to me why it is necessary that Duke University be 
the first university in the United States to close in the face of a student protest, 
especially when it’s a peaceful student protest?’ ” Huestis also played for time. 
“You  don’t have the authority to close this university,” Huestis told Tisdale. “At 
a minimum,  you’ve got to take it to the executive committee [of the board of 
trustees].” Tisdale then deferred action. The executive committee was sum-
moned to Durham for an emergency meeting on Wednesday, April 10.34
Griffith was relieved at the decision to call in the executive committee. He 
had his resignation “in his hip pocket,” he recounted, “if force was used against 
the demonstrators.” Huestis was exhausted. “I  don’t know any time that I’ve 
felt as emotionally, and physically, and spiritually drained as I felt that night,” 
he remembered. Huestis told his wife, “ ‘We’ve been through this now for a day 
and a half and I just  don’t know how I can do it all over again . . .  from scratch 
with the executive committee.’ ”35
Monday eve ning on campus was taken up with a rally that featured a 
previously scheduled appearance by antiwar activists Joan Baez and David 
Harris. When Baez and Harris tried to connect the issues in the vigil to 
 those in the antiwar movement, some  people raised objections. “We appre-
ciate your speaking to us about the re sis tance,” one student told Baez and 
Harris to loud and prolonged applause, “but this is not our main focus.” “I 
want to remind you,” another student said, “that this vigil is not a draft re-
sis tance vigil. . . .  Our main object  here is for the employees of Duke.”36 On 
Monday night, more than one thousand students and faculty slept on the 
main quadrangle of Duke University.
Early Tuesday morning, Cook, Kinney, and Howard Wilkinson, chaplain of 
the university, boarded a flight to Atlanta to attend Martin Luther King Jr.’s 
funeral. Cook and King had been friends for de cades. Classmates growing 
up, the two entered More house College in 1943 at age fifteen. Their friendship 
blossomed in college and they became allies in the civil rights movement.
As Cook and his Duke colleagues traveled to Atlanta, picket lines went up 
around campus dining facilities in the West Union, East Union, and Gradu ate 
Center.  Labor or ga nizer Peter Brandon estimated in the Duke Chronicle that 
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by Tuesday, the student boycott of the West Campus dining facilities was “90% 
effective.” On Tuesday after noon, maids and janitors on West Campus voted 
to strike, effective as of Wednesday morning. The class boycott also began on 
Tuesday, and a vigil spokesperson estimated 80  percent of students stayed 
away from classes.37
 There was no contact between vigil leaders and Duke administrators on 
Tuesday morning. A memorial ser vice for the civil rights leader was held 
in Duke Chapel at 10:30 a.m., timed to coincide with King’s funeral in At-
lanta. Throughout Tuesday, “rumors  were flying,” according to Henderson, 
“that Mr. Tisdale was  running the university and that the students  were  going 
to be removed from the quad with fire hoses and police.” A wdbs reporter 
commented on the pending confrontation between the trustees and the stu-
dents. “It becomes pos si ble, in a very real sense,” he said, that “some of the 
students . . .  may be putting themselves on the line not just bodily but in terms 
of their standing with the university.”38
Meanwhile, some of the national press broadcast news of the vigil, and 
statements of support from national leaders started to arrive. “By your action 
in support of the employees of the university who seek recognition for their 
bargaining rights,” Senator Robert F. Kennedy told the protesters, “you set a 
standard that all should emulate.” Civil rights leader Benjamin E. Mays, who 
delivered a eulogy at King’s funeral, commented on the redemptive power of 
the protest. “As long as students like you are interested in racial justice and are 
determined to carry on [King’s] noble work,” he told participants, “he  will not 
have died in vain.”39
Howard Fuller’s appearance at the vigil on Tuesday was one of the most 
power ful events of the day. As the most vis i ble Black leader in Durham, 
Fuller lent credibility to a civil rights protest composed almost entirely of 
white students and faculty. “We have an administration at this university 
that is out of touch with the needs of  those Black  people who toil  every day 
to see to it that food is right, the grass is cut, and all of the other  things that 
need to get done . . .  are done,” Fuller told the crowd. “With your support,” 
he stated, Duke workers have “taken a stand” against “inferior wages and 
bad working conditions.” Fuller challenged the protesters to ask themselves, 
“ ‘Are you  really serious?’ ” To thunderous applause, he said, “If  you’re  really 
serious . . .  that means that a lot of us are  going to be out  here for a long time.” 
“Any . . .  people who  don’t believe that every body can be  free,” Fuller told the 
group, “should be  here  today to see all of  these  people.” “I’m proud to be a 
Black man and I’m proud to be  here  today!” Oliver Harvey was amazed at 
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the power of Fuller’s speech. “Howard Fuller . . .  really moved  things up,” 
he remembered.40
Duke’s Black students  were at best equivocal in their support for the vigil. 
The aas did not officially endorse the protest, although members  were  free 
to participate as individuals if they chose to do so. “The Blacks  were clearly 
not as active in [the vigil] as they  were in their own  things,” Charles Becton 
explained. “It was mostly a white vigil.” “I think the white students  were very 
committed to the Vigil,” Hopkins observed, “but I . . .  was not committed to 
that type of protest. . . .  I personally would not sit out on the quad for days.” “It 
was absolutely unnecessary for us as Negro students to say we supported the 
Vigil,” Black student leader Stef McLeod commented. “To ask a black student 
if he is for the goals of this demonstration,” he said, “is like asking a Jew in the 
heights of Hitler’s reign if he was for the termination of the torture, oppression 
and extermination of the Jews.”41
Many Blacks saw “white guilt” as a primary motivating  factor for the pro-
test. The vigil, according to Armstrong, was seen “as a way for many whites to 
exonerate themselves from their guilt at being tied [to the King assassination] 
by the fact that they  were white.” Hopkins agreed. “Black students did not 
feel this guilt and thus many did not support the Vigil.” Griffith had the same 
sense. Black students, he remembered, “ were not very much involved [ after 
King’s death] that I could perceive.” “ Those few that I talked to said, ‘This is 
whitey’s  thing—if he’s got a guilt trip, well he can take his guilt trip.’ ”42
To the extent Black students did participate in the vigil, they did so primar-
ily to support Duke’s Black maids, janitors, and dining hall workers. Janice 
Williams recalled that “to us  these  people represented our parents.” Given 
 these deep personal connections, the university’s treatment of its nonacademic 
employees was “one of the most significant politicizing  things” for the Black 
students, according to Hopkins. “I did not participate in the Vigil,” Brenda 
Brown explained, “except to the extent we  were helping the non- academic 
employees on the picket lines. . . .  Any involvement on my part would be pick-
eting, rather than sitting on the quad.” “Black students  wasn’t too happy all the 
way through the vigil and the strike,” Oliver Harvey recalled, “but they did 
participate with us.”43
Significantly, one of the reasons Black students  were ambivalent about the 
vigil was the failure of the protesters to demand that Local 77 be recognized 
as exclusive bargaining agent for the nonacademic employees. The Black stu-
dents, Oliver Harvey recalled, “told the white students . . .  ‘How far are you 
 going? You  don’t mean what you are  doing.’ ” For the Black students, collective 
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bargaining, without recognition of Local 77 as exclusive bargaining agent, was 
not enough. “ ‘You  people are talking about compromise, and grow as you 
go,’ ” Harvey remembered the Black students telling vigil participants. And the 
Black students “ were saying the same  thing we  were saying. ‘ People want ex-
clusive recognition. They want it now.’ ” One Black student was also concerned 
that white students did not fully appreciate the importance of the workers’ 
demand for a  union. “I became . . .  exasperated,” she said, “when I saw that 
the vigilers could not understand that the  union, as a tool through which the 
workers can approach employers in a dignified and adult manner, was far 
more impor tant than a raise in salary.”44
Another concern for Black students was  whether a protest so firmly com-
mitted to “working within the system” could succeed. “While I did not ques-
tion the ends,” McLeod observed, “I did question the means by which they 
 were to be accomplished.” Henderson noted the same  thing. “Most of the 
black students said all along that [the vigil’s] tactics would not work,” he wrote, 
“and refused to participate.”45
It was ultimately a personal decision  whether a Black student joined the 
vigil. Armstrong recounted,
I  didn’t participate in the vigil. I think I appreciated the fact that a lot of the 
white students and faculty and other  people  really felt deeply moved by it. 
I just  didn’t feel that they understood. I was just too angry to do that. . . .  I 
can remember walking onto campus and  there  were all  these  people sitting 
around in the rain. And I  couldn’t understand what they  were  doing. And 
I  wasn’t sure what it meant to me. I thought it was just another world and 
I  didn’t feel like I belonged.46
The working team of university administrators spent Tuesday in meetings 
with Tisdale. They kept stressing the moderate nature of the protest and the 
caliber of the students involved. Cole described the “typical participant” in the 
vigil as “a highly motivated person of respectable middle- class background, 
with a creditable academic rec ord . . .  who was idealistic, concerned with the 
goals of equal rights and social justice for  others.” The administrative team 
was also trying to persuade Tisdale that events  were “moving in the right di-
rection” and that force was not needed to resolve the protest.47
During the late after noon on Tuesday, Tisdale was joined in Durham by 
trustee Henry E. Rauch, chairman of the board of Burlington Industries in 
Greensboro, North Carolina, and a member of the power ful Executive Com-
mittee of the university board. Discussions among Tisdale, Rauch, and the 
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administrative team could not have been easy. Tisdale and Rauch, both 
staunchly anti- union, saw Duke facing a protest where the central demand 
was collective bargaining for Duke employees. By Tuesday, according to the 
Duke Chronicle, the vigil was “on the verge of virtually shutting down the 
entire university.” “One can imagine no greater pressure on an administration 
negotiator,” the paper commented, “than to realize that the students are in 
control of the University.”48
Around 8:00 p.m. Tuesday eve ning, Griffith told vigil leaders that the uni-
versity would issue a statement the next day. He told them that they could 
see the statement before it was released but cautioned that  there was  little 
likelihood that any changes would be made based on their input. Griffith 
also said he saw  little possibility that the university would agree to collective 
bargaining.49
Despite Griffith’s cautionary statements, vigil participants continued to 
believe that the demonstration could achieve its demands. “Participants sin-
cerely felt,” Henderson wrote, “that the university had a  great opportunity to 
take a significant step forward in race relations and in progressive  labor prac-
tices in the South.” “In hindsight,” Henderson wrote in his journal for Tuesday, 
“it seems rather naive to think that we could appeal to the moral consciences 
of men, on the issue of collective bargaining, who had been fighting  unions 
and or ga nized  labor all their lives.”50
Hope prevailed, however, even in the face of discouraging feedback. 
Early in the protest, Small had characterized the vigil as an “act of faith.” 
The “spirit and faith” of vigil participants was “just overwhelming,” she said. 
Asked by a reporter why so many at Duke participated in a nonviolent protest 
while campuses around the world  were seeing violent confrontations, Small 
explained that “sometimes hope takes its last stand.”51 It was this hope that 
drew more than 1,400 Duke students and faculty to sleep on the quad Tuesday 
night.
Maids and janitors on West Campus went on strike on Wednesday morning. 
As vigil participants woke up, picket lines  were forming around dormitories, 
the divinity school, and the engineering, physics, and biological sciences de-
partment buildings. Rain drenched the protesters.52
The Executive Committee of the board of trustees started meeting early 
Wednesday morning. The meeting lasted most of the day. “It  really took a long 
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time to hammer out some of  these  things,” Griffith explained. He described 
the discussion on the minimum wage demand. “Trustees  were focused on 
how are we  going to find that money,” he recounted, “where is it  going to come 
from, was it the right  thing to do, could we do it  under the pressure of the vigil, 
is the university caving in? It was a very politicized situation,” he recalled.53
In the after noon, 160 Duke law students assembled on the quad to show 
support for the vigil. Much more significant, Howard Fuller, community 
or ga nizer Benjamin S. Ruffin Jr., and 100 leaders of the Black community 
in Durham marched to campus. Looking back years  later, Bertie Howard 
said that seeing the group from the United Organ izations for Community 
Improvement and the Durham Black community arrive on campus and join 
the protest was one of the “ things about the Vigil [that]  will always remain 
with me.”54
Around 3:00 p.m., Cook, just back from King’s funeral in Atlanta, spoke to 
the vigil crowd. “Just as it is hard to believe that Martin Luther King is dead,” 
he told the protesters, “it is equally difficult to believe that a movement for so-
cial justice and equality . . .  is alive at Duke.” Cook echoed King’s last speech, 
in which the civil rights leader spoke of having seen the “Promised Land.” “My 
eyes, physically now,” he told the protesters, “have some vision of the glory of 
the coming of social justice to this University and country,  because of you.”
Cook then spoke of King’s funeral:
As I saw, from afar, the casket containing his lifeless body, I was sustained 
by the knowledge of a thousand or more bodies, full of life, vision, and 
integrity,  here carry ing on his legacy in the spirit and in conformity with 
his ideals and methods. I was uplifted by the fact that you had made his 
mission your very own. And I am sure that Martin Luther King would be 
proud of you— mighty proud of you. Your vigil wiped my tears and helped 
to sustain me. You provided, at a tragic moment, roses for my soul.
Continued Cook, “A few minutes  after the assassination of Dr. King the other 
night, a  great soul, Dr. John Strange, came to our  house.” Strange asked, “How 
much more can you take? Can you take any more?  Haven’t you had enough?” 
According to Cook, “In a split second, my mind roamed over the tragic pilgrim-
age of my  people since 1619. I wanted to give a religious answer—in the tradition 
of the faith of my  fathers. I  couldn’t. How could I say anything in the name of 
God when Martin Luther King, a good man and  great soul, had been assas-
sinated? I strug gled over alternatives. But they did not satisfy me. I have been 
haunted by John’s probing question.”55
Hope Takes Its Last Stand 141
“I think I have the answer now,” Cook told Strange and the other two thou-
sand listeners:
I can go on affirming life; and I and other Negroes can go on hoping and 
believing in the promise of Amer i ca; we can go on believing that we are  going 
to be  free someday  because of  people like you and all other members of this 
magnificent vigil. This provides hope and succor for my spirit. You are help-
ing to create that kind of community, where, in the days ahead,  after this long 
and tragic night of racial separation and misunderstanding, you and I, white 
and black together, can shout from the mountain top and the valleys of our 
innermost being and say what is inscribed on Martin Luther King’s grave: 
“We all are  free at last.  Free at last. Thank God Almighty, we are  free at last.”56
The emotional climax of the  Silent Vigil, Cook’s speech prompted loud 
cheers and was replayed often in every one’s memories. By connecting the vigil 
to the life and work of King, Cook had embraced the tactics and goals of the 
protest while validating the efforts of the demonstrators to advance the cause 
of racial justice at Duke.
Shortly  after Cook’s speech, vigil negotiators  were summoned to the uni-
versity development office, where they received a very diff er ent message. The 
Executive Committee had finished meeting and Tisdale was ready to share 
a copy of the university’s official response to the vigil. Although Tisdale was 
described as “cordial,” he would not consider changes or offer any interpre-
tations of the written text. Tisdale told the students that he was prepared to 
deliver the statement to the vigil participants in person.57
Reading Tisdale’s planned remarks, negotiators saw immediately that the 
university’s response to the four demands was unacceptable. They also noted, 
however, that the chairman’s statement contained no threats to clear the quad 
by force or to close the university. The administrative working team had suc-
ceeded in persuading Tisdale to respond to the  Silent Vigil with restraint. At 
the executive committee meeting, “Bill [Griffith] and I hardly had to say a 
word,” Huestis recounted. “Wright explained what the students  were trying to 
say to us, emphasizing that  these  were our best and brightest students. He did 
a beautiful job explaining it.” Griffith remembered that Tisdale “used the same 
arguments that we had used.” Among other points, Tisdale told the executive 
committee, according to Griffith, “ ‘ These are our kids, they are part of our 
 family . . .  You basically work with your  family.’ ” He was “just very eloquent,” 
Griffith recalled. Huestis, for one, was surprised. “ Here was a man I’d been 
fighting for forty- eight hours.”58
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In his brief statement on the quad to vigil participants, Tisdale acknowl-
edged the protesters’ “deep concern with re spect to the  human issues which 
have now so intensely been brought into focus” and told them he “personally 
share[s] this concern with you.” Tisdale recognized that “Duke University has 
its own responsibilities” in addressing the “ great trou ble” the nation is facing. 
Tisdale then responded to the demand for a $1.60 per hour minimum wage for 
all Duke workers. While not willing to act immediately, Tisdale committed the 
university to achieving the $1.60 minimum by July 1, 1969— two years before 
the legally mandated deadline. Further, Tisdale said, the university would make 
a “significant step”  toward this goal by July 1, 1968. Tisdale said nothing about 
collective bargaining. He characterized the final two demands— that Knight 
sign the newspaper ad and that he resign from Hope Valley—as personal to the 
Duke president. A response to  those demands would await Knight’s return.59
 After Tisdale finished, the crowd began to sing “We  Shall Overcome.” 
Asked to join in by a student, Tisdale “gave a long, level, cold stare,” according 
to Huestis, “and said, ‘I’m not sure I can do that.’ ” However, as Tisdale started 
to walk away, Oliver Harvey recalled, a “white student grabbed him and had 
him rocking.” Standing just feet from the board chair, Huestis became “sud-
denly aware” that Tisdale was “booming out the song in his baritone voice, 
and he knew the words! He got caught up in the emotion of the moment,” 
Huestis thought. Criticized  later for joining the protesters, Tisdale said that 
he had done so only  because “ there  would’ve been a real disturbance” if he 
refused. “If you saw the picture” of me singing, Tisdale told an alumni group, 
“you’d know I  wasn’t happy about it.”60
In his journal, Henderson credited Griffith and Huestis for the “intense 
education” they gave Tisdale and for their role in persuading the trustees “not 
to use force to clear the quad, not to get rid of the leaders, to speak to the issues, 
to answer them positively, and for Mr. Tisdale to make his statement directly 
to the Vigil.” Henderson believed that if force had been used, “ there is no 
doubt that the University would have been destroyed, possibly with vio lence, 
undoubtedly by instant attrition by professors and students.”61
If total catastrophe had been averted, however, the protesters  were far from 
satisfied. The statement from the board of trustees was “totally unacceptable,” 
the student narrator commented. “ There is no mention made of collective 
bargaining. . . .  The only  people they talked to about this was faculty. They 
 didn’t talk to any students, they  didn’t talk to any workers.”62
It is not surprising that the university refused to address, let alone con-
cede, the issue of collective bargaining. “Duke was ner vous about  unions 
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and collective bargaining,” board member Mary D. B. T. Semans commented 
 later, “and  there was much apprehension about them during the Vigil period.” 
Griffith also recognized the power of the anti- union sentiment on the board. 
“I think the trustees  were very much opposed to collective bargaining,” he 
commented. “I think a lot of them  were . . .  textile  people [who had] success-
fully fought the  union situation.”  These trustees  were aware that any conces-
sion Duke made to its nonacademic employees could set a pre ce dent in  labor 
negotiations for other companies in the area. “I hope the  union  isn’t recog-
nized,” Tisdale told a Detroit alumni group in May 1968. “I  don’t think it is 
good for the individuals involved.”63
 Because it was still raining, more than one thousand vigil participants 
moved into Page Auditorium to discuss the next steps for the protest. “In Page 
Auditorium,” Henderson reported, “ there was unan i mous discontent with the 
statement from the Trustees.” The meeting of vigil participants lasted nearly 
six hours and was, by all accounts, chaotic. Kinney called it “democracy run 
amok.” According to the Duke Chronicle,  Silent Vigil leader Jack Boger and 
other speakers  were interrupted “as hundreds repeatedly jumped to their feet 
shaking their fists and four fin gers, and shouting in solidarity ‘Four, Four.’ ” 
“The dissension Saturday night at Dr. Knight’s  house was nothing compared 
with this,” Henderson wrote.64
A meeting of the Academic Council attended by approximately four hun-
dred faculty members concluded just as Tisdale was delivering his remarks 
to the vigil. At its meeting, the council unanimously  adopted a resolution 
supporting the goals of the vigil, urging amnesty for all striking workers and 
asking all faculty and students to “return to their classrooms, libraries and 
laboratories.” Students and faculty could have the assurance, the resolution 
stated, “that  those . . . issues that generated the [vigil] will receive the contin-
ued attention of the faculty, students, and administrative authorities of the 
University.” The council also established a committee, chaired by economics 
professor John Blackburn, to “determine the adequacy of the university’s rela-
tionship with its non- academic employees.” Early in the eve ning, the Execu-
tive Committee of the Academic Council arrived at Page Auditorium to tell 
students about  these developments.65
The discussion in Page Auditorium continued with no consensus. With the 
 Silent Vigil having failed to obtain meaningful concessions from the univer-
sity, many students pushed for more militant action. “[We] absolutely enter-
tained” the idea of occupying the Allen Building, Henderson remembered. “It 
was widely discussed. . . .  We assumed we  couldn’t pull it off.” He continued, 
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“Given what we had built, it was impossible to move more than twenty- five 
or thirty  people into Allen Building.  There  were large numbers of  people who 
would have felt set up and sold out. They  were  there peacefully— that was the 
 whole theme.”66
Eventually the protesters  adopted a series of proposals put forth by Strange. 
The vigil would be suspended for a ten- day moratorium. During this time, 
students would continue to honor the dining hall boycott and staff picket lines 
while raising monies for a strike fund. In addition, the Duke Chronicle re-
ported, participants would “carry the argument of the Vigil to the classroom” 
to convince  people to support the goals of the vigil and to “take advantage of 
the support [the vigil had] received, in Durham and nationwide.” Fi nally, a 
committee of students, workers, and faculty would be created (Vigil Strategy 
Committee). This group would meet regularly to plan strategy for the protest 
and to investigate the implementation of collective bargaining at Duke.67
Although the vigil had failed to achieve a single one of its four demands, 
some students and faculty began to characterize the protest as a success. “We 
have realized our  great end already,” religion professor John  Sullivan told the 
gathering in Page Auditorium. “You have transformed the university.” An 
editorial in the Duke Chronicle echoed this theme. It described the  Silent 
Vigil as more than a means for gaining the four demands and memorializing 
King. “More essentially,” the paper wrote, “it was a call for a change in spirit, 
a call for the University . . .  to take a position of leadership in the commu-
nity, a call for recommitment by whites to the princi ple of non- violence, 
and to working together to help Blacks. This, we feel, was to a large extent 
accomplished.” “We have seen  things happen  here,” the paper concluded, that 
would have “seemed inconceivable less than a week ago.”68
The workers and their allies in the Black community had a very diff er ent 
view of events. They  were not ready to suspend their protest or to declare the 
 Silent Vigil even a partial success. “I was very impressed by the number of 
 people they got to sit on the quad,” Howard Fuller commented. “They felt they 
had achieved a victory by sitting on the grass. To me, the victory has not been 
won  until the  union gets every thing it has asked for.” The strike would con-
tinue, the Duke Chronicle reported,  because “Local 77 felt that they  were given 
no satisfactory answers on the $1.60 minimum wage and collective bargain-
ing.” “I  don’t know what anybody  else’s plans are, but  we’re striking,” Brandon 
said. Harvey emphasized the importance of collective bargaining. “We appre-
ciate what you have done very much,” he told the students. “You have helped 
us live a decent life.” For Harvey and the workers, however, the path forward 
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was clear. “ We’re  going on if you decide to go back. Sink or swim, live or die, 
 we’re  going on.”69
On Wednesday night, vigil participants slept in Duke Chapel, Page Audi-
torium, and the West Campus Union. Well  after midnight, Tisdale announced 
to Griffith that he wanted to visit Duke Chapel. Tisdale “had a strong feel-
ing for the chapel,” Griffith explained. It “was very impor tant to him, to his 
faith.” Griffith cautioned the board chair that if he appeared on campus, he 
might “need to speak to  people.” Despite this warning, Tisdale went to the 
chapel, accompanied by Griffith and Ashmore. Student David Roberts who 
was in the chapel to “dry out” remembered seeing “an older man” who “looked 
up at the ceiling and bowed his head.” Although no one disturbed the board 
chair as he prayed, a student identified Tisdale on his way out. “They gathered 
around and they  really put the pressure to him,” Griffith recounted, “just like 
a beehive.” Tisdale was, according to Henderson, “absolutely adamant that 
Duke would never have collective bargaining.” The Duke Chronicle reported 
that the board chair “reiterated the determination that he  will not recognize 
a  union  because ‘a  union  can’t get nothing for  these workers that we  will not 
give them.’ ” Alarmed that Tisdale’s remarks  were making an already volatile 
situation worse, Griffith and Ashmore pulled him out. “We  were just anxious 
to get him out of  there,” Griffith remembered, “and he was anxious to leave.”70
Thursday morning began with another mass meeting of vigil participants in 
Page Auditorium. Many students  were angry when they learned of Tisdale’s 
chapel remarks the prior eve ning. Nevertheless, the decisions made the prior 
eve ning to declare a ten- day moratorium on the vigil and continue the dining 
hall boycott retained majority support. In addition, the Vigil Strategy Com-
mittee would meet regularly to plan strategy and investigate the implementa-
tion of collective bargaining at Duke.71
Midmorning, vigil protesters reassembled on the main quadrangle. To 
mark the suspension of the  Silent Vigil, the group marched to East Campus. 
A rally at 7:00 p.m. on the quad in front of Duke Chapel was planned.
 Later Thursday, the university learned that Knight had been hospitalized. 
Although William Anlyan commented that further testing was needed to 
predict how long Knight would be on leave, he told the Duke Chronicle that 
initial indications  were that Knight faced a recovery period that “may be a few 
weeks.”72
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Almost three thousand  people attended the 7:00 p.m. rally on the main 
quad, the largest such gathering in the history of Duke University. Professor 
Charles Tanford told the protesters exuberantly, “You have wrought a revo-
lution!” Not every one was persuaded, however, that significant pro gress, let 
alone a revolution, had been achieved. “A large segment of the crowd,” the 
Duke Chronicle reported, “decried the observation . . .  that the Vigil had won 
impor tant victories.”73
The ten- day vigil moratorium was taken up by “rallies, strategy meetings, 
and planning sessions.” Dining hall workers remained on strike. The student 
boycott of the West Campus dining halls continued. According to Theodore 
Minah, Duke’s dining hall director, the boycott was 75  percent effective on 
West Campus. Minah also said that as many as one hundred Duke students 
had crossed the picket lines to work in the dining halls.74
On Monday, April 15, the full university board met in an all- day session. 
In response to a request from Griffith, vigil leaders prepared packets of infor-
mation on the protest for board members. Included was a written statement 
strongly advocating for collective bargaining. Given the anti- union attitude 
of many of its members, however,  there was  little chance that the university 
board of trustees would agree to any form of collective bargaining. Rather 
than make its position on collective bargaining clear in mid- April, however, 
on the advice of Cole and other administrators, the board remained  silent on 
the issue.75 In  doing so, the board delayed the strongly negative student and 
 union reaction that would inevitably follow the announcement of its final po-
sition on the issue. Such a strategy worked to the university’s advantage, the 
trustees likely thought,  because it would be difficult for students to reignite 
substantial protest at the end of the semester.
Although the board might have avoided inflaming protesters on collective 
bargaining, the statement it released Tuesday was hardly conciliatory. Step-
ping back from Knight’s commitment to form a committee of students, faculty, 
administrators, trustees, and workers to address employment- related issues, 
the board established a Special Trustee- Administrative Committee (Special 
Committee) to “look into . . .  the adequacy of the relationship between the 
university and its non- academic employees.” In a power ful statement of the 
real intent of the trustees, neither students nor any nonacademic employees 
 were included on the committee. In what the board may have regarded as a 
concession, the statement “invited” striking workers to return to their jobs 
“with full standing.” Fi nally, the statement announced that the July 1 raise for 
nonacademic employees promised by Tisdale would be spelled out “as soon 
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as information is available [on] University resources [for] this purpose.” The 
statement ended by cautioning that the resolutions to the open issues “ will not 
advance further for some time.”76
The composition of the Special Committee was also problematic. While 
the committee was not precluded from considering collective bargaining, 
Tisdale populated it with trustees whom he knew would oppose any such 
arrangement. Henry Rauch, ceo of Burlington Industries, would be the 
chair. Charles B. Wade Jr., vice president of R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Com pany, 
P. Huber Hanes Jr., president of Hanes Corporation, and Walter M. Upchurch, 
se nior vice president of the Shell Com pany’s foundation, would serve as 
members. Rauch, Wade, and Hanes, professor Peter Klopfer wrote, “are asso-
ciated with companies whose reputations in the area of  labor are notorious, to 
say the least.” Their personal opposition to the princi ples of collective bargain-
ing and fair grievance procedures was, according to Klopfer, “unremitting.” 
As for Upchurch, he had been personnel director at Duke “at a time when the 
exploitation of Duke’s nonacademic employees was at its height.”77 Although 
 there would be other members of the Special Committee, it was unthinkable 
that se nior executives of Burlington, R. J. Reynolds, and Hanes and a former 
director of personnel at Duke would allow a collective bargaining recommen-
dation to come out of the group.
Both the students and the  union reacted to the April 15 board’s action with 
anger and disbelief. At a Tuesday night rally of 2,500 students and faculty on 
the main quad, Boger called the statement “disappointing and inadequate.” 
He explained, “They have not so much as mentioned in their statement col-
lective bargaining.” Edward L. McNeill, president of Local 77, was even more 
direct. Rejecting the statement “even before he had heard it,” McNeill said the 
trustees could have done something better with their time. Still, the previously 
announced ten- day moratorium on student protest would continue.78
More than two thousand  people attended a vigil rally on Wednesday night 
featuring folk singer Pete Seeger. Harvey assured the crowd of his unshak-
able determination to continue the fight. “I want to let you know,” he told the 
protesters, “ we’re not  going to give up.” Harvey told rallygoers that the strik-
ing workers needed $2,000 to $3,000 per week to remain on strike. He asked 
them to continue their efforts to raise money and to boycott the dining halls.79
Despite his strong statement at the rally, with the strike by dining hall and 
 house keeping workers nearing the end of its second week, Harvey was aware 
that time was  running out to resolve the  labor action. “The University had al-
most won,” Harvey remembered, “ because our employees had gotten . . .  worried 
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about getting back on the job. They  were fixin’ to leave me.” Harvey was “very, 
very worried”  because he knew “we would lose at Duke if we walked back in 
 there,” he recalled. “But by the help of God,” he recounted, “on the thirteenth 
day . . .  my wife called me and said that the Trustee board wanted to meet 
with me.” Harvey had been seeking such a face- to- face meeting with the trust-
ees for years. He considered the chance to speak directly to Duke’s governing 
body a significant accomplishment.80
Harvey appeared at a Special Committee meeting held on campus on 
April 20. The nonacademic employees “ didn’t get anywhere” at this meeting, 
Harvey remembered, “ because my main point was what we had struck for 
was exclusive recognition. But they talked all around that.” Instead, the Spe-
cial Committee proposed that “another type of organ ization” be set up. “They 
pleaded to us to go back, to call off the strike, and no person would be penal-
ized,” Harvey said. Faced with this response, the workers de cided to go back to 
their jobs. “So we come to the conclusion to end the strike,” Harvey explained, 
“by promises from the Trustee board that we would work with an organ-
ization that we’d agree on together that would [have] the same meaning to us 
as a  union, and that every body would be brought up to a $1.60 minimum.”81
Student representatives also met with the Special Committee, stressing the 
importance of collective bargaining. The Duke Chronicle reported “that the 
students  were pleased at the receptiveness of some of the committee members 
to their proposals.” Rauch told the students, according to the student news-
paper, that the committee “wanted to provide personal dignity and integrity 
in the decision- making pro cess of the University.” Despite the facade of ami-
able give- and- take, however, students had almost no negotiating leverage in 
the meeting. “We did not have the strength or the orga nizational ability to 
be determining what would go on in the negotiating sessions,” Henderson 
explained. “We  were negotiating from a position of threat, not strength.” 
“I think we got a  little seduced,” Gutman said de cades  later. “We  were sitting 
down with the trustees and we had the vigil on our shoulders. . . .  I think the 
firmness we showed when we planned the vigil, the firmness we had out on 
the quad, I  don’t think it was [ there] quite as much . . .  in that room.”82
During their meeting, the members of the Special Committee also reviewed 
a university study comparing the wages of Duke’s nonacademic employees 
with compensation levels at state universities in North Carolina. The find-
ings  were stark. The study found that the minimum wage paid to employees 
at state universities was $1.45 per hour, more than 20  percent higher than the 
$1.15 per hour minimum wage at Duke. In addition, wages paid to employees 
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at state universities with more than five years of experience  were “substantially 
higher” than  those paid to comparable employees at Duke. Fi nally, the study 
considered how the university’s payroll system was administered. Confirming 
a claim that Duke workers had been making for years, the study found that 
the administration of the wage structure at Duke was “extremely poor.”  Actual 
wages paid to nonacademic employees at Duke, the study found,  were “in 
most instances at substantial variance with the approved rate ranges for each 
job classification.” This meant that many employees at Duke  were not even 
being paid the amount applicable to their job classification.83
The wage study was central to the Special Committee’s recommendation 
that “prompt action . . .  be taken to bring Duke wages more nearly in line with 
 those currently paid by the State Universities.” Armed with a study showing 
wages at Duke “grossly out of line” with other schools, Huestis explained, “we 
 were able to lay in front of [the trustees] the figures. They  didn’t hesitate.” “We 
 didn’t feel like our conscience could be cleared before we took care of ” the 
wage disparity, Special Committee member Wade recalled. “We  were grateful 
to the students. We  were just sorry the students had to go to the length they 
did.” Huestis emphasized that this was not “a decision to break up the Vigil.” 
Rather, Huestis noted, “it was a statement by the trustees that this was some-
thing they felt was the right  thing to do.”84 The fact that Duke administrators 
had not previously provided this compelling and readily available market data 
on wages to the board speaks powerfully to how  little concern they had for the 
economic circumstances of the university’s nonacademic employees.
On Saturday, April 20, at 9:00 p.m., following what Cole called a “long 
and soul- searching deliberation,” the Special Committee released a statement. 
The committee acknowledged that “inadequacies in the relationship of the 
University and its non- academic employees do exist” and expressed its intent 
“to work as rapidly as pos si ble to remedy them.” The minimum wage for Duke 
employees would be raised from $1.15 per hour to $1.45 per hour on May 6, 
1968, bringing it to the level at state universities. On June 3, 1968, “additional 
appropriate adjustments” would be made for employees earning more than 
$1.34 per hour. Fi nally, the statement reaffirmed the university’s commitment 
to reach a $1.60 minimum wage by July 1, 1969. Huestis advised the Special 
Committee that the annual cost of  these wage adjustments was approximately 
$2 million.85
Although the Special Committee once again made no reference to collec-
tive bargaining, students, faculty, and workers still reacted positively. “ There 
was an atmosphere of general elation in the strategy session following the 
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release of the statement,” Henderson reported, and “every one seemed to feel 
that we had won a significant victory.” The workers  were similarly encouraged, 
commenting that “they never would have believed that  things would have 
worked out to this point . . .  so well.” The “statement changed every thing,” the 
student narrator observed. In its response to the Special Committee, the Vigil 
Strategy Committee said it looked forward to “the establishment of structures 
that  will allow effective employee participation in decisions affecting their re-
lationship with the University.” At least some students continued to believe 
that  these “structures” could include some form of collective bargaining.86
The striking workers met on Sunday after noon and voted to return to work 
for a “trial period” of three weeks. The Local 77 president declared that this 
suspension of the strike was to “allow time for the students, faculty, and trust-
ees to consider and act upon the issues and conditions which have arisen from 
the strike.”87 In addition, returning to work was a financial necessity for the 
striking workers. Most could no longer sustain the loss of income from being 
out of work.
At this point, Huestis and Griffith, among  others, urged the students to 
refrain from further protest. In their view, any escalation would jeopardize 
support for the vigil’s demands among faculty, administrators, and trustees. 
Vigil leaders accepted this advice. Further protest activities would be low- key 
and the dining hall boycott was suspended. Given the arc of events, however, 
the student narrator— among  others— was starting to doubt the trustees’ good 
faith. “My only concern,” he said at the time, was that “I’m not so sure that the 
trustees are playing fair with us. They could very well just be leading us down 
the garden path. . . .  We’ll just have to keep our fin gers crossed and hope that 
they deal with us in good faith,” he concluded.88
A nighttime rally attended by four hundred students and some faculty 
was held on Sunday, April 21. It was, according to Henderson, “a victory cele-
bration.” “Participants felt that the University was fi nally moving in the right 
direction,” he wrote. “Our methods had worked; we had proven that  people 
with concern could effect rapid, progressive change.”89
Rauch also thought that  things  were heading in the right direction. He 
wrote to the board of trustees on April 22, reassuring them that “only about 
400 students, faculty members and employees” participated in the rally the 
previous night. This was only a fraction of the more than two thousand who 
had attended the final vigil rally and Seeger concert only ten days  earlier. 
“While our statement did not go as far as [faculty and student groups] would 
have liked,” Rauch told the trustees, “they accepted it as evidence of good faith 
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and exerted their full influence on the faculty, students and employees on Sun-
day to accept it as evidence of definite pro gress.”90
With all the cele bration, however, the central issue of collective bargaining 
remained unresolved. The Duke Chronicle reported that McNeill told the Sun-
day night rally crowd that workers would return to their jobs for three weeks, 
“while the faculty, trustees, and committees had time to make constructive 
movement  toward collective bargaining at Duke.” “ We’ll be right back” on 
strike, Harvey told the rally, “if constructive pro gress  towards collective bar-
gaining is not made within three weeks.” Vigil leaders agreed. “This  thing 
might not be over,” vigil leader Bob Creamer told the rally. “The trustees have 
made a few statements but certainly have not instituted collective bargain-
ing. We’ve got to let the trustees know  we’re still  here.” “We cannot return to 
normalcy,” Strange told the rally crowd. “The effort to build the beloved com-
munity is long and difficult [and] we have only begun.”91 In the days leading 
up to the end of the spring semester, students and workers would learn just 
how “long and difficult” the effort would be.
By May 5, two weeks had passed since the first encouraging statement from 
the Special Committee. No word had yet been received from the committee 
on the issue of collective bargaining. With the end of the three- week morato-
rium approaching, vigil leaders  were becoming increasingly aware that their 
key demand might not be achieved. “ Things are very much up in the air,” 
Creamer commented.92
Several days  later, on May 9, the Vigil Strategy Committee issued a state-
ment expressing its growing concern “about the pro gress of the special com-
mittee . . .  toward creating a collective bargaining system for Duke’s non- 
academic employees.” It called the absence of any communication from the 
Special Committee “disappointing” and declared its support for a complete 
boycott of the university dining halls on May 10.93
On Saturday, May 11, one day before the three- week moratorium was set 
to expire, the Special Committee fi nally released a brief statement. The com-
mittee proposed establishing a “council of non- academic employees” at the 
university. It also indicated that it was looking into forming a “Duke Univer-
sity Employee Relations Advisory Committee” composed of administrators, 
faculty members, and nonacademic employees. Neither proposal addressed 
collective bargaining in any form. The statement also said that the Special 
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Committee would be reconvening on Wednesday, May 15, and hoped to meet 
at that time with faculty representatives, students, and workers.94
In a final attempt to apply pressure to the Special Committee when it 
met on May 15, the Vigil Strategy Committee de cided to reconvene the 
vigil at 2:00 p.m. on May 14. “It is with despair and disappointment that we 
return to the quadrangle,” a Vigil Strategy Committee statement explained. 
“We believed that the Trustees  were acting in good faith. . . .  It is now obvi-
ous that  there was no good faith and no understanding. . . .  We must be on 
the quad to demonstrate that we expect collective bargaining and  will not 
accept less.”95
The workers  were also deeply disappointed by the Special Committee’s 
statement. Oliver Harvey told the Duke Chronicle that while employees would 
report to work on Monday, May 13, representatives of the diff er ent depart-
ments would meet on May 14 “to determine if and when the non- academic 
employees  union members would begin striking again.” Harvey’s message to 
the Vigil Strategy Committee was somewhat diff er ent. He told the commit-
tee that a strike during the waning days of the spring semester was unlikely 
 because students would be leaving for summer vacation and many nonaca-
demic employees would be furloughed during that time. Anticipating his up-
coming meeting with the Special Committee, Harvey told the Duke Chronicle 
that collective bargaining is the “main issue” and that the workers “are not 
planning to commit ourselves to anything  else.”96
On May 14, students and faculty marched from East Campus to West Cam-
pus to reconvene the vigil. In contrast to early April when nearly 1,500 protest-
ers slept on the quad, now just over two hundred joined the march.  Because 
of a downpour, participants in the May vigil moved inside the chapel around 
6:00 p.m. and remained  there overnight. Student protesters and their faculty 
supporters  were “disillusioned with the Board of Trustees,” Creamer com-
mented. “We are  here out of sadness and determination.” Leaders announced 
that the vigil would remain on the quad  until  after the Special Committee 
meeting the next day.97
In Duke Chapel, many vigil participants  were busy working on end- of- 
semester proj ects. To understand why the turnout was so small, the Duke 
Chronicle conducted a “random sampling” of participants in the  Silent Vigil 
who did not join the vigil when it reconvened. Some  were uncomfortable that 
the protest now focused exclusively on collective bargaining. Most  Silent Vigil 
participants who did not participate in May, however, cited pragmatic rea-
sons. One “typical ex- Vigiler,” the student newspaper reported, commented, 
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“I have too much damn work to do, finals and papers are . . .  approaching, and 
being out  there to night just  doesn’t stack up.”98
When they met with the Special Committee on May 15, the students’ 
fears  were confirmed. The Special Committee would not be recommending 
collective bargaining in any form. The scene was confrontational. Collec-
tive bargaining “has gotta happen,” Small declared. “The time has come. 
Duke’s not a plantation.” At this point, according to Small, “Henry Rauch 
started shaking— literally shaking. He said, ‘ There  will never be collective 
bargaining at Duke University.’ ” Instead, the Special Committee identi-
fied seven areas that would be the focus of efforts to enhance employer- 
employee relations at Duke.99
The Special Committee delivered this same message to the workers. Har-
vey was direct in his response. According to the Duke Chronicle, he asked 
the committee  whether the trustees  were totally against collective bargaining. 
While trustee Brantley Watson responded, “We have not said we are against 
collective bargaining,” Rauch interjected, “I am!”100
Rauch also made his position clear when he transmitted the Special Com-
mittee’s recommendations to the full board. He expressed the group’s desire 
to improve relations between the university and its nonacademic employees 
and described the nonacademic employee “council” that the Special Commit-
tee recommended be established by the university. Rauch made clear to the 
board, however, that the creation of the employee council did not mean any 
change in who controlled the labor- management relationship at Duke. Em-
ployee participation, he assured the board, “is [not] intended in [any] way to 
transfer decision making responsibility to employees.”101
As the Special Committee was meeting on May 15, a group of about eight 
members of the small Duke chapter of the Students for a Demo cratic Society 
(sds) de cided that they no longer had any choice but to escalate the protest. 
The group entered the Allen Building, then staged a brief sit-in in the lobby 
on the second floor. Hutch Traver, the group’s leader, saw the tactics of the 
vigil as too moderate. “Like the Afro- Americans have realized in past weeks,” 
he said, “most of us realize the ways of the liberals  don’t work now.” Once the 
sds members entered the Allen Building, Traver tried to persuade  those in the 
larger vigil group on the quad to join the sit-in. He was unable to do so.  After 
about thirty minutes, the sds members left the Allen Building. Traver  later 
called the attempt at escalation a “disaster.” “For some reason it just died,” he 
recounted. “We got upstairs, sat down. . . .  There  weren’t even enough of us to 
block traffic in the lobby.”102
154 Chapter five
The Special Committee did not make its specific recommendations public. 
Instead, the committee issued only a brief general statement saying that it 
intended to work on spelling out the details of the program that had been out-
lined. “We  don’t expect you to be happy with this,” Huestis said to the students 
when he handed the statement to them.103
Huestis was right. The Duke Chronicle reported that vigil leaders re-
sponded to the statement with “resigned disgust” and that a “sense of frustra-
tion seemed to grip many participants.” The Vigil Strategy Committee said it 
was “extremely disappointed” that “ little pro gress [had been made] on collec-
tive bargaining.” The students  were getting “increasingly disillusioned” about 
the prospects for working with the Special Committee, the Duke Chronicle 
editorial board wrote. Noting the committee’s “intransigence” on the issue of 
collective bargaining, the paper correctly stated that students saw “no hope of 
dialogue with a group which delayed its discussion as long as pos si ble so as to 
make demonstrations academically difficult.”104
The nonacademic employees  were also very disappointed. As they un-
derstood it, the proposed employee council could not enter into a binding 
agreement with the university and would not be in de pen dent. Accordingly, 
the employee council could do  little, if anything, to improve the employees’ 
negotiating leverage with the university. “The trustees  don’t want to negotiate 
with a  union,” a flyer for a meeting of nonacademic employees stated, “but 
instead want to sit and talk to workers from a council. What’s the difference?” 
the flyer asked. “Power!!!!!!!!!!”105
The vigil soon disbanded. “It looks pretty hopeless,” Gutman told vigil par-
ticipants. Small told the Duke Chronicle that “many students are considering 
transferring.” “By the end of the vigil,” Henderson said  later, “we  hadn’t won 
anything.”106
Given that the  Silent Vigil failed to achieve its objectives, it is striking that 
Duke trustees, administrators, faculty, and students now broadly consider 
the protest as having been highly successful. For many, memories of the vigil 
have taken on a reverential glow. Cook called it a “transcendent moment and 
indelible memory.” Trustee Mary D. B. T. Semans recalled “golden moments” 
during the protest, calling the vigil “a special chapter in the life of Duke.” “It 
was,” she commented, “a collaboration of students and faculty acting for the 
betterment of the total university.” Students exhibited a “new maturity” and 
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“ele ments of unselfishness,” Semans recounted, “and the administration plus 
trustees listened and acted.” Professor Alan C. Kerckhoff recalled the event as 
a “beautiful example of  people trying to effect change through nontraditional 
means.” The vigil had been “inspirational,” he said. “We did this one right,” 
Kinney recalled. “It showed me the value of a small cadre of  people making 
committed decisions.”107
What explains this positive view of a protest for racial justice that, in 
April 1968, nearly shut down the university and ended with leaders feeling “re-
signed disgust”? One answer is that the vigil had, in some instances, a trans-
formative impact on both Duke University and  those who participated in it. 
Before the vigil, one student wrote in the Duke Chronicle, the university was a 
“peaceful, quiet bastion of Christian morality . . .  , a pleasant, sheltered place 
inhabited by bright, but unconcerned  people; where ‘nice kids’ came for four 
years of beer, basketball games and studying.”  After the vigil, that changed. “I 
use the meta phor of the tree,” Cell reflected in describing the impact of the 
vigil on Duke. “When the tree is shaking, [you  don’t know] what’s  going to 
come down. And it did shake the tree.” Cell saw a “new intensity” at Duke fol-
lowing the Vigil and he was very excited by it. “I told the students the morning 
of [April] 11 in Page,” he recalled, “that it was the first time I had been  really 
proud of the university.” “I think the vigil made a difference in the institu-
tion,” he said  later. “It marked the beginning of the changeover from a board 
comprised of mostly conservative, North Carolina businessmen [to a more 
progressive board]. The image Duke had of itself,” Cell commented, “and the 
kind of  people who  were in positions of power changed.” Small, among  others, 
dismissed the view that the vigil itself caused any fundamental change in the 
university. “That’s a bunch of crap,” she said. “As long as  people like Henry 
Rauch are in charge of an institution, it’s  going to stay exactly the same.”108
Students had also been affected. For one  thing, the vigil challenged the 
Cold War mindset that many students had brought with them to college. “It 
is hard for  people  today to envision,” Van Pelt  later commented, “a time when 
virtually  every American believed without question that we . . .  always had 
been good guys, which is why we  were a wealthy nation that never lost a war; 
that our leaders and law enforcement officials  were on a mission from God.” 
The vigil challenged  these assumptions. “For five days we made common 
cause with one another and the workers,” student David Roberts recalled. 
“Many of us found ourselves in growing realization that the world might not 
be so predictable, that our lives might not pro gress from comfort to comfort, 
that we would not have the luxury of ignoring or merely observing the anguish 
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and misfortune of Black Americans.” Campus activists had found a new mo-
mentum. “Many white  people,” according to McLeod, “have been forced to 
think for the first time.” “ ‘Activist’  will no longer be regarded as an epithet” at 
Duke, the student newspaper commented.109
For a number of students, the vigil had a profound personal impact. One 
alumnus writing on behalf a group of Duke gradu ates living together in Cali-
fornia years  after the vigil found that “the days of protests seem naive now.”
Yet the Vigil was a true and impor tant beginning. We learned on the sod-
den and trampled grass of the quad that  people can live and work together, 
and that ordinary  people possess within themselves the power to change 
the world. Yes, I remember panty- raids, blue jeans, drugs, making love 
(Duke Gardens!). I even remember Freddy Lind’s  great play to beat unc in 
overtime. But most of all, I remember the Vigil. The spirit of it lives on  here.
Another participant wrote that “ those four or five days when I participated 
in the Vigil, and my two days of sitting on the quad is very impor tant in my 
life. Participating in an . . .  active show of support for something I very much 
believed in,” she said, “gave me a foundation for  later active participation in 
my academic and work communities. None so dramatic or meaningful as the 
Vigil, but all stemming from my experience then.” “I was never the same”  after 
the vigil, student Clay Steinman commented. “I was now someone who saw 
my life as being interconnected with the lives of  others. I  can’t tell you what a 
change that was.”110
The vigil also had a positive impact on Duke’s nonacademic employees. 
Responding to one of the vigil’s demands, the university agreed to a signifi-
cant increase in the minimum wage for Duke workers, bringing it up to the 
level paid at state universities. In September, Huestis announced that the uni-
versity would meet the $1.60 per hour minimum wage by October 7, 1968. 
The cost to the university for  these increases was not insignificant. Soon  after 
the vigil, more customary job descriptions and job classifications  were de-
veloped for Duke’s nonacademic employees and,  under Huestis’s leadership, 
the payroll system was administered in a more professional manner. As plans 
for an employee council  were worked out with Duke’s nonacademic employ-
ees, communication between workers and the university improved along 
with working conditions for the employees. “Some of this [improvement in 
worker conditions] would have happened anyway,” Cell commented.111 Still, 
the vigil caused the changes to occur sooner than anyone would other wise 
have expected.
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Although the positive changes that ensued  were one reason why the  Silent 
Vigil is regarded with such  favor, another is the self- discipline and order many 
saw in the protest. Semans had not approved of the occupation of Knight’s 
 house. “It was a violation of his rights,” she explained, “showing bad man-
ners.” Yet her view of the  Silent Vigil was much more positive. For her, it was 
“purposeful and amazingly impressive, non- violent and constructive.” Hues-
tis saw the vigil in a similar light. “I think [the vigil on the quad] was a very 
responsible approach on the part of students,” he commented, “who wanted 
to be heard, who  were genuinely concerned and who did it in a style and 
in a tone that I think reflected credit on the Duke student body.” Sociology 
professor Alan Kerckhoff joined the chorus of praise. “ These  were all well- 
mannered, middle- class young ladies and gentlemen who  were brought up 
properly and did  things properly. More importantly,” he commented,  those 
organ izing knew that the “only way to accomplish anything was to do it in a 
proper manner. . . .  It  isn’t bloodletting, it  isn’t climbing walls, it  isn’t destroy-
ing property.”112
Some who admired the self- restraint and orderly nature of the vigil even 
viewed  those attributes of the protest as the reason for its “effectiveness.” 
Huestis observed, for example, that the peaceful, controlled vigil “was  really 
a far more effective demonstration than a violent demonstration.” Kerckhoff 
agreed, explaining, “We are dealing with  people for whom any overt attack 
would be defined as not only unacceptable from a legalistic point of view, but 
would completely erode the bargaining position of the  people involved.” “We 
appealed to the better aspects of the white southern church- going popula-
tion,” Kinney explained. “In order to build popu lar support for [the vigil], . . . 
we had to do  things that  were not the same as they did” at Columbia Univer-
sity, where the student protests turned violent. “It was just a totally diff er ent 
environment.”113
The white students and faculty who participated in the  Silent Vigil did so, 
in part, to demonstrate to Black students and workers at Duke and in Durham 
that nonviolent protest could still work. They wanted to show that by working 
within the system, a white institution such as Duke could be forced to make 
dramatic, meaningful changes to advance the cause of racial justice. Knight 
appears to have concluded that the  Silent Vigil accomplished this goal. He 
described the protest in his memoir as “highly effective.”114 Yet how effective 
was it actually? Answering this question requires more than simply determin-
ing  whether the vigil resulted in positive developments for the university and 
its students, which it certainly did. One still must ask  whether the vigil was 
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successful in accomplishing the specific objectives it set out to achieve. Did 
the remarkably self- regulated, highly or ga nized protest that occurred at Duke 
in April 1968 achieve the four demands it presented? If not, did it other wise 
summon the university to respond to the racial crisis in Amer i ca by taking a 
dramatic step to advance racial justice? Did Duke students show that a protest 
that operates squarely inside the “system” can force meaningful change?
The disposition of the four demands begins to provide an answer. The first 
demand, that Knight sign the Durham Morning Herald ad, was not accepted. 
Knight refused to lend his name to the ad. Regarding the second demand, that 
Knight resign from Hope Valley Country Club, the Duke president appeared 
to be more receptive. He agreed that at some point in the  future he would 
resign from the club, although he would not commit to a specific time frame. 
It would be another ten months before he took this step, and only due to es-
calating pressure from Duke’s Black students. The third demand—to increase 
the minimum wage for Duke employees to $1.60 per hour— received a more 
positive response. The university in fact did agree to a significant increase 
in the minimum wage for Duke workers, a step taken at no small cost. Still, 
while many observers viewed this wage adjustment as a response to the vigil, 
other  factors  were also certainly at work. At the same time as the  Silent Vigil, 
Duke ser vice workers staged a highly effective strike that lasted for almost 
two weeks. It is at least pos si ble that this strike was a contributing  factor in 
the university’s decision to raise the minimum wage. The compensation study 
presented to the Special Committee at the same time also certainly played a 
critical role. How much and how quickly the board would have raised wages 
in the absence of the worker strike or compensation report cannot be known.
The fourth issue— collective bargaining—is the most problematic and most 
central.  Because it involved a change in the power dynamic between Duke and 
its workers, ac cep tance of collective bargaining represented the most dramatic 
step the university was asked to make in order to distance itself from its tradi-
tional “plantation system.” As events demonstrated, the demand for collective 
bargaining was a nonstarter for the Duke board. Not only did the board refuse 
to grant this right in any form, but it delayed disclosing its inflexible position 
 until the end of the spring semester. Ultimately, Duke would cede no author-
ity or leverage to the workers in negotiating wages and working conditions at 
the university.
 Every observer is entitled to their own opinion as to  whether Duke Uni-
versity  rose to the moral challenge posed by the King assassination and the 
 Silent Vigil. Samuel DuBois Cook, King’s longtime friend and the man whose 
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speech to the vigil captured the spirit of the protest, answered the question 
in the negative. While not “for a moment [questioning] the good  will, mo-
tives, honor, or decency of the administration,” Cook assessed the university’s 
overall response to the vigil critically. “Honestly, painfully, unfortunately, and 
regretfully,” he wrote thirty years  after the event, “the response of the adminis-
tration was . . .  weak, myopic, institutionally unimaginative, ethically insensi-
tive, humanistically blind, extremely disappointing, and quite unworthy not 
only of Duke, but also its own  great potential.” Cook could not “escape or hide 
the feeling that the administration was terribly on the wrong side of a  great 
moral issue and missed, so sadly, a  great and unique opportunity.” “Thank-
fully,” Cook added, “Duke’s remarkable sense of community stayed intact.”115
With the vigil over, Black campus activism would regain center stage. At-
tention would turn to the Black students’ demands that the university fi nally 
take steps to address their cultural, social, and academic needs. How would 
 these students approach protest and how would the university react? Would 
Duke’s “remarkable sense of community” survive the encounter? Events oc-
curring at Duke in the fall semester of 1968 would begin to provide  these 
answers.
(above) Segregated seating at Duke 
University Stadium, Notre Dame  
versus Duke football game, December 
2, 1961 (Duke University Archives). 
A report prepared in 1962 explained 
that “the Negro section at the 
outdoor Stadium is predicated on the 
assumption that Negroes prefer to 
sit together and that such separation 
avoids ‘incidents.’ ”
(right) First three African American 
Duke gradu ates, 1967 (Duke University 
Archives). Among the “first five” in 
1963, Wilhelmina Reuben, Nathaniel 
White Jr., and Mary Mitchell Harris 
 were the first African American 
undergraduates to receive their 
degrees from Duke in 1967.
(left) Douglas M. Knight speaking at 
his inauguration, December 11, 1963 
(Duke University Archives). Offered 
the presidencies of Duke and Cornell 
at the same time, the forty- two- year- 
old Knight was among the youn gest 
university presidents in the nation.
(below) Martin Luther King Jr. 
speaking to an overflow crowd in Page 
Auditorium at Duke on November 13, 
1964 (Duke University Archives).
(opposite) Samuel DuBois Cook, 1966 
(Duke University Archives). Po liti cal 
science professor Samuel DuBois Cook 
became the first African American 
faculty member at Duke in 1966.


(opposite) A Black student band member 
remains seated, refusing to participate in 
the playing of “ Dixie” at a Duke athletic 
event, circa 1968 (photo by Larry Funk; 
Chanticleer, 1969, p. 34). Among the 
initial aas “concerns” presented to the 
administration, the playing of “ Dixie” 
and the display of the Confederate flag at 
university events were discontinued in 1968.
(right) Wilhelmina Reuben, May Queen, 
1967 (Duke University Archives). In 1967 
Wilhelmina Reuben was elected by the 
 Woman’s College as the first Black May 
Queen in Duke history. Trustee C. B. Houck 
wrote to President Knight that Reuben’s 
election was in “bad taste,” and trustee 
George M. Ivey Jr. found it “nauseating 
to contemplate” that Duke would attract 
students who would make such a choice.
(below) Stokely Carmichael speaks to a 
full  house in Page Auditorium, March 17, 
1967 (Duke University Archives). The 
appearance of the chair of sncc at Duke 
catalyzed Black students to meet as a 
group for the first time.
Approximately 250 nonacademic employees, students, and other supporters protest outside 
the Allen Building on April 19, 1967, seeking impartial third- party arbitration of employee 
grievances (Durham Civil Rights Heritage Proj ect; photo by Bill Boyarsky).
 Labor leader Oliver Harvey (center) and an unnamed student distribute Local 77 lit er a ture on 
the Duke campus, April 1967 (Durham Civil Rights Heritage Project; photo by Bill Boyarsky).
Black students hold a “study-in” in the anteroom outside President Knight’s office on 
November 13, 1967, to protest the continued use of off- campus segregated facilities by Duke 
student organ izations (Duke University Archives). Although Knight maintained he was  
not responding to Black student pressure, the university prohibited the use of segregated 
facilities by student groups less than four days  later.
On April 5, 1968, approximately 250 students, the vast majority of them white, occupy the 
home of Duke president Douglas Knight following a memorial march for Martin Luther 
King Jr. (Duke Chronicle, April 4, 1988). Knight gave the students permission to remain  
overnight, and they stayed in the  house for thirty- six hours.
(left) The  Silent Vigil, April 1968 
(Duke University Archives). 
The  Silent Vigil on the main 
quadrangle was highly or ga nized. 
Protesters sat in rows. Rules 
included “No talking. . . .  No eating 
except at group snack and meal 
breaks. . . .  No sunbathing” and 
“No singing except at specified 
periods  under the direction of the 
song leader.”
(below) The  Silent Vigil, April 1968 
(Duke University Archives). The 
first protest for most participants, 
the  Silent Vigil had a power ful  
impact on the individuals 
involved. One protester said it 
was “as close as I ever came to a 
religious feeling.”
The  Silent Vigil, April 10, 1968 (Duke University Archives). Left to right: Charles Huestis, Frank 
Ashmore, Wright Tisdale, student Reed Kramer, and student Jonathan Kinney. Tisdale,  
the board chair, and administrators joined in singing “We  Shall Overcome”  after Tisdale  
addressed the vigil. “If you saw the picture” of me singing, Tisdale told an alumni group a 
few months  later, “you’d know I  wasn’t happy about it.”
The  Silent Vigil, April 10, 1968 
(Duke University Archives).  Silent 
Vigil participants demanded that 
Duke’s nonacademic employees 
be granted the right to bargain 
collectively. Dining hall workers 
and students or ga nized picket lines 
outside the campus dining halls.
The  Silent Vigil, April 10, 1968 
(Duke University Archives).  Silent 
Vigil protesters remained on the 






























1. Senior administrators relocate 
from Allen Building to Advancement 
Oce.
2. Police move from Duke Gardens 
toward back door of Allen Building. 
3. Student activists leave through 
front door of Allen Building and 
march down Chapel Drive; police 
enter back door of building.
4. Police cars confront students on 
Chapel Drive and Quad.
5. Police use tear gas, pepper spray, 
and billy clubs on students in 











 Map of West Campus of Duke University showing movements of administrators, students, 
and police during the after noon of the Allen Building takeover on February 13, 1969. Map by 
Tim Stallmann.
Activist and comedian Dick Gregory speaks to a crowd of 3,000  people at the Duke indoor 
stadium on February 10, 1969 (Duke University Archives). Knight believed that Gregory’s 
speech, titled “Nigger,” was “the explosive one” that triggered the Allen Building takeover.
Students inside the Allen Building during the  
takeover, February 13, 1969 (photo by Lynette 
Lewis). Left to right: Carolyn Day, Josie Knowlin, 
C. B. Claiborne, and Leonard Brown. Duke 
decision- makers made only one attempt to 
engage in discussions with the protesters during 
the takeover and declined to send a faculty 
member into the building to speak to them, citing 
“hostage dangers.”
Students inside the Allen Building during the 
takeover, February 13, 1969 (photo by Lynette 
Lewis). Left to right: Chuck Hopkins (on phone at 
desk), C. B. Claiborne (at desk), Bertie Howard 
(seated on chair), Cheri Riley, unidentified student 
(seated on desk), Charles Becton, and Clarence 
Morgan. Students took turns answering the many 
calls that came in from media, friends, faculty, 
members of the local Black community, and 
parents, among  others.
The Allen Building takeover, February 13, 1969 (Duke University Archives). The  
administration immediately  adopted a “no negotiations” stance toward the protest, and  
Durham police and the state highway patrol  were called to campus soon  after 
administrators learned of the takeover. Police in full riot gear assembled in Duke Gardens, 
awaiting instructions, which came hours  later.
The Allen Building takeover, February 13, 1969 (Duke University Archives). A large crowd of 
white student activists, Black students, sympathetic faculty, and members of the Durham 
Black community, among  others, assembled outside the Allen Building to protect the 
protesters from the police. Once mobilized, police encircled this group.
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Police standing outside 
the Allen Building (photo 
by Larry Funk; Chanticleer, 
1969, p. 54). One member of 
the police contingent told 
a protester years  later that 
having been on standby in 
Duke Gardens for hours, the 
officers arrived on the quad 
“pumped up and primed” 
and ready to “whip some 
heads and get this  thing in 
order.”
Students on the quad  after the Allen Building takeover, February 13, 1969 (Duke University 
Archives). Although Black students had left the Allen Building, police determined that it 
was necessary to clear the quad. “Tear gas was flying everywhere,” one eyewitness said, and 
“police started hitting  people with billy clubs.”
Policeman approaching unidentified student, February 13, 1969 (Duke University Archives). 
One student reported seeing police “striking anything in their path.” “Kent State could very 
well have happened at Duke,” one protester thought  later.
Police approach students 
on the quad  after the 
Allen Building takeover, 
February 13, 1969 (Duke 
University Archives). In 
addition to tear gas, police 
deployed a pepper gas 
machine that one observer 
described as looking like 
“a combination- vacuum- 
cleaner- ray- gun.” Police 
efforts to clear the quad 
lasted for over an hour.
The central rec ords office  after the Allen Building takeover, February 13, 1969 (Duke 
University Archives).  Because they exited in haste, students left  behind the supplies they 
had taken into the Allen Building. A sweep of the occupied area showed that no rec ords had 
been destroyed and  little damage had occurred.
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 “Weapons” brought into the Allen Building (Douglas Knight Rec ords, Duke University 
Archives). The university presented this picture at the disciplinary hearing as evidence that 
students had brought “weapons” into the Allen Building. Students maintained that  these 
items  were used only to secure the occupied area.
University House, February 15, 1969 (Duke University Archives). Students 
confronted Knight (circled) outside his  house the day following the takeover. 
 After the chaotic, combative session, students, faculty, and administrators 
agreed to meet in the eve ning to discuss Black student concerns.
CHAPTER 6
Humiliating to Plead for Our Humanity
Negotiations
Just as the  Silent Vigil was ending, the Duke Chronicle wrote on April 12, 1968, 
about the “new Duke University” that had emerged from the protest.1 Thanks 
to the vigil, the paper noted, Duke faculty members had become more en-
gaged, and more students  were socially conscious and po liti cally active. Even 
the university’s board of trustees showed signs of listening to students and 
workers, exhibiting at least some concern for the social impact of the universi-
ty’s  labor policies. Many students returning for the fall semester of 1968 expe-
rienced the “new intensity” on campus that John Cell observed  after the vigil.
Duke was indeed changing. A new chemistry building and Perkins Library 
addition  were almost ready for occupancy. The East Campus science building 
was being transformed into an arts center. New rules allowed  women on East 
Campus to sign out of their dorms overnight, no longer requiring permis-
sion from a  house counselor. On West Campus, returning men encountered 
what the Duke Chronicle called, only half- jokingly, “a drastic change in their 
lives.” “Starting this September,” the newspaper reported, “maids  will no lon-
ger make beds for West Campus students.”2 In many areas, Duke appeared to 
have become less regional, less isolated, more in the mainstream of American 
universities that entertained national ambitions.
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If some sensed the emergence of a new Duke University in the fall of 1968, 
however, one group did not— the school’s Black students. Arriving back on 
campus,  these students faced essentially the same challenges that had made 
their lives so difficult in the years since desegregation. Cell wrote in late 1968 
that desegregation at Duke had meant permitting Black students to “enroll as 
members of the student body” but without any of their distinctive needs and 
concerns acknowledged. Through what Cell characterized as a policy of “pas-
sive ac cep tance,” the university had “thoughtlessly”  adopted an “assimilation-
ist model” of desegregation— Black students would be admitted to Duke, but 
the university would not change. Cell was correct. Duke had done nothing to 
address the needs of its Black students, who, he noted,  were called on “to do 
all the adjusting.”3
Compounding  matters, administrators seemed almost totally unaware of 
the prob lems that Black students  were facing. According to Cell, the reason 
was straightforward. “From the fall of 1963 to the fall of 1968,” he wrote, “ there 
was no effective communication between the black students and the Univer-
sity at large.” Administrators and faculty made  little effort to get to know  these 
students or to develop relationships with them. In his classroom interactions, 
Cell encountered a “formidable barrier of distrust and suspicion” in the Black 
students he taught. Without communication, white administrators had no 
chance to learn about, or try to understand, the real ity Black students at Duke 
 were experiencing  every day.4
 Because Duke administrators remained so passive, racial  matters at Duke 
 were static, even as the university was undergoing rapid change in other areas. 
“In effect,” Cell wrote to provost Marcus Hobbs in February 1969, “ there is 
enough of the old climate left to lend substance to the students’ impressions 
[that Duke is racist]. ‘ Dixie’ and Hope Valley memberships are but the tip 
of the iceberg,” he added. The school’s Black students still remained isolated; 
as of the fall of 1968, Duke only had one Black administrator and two Black 
professors. Black students comprised just over 1  percent of  those attending 
Duke’s undergraduate, gradu ate, and professional schools. In the employment 
area, Duke’s director of employee relations described the school as having “a 
white top and a black bottom.” Fully 70  percent of the 1,500 unskilled laborers 
and ser vice workers at the university  were Black. Yet outside campus, the uni-
versity had no business contracts with Black- owned companies in Durham. 
This created a deteriorating situation. “As the tone of the Black movement 
has turned from  legal rights to economic and social equality,” Cell warned 
in December 1968, “it has grown more militant. . . .  Black awareness has 
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increased, [and,] as the crisis in American society has deepened, the situation 
in the microcosmic community of Duke University [has] worsened.” With 
the increase in Black militancy nationally, Bertie Howard saw the atmosphere 
on campus begin to change. “ People no longer thought they needed to be so-
licitous of Black students,” she remembered.  There was “more open hostility,” 
more “mistrust.”5
On October 4, 1968, representatives of the Afro- American Society (aas) 
met members of the administration for the first time to discuss the issues 
Duke’s Black students  were facing. This meeting— along with several follow-
up sessions— provided a singular opportunity for the university to address 
the concerns of its Black students prior to confrontation. Yet with  little prior 
communication and few, if any, relationships between students and university 
administrators, this already difficult task proved nearly impossible. As events 
would soon show, race not only created the prob lems Black students  were fac-
ing but undermined the efforts of students and administrators to find a path 
forward together.
President Douglas Knight met for the first time with Duke’s Black students to 
ask for a list of their concerns on January 9, 1968, just as the spring 1968 se-
mester was getting underway. The Orangeburg Massacre had followed in Feb-
ruary, then the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. in April.  After the King 
assassination, historian Ibram X. Kendi wrote, “higher education shuddered in 
a paroxysm of . . .  black student power.” Black campus activism was pre sent in 
almost  every state— Iowa, California, Michigan, Connecticut, Wisconsin, Il-
linois, Mas sa chu setts, Oregon, Alabama, and New York, among many  others.6
Although the massacre and assassination  were watershed events for Black 
students at Duke, it was the  Silent Vigil—an event Charles Becton described 
as “mostly a white vigil”— that was the focal point for protest in the immediate 
aftermath of King’s death. As  these events  were unfolding, assistant dean of 
Arts and Sciences William Griffith followed up on Knight’s request that Black 
students provide him with a list of their concerns. Initially, Griffith contacted 
Lee Hatcher and Joyce Hobson. He was, according to a chronology prepared 
by vice president for institutional advancement Frank Ashmore, “assured that 
the list would be forthcoming.” Yet by May, the list had still not materialized. 
Hence Griffith had lunch with a group of Black students, repeating his request 
for a “written report.” Again, nothing was sent, leading Griffith  later in May to 
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suggest to Chuck Hopkins that a group of Black students meet with “faculty 
and administration over the summer for an in- depth discussion of prob lems 
related to black students on campus.” Griffith told Hopkins that the university 
would underwrite the travel costs of the Black students. Although Hopkins 
agreed to the meeting, no further contact occurred over the summer.7
Duke administrators and faculty assumed that Black students would read-
ily produce their list of concerns and  were baffled when they failed to do so. 
Since they had no effective lines of communication with the students, faculty 
members and administrators could only speculate on the cause. Ashmore rea-
soned that the students simply did not consider preparing the list a priority. 
“The students intended to prepare the report, but simply never got around 
to it,” he observed. Griffith attributed the delay to tactics. “I  couldn’t help but 
[feel],” he recalled, “that they  didn’t . . .  want to identify every thing. . . .  They 
 were reluctant to put [the specifics] down . . .  because then [in two weeks] 
 there might be another prob lem that  they’d see.”8
Given the lack of contact between university administrators and Black stu-
dents, it is not surprising that  these  were erroneous observations. It was not 
that the students lacked focus. Rather, generating a list of specific concerns 
was not easy given their own internal po liti cal conflicts. By January 1968, the 
group faced real divisions. “Black students  were far from monolithic,” Kendi 
explained. Like any other group of students, “black student communities 
comprised collections of minigroups ordered by charismatic students, frater-
nal connections, artistic talents, hometowns, and mutual interests and friend-
ships, to name a few distinguishing  factors.”9
Internal po liti cal conflicts came to a head with the aas leadership elec-
tions in February 1968. With Brenda Armstrong’s election as chair of the 
aas, the group had a leader who could unite varied factions and move the 
group forward. Yet even with her leadership, significant ideological and 
po liti cal challenges remained. The Black students— none “professional 
educators”— were operating in a rapidly changing po liti cal and social envi-
ronment, fraught with tension. Neither the Black campus movement nor ac-
ademia had developed a template of concerns that set forth the institutional 
changes a white southern university should make to eliminate de cades of 
racial exclusion. “Just as white universities [had] failed to anticipate the 
impact of the Black influx onto their campuses,” historian Allen B. Ballard 
wrote perceptively in 1974, “so had Black intellectuals and Black students 
failed to conceptualize exactly what was wanted from the white universities 
into which they  were entering.”10
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Students held widely differing views about what to include in their list of 
concerns. Some issues, such as the need for a Black barber on campus or a ban 
on the playing of “ Dixie” at university functions,  were noncontroversial. But 
 others, like Black studies and the high attrition rate among Black students, 
 were ideologically more complicated. They generated significant internal de-
bate. To avoid splintering further, the aas would need to reach consensus 
on which concerns to focus on. William Turner described one aspect of the 
challenge the students faced. “As students we could not articulate [the issues] 
as perhaps we can now,” he recalled. “The  things that are closest to you and 
that are most a part of your life— they’re the most difficult to talk about and 
rationalize.”11
Although for the most part the list of concerns was finalized by late spring, 
Armstrong and other leaders de cided not to give it to the administration  until 
the fall. “One of the  things we  were very careful about,” Armstrong explained, 
“was what we said to the administration . . .  and when we said it. [Even] the 
silences  were planned.”12
“A lot of the concerns we had  were crystal clear by the end of the [school] 
year,” Armstrong remembered. “But we felt that  there was no reason to meet 
with the administration in May, when summer would come, [and] every one 
was  going home. Giving them a set of grievances [and] the summer . . .  to 
answer them,” she explained, “would be one way to defuse the issues.”13
By September 1968, Knight had recovered from his relapse of hepatitis. As 
he prepared to resume a full- time schedule, he reached out to Griffith for an 
update on how  things  were  going. “Sometime before the fall,” he wrote Griffith 
in August, “I hope we can get together and talk about what’s been planned, 
during the summer, concerning our black student groups.” Knight recalled 
“how they came to see me last winter, and I think I need to catch up on where 
we stand at the moment.”14 By his own admission, Knight had been out of the 
loop. Indeed, he was unprepared for what he was about to confront.
Yet this was only one of the prob lems Knight faced upon his return. Per-
haps most challenging was his relationship with the board of trustees. They 
had become increasingly concerned with maintaining order on campus. The 
 Silent Vigil intensified  these concerns. Early in 1968, the university had an-
nounced a new policy that sought to ban “illegitimate” protests that disrupted 
the “orderly operation of the institution.”15 As subsequent events showed, 
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board chair Wright Tisdale, along with other trustees, worried that existing 
policies  were not sufficient to maintain order. They also wondered  whether 
university administrators could be trusted to respond effectively to disruptive 
activity.
Just  after the vigil, in May 1968, university counsel Edwin Bryson informed 
his administrative colleagues about a recent conference call with Tisdale. Ac-
cording to Bryson, Tisdale “stated that he had polled the members of the ex-
ecutive committee by telephone. [They]  were unan i mous in their decision” 
that the existing rules regarding picketing and demonstrations should be re-
scinded and new ones  adopted and made immediately effective.  Under the 
new rules, “disruptive practice[s],” including sit- ins, vio lence, injury to person 
or property, or specific threats to person or property, would “not be tolerated.” 
Any person (including faculty, students, or nonacademic employees) engaged 
in such practices would be notified that “he is in violation of University regu-
lations . . .  and that  unless he should forthwith discontinue such practice he 
 will be arrested and summarily dismissed from the University.”16 Instead of 
using the time since the  Silent Vigil to encourage greater administrative rec-
ognition of student concerns, the trustees had instead sought to make certain 
that  these concerns  were stifled.
Before Tisdale’s new rules  were implemented, a special committee of uni-
versity administrators was formed to consider ways to strengthen the school’s 
existing “pickets and protests” policy. When the special committee presented 
its proposed changes to the Executive Committee, they  were rejected as not 
strong enough. The special committee was instructed to “give the report fur-
ther study . . .  and to pre sent revised recommendations . . .  as soon as pos si-
ble.”17 Clearly, a wide gap existed between university administrators and the 
executive committee on how to respond to campus protests.
Once the revised pickets and protests policy had been finalized, Tisdale 
directed that it be sent to  every Duke student at home over the summer. In 
his transmittal letter, Knight described the policy as a “framework” through 
which vari ous members of the university community could “resolve, as rea-
sonable  people, the differences which may from time to time arise among us.” 
Tisdale was much less accommodating. “I hope  these [policies] are studied by 
 others as well as the trustees,” Tisdale wrote to Knight in late August. Tisdale 
explained, “In my view,  there is [a] clear . . .  need to take a firm hand and not 
let a few create another situation like we had [during the vigil]. Many students 
have gotten the impression from the acts of a few, and our reaction, that we 
are weak and they can have what they want.”18
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Undoubtedly, part of this more aggressive response to student protesters 
reflected the university’s increasingly difficult relationship with its alumni and 
donors. In December 1967, Ashmore had provided the Duke president with 
a list of “Criticisms of Specific Actions of University by Conservatives.” Seek-
ing to make Knight aware of how changes at Duke  were affecting the school’s 
development program, Ashmore set forth what he characterized as the “Ex-
treme Interpretations” of recent developments at the school. “Admission of 
students without regard to race, color, or national origin” was seen by some, 
according to Ashmore, as a “liberal sell- out to attract Federal money.” Election 
of Knight as president, “a non- Methodist, non- Southerner, Ivy League prod-
uct,” was seen as “Duke becoming another Harvard, Yale, or equally liberal 
and dangerous institution.” Faculty and student participation in demonstra-
tions meant that  these groups  were “not restrained properly from radical and 
un- American  causes.”  Those holding an “extreme interpretation” perceived 
the election of a Black May Queen as a “deliberate insult of all white  people, 
especially  women, and [an] example of student defiance of all authority.” Fi-
nally, such  people saw the administration’s response to the aas study-in over 
segregated facilities as “giving in to student demands [and] failure to exercise 
control and create examples.”19
Ashmore concluded by providing Knight with “Generalizations Being 
Made about Duke’s Administration and Policies.” According to Ashmore, 
 those raising questions believed that “Duke is being run by a group of lib-
eral, fuzzy- minded intellectuals; . . .  the University is changing in character 
from Southern to national, from religious to pagan, from moral to amoral, 
from controlled environment to complete lack of control, and the students 
are  running the University.” “I think a number of our  people,” Ashmore told 
Knight in a cover letter, “likely feel as I have described their thoughts  here.”20
The reactionary attitudes described by Ashmore had certainly been in-
flamed by the  Silent Vigil. To  these “conservatives,” the vigil provided further 
evidence that Duke students  were out of control, with an administration un-
able—or unwilling—to impose order. For them, the vigil meant that cherished 
“traditional” values  were being cast aside, as Duke moved ever further into the 
mainstream of liberal, secular, national universities.
Starting early in Knight’s tenure, Duke also began experiencing significant 
physical and cultural changes. In 1965, the university had announced its Fifth 
De cade Plan, Knight’s strategy for transforming Duke. The plan promoted 
significant investment in new buildings and other resources as well as the larg-
est fund rais ing initiative in the history of the university.21 New buildings  were 
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appearing on campus, the quality of the student body was increasing, cam-
pus social policies  were relaxed, and changes to the curriculum  were made. 
Knight never missed an opportunity to point out Duke’s rapid transforma-
tion, or the connection it had to his national ambitions for the school. But 
as Duke changed, many trustees and alumni, particularly  those from North 
Carolina, became concerned. According to director of alumni affairs Roger 
Marshall, they worried that “the university was not  going to serve its region in 
its efforts to serve the nation.” Many donors, he explained, “became uncertain, 
somewhat bewildered, [and]  weren’t real sure just what their contribution was 
 going  towards, what kind of institution it was supporting.”22
Compounding all  these issues, the university faced a significant bud get 
shortfall in 1968–69. In May, dean of Arts and Sciences Harold W. Lewis 
wrote to department chairs, deans, and directors, alerting them that the sal-
ary increases promised to nonacademic employees at the time of the  Silent 
Vigil required that “ every pos si ble economy must be made in all areas of the 
University” for 1968–69. Lewis announced a hiring freeze, asked that “small 
enrollment” and “non- essential courses” be considered for elimination, and 
drastically  limited bud get increases for nonsalary items. Even with savings 
from  these mea sures, vice president of business and finance Charles Huestis 
told his colleagues in late August that his “latest calculations set the proposed 
1968–69 deficit at $2,009,000.” In September, Huestis urged that the need for 
permanent replacements for vacant positions be “critically reassessed” and 
asked that word be “passed along” that  future fa cil i ty renovations would be 
“attractive but Spartan.”23
As the 1968–69 school year began, Knight’s days as Duke president seemed 
numbered. The timing of his leave of absence for health reasons— just as the 
 Silent Vigil was starting— could not have been worse. “If  you’re taken out of 
the picture at the critical time of the university’s” life, Griffith explained, “it 
would be self- evident that [Knight] would have lost the chance to get back in 
as a  viable president.” Many trustees, including  those on the Duke Endow-
ment board, no longer supported the Duke president. William Anlyan, dean 
of the School of Medicine, remembered times he was with Duke Endowment 
trustees “when some of them . . .  would take Barnes Woodhall and me aside to 
try to persuade us to help them get rid of Doug Knight.” Knight recalled “con-
stant veiled threats of the withdrawal of Endowment support.” Fi nally,  there 
was a meeting in the late 1960s, Knight recounted, where Endowment trustee 
Amos R. Kearns “fi nally came out from  under his rock” and confronted him. 
Unhappy that Knight had failed to carry out the wishes of the Endowment on 
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university  matters, Kearns told Knight angrily that “you  haven’t done what we 
told you to do.” Soon thereafter, Knight was eliminated from monthly Endow-
ment board meetings, and direct encounters with Endowment board mem-
bers  stopped. “ They’re  going to get him,” a member of the Executive Com-
mittee told board chair Charles Wade  after this confrontation with Kearns. 
“ They’re  after [Knight], and  they’re gonna get him.”24
Knight recalled 1968 and 1969 as an “embattled time.” Yet he believed that 
he was “moving and getting  things done” upon returning in the fall, despite 
“the fact that the Endowment members of the Executive Committee liter-
ally no longer spoke to me. They acted,” Knight remembered painfully, “as 
though I  wasn’t  there.” Still, the stress was taking a huge toll on his  family. 
Years  later, Knight recalled an eve ning during the fall of 1968 “when I said 
to my wife . . .  ‘I’m feeling a lot better and  there’s still so much to do and 
I think I can stick it out for a while.’ ” But as he looked over at her, he saw 
“tears  were  running down her face.” “You  can’t do this to  these  people who 
are your  family,” he said to himself. “I knew at that moment that I had to 
find a decent way out.”25
The summer of 1968 was a turbulent one across the globe. In June, presidential 
candidate Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated just  after winning the impor-
tant California primary. Prague Spring continued in Czecho slo va kia as pro-
tests against communist rule intensified. In August the Soviet Union invaded 
Czecho slo va kia with 200,000 Warsaw Pact troops. Ralph Abernathy, Mar-
tin Luther King Jr.’s designated successor, spearheaded the establishment of 
Resurrection City on the National Mall as an antipoverty protest. Approxi-
mately 2,500  people occupied Resurrection City for almost six weeks,  until the 
encampment was raided and demolished by police. Thousands of protesters 
gathered in Chicago in August for the Demo cratic National Convention. “In 
response,” one historian has written, “Mayor Richard Daley had turned the 
city into a virtual fortress, mobilizing almost 12,000 police, preparing to call 
out 7,500 national guardsmen, and denying demonstrators the right to hold 
protest rallies.”  After the demonstrators convened one protest, the police re-
sponded violently. “The cops had one  thing on their minds,” one journalist 
reported: “club and then gas, club and then gas, club and then gas.” At least 
100 protesters went to emergency rooms  after the melee and more than 150 
 were arrested.26
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With  these tumultuous events as a backdrop, 104 Black students enrolled 
in degree programs at Duke for the fall semester of 1968. Of  these, 82  were 
undergraduates, 12 attended gradu ate school, and 10  were in professional 
schools; 43 Black students matriculated as freshmen. While the number of 
Black students at Duke had increased steadily since 1963, their number re-
mained miniscule— just over 1  percent—at a school with a total of more than 
8,000 students.27
Still, the increased size of the Black student body was significant. “I re-
member [in the fall of 1968]  there  were a lot more Black students on campus,” 
Brenda Brown recalled. With more students, perceptions changed. “We felt,” 
she explained,  there  were “enough of us  here, they have to deal with us. . . . 
 There  were enough [of us] that our demands could not be shut off to the side.”28
Griffith remained intent on establishing a dialogue with the Black students. 
His per sis tence, Cell commented, came  because he “sensed unrest among 
the Black students before anyone  else did.” Few  others in the administration 
shared Griffith’s urgency. Assistant dean of instruction Annie Leigh Brough-
ton, for example, wrote administrators in July 1968 suggesting that more con-
sideration be given to the needs of Duke’s Black students. But for Broughton, 
any such discussion could wait  until well into the fall semester.29
Griffith, by contrast, wanted to move quickly. Just  after classes started, he 
again approached Hopkins, asking him to assem ble a group of Black students 
to discuss their concerns. At the meeting, Griffith suggested that an ad hoc 
committee of Black students, faculty, and administrators be assembled for “in- 
depth discussions of prob lems related to black students.” The students agreed 
and members of the ad hoc committee  were jointly selected— Cell, Robert F. 
Durden, and Richard L. Watson Jr., all professors from the history depart-
ment; dean of Trinity College James Price, acting dean of the  Woman’s College 
Jane Philpott, and assistant dean and vice provost Frederick Joerg; students 
Tony Axam, Becton, Vaughn Glapion, Hopkins, Bertie Howard, Stef McLeod, 
and Katherine Watson. Griffith chaired the committee.30
Two  factors loomed large for Black students as they considered a meet-
ing. The first was recruiting incoming freshmen into the aas. “We felt . . .  that 
the prob lems we thought  were pivotal [in the spring] would get magnified,” 
Armstrong explained. She believed October was the “ideal time” for an initial 
meeting  because, by then, freshmen had been on campus for “six or eight 
weeks” and would have had the chance to be exposed to the aas.31
A second  factor had to do with planning for Black Week, the student- 
organized festival of Black arts, drama, culture, and politics, to be held during 
170 Chapter six
the first week of February 1969. A much smaller version of the event had oc-
curred in early 1968. “All of us recognized from the year before,” Armstrong 
remembered, “how you could draw even the quiet est students out by allowing 
them to express themselves in their own ways during Black Week.” A meeting 
with the administration in October, therefore, seemed well timed. Armstrong 
explained that the aas could “make a statement of the issues in October, and 
then have our students work for two months on Black Week— knowing that 
the issues  were out  there.” The first meeting of the ad hoc committee was 
scheduled for October 4, 1968, at 5:00 p.m.32
Hopkins opened the meeting of the committee. “The prob lem,” he said, “is 
how can we together solve the prob lems of black students on a white campus?” 
Hopkins explained that the assimilationist approach of the university was 
deeply flawed. “Integration,” he explained, “is not [just] taking a person into 
a society which is almost totally diff er ent from his own and asking him . . . 
to forget who or what he is and assume the appearance of something  else.” 
“Sociologists, anthropologists, and educators . . .  tell us,” Hopkins noted, “one 
of the foremost goals of education is the passing of culture from one genera-
tion to the next.” This made the pro cess of finding one’s identity central to the 
educational pro cess. For white students, this was “easy,” Hopkins explained, 
“ because their ele ments of identification are interwoven throughout the ed-
ucational structure.” For Black students, however, “the situation . . .  is quite 
diff er ent.” A Black student  faces three choices: “accepting the educational 
structure [at a white institution] as it is and seeking his real self outside of 
it; . . .  rebel[ling] at the lack of himself in the [existing] educational structure 
with extreme expressions of militancy; . . .  or . . .  attempt[ing] to have some 
of his own ideas and culture [be] incorporated into the overall structure of 
the educational institution. . . .  We are  here this eve ning,” Hopkins explained, 
“to discuss the [last] alternative.”33
Hopkins then outlined twelve areas that he urged the committee to address 
“as quickly as pos si ble.” He presented  these as “concerns” and not “demands.” 
The first group of concerns involved the Black educational experience. First, 
the Black students asked for the establishment of a Black studies program, 
preferably taught by Black faculty members, as well as additions to the library’s 
book and magazine holdings on topics relevant to the Black experience. When 
it was pointed out that a course, The Negro in Amer i ca, was already offered 
Humiliating to Plead for Our Humanity 171
in the sociology department, Black students highlighted “prob lems inherent 
in” the course, including, in their view, the fact that the professor “is not up to 
date in the material presented.”34
The size and composition of the Black student population at Duke repre-
sented a second area of focus within this first group of concerns. The students 
asked that the number of Black students on campus be increased, with a focus 
on recruiting Black athletes and  those from urban areas.
Fi nally, regarding the Black educational experience, the students sought 
the establishment of a summer program for incoming Black students and the 
appointment of a Black adviser with an administrative connection to se nior 
university leadership. The summer program would focus on En glish, math, 
and foreign languages and would also ease the transition to college by giving 
Black students “a feel for the Campus before the beginning of the academic 
year.”
A second group of concerns focused on the need for social arrangements 
to be developed on campus for Black students. In this area, the students re-
quested official university endorsement for Black Week, a Black barber in the 
campus barbershop, office space for the aas, and the opportunity—if they 
wanted— for Black students to live in an all- Black dormitory. The minutes of 
the meeting noted that the Black students “strongly felt that . . .  local fraternity 
chapters are racist.” As to in de pen dent dorms, the students objected to the 
significant cost of participating in a social program that “does not speak to 
the black student.”
A third group of concerns called for the elimination of racist symbols at 
the university. The students asked for a complete ban on the playing of “ Dixie” 
and a regulation against any display of the Confederate flag at university func-
tions. The Black students also made clear that the president’s country club 
membership remained an area of “ great concern,” signifying “support of seg-
regated institutions and thus an abdication [to]  those racial inequalities which 
Duke is attempting to overcome.” They again demanded that Knight resign 
from the club.
The October session lasted about ninety- five minutes and included what 
Griffith described as “a fair bit of discussion” about the concerns raised. Cell 
characterized the tone of the meeting as “friendly.” When submitting the min-
utes to Knight, Griffith reported that a group of se nior administrators— the 
Provost Group— had already met to discuss the issues. That group “felt that a 
number of the items  were valid and did have solutions” but that “ others  were 
of a more difficult and perhaps questionable nature.” The administrative group 
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recommended that the ad hoc committee be reconvened “to identify ways in 
which to [immediately] deal with a number of  these questions.” Griffith also 
invited Knight to make any suggestions he might have.35
Knight soon responded. On most issues, he showed a continued adherence 
to assimilation as the appropriate model for integration. Regarding university 
support for Black Week, Knight commented that  there was “obviously some 
dynamite” in the prospect. Knight also stated that he was “disturbed about the 
[potential reverse segregation] aspect” of having a Black barber and a Black 
adviser and emphasized that he was “very opposed” to the idea of a separate dor-
mitory. “This is an integrated” university, he declared. Perhaps most revealing, 
Knight was dismissive  toward the request that symbols of racism, like the play-
ing of “ Dixie” and the display of the Confederate flag at public university events, 
be eliminated. Characterizing the issue as a “mixture of [the] truly impor tant 
and truly unimportant,” he observed “how touchy this is, but the very touchi-
ness is worrisome.” Apparently Knight believed that “ Dixie” was not a “segrega-
tion song” but “originally a black man’s song.” Hence, he was unable to grasp 
the significance of the issue. Knight was apparently unaware that “ Dixie”— the 
anthem of the Confederacy— had originated as a “plantation song and dance” in 
the racist blackface minstrel shows of the mid- nineteenth  century.36
Knight’s strongest reaction, though, came in response to the demand that 
he resign from Hope Valley Country Club. The statement that his member-
ship “signified support of segregated institutions” and represented “an abdica-
tion [to]  those racial inequalities which Duke is trying to overcome,” Knight 
commented, was “False, Untrue, Unfair.” If they forced him to resign, Knight 
explained, they “nullify any opportunity I have to accomplish anything con-
structive in that area.” In Knight’s view, resigning would only strengthen  those 
in the community who opposed racial pro gress. “This is rough language (and 
you  will have to tone it down),” he told Griffith, “but if they want to work for 
 those very  people they think they are resisting,  there  isn’t a better way to do it 
than to push me in this way.”37 Knight knew he would pay a po liti cal price if 
he resigned from Hope Valley. Given how  little po liti cal capital he still had, the 
Duke president hoped to delay any decision on his Hope Valley membership 
for as long as pos si ble. In  doing so, he failed to recognize the import of his 
response to Black students at Duke.
Knight’s final comments reflected how  limited his insight was into the 
world of Black students at Duke. Knight commented that the Black students 
“have to realize we are working on the good  will and the truth.” If they  didn’t 
share this perspective, “nothing can be done.”38  Here, Knight was reflecting 
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a view shared by many white administrators that Black student demands 
constituted “reverse discrimination.” The Black students, he wrote, “must not 
think they can solve prob lems by [discriminating against]  others.” The Black 
students  will “make me useless,” Knight concluded dismissively, “if they push 
some of  these useless  things.”39 With  these words, Knight seemed to equate 
Black hostility to segregation with reverse racism.
Still, in his desire to advance the dialogue on the issues Black students had 
raised, Griffith convened a second ad hoc committee meeting on October 15. 
In his opening remarks on October 4, Hopkins had asked that the twelve is-
sues he raised be addressed “as soon as pos si ble.” Yet if Black students had 
hoped that they would quickly receive positive feedback from the university, 
they  were disappointed. Instead, following the suggestion of Dean Price, the 
committee chose to designate subgroups to address each issue. The subgroups 
would then meet “with the appropriate persons to pursue further the indi-
vidual questions raised.”40
On the key issue of Black studies, administrators described a “general feel-
ing . . .  that at least a number of departments would be receptive to . . .  courses 
dealing in subject  matter more germane to the Black history and culture.” Yet 
funding and “the ability to secure competent teachers,” they said,  were prob-
lems. Given the bud get issues, the group reached a consensus that “the first 
approach should be made through the departments, with a pos si ble secondary 
approach through the sub- committee on curriculum of the Undergraduate 
Faculty Council.” The subgroups working on other issues  were referred to the 
appropriate university administrative channels.41
During this time, Knight seemed completely out of the loop on the issues 
raised by Black students. In late October, Provost Cole had seen a note from 
Knight suggesting the “appointment of a committee to look into the develop-
ment and experiences of the Negro undergraduate at Duke.” In his reply, Cole 
reminded Knight of the informal ad hoc committee chaired by Griffith that 
“has [already] been functioning in this area” and suggested waiting for a re-
port from that group before appointing another committee. Knight responded 
that Cole “was absolutely right about the informal committee. All I want,” 
he added, “is to make sure that we are ahead of our own black students in 
working with the puzzles of their position  here.”42 Why and how Knight saw 
 these issues as “puzzles” says much about his grasp of the concerns that Black 
students had presented to the university.
On the same day that Griffith’s ad hoc committee would meet for a third 
time, a separate committee of faculty members chaired by po liti cal science 
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professor J. Harris Proctor (Proctor Committee) met for the first time to 
“consider the desirability of developing a proposal for . . .  African and Afro- 
American Studies at the gradu ate level at Duke University.” Although the 
initial focus of the Proctor Committee was a gradu ate program, the group 
would also eventually begin to explore a secondary priority—an undergradu-
ate program in African and Afro-American studies. No students served on 
the Proctor Committee, nor  were they consulted about what a gradu ate or 
undergraduate program in Black studies might look like. Indeed, since the 
university made no announcement about the formation of the Proctor Com-
mittee, students  were unaware of its very existence.43
The ad hoc committee reconvened on November 4 to receive reports 
from a number of subgroups. Pro gress was reported on at least some is-
sues. Cell told participants that in a meeting with Robert H. Ballantyne, 
the director of admissions had explained the challenges Duke had faced 
in recruiting Black students and asked for a list “at once” of  people willing 
to devote time to the proj ect. From that list, one or two students would 
be selected to accompany Ballantyne on  future recruiting trips, where 
appropriate. Likewise, Watson and Axam reported a productive meeting 
with the university’s assistant librarian, who pointed out that the library 
already subscribed to some of the newspapers and periodicals requested 
and agreed to order  others.44
McLeod and Cell also offered an encouraging report on their meeting with 
Knight. The president, according to Cell, was “genuine in his concern” about 
the issues raised by Black students. Knight made clear, however, that outside 
funding would be required for initiatives like Black studies to be implemented. 
His ability to make concessions, he told them, was severely  limited by internal 
bud getary and po liti cal pressures. “Knight . . .  was a good man,” Cell believed. 
“He wanted to do the right  thing.” But  others, like Harold Lewis, vice provost 
and dean of Arts and Sciences, was one of the “very hard- nosed administra-
tors” Knight had to deal with. “Lewis . . .  was reluctant to do anything,” Cell 
recounted. “He  didn’t think Black studies was  going anywhere.” In addition 
to colleagues like Lewis, Knight felt that he had to deal with “ silent, perhaps 
unspoken opposition, but opposition you knew would be  there.” Still, he failed 
to acknowledge his own accountability for the slow pro gress. Samuel DuBois 
Cook saw this as a failure of presidential leadership. “It goes back to the presi-
dent,” he said. Cook saw Knight as “ambivalent” on the issues raised by the 
students and thought that “had he been more committed to” them, pro gress 
could have been made more quickly.45
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On other issues,  little headway was made. McLeod and Hopkins  were un-
able to persuade the Duke bands to voluntarily stop playing “ Dixie” or dis-
playing the Confederate flag.  After much back and forth, the band voted “not 
to decide” on the issues, effectively retaining the ability to continue existing 
practices. “ People  couldn’t understand the request,” Hopkins commented. 
As for a Black adviser, Lewis reported that the university “could not create 
an official position at this time,” although several interim alternatives  were 
discussed.46
The greatest amount of time was spent discussing the most difficult and 
impor tant issue— development of a Black studies program. As at many other 
campuses, this proved to be an extraordinarily difficult issue to navigate. Black 
studies, according to historian Martha Biondi, “arrived like an explosion on 
the American scene.” In the fall of 1968, focus on the idea was still new. The 
first Black studies program had only been established at San Francisco State 
College in the fall of 1966. Harvard’s announcement that it would move to 
create a Black studies department— seen by Ballard as conferring the “im-
primatur of academic respectability” on the new discipline— did not occur 
 until January 1969. Moreover,  there was  little ideological consensus on what 
a Black studies program would entail. “Some colleges choose to emphasize 
Pan- Africanism,” Ballard described, “ others the Black experience in Amer-
i ca, still  others concentrated on con temporary Black life in urban areas, while 
some programs  were deep into ‘Third Worldism.’ ” What ever the focus, “Black 
students, faculty, and administrators worked to infuse Black studies with the 
Black Power ideology,” education professor Joy Ann Williamson explained. 
Civil rights activist and scholar Vincent Harding has said that  these programs 
 were “proudly, openly pro- Black, and recognized predominantly white uni-
versities as part of [a problematic] American po liti cal structure.”47
As they considered demands for a Black studies program, Ballard ob-
served, faculty and administrators at white universities encountered what he 
described as “a complex set of prob lems.” According to Ballard, they had to 
address “serious doubt . . .  that any such body of knowledge as ‘Black studies’ 
existed,” concerns that “the program would be highly politicized and doc-
trinaire, . . .  fear . . .  that the quality of the programs would be inferior since 
 there was a severe shortage of scholars . . .  trained in the discipline,” and “con-
cern over dangers to academic freedom implicit in the student demands for 
complete autonomy of the program.” “Black studies was seen by many,” Biondi 
summarized, “as an academically suspect, antiwhite, emotional intrusion into 
a landscape of rigor and reason.”48
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 These dynamics complicated the conversations between Duke professors 
and subgroup members on Black studies. Although Cell found his meeting 
with Becton and economics professor John Blackburn “encouraging and pro-
ductive,” clear differences soon emerged. Blackburn suggested an economics 
course with a “theoretical” approach, looking at how economic systems  ought 
to work and what happens when racial prejudice and discrimination are added 
to the mix. Becton wanted a curriculum that covered specific conditions in 
the “ghetto” (such as loan sharking, price fixing, and job discrimination) along 
with practical responses. Blackburn “strongly oppose[d]” offering any course 
without a prerequisite of three hours of introductory economics. Without such 
background, he said, any course would be “second-rate” and “have  little interest” 
in the department.  Because economics, like other departments, operated by 
committee, Blackburn indicated that the next step would be for Cell and Bec-
ton to talk with the “departmental committee on undergraduate curriculum.”49
Other differences arose in a meeting between subgroup members Axam 
and Watson and po liti cal science professors John Hallowell and Samuel Cook. 
Axam advocated for a po liti cal science course dealing with Black  people in 
American politics and taught by a Black professor. While supportive of a 
course in which Black politics would be studied in the context of American 
politics, the two professors thought the topic could be addressed in the intro-
ductory po liti cal science course or in the existing course Groups in American 
Politics. Hallowell strongly resisted the idea that only a Black professor could 
teach the course. According to Watson, “Hallowell stated that it was impor-
tant to recognize the requirements of po liti cal science as a discipline . . .  and 
that it should not be necessary to be black in order to teach black politics.” 
For Hallowell, the principal criteria for se lection “should be the academic 
qualifications for a par tic u lar position.” That said, Hallowell indicated that 
the department would welcome suggestions of available teaching candidates 
“contingent upon the availability of funds and an appraisal by the Department 
of the academic qualifications of the candidate.”50
Differences of opinion on Black studies also arose at the November 4 meet-
ing of the ad hoc committee. In discussing a proposed Black history course, 
Hopkins stressed the importance of a Black professor, arguing that a Black 
person would be better able to speak “from the real ity of the situation.” One 
faculty member on the committee responded sharply that “it is not the pur-
pose of the historian to solve identity crises.” A report to the board of trustees 
accurately summarized the uncertain status of discussions on Black stud-
ies. “The department chairmen  were receptive to the curriculum requests,” 
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it commented, “but their response was restricted by the lack of precise clarity 
in stating what was desired, [as well as] by the lack of funds, the lack of ex-
pertise, the lack of time . . .  required to develop the courses, and the lack of 
authority to make an outright commitment.” An administration report called 
the Black students’ response to  these developments “somewhat negative”—an 
understatement.51
Still, the November 4 meeting was civil. Administrators and faculty  were 
encouraged, believing that the members of the aas saw pro gress, however in-
cremental, on the twelve concerns that they had presented weeks  earlier. Black 
students, on the other hand, had a very diff er ent take on the sessions. Hop-
ing for resolution of their concerns “as quickly as pos si ble,” they found them-
selves navigating an increasingly complicated bureaucratic maze with no end 
in sight. Capturing the frustration and growing alienation felt in the pro cess, 
Hopkins told the ad hoc committee that Black students found it “humiliating 
to plead for our humanity.”52
To be sure, some issues did end up being resolved before Christmas break. 
Huestis committed to the university hiring a barber able to cut the hair of the 
Black students. Griffith found dedicated office space for the Afro- American 
Society. The university agreed to provide financial support for Black Week.53
The controversy over “ Dixie” and the Confederate flag was also resolved. 
Facing pushback from students, band members, and alumni, Griffith stepped 
in. “I met with the officers of the marching band” and told them not to play 
“ Dixie,” Griffith remembered.  Later, when the band again balked, he was even 
more direct. “I fi nally said, ‘Look—we can talk about this all day,’ ” Griffith 
recounted. “As long as you are the Duke Marching Band, you  aren’t  going to 
play ‘ Dixie.’ ” Although no formal university ban on the playing of “ Dixie” 
was ever  adopted, the band “voluntarily” agreed not to play the song.54
By contrast, the university stalled on the students’ request for a Black ad-
viser. Dean Price had said that hiring such an adviser would involve three 
steps. “First, the administration must be receptive and sympathetic  towards 
the idea,” he explained. “Second,  there must be sufficient funds to pay the sal-
ary. Third, the right man must be found.” “The administration is hopeful that 
a black advisor can be found,” the Duke Chronicle summarized, “but it is still 
too concerned with the prob lems of finding the money and the man to express 
much optimism.”55
In early December, Cell completed a draft proposal to fund Black studies 
and implement other changes at the university requested by the Black stu-
dents. The proposal was ambitious. Cell wrote,
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If Duke is to meet the challenges posed by  these students, it must do so on 
a massive scale and within a special, enlarged framework. The students are 
asking for something big, exciting, and expensive, something far larger than 
they themselves  imagined at the outset. Duke cannot solve  these prob lems 
by means of the adjustment of this or that social regulation, by the appoint-
ment of a part- time counselor, or by a  couple of additions to our list of 
courses. The prob lems demand a comprehensive, well- financed program.
Cell proposed that the university seek $600,000 in outside funding to be 
spent over a three- year period on a summer program, new faculty, scholar-
ships, a Black adviser, library support, and cultural events or ga nized by the 
Afro- American Society. As he had promised, Cell circulated the draft to Hop-
kins and other Black students on the ad hoc committee.56
In fact, Cell received no comments on the draft proposal. “The students 
and I  were supposed to get back together and discuss [the] document,” Cell 
recounted. “They  were to criticize it, react to it, and then we would draw up 
one that represented what we all thought. That never happened. It  wasn’t that 
I  didn’t ask them. They just  didn’t do it.”57 In late December, Cell de cided that 
he could not wait for student comments any longer. “We are just not  going 
to be able to count on” the students, he told Griffith. “We are just  going to 
have to go ahead.” On December 30, 1968, Griffith sent Cell’s draft proposal to 
Knight, the other members of the ad hoc committee, and the Provost Group. 
“The Afro- American Society has some further suggestions regarding this pro-
posal,” Griffith informed Knight, “but they  will not be forthcoming  until  after 
examinations due to the press of academic work at this time.”58
From mid- December to early February,  little contact occurred between the 
aas and the administration on any of the issues.59 When students returned 
in mid- January from Christmas break, exams and planning for Black Week 
occupied most of their time. As a result,  there was no pro gress on critical 
concerns like Black studies, the Black adviser, the summer program, and dedi-
cated housing on campus for Black students. Knight had also not announced 
any decision on his Hope Valley membership and remained a member of the 
club.
During the period from October 1968 to early February 1969, fundamen-
tally diff er ent perceptions of the negotiating pro cess began to emerge. For 
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administrators, the view was positive. “I thought it was very clear in  these 
meetings,” Griffith observed, “that communication was occurring.” Cell de-
scribed the meetings as “extremely informative and educational,” comment-
ing that “both groups have learned something.” Knight had the same sense. 
“We  were  going along steadily settling” the issues, he recounted. Many in the 
administration believed that the university was making a serious effort to ad-
dress the Black students’ concerns. “The administration has repeatedly taken 
the initiative in attempting to define the concerns of our black students,” Ash-
more reported to the board of trustees, and “diligent efforts have been made 
to understand and meet these needs within the framework of the established 
policies and procedures of the University.”60
The view of the aas was starkly diff er ent. “We  were getting nothing done 
in the meetings,” Hopkins described. “We  were missing each other. It’s almost 
like they  didn’t realize what we  were saying, although we  were sitting  there 
saying stuff to them.” Although the university might have believed that it was 
taking the initiative in addressing Black students’ concerns, the students saw it 
differently. “I  don’t think the university had  really come to terms with what it 
meant, practically speaking, to have a significant Black student population on 
the campus,” Turner observed. “Their lack of . . .  responsiveness,” C. G. New-
some explained, “signaled to us that they did not see us, they did not hear us,” 
and “that they considered us non- persons.”61
 These profoundly diff er ent perceptions arose  because the negotiations— 
the first substantive discussions between the university and its Black stu-
dents since desegregation— had primarily served to highlight the differences 
between the parties, not narrow them. “We  were talking about institutional 
change,” Hopkins explained. “We  were talking about new courses, changing 
courses. And that’s where Watson and Durden sat back and said, ‘We are a top 
school in the nation. What are you talking about—we are  here to teach you. 
You have critiqued us and said that we are lacking in something.’ ”62
To Janice Williams, the university’s attitude was “ ‘This is a plantation and 
it runs real smoothly and nobody makes waves. . . .  By you making waves, you 
bring attention to this university, to this administration.  You’re actually mak-
ing  people question us.’ ” Turner saw the university’s attitude as patronizing 
and dismissive. “We have brought you from your impoverished, underprivi-
leged, deprived conditions,” he  imagined university officials thinking. “What 
 else do you want? Why keep being a nuisance? Just be nice and appreciate 
what’s been done for you.” “We  were saying we wanted Black courses,” Hop-
kins recounted, “and Durden and somebody  else was sitting  there saying ‘we 
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already have this.’ ” For some in the history department, according to Hopkins, 
a course was a Black history course even if it only “mentioned Black  people” 
and then only “the proper Black  people.” The university’s position, Hopkins 
recalled, was “that basically  there was  really nothing much wrong with Duke, 
so it  wasn’t a real open dialogue.” Looking back, Hopkins realized, “we  weren’t 
talking about the kind of stuff they  were talking about.”63
Friction arose even when the university responded favorably on an issue. 
“The [discussion] that sticks in my mind was the . . .  hiring of a Black ad-
viser,” Kerckhoff recalled. “Marcus Hobbs had said two or three times that 
‘the university is committed to this.’ ” For Hobbs,  these words meant that the 
hiring of a Black adviser was “ going to happen, in due time.” Despite  these as-
surances, however, the students kept returning to the issue. Fi nally, Kerckhoff 
remembered, “one gal . . .  just exploded. . . .  ‘We  don’t care about that, we 
want to know is it  going to happen?’ Hobbs felt he had said that. He just sort 
of looked startled at her  because it never occurred to him that anyone could 
have interpreted his words in any other way than ‘Yes, it’s  going to happen.’ ” 
“Clearly the difference between the soft, academic, bureaucratic, cloudy way 
of saying  things,” Kerckhoff explained, “and the hard- nosed- demand  kind 
of language was a part of the  whole difficulty of communication.” University 
assistant registrar Clark R. Cahow characterized interactions between the 
university and the aas even more succinctly. “If ever  there was a gap in com-
munication,” he commented, “ there was one  here that was as broad as the 
 Grand Canyon.”64
Most fundamentally, differences arose  because faculty and administrators 
did not share the fierce urgency the students  were feeling. “Insensitivity was 
a basic part of it,” Cook explained. “I’m sure that [administrators and faculty] 
just thought . . .  the situation would go away, that the students would get tired 
of it [and] forget about pushing their demands.” “The amazing  thing is how we 
 were actually missing each other,” Hopkins remembered.
They never realized how intense we felt about  things we  were talking 
about. . . .  With us, it was an everyday  thing. . . .  But they  were . . .  like they 
 were off somewhere and comfortable. It was like they  were dealing with 
another university to have some kind of a collective curriculum. They  were 
just easy, in a very gentlemanly fashion, scholars taking their time. They 
 were on a totally diff er ent kind of time frame than we  were. And when I 
look back on it, they  didn’t realize that. I  don’t see how they escaped it, but 
they  couldn’t pick up the intense feelings we had about this stuff.65
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In retrospect, members of the administration had clearly failed to see the 
missed signals. “Around me the attitude was ‘what’s the hurry?’ ” Knight re-
membered. “None of us understood their urgencies.” “Circumstances  were 
beyond the insight of any of us right at that point,” he concluded. “And our 
efforts, as a result, went awry.” “I  don’t know what the barrier was,” Watson re-
called. “In one way or another we  weren’t able to convince [the Black students] 
that we  were seriously interested [in solving their prob lems].” “We  were liv-
ing entirely diff er ent times, diff er ent rhythms, diff er ent cycles,” Cell observed 
wistfully. “I was trying to work to use a power structure that I know a  little 
about. . . .  I  don’t think they  were ever in that game at all.”66
Without a common view of events and issues, differences hardened. 
Griffith’s “perception” was that they  were not meeting in good faith, he ex-
plained. “I certainly felt [that they  didn’t want an agreement]  after a time.” 
Even when the university would make concessions, “they would never recog-
nize that we had done that,” Griffith recounted. “That was one of the frustra-
tions.” Cell questioned the failure of the aas to comment on his draft funding 
proposal for a Black studies program. “I still  don’t know how much of that was 
sloppiness . . .  and how much of it was just tactics,” Cell recalled. “By tactics, I 
mean . . .  the effect of that was to paralyze the administration . . .  in the three 
or four months before the Black consciousness reached its crescendo. I  don’t 
know if [Knight and  others] would have done anything. But the effect of this 
was to paralyze efforts in November, December, [and] early January.” It was 
“not pos si ble . . .  to make any pro gress” from mid- December through early 
February, Ashmore told the board, “ because black students  were not available 
for the kind of direct involvement they had consistently requested.”67
For members of the aas, it seemed clear that the university could not—or 
would not— take their concerns seriously. Despite movement in a number of 
areas, the most significant issues the students had raised  were bogged down 
in university committees that seemed unable to cut through bureaucratic red 
tape, let alone respond to the existential crisis the students  were now experi-
encing. Even where issues like the Black adviser or summer transition pro-
gram  were agreed to in concept, the students could not trust that the univer-
sity would implement them in a way that met their needs.
“Soon it got around,” Hopkins recalled, “to the  thing where we said, ‘Hey, 
we got to do something about this to get them to respond.’ ”68
CHAPTER 7
Now They Know, and They  Ain’t Gonna Do
Planning
On February 12, 1969, members of Duke’s Afro- American Society (aas) final-
ized plans for the takeover of key areas of the Allen Building— the administra-
tive hub of Duke University. Although unaware of  these specific plans, some 
administrators and faculty close to the situation had begun to view such a 
confrontation as unavoidable. History professor John Cell, as close to Duke’s 
Black students as any faculty member, saw a “sudden, swift, astonishing trans-
formation . . .  among the [Black] students” in January and February 1969. 
Black student participation in committee meetings had ceased. Instead, “ there 
was a lot of talk of revolution, [and] a lot of anger.” “I honestly do not think,” 
Cell remarked, “that . . .  there was any way that the takeover of Allen Build-
ing could have been prevented.” Assistant dean of Arts and Sciences William 
Griffith also saw the Black students carried along by historical forces they 
could not—or would not— resist. “I think they  were living out an inevitability 
across the country,” he commented, “that you  didn’t gain your . . .  ‘mantle of 
Blackness,’  until  you’ve taken over a building. I sort of felt this was their com-
ing of age.”1
It was clear by early 1969 that support among Black students for direct 
action was growing. They believed that a targeted protest would trigger an 
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immediate, definitive response to their demands from the university. How-
ever, to characterize the confrontation that occurred as inevitable indicates 
how out of touch even sympathetic Duke administrators and faculty members 
 were with the Black students who  were finalizing protest plans. In fact, for 
 these students, the decision to occupy the Allen Building was an agonizing 
one. Brenda Armstrong remembered the first meeting when a takeover was 
discussed. “It was more like a sensitivity session,” she recalled. “Every body 
talked about their fears. . . .  The fact that although we needed to do it, [we] 
 weren’t sure [we]  were  doing the right  thing.” “A lot of  people  were frightened,” 
Armstrong recounted. “Me included.”2
Some students consulted their parents, though  these conversations often 
only deepened their anxiety and inner conflict. “I was scared, and I had talked 
with my  mother,” Brenda Brown said. “She was very upset. In fact, she packed 
up and went to California. She de cided she just  wasn’t  going to bother about 
me and my militant ways. . . .  She felt like that  wasn’t why she and my  father 
sent me to Duke. . . .  She just  didn’t feel like that was the way to do it. She felt 
like we had been watching too many takeovers on tv.” “It might not be the way 
to do it,” Brown told her  mother, “but this is the way the majority wants to do 
it, and I feel like I’m part of the group.” Brown’s  mother asked: “Why  couldn’t 
you just go get your education and get out of  there? Why do you have to cause 
all this ruckus?”3
For parents, their  children’s physical safety was a paramount concern. “A 
lot of [parents]— most of them— were afraid of the fact that the campus was 
ripe for us to be attacked or assaulted,” Armstrong explained, “not just in ver-
bal ways but physically. My  mother, although she herself was an activist . . . 
did not want her  children to have to grow up that way.” William Turner re-
called that his  father “wanted the best for his sons and  daughters.” Like other 
parents, he had seen firsthand the consequences that activism could have. 
“ There  were many parents who marched in the ’50s and early ’60s that had 
the same fear for their  children,” Turner explained. “It  wasn’t that they  didn’t 
want what their  children wanted. It’s that [they knew] their  children . . .  could 
be severely threatened by lethal contacts with the law. . . .  And they  were right. 
We had folks [in the civil rights movement] who  were beaten, battered, killed, 
bludgeoned, or who had their  futures tarnished.”4
Why then did this group of Duke students decide to put aside their doubts 
and fears and occupy Duke’s main administration building? How  were they 
able to overcome the grave concerns of parents who feared that such an action 
could derail their  children’s  future plans and expose them to physical harm? 
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How did Duke administrators understand the unfolding events and what role 
did race play in shaping their perceptions? Events of late 1968 and early 1969 
begin to reveal the answers.
All students who participated in the Allen Building takeover came to the 
decision to act in their own way, operating in an environment fraught with 
tension, where national, local, and personal  factors  were powerfully converg-
ing. “The  thing you have to understand,” Black student leader Chuck Hopkins 
noted, “is that the times  were such that the  things that  were happening in and 
around campus, in the local community, the stuff that was happening nation-
ally, the militant sixties— all of that stuff was bearing in [on us]. . . .  It was all 
of  those  things that kind of set the general consciousness level.”5
National events provided one context for the rapidly escalating Black 
student activism on Duke’s campus in early 1969. Indeed, it was during this 
period that the Black campus movement was reaching its zenith across the 
country. “With the onset of Black Power, the urban uprisings in such cities 
as Detroit and Los Angeles, and the increasing enrollment of Black students 
at white institutions,” wrote education professor Joy Ann Williamson, “Black 
student activism turned  toward their own institutions, and Black student 
 activism grew.” “Dozens of white colleges  were . . .  disturbed by blacks demand-
ing a more relevant education in November and December of 1968,” Ibram X. 
Kendi observed. Schools as varied as University of Mas sa chu setts– Amherst, 
Bluefield State, Fordham University, Brown University, University of Wiscon-
sin, Case Western Reserve, and the University of San Francisco saw significant 
protests. Moreover, “Black students on white campuses became the vanguard 
of the student protest movement,” Williamson explained. She reported that 
Black students  were involved in 57  percent of campus protests at predomi-
nantly white institutions during the 1968–69 academic year.6
Administrators and faculty at Duke looked at Black student protests roil-
ing campuses across the nation and saw an ominous pattern. “Our students 
sought out movement leaders,” Knight wrote, “and Duke in turn was sought 
out. In this way we became a target university—in many ways the target 
university— for the Southeast.” Cell agreed. “I knew  there was . . .  a national 
Black students’ conspiracy,” Cell noted. “That’s clear,  isn’t it?” For support, Cell 
pointed to comments made to him by aas member Michael McBride  after 
returning from the November 1968  Towards a Black University conference 
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held at Howard University and attended by two thousand students. “I know 
 there was a meeting to which our  people sent representatives and delegates,” 
Cell recalled. McBride “came back and I remember . . .  he said: ‘Well,  things 
are  going to be shaking this year.’ ”7
“Allen Building was  there in all of our minds,” Hopkins explained, “ because 
it was happening all over the country.” Moreover, escalating events at other 
campuses created a “pressure to act.” But  there was no or ga nized Black stu-
dent conspiracy, according to Armstrong. Rather, it was like a “contagion,” 
she explained. “The media had helped to put the . . .  grievances of vari ous 
Black [student] groups in the fore . . .  and that  whole aura of student activism 
was on the scene.  There was not a unified effort among any of the schools to 
pull this off at the same time.” Instead, Armstrong recounted, this was “the 
simultaneous expression of the dissatisfaction that Black students  were feel-
ing.” Williamson agreed, noting that no “umbrella organ ization coordinating 
protest on several individual campuses” existed.8
Still, the absence of a “conspiracy” did not mean Duke’s Black students 
acted in isolation. “Students on vari ous campuses,” Williamson explained, 
“talked to one another about strategy, published their demands in one an-
other’s newspapers, and even travelled to one another’s campuses for support.” 
 These interactions led to similar events occurring on diff er ent campuses, even 
if they did not reflect conscious collaboration. “No  matter where they  were 
located,” Williamson wrote, “Black students demanded similar concessions 
from administrators and used a common ideology to understand their role 
in the Black liberation strug gle.” This was true for the Black students at Duke. 
“We had made connections at Cornell, at Prince ton, and at Berkeley,” Arm-
strong recalled. “Once we had a chance to figure out we had the same issues, 
we felt empowered that we  weren’t stupid and that we  weren’t isolated.” Not 
only did Duke students learn from events at other schools, but,  because the 
university was a “southern, very traditional school,” the impact of develop-
ments at Duke was all the more significant.  People said, according to Arm-
strong, “if it works [at Duke], maybe it  will work at Cornell.”9
Given this context, Cell was mistaken in concluding that the Howard 
University conference in November 1968 was part of a national conspiracy 
among Black students. According to Kendi, the  Towards a Black University 
conference attended by Duke representatives in November 1968 was “quite 
possibly the most activism- inducing” program held during the period. Yet 
even with Stokely Carmichael imploring the two thousand student attend-
ees “to quit talking and start acting,” the conference was only one piece of 
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a much larger picture. “I’m sure [the meeting in Washington] . . .  did have 
an impact,” Hopkins stated. “But Duke’s Black students  didn’t have to go to 
Washington [ because]  there was stuff happening in Durham. Howard Fuller 
was  here. Neighborhood organ izations  were protesting. . . .  So the Washing-
ton [conference] was . . .  not a turning point. . . .  It was just one . . .  part of a 
 whole activist era.”10
Events in the local Durham community  were impor tant for Duke students. 
Since desegregation, Duke’s Black students had found purpose and ac cep tance 
through their work with Durham community organ izations and local po liti-
cal activities. Some  were active in the local ymca or the Durham Big  Sister 
program, while  others participated in voter registration. A number of Duke’s 
Black students, including Hopkins, participated in a community- based sum-
mer internship program sponsored by the Foundation for Community Devel-
opment  under the direction of Fuller. “This involvement” in the community, 
Hopkins explained, “created a new atmosphere of cooperation between Black 
college students and neighborhood  people. During this time, Black students 
at Duke underwent some impor tant ideological changes,” he noted. “The stu-
dents began to think and talk about [the] relevance of the entire educational 
pro cess to the needs of the Black community. They concluded that the pro cess 
as it exists is, in fact, irrelevant.”11
Fuller’s role in all this was impor tant as well as misunderstood by many. 
By 1967, with his organ izing efforts in Durham, Fuller had become the most 
vis i ble Black activist in North Carolina. Adopting the ideology, terminology, 
and tactics of Black Power, he became identified as a leader of the local move-
ment. Duke’s Black students  were among  those who felt a strong connection 
to Fuller, who was not only a bridge to Durham’s Black community but also 
an experienced sounding board and adviser.
The white community, however, viewed Fuller differently. In his memoir, 
Fuller wrote that by late 1967, he was “one of the most hated Black men in 
North Carolina in certain circles of white  people with power.” “To them,” 
Fuller described, “I was an ‘outside agitator’ stirring up discontent wherever I 
went.” For their part, Durham’s newspapers referred to Fuller as a “Negro ac-
tivist,” “militant,” “Black Power Advocate,” “revolutionary,” and an “Advocate 
of the destruction of the Cap i tal ist system.”12
Most Duke faculty and administrators embraced this negative view of 
Fuller. They also believed that he played a critical role in shaping the tac-
tics that Duke’s Black students employed in dealing with the university. 
“Clearly, they turned to [Fuller] as one who knew how to do  things,” Alan 
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Kerckhoff commented. Fuller “clearly was attempting to foment some-
thing,” he cynically observed. “When one  thing failed, he seemed to turn 
to another.” In the view of law school dean Kenneth Pye, it was incon-
ceivable that Duke’s Black students arrived at the decision to occupy the 
Allen Building on their own. Pye felt that “only someone who wanted to 
exacerbate the [Duke] situation for broader po liti cal purposes . . .  would 
have recommended” a takeover. Pye saw Fuller particularly as giving the 
students “bad advice.” The Black students, in Pye’s analy sis,  were “suscep-
tible to  people [like Fuller] who had a quite dif fer ent agenda than reform-
ing the university.”13
Duke’s Black students acknowledge that Fuller was impor tant to them. 
Still, he did not, as administrators  imagined, play a key role in directing 
events. Fuller “did nothing to suggest a course of action,” Charles Becton re-
ported. “The decision to sit-in at the president’s office, to picket Hope Valley 
Country Club, to march to the president’s  house, and to take over the Allen 
Building  were made in meetings . . .  without Howard being pre sent,” he ex-
plained. Fuller “did not instigate any of this.” Indeed, Hopkins said that Fuller 
was “totally out of ” the decision to occupy the Allen Building. Duke students 
informed Fuller “ after we had made the decision.” The Black leader “had ab-
solutely no part.”14
Why then  were Duke faculty and administrators so ready to believe that 
outsiders  were responsible for Black student activism at Duke? One explana-
tion is provided by historian Jason Sokol, who saw a similar readiness on the 
part of white southerners to blame Black activism in the civil rights move-
ment on a communist conspiracy. “White southerners continued to equate 
attacks on remnants of segregation with communist conspiracies,” Sokol ob-
served, “ because red cries fit snugly into their traditional racial views. Anti- 
communism occupied the place it did  because of its unique ability to explain 
changes in African- Americans, and to do so in ways that reinforced rather 
than disrupted ste reo types. Black southerners  were happy, docile, and sus-
ceptible to manipulation, many whites believed. When they suddenly looked 
or ga nized, discontented, and autonomous in the 1960s, whites attributed it to 
a communist plan.”15
Similarly, at Duke, by attributing Black campus activism to external forces, 
administrators and faculty  were able to maintain their view that Black students 
lacked the agency, intelligence, and skill to plan a sophisticated protest. “They 
never gave us credit,” Armstrong observed, for “the brilliance in the planning 
for Allen Building.”16 By adopting such a perspective, university officials  were 
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also able to blame Black activism on external forces rather than the failure of 
the school to exercise responsible leadership on racial  matters.
Against the backdrop of national and local events, the focus on Black 
Power ideology grew more intense among Black campus activists. “No gen-
eration of students,” Kendi wrote, “read more po liti cal lit er a ture than  these 
black campus activists.” “I read every thing I could find by Black authors,” 
Becton recalled. His racial consciousness evolved as he read books like The 
Wretched of the Earth by Frantz Fanon as well as works by James Baldwin and 
Dick Gregory. “For a while I  didn’t go to class,” Turner remembered. “I just 
sat around and read. . . .  I almost flunked out.” “I’m willing to . . .  say,” Becton 
recounted, “that  every ju nior and se nior [who participated in the Allen Build-
ing takeover] had read fifteen books on Black awareness and had a good idea 
about what it takes to get what you want.”17
Issues raised in  these books  were dissected and debated for hours. “We 
would always stay up at night talking,” Hopkins recalled. “I was saying stuff 
about our situation at Duke and our situation in this country.” “I still see that 
 house on Cornwallis,” Turner commented wistfully fifty years  later. “We  were 
laying up in that  house, reading and rapping and talking, discussing.”18
In  these interactions, Biondi explained, “students began using a new lan-
guage: embracing ‘revolution’ and ‘revolt,’ questioning ‘working within the 
system’ and openly challenging the ‘white power structure.’ ” The strategy of 
nonviolent protest also came  under intense scrutiny. A study of Black high 
school students conducted in 1970, Biondi reported, determined that “nearly 
half of the activists agreed with the statement [that] ‘vio lence is cleansing,’ as 
did more than a third of the non activists.” Just as significant, the study found 
that “only 7  percent of all the Black students thought that whites could be ‘per-
suaded’ to change.” Still, despite the new terminology of “revolution,” Biondi 
insisted that at most campuses, “even as students embraced many aspects of 
Black nationalism, they remained non violent in both theory and practice.” 
Kendi agreed. “Most activists seem to have been moderates,” he observed, 
“juggling (and separating) the politico- cultural strug gle with their academic 
and social lives, while also ideologically juggling radical and liberal thoughts, 
socialist and cap i tal ist ideas, the desire to work in and outside of the ‘system,’ 
protest tactics with negotiations, . . .  and optimism and pessimism for Ameri-
can institutions.”19
The cumulative impact of national, local, and ideological  factors remained 
transformative. “The attempt was [made] to put us in our place,” Armstrong 
recalled, to tell us “that we  were not good enough to come to Duke. . . .  Most 
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[of] us came from schools and families that  were so strong and came from 
such traditions of surviving,” she explained, “that we thought they  were 
crazy. We did not feel the least bit intimidated by them. . . .  It was empower-
ing,” she recounted. “I  wasn’t the same person by 1969,” Turner remembered. 
“I  wasn’t the same person as when I came. I  wasn’t reading the same  things. I 
 wasn’t having the same conversations.” For Turner, the transformation had a 
power ful religious dimension. He explained:
You have a generation of young [ people] that are involved in some serious, 
serious existential conflicts. What does it feel like to wake up one morn-
ing and realize every body you trust has been lying to you or speaking out 
of both sides of their mouth? You teach all of this wonderful stuff in Bible 
school and church and you come and arrange your society in an antitheti-
cal way. . . .  You got to live out what you know is a lie. You know it’s a lie. 
You feel it inside. The tension is palpable.  You’re talking about good Sunday 
school  children who took seriously what the . . .  preacher said.20
Triggered by events on campus, soon  these “good Sunday school  children” 
would be discussing strategies on how to force the university to respond con-
clusively to their concerns.
Returning to campus in January 1969, members of the aas received shocking 
news— approximately fifteen of eighty- two Black undergraduates had  either 
been dismissed from school for academic reasons or voluntarily dropped out 
of school following the fall semester. This equaled an 18  percent attrition rate 
for Black undergraduates  after one semester, twice the university’s overall an-
nual attrition rate of 9  percent.  Later in January, Griffith advised the Admin-
istrative Council that “11 of the 22 freshman black students in Trinity College 
had failed academically the first semester, and  others are barely holding on.”21
This accelerating attrition rate among Black students escalated tensions 
within the university dramatically. For one  thing, as Bertie Howard described, 
“ there  were a lot of  people we liked” in the group that was forced to leave. 
More broadly, the timing was problematic. “While  we’re in  there talking to 
them about some of the  things that  were happening,” Armstrong recalled in-
credulously, “ they’re out  there putting somebody out.” Hopkins remembered 
“Black students having to leave for academic reasons” as a “new [issue] that 
was inserted.  There  were strong feelings about it,” he recounted. “I had [Black] 
190 Chapter seven
students . . .  who had never participated in [the aas], who had never spoken 
to me, [come to me and say], ‘Chuck, we need to do something.’ ”22
Throughout January, the tempo of internal discussions accelerated among 
Black students. “Many of us  weren’t  going to classes,” Hopkins recalled. “It 
happened rapidly in terms of our consciousness.” Events on campus “began to 
move in rapid succession,” he wrote  later. “We met more frequently,” Brown 
said, and “it just generally escalated.” “The only reports [of negotiations] that 
we got  were of stalemate,” Turner remembered. “It seemed like  every time it was 
the same  thing over and over.” “We had presented demands and  hadn’t gotten 
any answer,” Brown recounted. “ People  were tired of [the] committees . . .  we 
 were sitting on.”23
In tandem with  these developments, plans for Black Week in early Febru-
ary  were being finalized. Since “Negro History Week” was first celebrated in 
1926, early February had been impor tant in the Black community as a time to 
focus on the study of African American history. Arriving at Duke, the school’s 
Black students found that the university’s all- white students, faculty, and ad-
ministrators did nothing to mark the special time. “Black History [Week] 
has always been . . .  part of our culture,” Janice Williams remembered. “They 
 weren’t  going to do anything,” she recalled bitterly.24 This omission became 
even more glaring in the late 1960s when Black student organ izations across 
the country began to or ga nize annual Black Cultural Weeks on campus.
Duke’s Black students had or ga nized their own small Black Cultural Week 
program in early 1968. In 1969 they undertook planning for a far more am-
bitious cele bration of Black history and culture. Scheduled for February 4 
through February 11, Black Week had two stated purposes. First, it provided 
an opportunity for Duke’s Black students to celebrate their history, culture, 
and identity. Second, the week was to “educate the whites at Duke,” the Duke 
Chronicle reported, “attempting to dispel their ignorance and myths about 
black culture and the demands of the black movement.” While the university 
paid the out- of- pocket costs for Black Week, all programming, scheduling, 
and logistics  were handled by Duke’s Black students.25
As Black Week approached, the aas was finalizing a “Ten- Point Program” 
laying out “What We Want and Why We Want It.” A combination of specific 
demands and more sweeping pronouncements, the program showed how 
much the thinking of  those in the aas had evolved since October 1968 when 
the group first met with university administrators to pre sent their “concerns.” 
The aas now demanded “the power to determine the basis for our educational 
environment,” calling any academic program not developed in tandem with 
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Black students “indoctrination.” Recognizing the “necessity for revolutionary 
change,” the aas wanted “an education which  will sustain the culture of black 
 people” while providing skills that would address “the needs of our  people in 
this racist society.” Asking for “an equitable repre sen ta tion of Black students at 
Duke,” the program called for the student body to be 29  percent Black by the 
fall of 1973. The ten- point program also included a call that the university “dis-
employ grading” in evaluating the academic achievement of Black students 
and support the strug gle of its nonacademic employees for “ unionization and 
liberation.” It demanded an end to “racist living conditions” on campus, “po-
lice harassment of Black students,” and “tokenism of Black repre sen ta tion in 
university power structures.”26
Reproduced in Harambee, a Black student– sponsored newspaper pub-
lished at the beginning of Black Week, the ten- point program of the aas 
addressed issues Black students had been facing at Duke for many years. 
In addition, the program set forth a number of new issues and demanded 
changes to the racial status quo that went well beyond prior discussions with 
the university. Historian Allen B. Ballard viewed Black student demands in 
this period from a historical perspective. “The Black students’ demands,” he 
wrote, “often from fewer than 50  people on a campus of 10,000— carried with 
them the weight of  every slight and injury suffered by Africans from the time 
they  were stolen from their ancestral villages.” “ Behind the . . .  demands,” he 
explained, “some clearly logical, some apparently absurd— lay a deeper unar-
ticulated demand: to be taken seriously as  human beings and to be treated as 
any respected  human being would be treated.” In retrospect, Knight appeared 
to grasp the message the demands communicated. “The nonnegotiable de-
mands often meant,” the Duke president wrote  later, “ ‘Hey, look at me. I want 
to talk as an equal, and I want to keep all of my differences intact. I want to be 
vis i ble to you as myself .’ ”27
Griffith was growing frustrated. “It seemed like the demands  were . . . 
always in a state of flux,” he recalled. “This was . . .  one of the prob lems we had 
in trying to deal with them. We would talk about one [demand] and then an-
other one would surface. And it was very hard to tie down what they wanted.”28
More broadly, as events  were unfolding, university administrators  were 
unable to comprehend— let alone respond to— the anguish and frustration 
the school’s Black students  were expressing. At a meeting of the Administra-
tive Council held on January 30, the group of se nior administrators received 
a report from Griffith on “requests from the Afro- American Student Group.” 
Griffith told the council that the ad hoc committee formed in October 1968 
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had “resolved several requests” and that “other prob lems are  under close con-
sideration.” He acknowledged, however, that the committee was “without pre-
rogative” to deal with the Black students’ more significant requests, includ-
ing  those seeking additional Black faculty members, more Black students, a 
Black student adviser, and summer and tutorial programs. Referring to the 
50  percent attrition rate experienced by Black freshmen following the fall 1968 
semester, Griffith warned that “frustrations are mounting.”29
Presiding over the Administrative Council, Knight remained unwilling to 
think outside the box in responding to Griffith’s report. Knight asked Duke 
provost Marcus Hobbs to “pursue the establishment of an advisory committee 
composed of Academic Council members to sit with Mr. Griffith in meet-
ings with students, including disadvantaged students, on non- academic af-
fairs.” Resisting demands that the university address the distinctive needs of 
Duke’s Black students, the committee agreed that the prob lems presented by 
the aas “involve all disadvantaged students, not just a special few, and  will be 
approached from this viewpoint.” Vice provost and dean of Arts and Sciences 
Harold W. Lewis appeared focused on optics. “We must show at least that 
some program is coming,” he told the group. Lewis suggested that “the most 
graceful way is that we have a committee . . .  to look at the academic situation 
of all students who have failed to make it this semester and why, and further, 
at what can we do to [get] them up to standard.”30
Rather than move  toward decisive action, Knight requested additional in-
formation. He asked the group to look into “(1) the academic prob lem and 
(2) the black student situation from the viewpoint of (a) what response to 
their situation have we already developed (b) the vis i ble committees for the 
continuation of our efforts (c) what have we done over the past several months 
and  whether this is the direction we want to move.” The administrators should 
come back to him, Knight said, in “all due haste.”31
On January 31, the aas held a forum on the quad to discuss the high at-
trition rate among Black students. According to the Duke Chronicle, nearly 
all of Duke’s Black students attended the forum, along with three hundred 
white students and professors. In “speech  after speech,” the Black students dis-
cussed the  causes of the high attrition rate. Among the  factors cited, the Duke 
Chronicle reported,  were “academic weakness, racism, cultural shock, hostil-
ity, difficulty in adjusting to dorm life, frustration and bigoted professors.”32
At the conclusion of the forum, a “pro gress report” on the aas demands 
was provided by Black student leaders along with a discussion of each. Lis-
tening to the report, Griffith heard no mention of pro gress the university 
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had made on issues like a Black barber, library holdings, dedicated office 
space for the aas, financial support for Black Week, and the playing of 
“ Dixie” at school events. Griffith felt he had no choice but to correct the 
rec ord. “At a forum on the quad,” he said  later, “I just went down item by 
item,  because I was  really so upset that they  were putting out material that 
was just untrue.” However, Griffith had no pro gress to report on key issues 
such as Black studies, recruitment of Black faculty, and the president’s Hope 
Valley membership.33
Many Duke administrators and faculty now perceived the school’s Black 
students as more interested in confrontation than in effectuating change. “It 
was more for disruption than wanting any par tic u lar  thing,” Hobbs com-
mented. “If you agreed in one area, it was immediately upgraded— you needed 
to acquiesce in another two or three.” Some of the protesters, Hobbs believed, 
“wanted to run the university.” “I was convinced that [the takeover] was just 
an inevitability,” Griffith recollected. “I do believe that if we had opened up 
and said, ‘ We’ll do anything you want us to do’ [a confrontation still] would 
have happened.” “I  don’t think the Black students  were interested in . . .  an 
agreement,” Cell commented. “They  were presenting demands for the pur-
pose of creating a confrontation. The end was not the Black studies program 
or this or that concession.  These  were means; the end was a confrontation 
with a university that very much needed to be confronted. I’m not quarrelling 
with that. Except that this was very difficult to deal with. In fact, impossible 
to deal with.”34
As for the Black students,  after the January 31 forum, their internal discus-
sions began to increasingly focus on a takeover of the Allen Building. No ac-
tion, however, was imminent. “We de cided,” Armstrong explained, “to see if 
Black Week would loosen  things up.”35
When Knight had learned of the Black students’ request that the university 
support Black Week in October 1968, he responded that  there was “obvi-
ously some dynamite” in such a prospect.36 With Black Week now only days 
away, Knight tried to mitigate the destructive force he feared the event would 
generate.
First, Knight wrote the trustees, alerting them to the upcoming Beauty of 
Black symposium. He described the weeklong program and warned that the 
student publication Harambee would include student essays, “some of which 
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are expected to be critical of Duke” and “use language which  will be offen-
sive.” Knight reassured the trustees that no university funds had been used to 
produce Harambee. “A careful reading [of Harambee]  will tell us a good deal 
about what  these students feel,” he explained, “and we need to know.”37
At the same time, on February 4, Knight published a statement in the 
Duke Chronicle endorsing Black Week. Hoping to defuse growing anger, he 
used his comments to respond to a number of the Black students’ demands. 
Knight commended the aas for “providing opportunities to consider aspects 
of black American culture of which they are justifiably proud” and encour-
aged the entire university community to take full advantage of them. Acknowl-
edging both “genuine successes” and “undoubted failures” in the university’s 
dealings with its “minority group students,” Knight noted that some of the rec-
ommendations made by the aas in October 1968 had been approved “without 
delay” while  others “ will require careful study.” The Duke president announced 
steps designed to deal with the “disproportionate attrition of our black students,” 
including implementation of a summer transition program, appointment of an 
adviser to all minority groups, and identification of “ those students whom we 
have already lost” who might qualify for readmission following participation in 
the new summer program.38
Knight’s final announcement was by far the most difficult for him. Be-
cause “ there must be a clear commitment on the part of us all to the propo-
sition that this University is one place and one community,” Knight said, “as 
President of the University, I can no longer be a part of organ izations which 
practice racial discrimination.” On the same day, he advised the president 
of Hope Valley Country Club of his resignation, telling him that “I regret 
that this is made necessary by Club policy, and I retain genuine good  will 
for my many friends who have reached conclusions which differ from my 
own.” His withdrawal was an “insult” to club members, Knight said  later. 
“If you want to take something that called for real fortitude, that was a real 
winner.”39
While Knight  later characterized his Hope Valley resignation as “a  matter of 
conviction,” his decision- making pro cess was more complicated. Approached 
initially about his club membership in 1966, Knight had resisted repeated calls 
to resign  because he feared  doing so would weaken his position at Duke. “This 
was a very sharply defined issue,” he explained, “ because it involved what  were 
regarded as the social rights of  every member of the club. . . .  It was a devas-
tating  thing that I had to do. . . .  It called into question the judgment of all 
of the  people around me. It would have been a small fraction of 1  percent of 
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the  people around me who would have taken . . .  that position,” he concluded. 
“And yet it was the right one—so  there you are.”40
In public, Knight had defended his continued membership as neces-
sary to allow him to work from within the club to effectuate a change in its 
membership policy. “I think [Knight] had  really mixed emotions about that 
country club situation,” Griffith recounted. “He was caught pretty much be-
tween a rock and a hard place. . . .  He was not happy about the [Caucasian- 
only] clause being in  there [but] felt that if he left, he’d be  doing more harm 
to the situation. He was the liberal Duke president who would basically 
cut off his connections with the segment of Durham that was impor tant to 
Duke.” Griffith reported about Knight, “He felt that from within the club he 
could” change the policy.41
Knight eventually saw that getting Hope Valley to reverse its segregation-
ist membership policy was impossible. “I think I knew what a forlorn hope it 
was when I started off,” he recounted, “but I thought I had to play it out. . . .  I 
discovered that  there  wouldn’t be a bit of movement on the part of the Hope 
Valley folk, so that all the movement had to be mine. . . .  They  weren’t about 
to show even a slight degree of change in their membership policy,” Knight 
recalled painfully. “Not a flicker.”42
Even  after this became apparent, Knight agonized. In January 1969, with 
pressure on him reaching a crescendo, the Duke president asked for Griffith’s 
advice on what to do. “I must confess from where I sit,” Griffith responded, 
“my recommendation would be to resign your membership in light of the fact 
that  there can be no anticipated change in the club membership [policy] in 
the foreseeable  future.”43
Knight’s response to Griffith showed how conflicted he was. “The public 
prob lem remains as vexed as ever,” he told Griffith, “in the sense that if I 
take the step we have discussed, I think I may pretty effectively neutral-
ize what ever remains of my usefulness down town. On the other hand,” he 
wrote, “my own conscience bothers me so seriously that I think I may have 
to resolve the question on that ground alone (hardly the weakest ground, 
 after all).”44
Knight looked back bitterly on how  little credit he got for making such a 
po liti cally costly choice. “The irony of it,” he commented, was that resigning 
“was a very difficult  thing to do. And in the temper of the student mind, this 
was something that they had forced and it  really  didn’t cost them anything. 
And the thought that this was just one more step in the destruction of my 
position,” Knight reflected, “just  didn’t  really cross their minds.”45
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Knight was correct that he garnered  little credit from Duke’s Black students 
for his Hope Valley resignation. “We would appreciate more him  doing noth-
ing,” McBride, aas president at the time, told the Duke Chronicle, “than coming 
out and telling [us] how liberal he is. . . .  They  either think that we are joking 
or that we’ll give up and forget about it.” McBride called on  every Duke stu-
dent to reinforce how “dead serious” they  were about the changes Blacks  were 
demanding. Hopkins dismissed Knight’s announcement as a “pacification 
effort.” “When he feels that something is imminent as far as unrest among the 
black students,” Hopkins commented, “he comes up with a few concessions.” 
Griffith, not surprisingly, was more positive. “I interpret [Knight’s] statement,” 
he said, “as a commitment to make considerable effort to resolve some of the 
remaining questions that exist.”46
The tense racial climate on campus became clear when, on the same day 
that the Duke Chronicle reported on Knight’s endorsement of Black Week, it 
published a column by Chuck Hopkins titled “Why Duke Is Racist.” White 
 people seeking to understand the Black student experience at Duke, Hop-
kins wrote, must first ask what institutional changes “ were undertaken when 
blacks  were brought to this campus.” Calling Duke before 1963 “a bulwark 
of institutionalized  human degradation,” he argued that “since its integra-
tion Duke has done nothing institutionally to deal with its own racism.” As 
proof, Hopkins pointed out that “the same racist structures and person-
alities which ran this University in its pre- integrated state are still  running 
it  today.” The prob lem of Black student unrest could be solved, Hopkins 
explained, only when the  people who run the university “decide that it is 
necessary for them to sit down with Black  people and deal effectively with 
the racism which prevails  here. . . . But if they continue to believe they can 
buy time with their pacification efforts,” he warned, “they are dealing with a 
myth that they clearly can no longer afford.”47
Rumors that a building takeover was imminent now actively spread 
around campus. Knight increasingly worried about a confrontation. “This 
is no easy road,” he reminded a group of white students who wrote to 
him  after his February 4 announcement to ask that he “give immediate 
attention” to the remaining aas demands. “We could find it impossible to 
accomplish the very  things you believe in most,” he warned, “if by some 
grave error” Black students tried to use force to achieve their demands. 
An even clearer statement came at an off- campus dinner discussion at the 
start of Black Week when the Duke president was asked what would be 
done if a group of students seized a university building. Such an action 
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“would be a  great error,” a red- faced Knight responded. “It had damn bet-
ter not be taken.”48
The road signs to disaster had become even clearer.
Black Week at Duke in February 1969 was a remarkable event. It featured 
twenty- one scheduled speeches, seminars, plays, and other programs as well 
as soul food, a boutique of African fashion, Black  music (on the campus radio 
station), and an exhibit of works by Black artists.49
Harambee set the tone with essays, poems,  free verse, interviews, and 
photo graphs. The newspaper expressed the insight, frustration, bitterness, 
and pride Duke’s Black students  were experiencing. In its “Statement of Pur-
pose,” the paper spoke directly to white readers. “The motive”  behind Haram-
bee, the editorial board wrote, “is to dispel your ignorance and myths. Please, 
realize Blacks did not enter this institution on a premise of becoming hope-
lessly  bitter. . . .  Blacks believe that blatant racism, subtle bigotry, dehumaniz-
ing effects of shallow liberalism and the belief that a white ‘superior’ culture is 
liberating the minds of Black  people generated our pre sent mentality. . . .  The 
essays [in Harambee] show the epiphany of Blacks who  were once negroes.” 
“To be Black,” the Statement of Purpose concluded, “is to emerge from the 
shackles of lies and deceit that make  people niggers.”50
Hopkins published an essay in Harambee called “Black Rap,” discussing 
the educational system in Amer i ca. “It is crystal clear,” Hopkins wrote, “that 
the intellectual bullshit which is taught on campuses  today is directed  towards 
maintaining the established ruling class in this country. The Black student,” he 
explained, “must cleanse himself of all value teachings from the reactionary 
American educational system.” Hopkins argued that a new ideology would 
emerge “from the bosoms of the loving, hating, destructive, creative, and 
beautifully passionate masses of Black  people.”51
Other essays and poems conveyed direct or implied threats of vio lence. 
“We now see a new Black man,” freshman Larry Weston wrote, “who is will-
ing to utilize any means necessary to ensure that his voice is not only heard, 
but respected. . . .  It must be increasingly recognized,” he wrote, “that the 
Black man . . .  must wield the awesome power which he controls if he is to 
survive. . . .  Like it or not world, your time has arrived. . . .  Move over, baby, 
or we  shall move over you.”52 In his poem “A New Language,” McBride was 
equally direct:
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 There is one language
that even pigs understand
It’s spoken with lead teeth,
A mouth of steel,
And a tongue of hot, burning powder. . . .
Now all you  people who
don’t know this language
You’d better learn it fast
’Cause we all are  going to need it
To talk to our “pig chowder.” 53
Trustees, alumni, and administrators who saw a copy of Harambee  were 
deeply offended. One trustee who had seen excerpts from the newspaper 
called them “vile, filthy, and obscene. . . .  No Duke student,” he wrote 
Knight, “should be permitted to remain in school who would write . . . 
any of  these thoughts” for publication. The contents of the newspaper trig-
gered alumnus William Werber’s worst fears. Harambee, he said, “advo-
cated teaching young blacks to murder white  people” and contained threats 
to “burn white homes and white businesses.” Another alumnus, Sim A. 
DeLapp, asked what defense the university had to “the depraved minds who 
give utterance to  these filthy, dangerous comments? An administration that 
 will allow this to pass unnoticed,” he charged, “is not worthy of the re spect 
of decent,  free men.”54
Black Week began when Howard Fuller spoke on Thursday, February 6, at 
a seminar called No More Orangeburgs. Fuller told the group he saw “no dis-
tinction between the physical vio lence which took place in Orangeburg, and 
the killing of minds that is taking place in our school systems.” “Black  people 
cannot allow  people to be slaughtered,” he argued, and “must stop turning the 
other cheek.” Fuller dismissed a system of education that is “brutally destroy-
ing black minds” and called for the creation of a Black studies program at 
Duke that would “meet black needs and goals.”55
President Knight attended a number of Black Week events, including a 
per for mance of God’s Trombones by James Weldon Johnson. First published in 
1927, the work’s subtitle is Seven Negro Sermons in Verse. Its penultimate mes-
sage, “Let my  People Go,” is based on the book of Exodus and tells the story of 
the liberation of the Hebrews from Egypt. Performed by William Turner, the 
sermon carried a special message for the Duke president. Knight “was  there 
in Branson that night in the audience,” Turner recalled. “The words ‘Let my 
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 People Go’ [in the sermon]  were directed explic itly and clearly right to him in 
his face. ‘Let my  people go!’ ”56
Cell also attended the plays. Afterward, he offered some unsolicited tacti-
cal advice to Black student Tony Axam. “ Don’t go into Allen Building,” he 
told the Black student leader. “Once you do, [the administration]  will know 
exactly what to do. . . .  It’s your trump card,” Cell cautioned, “but it’s the last 
one  you’ve got.  Don’t play it.” The suggestion, Cell thought, “got nowhere.”57
The most anticipated event of the week was the appearance of comedian 
and activist Dick Gregory. During the late 1960s, Gregory spoke at hundreds of 
academic institutions. “I spend about 98  percent of my time  today on college 
campuses,” Gregory commented, “and for a reason. I feel that you young folks in 
Amer i ca  today are prob ably the most morally committed, ethical group of dedi-
cated young  people that have ever lived in the history of this country.” Greg-
ory’s speech— titled “Nigger”— was scheduled for 8:00 p.m. on February 10.58
Knight did not attend Gregory’s speech. However, aware of Gregory’s im-
portance, the Duke president invited the Black leader, along with sixteen Black 
students, to dinner at University House before the speech. Knight looked for-
ward to hosting what he hoped would be “a good and proper dinner.” The eve-
ning did not turn out as planned. “Armored in our white liberal innocence,” 
Knight recounted  later, “we  were a bit bewildered when . . .  no one [came] for 
dinner— just a terse message saying that if all could not come, none would 
come. Our black servants (good friends by now)  were far more outraged than 
we,” Knight recounted, “and said so with considerable vigor.” “You are  doing 
the  thing that’s right,” Knight said  later. “Then you find out that the request 
[for a dinner] was nothing but a ploy . . .  on the part of all black students [to 
object] that they  couldn’t all be  there.” “One gets caught,” Knight concluded. 
“ There is almost nothing you can do that’s right. Almost nothing.”59
Unfortunately for Knight, the dinner snub did not end his eve ning. The 
Black students “got together in a meeting,” Hopkins reported, “and said, ‘Hey, 
 these are grievances we all are  going to raise. Let’s all go out  there.’ ” Joined 
by Gregory, “all of us walked into Knight’s  house. He took it well,” Hopkins 
recalled. “It was kind of tense at first, but then we got to talking.”60
Knight and the seventy- five Black students discussed a list of nine demands 
the aas was now presenting to the university. The wording of the nine demands 
was more urgent than in the past, focusing on the issue of control. The Black 
students wanted a Black studies program “right away.” They insisted on a Black 
dorm, promising to be “just as selective as to who stays  there as the fraternities 
on campus already are.” On academic  matters, they wanted reinstatement of 
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all Black students who “failed to make a successful academic adjustment to the 
University,” and an academic adviser selected by them— not “an administration 
appointee who identifies with the white power structure rather than us.” The 
language in the demands showed how wide the gulf between the administra-
tion and its students had become. “We  will not be appeased by the tidbits the 
administration has handed out,” the first demand said. “We  will not compro-
mise our humanity. . . .  We want a say in every thing that involves us. . . .  We 
want to be in on . . .  any plans or decisions that have anything to do with us.”61
Gregory remained quiet through much of the discussion with Knight. “We 
 were trying to figure out what Gregory was  going to say,” Hopkins recounted, 
“which way he was  going.” Fi nally, Gregory “just came out and told Knight,” 
Hopkins recounted, “ ‘Give the students what they are asking.  They’re not 
asking that much.’ ” Before departing, the students turned up the heat fur-
ther. They warned the Duke president of “an unspecified action” in the “near 
 future” if he did not comply satisfactorily with the demands.62
Gregory’s speech  later at the indoor stadium was attended by three thou-
sand  people. “This is the most morally polluted, degenerate, insane nation on 
the face of the Earth,” Gregory told the crowd. “ We’re saying  we’re tired of this 
institutionalized racism.  We’re saying we want Black studies  because we all 
at once want to find out who we are. Since we de cided we  ain’t your nigger,” 
Gregory said to cheers and clenched fists from Duke’s Black students, “we 
wanna know who we are.”63
The next day, Knight issued a statement. His concern was not the substance 
of the Black students’ grievances but the pro cess, especially their use of the 
word demands. “I  didn’t have a group of students at University House making 
‘demands’ on Monday eve ning,” he told the Duke community in a statement 
that appeared in the Duke Chronicle. “The way the university works, we  don’t 
make demands of one another. I  don’t accept demands from the trustees,” he 
went on, and “I  don’t make demands of any of my faculty colleagues.” Des-
perate to characterize his interactions with the Black students as part of the 
university’s more customary decision- making pro cess, he explained that the 
students on Monday had simply “described . . .  matters which are of deep and 
genuine concern to them.” Knight said the issues raised would be considered 
“without any of the delays of which  people are so suspicious  these days.”64 
Yet by framing his remarks as a rebuke to the notion of “making demands,” 
Knight had further polarized the situation.
The day  after he released his statement, Knight told a joint meeting of 
the Administrative Council and the Executive Committee of the Academic 
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Council that he had talked to the Black students at University House on Mon-
day night “with what he felt was good rapport.” In fact, he was mistaken: the 
students viewed the eve ning as a turning point. “During Black Week we went 
to visit Dr. Knight with Dick Gregory,” Brown recounted. “That was the point 
every one went back and said  we’ve got to talk about something that’s gonna 
do something.”65
Knight thought Gregory’s visit and speech  were a direct precursor to the 
Allen Building takeover. “Dick Gregory was the trigger,” he said  later. “I would 
say the speech he gave that night was undoubtedly the explosive one. It was 
designed to be, [and] in that sense it was a very well worked out enterprise.” 
Like  others who blamed campus unrest on “outside forces,” once again, Knight 
was wrong. Gregory “might have said a lot of  things that . . .  firmed it up in 
some  people’s minds,” Becton recalled, but “nothing that he said was the spark 
for ‘Let’s take over Allen Building.’ The idea came from within.”66
The programming on Tuesday, the final day of Black Week, further acceler-
ated  matters. At 10:00 a.m., Fannie Lou Hamer, leader of the Mississippi Free-
dom Party, spoke on the “politics of liberation.” “I  don’t want to hear any more 
talk about ‘equal rights,’ ” she told the audience. “I  don’t want to be equal to 
 people who raped my ancestors, sold my ancestors and treated the Indians like 
they did. I  don’t want to be equal to that. I want  ‘human rights.’ ” The events of 
the day ended at 10:00 p.m. with six concurrent student- led seminars, titled 
“Where Do We Go from  Here?— Community or Chaos?”67
Members of the aas hoped that the events of Black Week would sensitize 
Duke administrators and students to the issues Duke’s Black students  were 
facing, but this did not occur. Attendance by whites at Black Week events was 
largely confined to the plays that  were presented. “The purpose of Black Week 
was to educate, not to entertain,” Hopkins commented. “I feel that we failed . . . 
in this re spect as the only events well attended by whites  were the entertaining 
ones.” Black Week “prob ably  didn’t change their minds,” Bill Werner observed. 
“We saw the same white  faces at all the seminars, the same radical few.”68
Beyond apathy, Black students sensed a generally negative reaction to 
Black Week among many administrators. “They  were so angry with us,” Jan-
ice Williams recalled. “They just got  really upset with us pulling that off and 
pretty much let us know that they  didn’t appreciate it,” she said. “The re-
sponse to Black Week was very negative.” According to Armstrong, “Duke’s 
Black students came away from Black Week wondering, ‘Who’s listening to 
us?’ . . .  Nobody cared that we  were  there. Nobody cared to find out any-
thing about us.”69
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If Black Week had  little impact on Duke’s white community, it had a pro-
found effect on the school’s Black students. As leaders of the aas had an-
ticipated, Black Week brought Duke’s Black students closer together as they 
began to coalesce around the demands of the aas. “Black Week was very piv-
otal for  people allowing their collective ethnicity to come out,” Armstrong 
noted. “It was nice to congeal the interests of a lot of the ‘conservative’ factions 
with the po liti cal ‘issue oriented’ interests of the ‘militant faction.’ You could 
do that in the context of Black Week.”70
Speakers like Dick Gregory, Howard Fuller, and Fannie Lou Hamer, Turner 
said, created “a revolutionizing experience” for many Black students. Black 
Week is what  really “radicalized me,” Turner explained. “I’ll never forget the 
 people.” One question Gregory asked made a particularly strong impression 
on Armstrong. “Dick Gregory talked to us about what we  were  doing at Duke,” 
she recalled. “He said, ‘They  don’t want you  here in the first place, and  they’ve 
made it so hard for you to live  here and study  here that  you’re not  going to get 
an education. What are you  doing  here besides satisfying a quota?’ ” For Turner, 
Hamer, who passionately described her suffering in the racist South and a 
 career in civil rights activism, was “prob ably the one with the greatest impact 
of all.” Hamer also moved Bertie Howard. “For a lot of us,” Howard recalled, 
she “caused us to stop and pause and think about what we  were  going to do.”71
Planning for a building takeover was by now underway. Hamer’s presence 
on campus solidified the resolve of a number of the participants. “To think 
that a  woman could tolerate all the stuff that she had and go on,” Howard re-
marked. “And  here you are in a real luxurious situation. . . .  In the face of that, 
taking a building was a very tame  thing.”72
Duke’s Black students met at Becton’s off- campus  house during Black Week to 
consider their next steps. Despite discussions with school administrators that 
had started months  earlier, Black students felt they had made few advances. 
“The  people who  were talking to the administration,” Armstrong remembered, 
“proved that they had gone the 100  percent route and that they had nothing to 
show for it.” When the option of occupying the Allen Building was brought up, 
it was not a new idea. “It was a time that  these  things  were happening on other 
campuses,” Brown explained, “and it was in the minds of many students.”  Until 
Black Week, however, occupation of a building as a way of focusing attention 
on university racial issues had garnered  little internal support. “It was viewed 
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on a continuum . . .  as . . .  the most radical”  thing to do, Hopkins said. “It had 
come up in previous discussions, but . . .  somebody would always get up and 
say, ‘ We’re not ready to do that.’ So it was held in abeyance.”73
Although a substantial number in the group  were now open to the strategy, 
 there was still no consensus. At least one group of students felt that the right 
approach was to continue discussions with the administration. “Let’s try talk-
ing to the faculty some more,” Armstrong remembered  these students saying. 
“I  don’t think  we’ve exhausted all the channels.” A second option— a mass 
withdrawal of Black students from the university— had more support. Brown 
favored this approach. She explained:
I just felt like the only  thing that would  really shock  these  people was for 
 every Black student  there to go see their dean and tell them that they  were 
withdrawing, pack their bags, and leave the place all white. And the next 
time they . . .  go out and recruit some Black students [they would have] 
to explain why all  these Black folks left [and] maybe they would sit down 
and try to figure out what they needed to do to make life livable for us on 
campus. We sat arguing for three hours [about] alternatives.
 There was “a lot of yelling,” Armstrong remembered. “ There  were sixty of us. 
Maybe thirty or forty  were sure they wanted to [occupy the Allen Building]. 
 There  were five or six guys on the athletic teams who could not participate 
actively [ because they could lose their scholarships]. Fifteen  people  weren’t 
 really sure.”74
No final decision was made that night at Becton’s  house. “We talked about 
it and every body went home,” Armstrong recounted. “We  didn’t make a deci-
sion, we  didn’t say, ‘Yes,  we’re  going to do this.’ ”75
Still, the meeting was critical. “We de cided it was the only option we had— 
either that or just forget about it,” Armstrong recalled. Mass withdrawal was 
off the  table. “I  don’t think 75 or 80  percent of us thought that  there  were any 
other options available to us that  were reasonable,” she explained. “For the vast 
majority of the  people in the aas, leaving school was not an option  because we 
knew that if we left, they would just get another group of students.”76
When the group reconvened several days  later,  those supporting the oc-
cupation prevailed. “The vote was 90  percent to go in and occupy,” Becton 
reported. Most of  those voting against a takeover, he recalled, felt it was “too 
drastic a mea sure to take.” Despite strongly differing opinions, however, Brown 
saw no “sense of divisiveness” in the group. “Once the group de cided ‘this is what 
 we’re  going to do,’ ” Brown remembered, “it was up to  those with indecision to 
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make up their minds on their own. . . .  Most of us understood the reasons why 
[students] de cided not to participate.” This “inclusiveness” reflected the matu-
ration of the aas and its leadership. “By the time we got to Allen Building,” 
Hopkins explained, we  were committed to “letting every body contribute what 
they want[ed] to rather than making every body be the ‘militant.’ A lot of  people 
felt as strongly about the issues as we did but parents  were calling in to students 
asking what was happening, saying, ‘I  didn’t send you to Duke to get involved 
with that.’  People wanted to keep their scholarships, the athletes  didn’t want 
to jeopardize playing on the team. We  didn’t alienate anybody,” Hopkins re-
counted. “We let  people contribute what they  were ready to contribute.” Accord-
ing to Brown, the vast majority of  those Black students who de cided they could 
not join the occupation of the Allen Building nevertheless “did something to 
help.”  People acted “with one mind,” Turner remembered. “We felt like we  were 
part of each other. We had every thing at stake together.”77
Attention now turned to planning and logistics. The group de cided to oc-
cupy the central rec ords office and the bursar’s office in the Allen Building 
 because “that was the hub of Allen Building and we  didn’t need anything  else,” 
Armstrong recalled. The takeover would be planned for precisely 8:00 a.m., 
the time that the safe containing Duke’s central rec ords opened automatically 
each day. “I’d go [into the Allen Building]  every day and commit the floor 
plans to memory,” Armstrong explained. Another student, Clarence Moore, 
also had classes in the building. “Between the two of us, we figured out how 
many doors, what they  were like, how they  were locked. From that we could 
figure out how to take over the building in the most expedient way . . .  and 
how long it would take us to do it.”78
Other jobs  were also assigned. “ There  were . . .  people who  were to find 
out how easy it would be to . . .  get on the roofs and . . .  be able to see what . . . 
was  going on,” Armstrong explained. “ There  were  people who had to get us 
walkie- talkies;  there  were  people who  were to get rations, blankets, medical 
supplies;  there was one person who was to get the truck.  There was one person 
who was to figure out how to establish communications once we got inside the 
building.  There  were one or two  people who  were to find out how to defend 
ourselves, or what to do if we got into a confrontation.”79
Hopkins recalled that a transfer student from North Carolina College ar-
ranged for the truck to transport students to campus the morning of the take-
over. “He had come from ncc to Duke,” Hopkins recalled, “which was a big 
step up. He was  doing well in his courses and he  wasn’t about to jeopardize all of 
that. So he was the one who volunteered to get the truck. That was his  thing.”80
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Even as planning proceeded, differences emerged on the tactics to be used 
in the takeover. The biggest prob lem came when a small faction proposed 
taking guns into the Allen Building. “I said, ‘You all are crazy,’ ” Hopkins re-
called. “What are we  going to look like trying to outshoot cops and stuff holed 
up in Allen Building,” he said. “It was Chuck’s position and mine,” McBride 
recalled, “that we not do anything to give anyone an excuse to not address our 
demands. My concern was that I thought . . . we might die, and . . .  if we had 
guns, I was certain we would die.”81
Even so, the suggestion was more than empty talk. “Some of the Black 
 people on campus  were more violence- oriented,” sds member Hutch Traver 
recalled. “I was once asked by a Black student if I knew where I could get some 
guns.” This represented “a splinter group,” Traver noted, and the talk of guns 
was just “radical euphoria.” “They had no idea of what would have happened if 
someone had shot a gun in the air at Duke University,” he recounted. “It would 
have been a  whole diff er ent ball game.”82
The diversity of opinions in the discussions reinforced Becton’s decision 
to participate in the takeover. “One of my concerns was that  there was a 
wide range of opinions about what  ought to be done and how it  ought to be 
done,” he explained. “ There  were . . .  some freshmen who had been reading 
and breathing Watts and all  these other places who  were just basically hot 
heads. I was concerned that  there be a balance of power [in the building] 
and that  there be level heads.  Because if the  thing got out of hand, I wanted 
to be sure that  there  were enough  people to be thinking clearly and ratio-
nally, as opposed to emotional sorts of  things that had been pre sent at some 
of our meetings. Some  people went in,” he explained, “to make sure that we 
 don’t just blow  things by being totally destructive [and] lose sight of what we 
 really want.” Michael LeBlanc recognized this dynamic. “ There was a radical 
faction,” he acknowledged, “and  there was a faction that, thank God, was a 
 whole lot more sensible.”83
One idea that initially gained ac cep tance was a proposal to bring kerosene 
into the Allen Building. Knowing that they would have control of central rec-
ords, the students’ rationale was defensive. The kerosene “was an ace in the 
hole . . .  that was protection,” Howard explained. In effect, the students  were 
saying to anyone who tried to end the takeover by force, “If you come in  here 
and take the building,  you’ve got to remember that . . .  there’s all this kero-
sene laying around [and all  these rec ords], so you better be careful what you 
do.” “We never  really thought of destroying property,” Armstrong recounted. 
“Even if it was raised, it was objectionable. Extremely objectionable.”84
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Since the moderate, nonviolent Black students controlled the planning and 
execution of the Allen Building takeover, the decision was made, according 
to Brown, to avoid a “violent confrontation.” “We wanted [to get  people to] 
negotiate with us on a serious level. . . .  I  don’t think we had any intentions of 
hurting anyone, or physically damaging the building.”85
Despite their talk of revolution, leaders of the aas still clung to the lib-
eral notion that  people of good  will could be moved to action. “Although 
we  were militant and out spoken,” Hopkins explained, “all of us came out 
of a consciousness [that said], if you show the oppressor his wrongs,  he’ll 
change them.” “I think all of us held on in the back of our minds,” Armstrong 
remembered, “to that last vestige of hope for reason among  those in the 
administration.”86
The takeover was set for February 13. All planning had been completed and 
supplies and transportation arrangements  were in place. On February 12, the 
Black students gathered for a final meeting at Becton’s  house to confirm the 
decision to move ahead with the takeover. “It could have been called off as late 
as the night before,” Hopkins recalled. But “when we broke up that night, . . . 
the decision had been made. It was just a  matter of every body meeting at the 
right time and the individuals who  were supposed to do certain  things  doing 
them.”87
Duke administrators also gathered on February 12 at a joint meeting of the 
Administrative Council and the Executive Committee of the Academic Coun-
cil. The minutes of the meeting indicate that Griffith “observed with concern 
that just prior to and during [Black Week], notable deterioration had taken 
place in University relationships with its black students.” Griffith saw “an im-
patience and apparent unwillingness to cooperate” among the Black students, 
“making it hard for him and  others working with him to do anything about 
their petitions for changes.” McBride, the new president of the aas, Griffith 
told the group, had “expressed  little interest in meeting with committees” and 
“become demanding in talks with [Griffith] about what is to be done. . . .  A 
demonstration was pos si ble at any time,” Griffith warned.88
Aware of a looming crisis, the administrators de cided to form yet another 
committee. Hobbs expressed dis plea sure with the ad hoc committee that had 
been working on the Black students’ demands. “Hobbs’s foremost objective,” 
Cell described, “was to try to get  things back into channels. It had gone all 
haywire. . . .  Provosts and deans  running around like chickens with their 
heads cut off.”89 He preferred “one committee somewhat akin to a steering 
or a grievance committee composed of faculty and, perhaps, students having 
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knowledge of, rapport with, and access to all campus groups.” Such a commit-
tee would serve as a clearing house for all student suggestions and demands. 
“It would be understood,” the minutes reported, “that if one wanted to be 
heard, he was expected to go through this committee.”90
Thus, at the very moment that Black students  were preparing a takeover 
to focus attention on their demands, administrators  were urgently seeking to 
reestablish order. All demands would go to the new committee. The minutes 
of the joint meeting showed that administrators had determined that,  going 
forward, “channels must be followed.” “No other procedure is acceptable to 
Duke University,” Hobbs wrote at the time, “and individuals who advocate or 
practice violent or massive confrontation . . .  will be declared personas non 
grata and procedures  will be instituted to deny [them] access to the property 
of Duke University.”91
The two meetings, the same day, dramatically illustrated the chasm that had 
developed between Duke and its Black students. Six years into desegregation, 
Black students looked at the university and saw indifference, intransigence, 
and bad faith. “I guess initially we thought all you had to do was say, ‘Look, 
you overlooked something,’ ” Brown explained. “Well, now they knew they 
had overlooked a  whole lot of  things and they still  weren’t  doing anything. . . . 
It  wasn’t just a  matter of letting  people know. Now they know, and they  ain’t 
gonna do.” For their part, administrators saw the Black students’ demands as 
without substance and simply designed to provoke confrontation. “Every body 
 ought to have a voice,” Hobbs acknowledged, but  matters had gone too far. The 
Black students “wanted every one  else to do what they wanted them to do,” he 
commented. “That’s . . .  real anarchy as far as I was concerned. . . .  You  can’t 
have an institution and have anarchy at the same time.”92
By morning,  these two groups would face each other in a confrontation 
that carried enormous risk and potentially dire consequences for the univer-
sity and the individuals involved. As it had from the moment Black students 
stepped onto Duke’s campus, race would shape how events unfolded.
CHAPTER 8
No Option to Negotiate
Confrontation
The Black students who spent the night at Charles Becton’s  house on Febru-
ary 12 stepped inside the back of the U- Haul truck to travel to campus to 
take over the Allen Building just  after 7:30 a.m. “ There was a giddiness at 
first,” Brenda Armstrong recounted, “but when they closed the door and it was 
dark . . .  it jolted every one into [a] real ity of how impor tant and . . .  potentially 
dangerous what we  were  doing  really was.”1
For Armstrong, the short trip to campus brought to mind thoughts of her 
ancestors. “I remember talking to my best friend . . .  about knowing what it was 
like in the ‘ Middle Passage,’ ” the brutal sea journey that took slaves from West 
Africa to the West Indies. “It was dark,” she recalled. “My hands  were just full of 
sweat. . . .  It was the most frightening  thing I’ve ever been through in my entire 
life.” Bertie Howard had more immediate concerns. “The gas fumes  were ter-
rible,” she vividly remembered. “It was early in the morning. I  hadn’t eaten. 
I  hadn’t slept. . . .  I remember thinking to myself, ‘I’m  going to throw up.’ ” For 
every one, the stakes  were momentous. Students realized, as Armstrong said, 
that if the takeover failed, “we had put [our lives] and  careers on the line.”2
The takeover was planned for 8:00 a.m. That time was selected  because 
the safe in the registrar’s office containing the only copies of the permanent 
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academic rec ords of Trinity and Duke students  going back to 1854 opened 
without fail at that hour each day. At precisely the designated time, Becton 
recounted, “the truck  stopped, the back came up, the kids jumped out, [and] 
ran into the back of Allen Building. At the same time, kids  were coming from 
all four points on the quad,  running  toward Allen Building.” Even with this 
precision, not every thing went exactly as planned. The last one off the truck, 
Stef McLeod, had brought a box of choco late bars to use as energy food during 
the takeover. Chuck Hopkins described how McLeod,
as he was coming off the truck, dropped the box and had choco late bars all 
over the place. . . .  We  were  going into Allen Building, trying to get every-
one in  there quick, and  there was Stef out  there trying to gather up choco-
late bars. And [the driver] Jim was trying to get the truck out of  there. I yelled 
to Stef, “Man, leave  those choco late bars alone.” . . .  So the scene was Stef 
holding on to the back of the truck trying to hold on to the choco late bars. 
[Fi nally he] jumped off and ran in.3
As the students entered the building, “the adrenaline was flowing,” Janice 
Williams remembered. “We wanted to do  things just right so that they would 
know we meant business.” The first step was to usher employees already at 
work out of the building. In the registrar’s office, Mary Seabolt tried unsuccess-
fully to close the vault containing the university’s irreplaceable academic rec-
ords. Clark Cahow, university assistant registrar,  later described the students 
as having been “very polite.” Upon entering the registrar’s office, he said, the 
students informed Seabolt and  others “that they  were taking over the build-
ing. [They] asked them please [to] get their personal belongings . . .  so they 
could be escorted out of the building.”4
In a letter to the editor of a North Carolina newspaper, employee Joyce 
Siler described her experience in the bursar’s office very differently. “A Negro 
male entered the Bursar’s Office and firmly commanded that we ‘get out,’ ” 
she wrote. “Baseball bats, lengths of pipe, and chains . . .  were being banged 
against the walls and floors of the office and shouts of ‘get out’ could be heard 
from all sides. I took my coat from the rack and headed  toward the door when 
a Negro male carry ing a baseball bat . . .  grabbed my dress sleeve and shouted 
obscenities, demanding that ‘I get out now.’ ”
Siler felt “man- handled, pushed, [and] terrorized.” Other secretaries testi-
fied that they  were “frightened to death,” “very afraid,” or “shocked.”5
However diff er ent  these perceptions, no employees said they  were physi-
cally harmed when the offices  were vacated. Although deeply unsettling to 
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some of the Duke employees in the Allen Building, the takeover had been 
completed without vio lence.
The Black students then proceeded to secure the space. A metal bar and 
chains  were inserted through the  handles of the glass doors that opened 
to the Allen Building lobby, and furniture was piled in front of the doors. 
A pair of wooden doors at the opposite end of the first- floor corridor was 
nailed shut. Other access points  were chained. Win dows from the lobby 
into the offices on the first floor of the Allen Building  were covered with 
a hand- lettered sign announcing that the area had been renamed the 
“Malcolm X Liberation School.” The entire operation was completed in just 
two minutes.6
William Griffith “heard some pounding on [the] back double doors” of the 
Allen Building as he headed up the stairs to his office on the second floor. 
“I went to see what was  going on and I  couldn’t get in,” he explained. “I looked 
through the crack and . . .  knew it was being barricaded. I said, ‘Look, let me 
talk to you.’ . . .  They came to the door and [said] that they  couldn’t talk to 
me. . . .  I went around the other side of the building and saw it was also bar-
ricaded.” With Douglas Knight out of town, Griffith called university provost 
Marcus Hobbs, telling him, “We’ve got a situation  here.”7
Duke was far from the only school to experience Black activism on Febru-
ary 13, 1969. On the same day, historian Ibram X. Kendi wrote, “black students 
disrupted higher education in almost  every area of the nation.” Indeed, Kendi 
described February 13, 1969, as “a day, or the day, that black campus activists 
forced the racial reconstitution of higher education.” “It was a day,” he wrote, 
“that emitted the anger, determination, and agency of a generation that stood 
on the cutting edge of educational progression.”8
Each school experienced Black protest in its own way, with events play-
ing out against the backdrop of Black activism and the impact of dif fer-
ent personalities, entrenched power dynamics, and aspirations unique to 
each institution. At Duke, one key part of that context was the  Silent Vigil 
that had occurred in April 1968— only ten months  earlier. Although they 
 were very dif fer ent events, the  Silent Vigil and the Allen Building takeover 
presented  those in power at Duke with many of the same agonizing deci-
sions. Would the university negotiate or make concessions in the face of 
student protest? What strategies, relationships, and resources would Duke 
deploy to persuade the students to end the crisis peacefully? How quickly 
would decision makers give serious consideration to the use of force to 
end the occupation, and on what basis? Answers to  these questions on 
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February 13, 1969, show how powerfully race  shaped the university’s re-
sponse to protest.
Although planning for the Allen Building takeover had been done in secret, 
advance notice of an “unspecified action” the next day was provided to a small 
group on Wednesday night, February 12. One recipient of the news was Ben-
jamin Ruffin, a Black community leader and close associate of Black activist 
Howard Fuller. Takeover planners told Ruffin, Hopkins explained, “ because we 
wanted support from the Black community.” Black student leaders also alerted 
several staff members of the Duke Chronicle, all of whom  were sworn to secrecy. 
The Black students “wanted to be sure that outside media  were notified as soon 
as pos si ble,” executive editor Tom Campbell recalled. “They felt that might help 
to protect them from a brutal response from the police and administration.” The 
student leaders also wanted to be certain that the national media  were made 
aware of the protest. Hopkins commented: “We  were smart enough to know 
back then that we  didn’t want [the takeover] to be an isolated event down  here 
in Durham. We wanted the nation and the world to know what was  going on.”9
As requested, the Duke Chronicle staff members convened at approxi-
mately 7:30 a.m. on February 13 and awaited word from the students. That 
word arrived just  after 8:00 a.m. The students released a statement to the Duke 
Chronicle, drafted the prior eve ning, that set forth eleven demands, along with 
the rationale for the takeover. The statement issued from the Malcolm X Lib-
eration School inside the Allen Building announced in capital letters:
we seized the building  because we have been negotiating with 
duke administration and faculty concerning dif fer ent issues 
that affect black students for 2 1/2 years and WE have no 
meaningful results. we have exhausted the so- called “proper 
channels.”
 After contacting the Duke Chronicle, Hopkins called Griffith and said, “We’ve 
just taken over the administration building, and  these are the demands.” Hop-
kins recalled that  after hearing the demands, “Bill Griffith sort of stuttered a 
 little bit and he fi nally said, ‘OK, Chuck, I’ll get back to you.’ ”10
Chronicle editor Alan Ray also received a call from a student inside the 
Allen Building. “He said for me to call the security cops,” Ray recounted, 
“and tell them the blacks would burn the rec ords if the police  were sent in.” 
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Chronicle managing editor Bob Ashley received an even stronger warning. If 
the demands  were not met immediately, the student journalist said, and the 
telephone line into the Allen Building did not remain open, the rec ords would 
be burned.11
Despite  these warnings, the threat to burn the rec ords did not reflect the 
views of the vast majority of takeover participants or of Black student lead-
ers. Destroying university property was contrary to the wishes of the major-
ity of the group. Although kerosene was brought into the Allen Building, 
Armstrong recounted how, within an hour, the group “put it in the toilet. 
We de cided,” she explained, “that even as a final act of desperation, [burning 
rec ords] would not serve any purpose.” Shortly thereafter, the Duke Chron-
icle reported that any threat to burn the university’s rec ords had been with-
drawn. “No property has been destroyed,” Hopkins commented through 
a win dow in the Allen Building, “nor is  there any intention to do so.” He 
warned, however, that “if attacked, the black students  will defend the black 
 women in the building.”12
The students had planned for a prolonged occupation. Hopkins told the 
Duke Chronicle that they had enough food to last for a week. “We have lots of 
food,” Josie Knowlin wrote her parents from inside the Allen Building: “pea-
nut butter, jelly, gum, life savers, candy, bread, coffee, sugar, coffee mate, and 
 water, all of the essentials to or for surviving.” Supplies also included cups, pots, 
toilet paper, mouthwash, deodorant, bulbs, batteries, towels, a crowbar, and 
hammers. Walkie- talkies for communication with spotters outside the build-
ing  were available. So was a police radio scanner. At least one item included in 
the planning proved unnecessary. “We had portable commodes,” Hopkins re-
called. “And we get inside and somebody said, ‘Hey,  there are bathrooms in this 
area we have taken.’ ” Every body cheered this news, Hopkins remembered.13
Howard Fuller received word of the takeover as he was speaking at a con-
vocation at Bennett College in Greensboro. Hearing the news, he was “im-
mediately concerned for [the students’] safety” and canceled plans to travel to 
Atlanta  later in the day. Instead Fuller “headed back to Durham and straight 
to Duke.”14
As the students settled in that Thursday morning, their mood was generally 
positive. Armstrong remembered “a lot of rejoicing,”  because “all of a sudden 
[the takeover] was beginning to become successful.” Initially, “ there  wasn’t an 
atmosphere of much tenseness,” Brenda Brown recalled. Knowlin wrote her 
parents that the students  were “playing cards, listening to the news, carry ing 
on semi- intellectual conversations, sleeping, [and] playing ball.” “Some  people 
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would tell jokes,” Armstrong recounted, “[and]  there would be a silly tense 
laugh [from] every one  else.”  These lighter moments, however, simply masked 
more intense focus. “The  whole atmosphere was that we had a goal to accom-
plish,” Williams explained, “and by God we  were  going to do it.”15
Initial reactions to the takeover among administrators and faculty varied. 
Some  were sympathetic. “I was not shocked at all,” po liti cal science professor 
Samuel DuBois Cook commented. “I’m sure they felt that [this] was their only 
way out.” Cahow, whose Allen Building office was occupied, shared Cook’s 
perspective. “They felt they  were getting the ‘cold shoulder,’ ” he commented. 
“They  were absolutely convinced that they  weren’t being heard and that no 
action would ever be taken. . . .  You just live with that kind of frustration for 
so long and then something has to give.” Some expressed surprise. “Many 
of us  were startled,” Knight said. “We had come eight miles out of nine” on 
the Black student demands. “All of us  were quite astonished,” history profes-
sor Richard Watson remarked. “We thought we  were making headway.” Most 
 others  were deeply critical. “My gut reaction was ‘Jesus Christ,  they’ve made 
another blunder,’ ” law school dean Kenneth Pye recalled. Before the takeover, 
he reasoned, “they  were . . .  in the best pos si ble position to negotiate almost 
what ever they wanted from the president. He would have given away the 
 Chapel!” Pye thought that by occupying the Allen Building, the Black students 
“had played their trump card.” History professor John Cell was more succinct. 
Told of the takeover by a colleague, he responded, “Shit.” Most telling was the 
initial reaction of dean Harold Lewis.  After talking about the takeover with 
Cahow, his first response was “Well, we better call the police.”16
A group that eventually included as many as twenty- five se nior adminis-
trators, faculty, and two student representatives began to gather in the board 
room on the second floor of the Allen Building around 8:20 a.m.  Until mid- 
after noon, this served as the “situation room” for the university in dealing 
with the takeover. University secretary Rufus Powell took detailed contempo-
raneous minutes of the meeting. Knight was not pre sent but in New York for 
meetings with the Ford Foundation seeking funding, ironically, for a Black 
studies program. A plane was chartered to bring Knight back to Durham and 
he arrived on campus in the after noon.17
The first minutes of the meeting  were spent exchanging the sketchy in-
formation attendees possessed about the events that  were unfolding. Hobbs 
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shared what he knew about the occupation. Perhaps believing that all of 
Duke’s Black students had participated in the takeover, he said that  there  were 
“approximately 70–80 inside.” In fact, only around forty Black students oc-
cupied the Allen Building. Despite only incidental physical contact between 
the protesters and vacating Allen Building employees, Hobbs passed along 
reports that the Black students “had somewhat maltreated some of the  people 
that they put . . .  out of the building. . . .  Some of the girls who  were in the 
building  were pushed around a  little bit,” he said. More significant, the provost 
told the group that the students  were reported to “have kerosene” and said 
they  were insisting upon their demands as set forth in the Chronicle. Griffith 
reported on the message Ashley had received from the Black students mo-
ments  earlier. “They told Bob they have the rec ords,” Griffith recounted, and 
“if their demands . . .  were not met immediately, . . .  there  will be fire.” Griffith 
also reported that the Liberal Action Committee had called for a forum on the 
quad at 11:30 a.m. as a show of support for the Black students. Cahow almost 
certainly shocked the group when he reported on the contents of the open safe 
in his office. “Our rec ords from the beginning of time are open to them, from 
the beginning of the University,” he explained, “and  there are no copies.” “We 
realized they had every one by the short hairs,” Griffith recalled.18
By 8:40 a.m., Hobbs had spoken to Knight. Immediately adopting the “no 
negotiations” stance that prevailed throughout the day, Knight advised Hobbs 
that the administration “was not in a position to accede to demands.” Hobbs 
reported that Knight did not “intend at the present time to take police ac-
tion” but also relayed instructions from the president that began to frame the 
rationale for the use of force against the students  later in the day. If they did 
not vacate the offices “within an hour of notification,” Knight instructed, “they 
are to be suspended, . . . are guilty of trespass, and their action goes beyond 
the Pickets and Protests policy.” Hobbs went further. If the protesters did not 
leave the Allen Building, they “will have to get off the campus”  until “a hearing 
 under due pro cess.” Less than one hour into the takeover, the university’s two 
top administrators had characterized the Allen Building protesters as “tres-
passers,” and as such, they  were subject to removal from campus—by force if 
necessary. A deadline for resolution of the takeover had also been established. 
It was “apparent that Knight had made the decision,” Griffith commented, 
“that the building would be cleared that day.”19 The patience and restraint 
white protesters had been accorded during the University House occupation 
and  Silent Vigil ten months  earlier clearly would not extend to the Black stu-
dents in the Allen Building.
No Option to Negotiate 215
The news of Knight’s hard line deepened concern at the meeting. While 
the safety of the students was a worry, preserving the university’s irreplaceable 
academic rec ords was also a focus. Cahow saw the threat to burn the rec ords 
as the students’ “hole card” and recalled that the group “stewed and stewed 
over what to do.” University counsel Edwin Bryson and vice provost Frank 
de Vyver commented that they hoped no police action would be taken  because 
of “jeopardy of the rec ords.” Education professor and Academic Council chair 
William Cartwright, vice provost Barnes Woodhall, vice president of business 
and finance Charles Huestis, and vice president for institutional advancement 
Frank Ashmore suggested that an offer of amnesty be made to the students 
“to protect the rec ords.”20
 Others  were less worried. “The gasoline  thing never impressed me as being 
a serious threat,” Hobbs  later explained, “ because if they did [burn the rec ords], 
it would endanger them as well.” University registrar Richard L. Tuthill also 
discounted the possibility that the students had kerosene and pressed a plan for 
security forces to storm the registrar’s office through its plate glass win dows. 
“I just felt we could get through and get them out before any rec ords  were 
burned,” he commented. Moreover, since the rec ords  were “very durable, high 
quality, rag content paper,” Tuthill considered it a “seriously open question . . . 
how many [rec ords] could have been burned [and] and how rapidly.”21
Any thought of amnesty for the students—to preserve the university’s rec-
ords—or attempts at substantive discussions with protest leaders soon evapo-
rated. Ashmore reported that in a call with Charles Wade, the chairman of 
the board had directed the administration to “give them one hour to vacate.” 
 There would be “no promises, no amnesty,” Wade said. Only “ after they leave 
or are removed,” Ashmore relayed, would “a decision . . .  be made as to what 
to do.” Less than thirty minutes  later, at 11:00 a.m., Hobbs confirmed that 
Knight agreed with Wade. Although the president saw no reason Duke deci-
sion makers “should not stay in touch with the students,” amnesty was “not 
 under discussion.” Like Wade, the president was prepared to accept the risk 
of a fire in an office packed with Duke students rather than deviate from his 
uncompromising position. Before using force to clear the building, however, 
Knight wanted a statement presented to the students setting forth “all that we 
have done  toward [addressing their] stated goals.”22
Cartwright  later described the hours- long meeting of administrators, fac-
ulty, and student representatives as a “full, open, long, and difficult session.” 
Although a range of topics  were discussed, minutes of the meeting indicate that 
only once did any participant suggest that the university consider substantive 
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discussions with the Black students. Sociology professor Alan C. Kerckhoff 
asked  whether  there was “anything in the proposals [that was] feasible.” Seeing 
the use of force approaching rapidly, Kerckhoff thought it “a shame to take this 
action when [action on] some goals [was] pos si ble.”23
Kerckhoff ’s suggestion gained no traction. In fact, the minutes say he 
was met with a “chorus of voices.” “Action has been  going on [on] a  great 
many” of the issues, Kerckhoff was told. “We cannot act  under demands,” 
Hobbs commented. “I think the answer is no negotiations while [the] rec-
ords are in their possession.” Seeking to portray the university as blameless 
for the confrontation, dean of Trinity College Robert L. Price reviewed what 
the administration had done to date on the demands, the “promptness of 
the university [and] the failure of the students themselves to follow-up on 
meetings— even  today.”24
Although, as Cartwright described  later, “all of us in [the] meeting  were in 
agreement that we could not act on  these demands  under threat of vio lence,” 
the university did remain willing to consider the Black students’ “requests 
and proposals for the university”  after the takeover ended. Accordingly, with 
students barricaded in the Allen Building and police action  under active dis-
cussion, Hobbs announced the formation of the “special committee on stu-
dent concerns,” chaired by Kerckhoff (Kerckhoff Committee). This commit-
tee would be the university’s central point of contact for  future discussion of 
Black student issues. At around the same time, a general faculty meeting was 
called for 4:00 p.m. on East Campus, in part to announce the creation of the 
Kerckhoff Committee.25
Griffith, the Duke administrator with the most prior contact with the Black 
students, also spoke up during the discussion. Having played a central role 
in peacefully resolving the University House occupation and  Silent Vigil, he 
questioned the growing consensus to use force to end the occupation. “I felt 
that they could be talked out,” he recalled. “I just said it was counterproductive 
to try to drag them out of the building. I thought [the Black students] would 
realize that it was counterproductive on their part to stay” and that “they would 
leave.” During the morning, Griffith also relayed a warning from Cell, who 
asked that the administration refrain from taking precipitous action. He ad-
vised the group of a mobilization taking place in the Black community and 
among the faculty in support of the students. “I told Griffith,” Cell recounted, 
“that if they brought in the cops, it would be over my dead body.”26
Griffith also heard from Cook, who considered the use of force “a very 
serious  mistake.” Cook conceded that force was used by the students in the 
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takeover. “But the police are a  great symbol of naked force,” he argued. “When 
you invite them into your campus, . . .  you’re  really asking for a lot of trou-
ble. . . .  Because [calling in the police] means . . .  that  you’ve abandoned com-
pletely the rule of reason and commitment to the rule of reason. . . .  You’ve 
surrendered to naked force. . . .  That’s when  things  really,  really take off.” Like 
Griffith, Cook urged patience. He favored isolating the protest “for a while. . . . 
Wear them down. . . .  Wait it out.” “I was hoping that someone would get to . . . 
the president to make the decision that they would not call in force,” he said.27
Yet, in contrast to the University House occupation and  Silent Vigil, 
Griffith found  little support for a more mea sured approach among other 
administrators. “I think  there  were some who agreed with me,” the dean re-
called, “who  were more reluctant to speak out . . .  because  there was a feeling 
of being [seen as] soft.” “The university was getting entrenched in a pretty 
hard line,” Griffith observed. “ There was a strong feeling that something had 
to be done.” He sensed  others thinking, “Well, Bill,  you’ve said your piece, 
let’s get on with it.”28
Momentum  toward a confrontation continued to build. Just  after 11:00 
a.m., Hobbs reported that the police could have fifty officers on campus within 
an hour.29
At the 11:30 a.m. forum on the quad convened by the Liberal Action Com-
mittee, a crowd of more than 350 could hear in the speakers’ remarks that 
an escalation of the confrontation was now looming. Mark Pinsky, a student 
leader, told the crowd that they would “have to choose sides within the next 
 couple of hours.” The Black students’ “strug gle is your strug gle,” he declared.30
An aas spokesman described efforts to get their demands met through 
the “proper channels” and insisted on the need for Black students to control 
the implementation of university commitments made to date. “History has 
shown,” the speaker said, “that when we do not have control, . . .  we cannot 
rely . . .  that anything such as a Black course or a Black adviser appointed by 
the administration . . .  will be beneficial to us.”31
Cartwright agreed that “not nearly enough [pro gress] has been made” on 
the issues presented, but he urged patience. “Although each demand has at 
least some kernel of justice in it,” he said, “pro gress on any major social issue 
 will not be made overnight, and  will not be brought about . . .  as a result of 
vio lence.”32
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The Student Liberation Front followed Cartwright, stating that it “fully 
supports the demands and actions of the Afro- American Society.” The group 
announced the establishment of a “freedom school” on the third floor of the 
Allen Building to demonstrate solidarity with the Black students “and con-
sider the larger issue of racism in our society.” Eventually as many as two hun-
dred students participated in  these discussions.33
History professor Thomas Rainey also spoke, lauding “the patience shown 
heretofore by the Afro- American Society” and urging the faculty to support 
their demands. Rainey outlined three “levels of commitment” for faculty 
members to consider. He asked his colleagues to “call for reason on the part of 
the administration, and urge them not to use force on Blacks in the building.” 
He requested that his colleagues sign a petition in support of the students, and 
then raised the stakes even further. Rainey urged faculty “to join with a few 
of us that intend . . .  to put our bodies on the line to keep the administration 
from using force at this time on the Afro- American Society.”34
Fi nally, Griffith summarized the status of each of the twelve issues raised 
by the Black students at the initial meeting of his ad hoc committee on Octo-
ber 4. “I think you can see,” Griffith concluded his review, “that  those [issues 
where]  there has been an ability to work [in] an immediate context have been 
resolved.” Other questions, like the implementation of a Black studies pro-
gram, he explained, “need time and . . .  input of considerable numbers of the 
university community.”35
Back on the second floor of the Allen Building, Griffith, Price, and Ash-
more met to prepare the statement and ultimatum Knight had requested. 
 Others, remaining in the board room, began discussing the best way to 
communicate with the Black students in the Allen Building. The questions 
they raised dramatized how  little  these administrators and faculty knew 
 these Duke students. Hobbs asked  whether  there was “any group through 
which they can be reached, with whom they relate.” In contrast to the 
vigil, where Griffith, po liti cal science professor John Strange, and Huestis, 
among  others,  were able to call on long- standing relationships with moder-
ate white student leaders to defuse the protest, the university could think 
of no “trusted advisor” who could be sent to talk to the Black students. 
Even Griffith demurred. Recommending that any intermediary be someone 
higher than himself in the university hierarchy, Griffith said that he had 
“arrived at a plateau in my discussions” with the Black students. “I’ve gone 
as far as I can,” he confessed. “I’m talked out.” Griffith also believed that, 
 because of his history of advocating for the students, he had lost the con-
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fidence of some in the administration. “I’m not sure [hard- liners] would 
have even trusted me,” he thought.36
Hobbs also asked who from the university should be the point of contact 
with the students. The suggestion that a faculty member attempt to deliver the 
university’s message in person was rejected  because of “hostage dangers.”37 
That some university leaders seemed to think that the protesters occupying 
the Allen Building might take Cook, Cell, or another faculty member hostage 
shows that the students  were perceived as completely out of control.
Even as events accelerated, however, Hobbs de cided to propose a face- to- 
face meeting with Black student representatives. He wanted to do so before the 
university’s one- hour ultimatum was delivered. Hobbs proposed suggesting 
that the Black students send five representatives to the board room to speak 
to “five of us.” The purpose of the meeting would be to “discuss the situation 
for 30 minutes or so.” No substantive discussion of the Black student demands 
was contemplated. At approximately 12:15 p.m., Hobbs, professor and chair of 
the electrical engineering department Thomas G. Wilson, and professor and 
chair of the physics department Henry A. Fairbank left the second floor of the 
Allen Building to deliver the proposal for a meeting to the students.38
Speaking to McLeod and Hopkins through a win dow, Hobbs introduced 
himself and said that he would like to talk. According to an account of the 
meeting prepared by Fairbank and Wilson, the students did not recognize 
Hobbs— the university provost—by “face, name, or office.” Tuthill recounted 
hearing a student shout, “Go get somebody impor tant,” not aware that Hobbs 
was, in Knight’s absence, the acting se nior administrator of the university. 
Hobbs proposed a five- on- five meeting between university representatives 
and Black student protesters. “We’ve chatted for two or three years already, 
man,” one of the student leaders responded to Hobbs. When Fairbank stated 
that the university believed that  there was “a  great deal of interest in your prob-
lems,” the student responded sharply, “We want something concrete. Do you 
have the power to deal with this  matter? We want to speak to  those who have 
the power.” The students also conveyed to Hobbs that two new demands had 
been added to the original list of eleven— “amnesty” for the protesters and an 
end to grading for all Black students. Hobbs assured his counterpart that the 
student representatives would have “ free access” to return to the Allen Building 
and urged that representatives for the two sides meet for “30 or 40 minutes to 
see if we can reach agreement.” While the students  were open to a discussion, 
the format proposed by Hobbs was unacceptable. “ We’ll deal with you as a 
group, not as individuals,” the student responded. When Hobbs answered that 
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a group meeting was “not a very reasonable alternative,” the Black student 
asked the provost to call back in a half hour.39 The student protesters had 
bought time to consult with each other.
In retrospect, it is not at all surprising that the initial win dow conversation 
was so unproductive. The brief interaction with Hobbs, Wilson, and Fairbank 
was the first communication the students in the Allen Building had received 
from any official university representative. The students did not know, as 
Cahow  later said, “who the provost was or what a provost was.” A former 
chemistry professor, Hobbs had assumed the provost position only in January, 
one month prior to the takeover. During his brief tenure, Hobbs had partici-
pated only “indirectly” in discussions with the Black students. Thus, the brief 
conversation among Hobbs, McLeod, and Hopkins was a first meeting for the 
three of them. Tuthill almost certainly spoke for other administrators. “They 
 didn’t know anybody,” he commented. “I  didn’t know any of them.” This was 
hardly a good foundation for further discussions.40
The morning and early after noon  were a heady time for the occupying 
students. Community leaders who had been role models for the students 
came by and spoke to them through a win dow. Media inquiries, including 
from the national press, started to arrive.  Others in the community reached 
out by phone, including a call from the Ku Klux Klan (kkk). A Black stu-
dent interviewed by wdbs from inside the Allen Building sounded a positive 
note. “We felt that it was a good strategic move  today, that the timing was 
right, right  after Black Week,” he said. “Every thing’s coming off smoothly 
now. . . .  We plan to stay  until the university concedes to our demands. . . . 
We have nothing offered to us but a white man’s education, which has no 
relevance to us.”41
When the Black students met to discuss Hobbs’s proposal for a meeting, 
the group was unimpressed. “We de cided it was a diversionary move,” Arm-
strong explained. “If they got five  people out, all five  people would not be able 
to talk for all the  people who  were in  there. . . .  It seemed to us to be a compro-
mise of sorts. It  wasn’t what we  were  after.”42
Significantly, although the Black students considered Hobbs’s proposal un-
appealing, they  were not unwilling to negotiate with the administration  under 
any circumstances. “We  didn’t go in  there with the stance of not negotiating,” 
Hopkins recounted. “That’s why we went in  there—to force a negotiation.” 
What the students  were demanding, however, was the chance to negotiate 
with someone in the university hierarchy who had the power to act defini-
tively on their demands. “We looked at it as an operation,” Hopkins explained. 
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“No more of  these long meetings, no more of  these long periods between 
meetings. We want[ed] to get  people’s attention and get them to address  these 
issues.”43 Without knowing that Hobbs was second-in-command, they viewed 
him as yet another functionary without authority to commit the university to 
specific actions. Hence, the students found the prospect of meeting with him 
unacceptable.
Around this time, Cell had a call with Hopkins, urging the Black students 
to vacate the Allen Building. Hopkins refused, telling Cell, “ We’re staying 
 until our demands are met.” “They wanted to negotiate with Knight,” Cell re-
counted. He considered this a miscalculation resulting from a misunderstand-
ing of how the Duke bureaucracy operated. “Hobbs sent word to them that 
he was the provost,” Cell explained. “They  don’t even know who the goddamn 
provost is. They  don’t understand that the provost is more impor tant than 
the president— especially then. Hobbs is a strong and effective administrator 
who had the confidence of the university, the faculty— which Knight certainly 
did not. And they  don’t even know that.” Cell was exasperated that Hopkins 
and his fellow protesters did not “know a damn  thing about how a university 
worked.”44 Left unsaid, of course, was that neither Hobbs nor Knight had the 
authority to respond unilaterally to Black student demands.
Hobbs called the registrar’s office at 12:50 p.m. as instructed by the Black 
students. McLeod and Hopkins told Hobbs that “they had been talking for 
two and one- half years without action.” When Hobbs asked specifically if they 
 were refusing his proposal for direct talks, “the response was clearly negative.” 
When Hobbs asked a second time “if they  were in fact refusing to send out 
representatives who would be guaranteed re- access,” Hopkins and McLeod 
“seemed to have hung up.” The entire interaction had lasted less than ten 
minutes.45
Hobbs returned to the board room at 1:13 p.m. to report on the call. “The 
university has heard the demands,” he quoted the students as saying, “and 
 these are the  things that determine  whether the Afro- Americans  will start 
talking or not.” Hobbs also told the group that the students had hung up when 
he specifically asked if they absolutely refused the proposal for a meeting.46
The conversation from the Allen Building win dow and the subsequent 
brief follow-up call with Hopkins and McLeod  were the only attempts by 
university decision makers to interact with the students during the takeover. 
Despite the high stakes involved, Hobbs believed that he had discharged any 
responsibility the university had to reach out to the protesters. “I think I’ve 
made a reasonable, honest try,” he told the group. Based on this interaction, 
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Hobbs and the other administrators concluded that the students  were unwill-
ing to engage in discussions of any sort. “They  were not in much of a mood to 
talk,” Hobbs commented  later.47
Not long  after this, at approximately 1:45 p.m., Hobbs reported to his col-
leagues on a telephone conversation with Knight. The Duke president was 
back in Durham and Hobbs had raised the possibility of a call by Knight to 
the students in the Allen Building. “He had considered  every alternative . . . 
without any conviction it would do any good,” Hobbs quoted Knight as say-
ing. Hence, no call would be made.48 In spite of the dire situation, Knight did 
not even attempt to speak directly to the students inside the Allen Building.
The statement and ultimatum drafted by Griffith, Lewis, and Price was 
nearing completion. Since the document called on the students to arrive at a 
decision to leave the Allen Building within one hour, the administrative group 
de cided that delivery would be delayed  until word was received that the “po-
lice are ready for action.” At 1:50 p.m., Huestis called to say that the police had 
been summoned to campus and  were mobilizing.49
Events now moved forward rapidly. The group of about two hundred students 
and faculty participating in the Student Liberation Front’s “freedom school” in 
the Allen Building moved their discussions to Duke Chapel. By mid afternoon, 
the group had increased to five hundred. Student Mark Pinsky reported that 
a student renewing his driver’s license at the highway patrol station “had seen 
patrolmen with gas masks loading into cars at the station.” Word reached the 
Allen Building board room that the students in the freedom school  were dis-
cussing “what other buildings they might take over.”50
Members of the Durham Black community also started to mobilize. “How-
ard [Fuller] and Ben [Ruffin] and Reverend Cousin had gotten to the com-
munity,” Armstrong recounted. “They said, ‘You must come [to campus]. You 
must come and protect  these  children. . . .  We should be afraid for them but we 
should all be proud of them.’ ” Students at ncc heard about the takeover on the 
radio, and many came to the Duke campus. Asked by a wdbs reporter if the 
ncc students supported the Black students’ demands “completely, or half, or 
what?” the ncc representative was direct. “ There is no half- Blackness. . . .  We 
support all of the demands they have submitted.” Fuller was back in Durham 
and climbed through a win dow into the registrar’s office in the Allen Building. 
He found the students “calm, pretty well or ga nized, and determined.”51
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Not every one on campus supported the takeover. “Right wing students,” 
the Duke Chronicle reported, “including members of the Young Americans 
for Freedom,  were said to be considering ‘direct action’ against the blacks, 
possibly including an invasion of the occupied building.” Other students who 
opposed the takeover, including members of the Kappa Alpha fraternity,  were 
beginning to congregate on the quad.52
Around 2:00 p.m., Knight’s fifteen- year- old son told his  father that he 
would “go out and just look around” campus. “He came back,” Knight recalled, 
and said “ things  were relatively quiet [on campus], but [that] he did notice a 
certain amount of activity around the edge of the campus.” “By mid afternoon,” 
the Duke president wrote  later, “I was getting reports of men in pickup trucks, 
shotguns in the win dow racks, driving slowly around the outer perimeter of 
West Campus, watching, waiting for dark.” For Knight, this information was 
pivotal. “I had an acute distrust of anybody with a gun rack in his truck,” 
Knight said. “The threat to our black students during their day of occupation 
was only too clear,” he wrote  later. “If  there had been any easy way to get at 
them, several would have been injured or killed.” The report from his son “was 
about all I needed,” he commented. “It was evident we  couldn’t temporize.”53
For many, Knight’s fear of men with gun racks in their trucks was exagger-
ated. “I  don’t believe that [a] thought [of vigilantes] ever crossed my mind,” 
Hobbs said. “It  really  wasn’t a consideration.” “My feeling in Allen Building,” 
Howard commented, was that members of the Kappa Alpha fraternity “ were 
a bigger threat than the kkk. . . .  Those  were some crazy  people.” Armstrong 
called the notion that Knight summoned the police to protect the protesters 
from attacks by whites “a bunch of crap.” “The  people we  were most afraid of,” 
she said, “ were the Durham police.”54
Police cars  were now gathered at a staging area in Duke Gardens, just off 
the quad on West Campus. Seventy- four armed police officers had arrived 
with tear gas at the ready. Lookouts carry ing walkie- talkies relayed this omi-
nous news to the protesters in the Allen Building. Around 3:00 p.m., Griffith 
reported to the administrative group that students  were aware that police had 
gathered in Duke Gardens.55
Inside the Allen Building, the mood was changing. The excitement of 
 earlier in the day had given way to what Armstrong described as a “sense 
of tenseness [and] frustration.” “I thought about my folks a  whole lot,” she 
recalled, “ because my  father was very against me being involved.” This time 
was “very tense— very, very tense,” Josie Knowlin recalled, “ because we  didn’t 
know what to expect.”56
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Not optimistic that the students would comply with the university’s ulti-
matum, Hobbs drafted a brief second notice that would be delivered if they 
refused to vacate the building. Around 3:20 p.m., Huestis called to report that 
the police had completed all final preparations. With this news, Hobbs, Fair-
bank, and Wilson approached a win dow outside the registrar’s area of the 
Allen Building. Hobbs requested permission to pass copies of the statement 
and ultimatum to the students, and a win dow was opened to receive the docu-
ments. Hobbs read the statement through the win dow as the students fol-
lowed along. “President Knight has acknowledged our genuine concern that 
your legitimate needs in the University be met,” he said. “At his request nu-
merous meetings have been held since early October with the Afro- American 
Society. At that time your major concerns  were identified, and an honest effort 
was made to understand them.”  After reviewing the university’s commitments 
on issues such as a Black dorm, summer program, recruitment, and a Black 
adviser, Hobbs reported the formation of the Kerckhoff Committee. The new 
committee, he said, would meet with “you and with other groups of students 
who feel the University is not adequately meeting their needs.” Pursuit of the 
issues raised by the Black students, the provost told the students, “can and  will 
take place when you depart voluntarily from this building.”57
The ultimatum Hobbs then issued was cryptic. “We realize that you must 
discuss this among yourselves and arrive at your own decision,” he said. 
“In order to permit you the opportunity to do this you are advised that you 
may take the next hour to arrive at your decision. It is imperative, how-
ever, that your decision be reached within one hour.” As Hobbs completed 
reading the statement, a student demanded to know the significance of the 
one- hour time limit. Without being specific, Hobbs responded only that the 
orderly pro cess in the university had been disrupted. “ You’ve given us one 
hour and  we’ve given you two- and- one- half years to solve the prob lems of 
this racist institution,” Hopkins shouted back. Despite student requests for 
further explanation, the provost and his colleagues concluded that “further 
discussion at this point would be useless.” “One was attempting to commu-
nicate through a slit win dow . . .  across a concrete moat,” Hobbs wrote  later. 
“The occupants in the Registrar’s area had full telephone ser vice, directories, 
 etc. and could pursue the  matter by telephone if  there was real interest in 
discourse.” With the sixty- minute clock now ticking, Hobbs and other se-
nior administrative colleagues left the Allen Building. All “adjourned to the 
advancement office on Campus Drive,” out of harm’s way. Griffith was one 
of the very few administrators who remained on the quad. “I  didn’t want 
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force to come to campus,” Griffith explained, “so I wanted to mobilize all the 
resources against force that I could.”58
When word of the ultimatum reached the five hundred students meeting in 
the chapel, leaders reached out to the Black students to find out what course 
they wanted the group of sympathizers to follow. The Black students asked for 
wet towels “ because the man is coming with gas” and requested that a  human 
shield be formed outside the Allen Building by supporters. A  little  later, Ash-
more reported that meetings of asdu legislators and dorm  house counselors 
resulted in requests to the administration that no police action occur.59
At 3:45 p.m., Griffith called the advancement office to report that  there  were 
now one thousand students outside the Allen Building, many encouraging the 
Black students to hold out. Hearing this, Bryson said it would be “foolish” to 
send seventy- four police officers into a crowd of this size without backup. It 
was de cided that delivery of the second notice that would trigger police action 
would be deferred  until the National Guard could be mobilized.60
A general faculty meeting in Baldwin Auditorium convened just  after 4:00 
p.m. Knight attended. At the request of a faculty member, Cartwright read the 
statement that had just been delivered to the Black students by the provost. A 
member of the faculty commented that he was “disturbed by the use of force 
implied in the statement.” He asked the president to suspend the use of force 
“ until the deliberations of this Faculty meeting have been completed.” “At cer-
tain times it [is] impossible to suspend an action,” Knight replied cryptically. 
“The context is not one of our devising,” he continued. “A threat of force has 
been brought to bear on us. The students have refused to proceed with discus-
sion and conference.”61
“At this moment,” the minutes of the meeting rec ord, Professor Blackburn 
reported on a telephone conversation he just had in which an asdu represen-
tative said that the students in the Allen Building  were “very  eager to discuss 
 matters with the Provost.” Knight was encouraged. “If indeed this report is 
accurate,” he said, “we may have a real chance for renewal of conference.”62
Knight was now pressed again to answer directly  whether the police had, 
in fact, been called. He fi nally confirmed that police had been summoned 
to campus. “You cannot exist without recognizing the pressure of force,” the 
president commented. “We would have been irresponsible had we not called 
the police.” About thirty faculty members sympathetic to the students bolted 
from the meeting, many heading to West Campus. As they left, one faculty 
member recounted to wdbs, they heard “jeering, hisses, and derisory ap-
plause [from] a large number of our colleagues.”63
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Even  those faculty members who remained at the meeting  were concerned. 
Knight “was very vague . . .  in defense of what was taking place,” Richard Wat-
son recalled. “He found it very difficult to admit that the step [to call in force] 
had been taken. . . .  It  didn’t appear to us at that point,” Watson described, 
“that the president was giving the kind of leadership that . . .  really had been 
thought through.”64
Around 4:30 p.m., Knight left the meeting to join the administrative group 
in the advancement office. Before the faculty meeting adjourned about an 
hour  later, they voted overwhelmingly to support the actions of the president 
and administration.65
Griffith called the advancement office at approximately 4:30 p.m. to re-
port that the crowd in front of the Allen Building now numbered about 1,500. 
The situation was dynamic and increasingly unpredictable. Since he had no 
walkie- talkie or other means of direct communication, Griffith had to leave 
the quad to find a phone to report updated information to decision makers. 
“By the time you would get to the phone and back to the crowd,” Griffith said, 
“the scene would have changed.”66
With pressure building rapidly, the Black students in the Allen Building  were 
outraged that police action was looming. They had no guns, knives, axes, or 
weapons of any kind. They had no kerosene. Their threat to burn the univer-
sity’s rec ords had been withdrawn, even if the administration seemed un-
aware of that fact. No one had been hurt or manhandled as the building was 
vacated. Rumors to the contrary, they said,  were “lies.” From their perspec-
tive, the protest was nonviolent. They blamed the administration for risking a 
physical confrontation. “You  can’t kick  people around and treat ’em like dogs 
and expect them to say, ‘Thank you, white man,’ ” one student told wdbs from 
inside the Allen Building. “ We’re saying, ‘white man, give us what is ours!’ 
He brought us  here. He said he would give us what we needed. He  ain’t given 
us a goddamn  thing! He put us  here like a bunch of dogs. He called the pigs 
in,” the student said. “He called the pigs in  because he thinks that’s the  thing 
to do.”67
Many of the Black students  were surprised at the university’s readiness to 
use force. “I  didn’t think any of us thought it would be violent,” Armstrong 
recounted. “The last  thing that ever came to our mind was that they would . . . 
call the state [police] or National Guard,” Williams recounted. “We thought 
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they would give a lot of threats. We  didn’t  really feel that they would actually 
endanger our lives.”68
Cook sensed a potential disaster looming. He had talked to Hopkins sev-
eral times during the takeover. “I said, ‘If the police should come,  don’t let 
[them] catch you and the other Blacks in this building  behind closed doors. 
They  will bludgeon you. They  will crack your head.’ I’d seen it in Georgia and 
Alabama. . . .  I knew from experience.”69 Cook joined the  human shield that 
had formed around the Allen Building.
Hobbs did not share Cook’s concern about law enforcement. “Nobody an-
ticipated vio lence,” Hobbs said  later. Told of Cook’s comment that the students 
would be “bludgeoned” if caught by police in the Allen Building, Hobbs called 
it “a misdirected statement” and “unnecessary.” “ There was no reason to feel 
that the police would do more than say, ‘ You’re  going to be arrested if you 
 don’t get out,’ ” Hobbs recounted. “That’s [what we] thought would be done.” 
Belying this confidence, however, Hobbs was in touch with Duke hospital 
personnel to ask that they prepare to treat anyone injured in the approaching 
police action.70
Meanwhile, efforts by asdu leaders, dean of freshmen Hugh M. Hall, 
and  others to head off conflict intensified. In the late after noon, Ben Ruffin 
approached Joe Martin, head of student activities at Duke, asking if Martin 
“could possibly get Dr. Knight to talk with the students who  were now will-
ing to come out and talk.” The proposal was that three students would meet 
three university representatives in the Social Sciences Building right next to 
the Allen Building. The other protesters would remain in the Allen Building. 
Martin called Ashmore and communicated the proposal. Ashmore relayed 
the offer to the administrative group at 4:55 p.m. He also reiterated Wade’s 
view that “vacating is a sine qua non.”71
At 5:05 p.m., Bryson reported a call from the mayor, who advised him that 
240 guardsmen  were mobilized. The mayor was clear, however, that he would 
not “hold the men for action at night.” He was distressed, Bryson said, over the 
delay that had already occurred.72
Knight entered the advancement office at this highly charged moment. 
Hobbs relayed the students’ proposal for negotiations. Bryson told him the 
National Guard was mobilized. The classics- professor- turned- university- 
president, exhausted from months of illness and conflict, now faced the fateful 
choice he had hoped “moderation” would allow him to avoid.
“We have no option to negotiate,” Knight told his colleagues.  Later, the 
Duke president justified this decision as based on princi ple. He had no 
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choice, he advised the Duke Chronicle the next day, but to put “the freedom 
of the University above the force used by the black students.” “If this group 
can win by this means,” he asked, “what about the far right? Look at the 
Nazis in Germany.” “You  can’t use the wrong means to accomplish the right 
ends,” he argued. “If we do, then evil men are  going to use the same means 
for wrong ends.” Knight was also concerned about pre ce dent. He mentioned 
a call he received during the takeover from Ben Roney, an assistant to Gover-
nor Robert W. Scott. “If one University gives in to a set of demands,” Roney 
warned the Duke president, “within 24 hours demands [ will] appear on other 
campuses.”73
Knight was also influenced by internal po liti cal considerations. “ There was 
no way to consider the demands  until they  were out of  there,” he explained. 
“That would have been the immediate kiss of death. . . .  If I had sat down with 
five of them during the day and said, ‘OK,  we’ll negotiate  these [demands] and 
then you  will come out if we agree,’ . . .  I’m certain the board of trustees would 
have repudiated me. We would have had a real donnybrook on our hands,” 
Knight thought. “It  wasn’t an available option.”74
Knight’s decision- making latitude was  limited from the start by his waning 
power among his colleagues and the board of trustees. In effect, his impotence 
simply exacerbated the likelihood of a confrontation.
What ever the mix of reasons, the decision triggered complex emotions for 
Knight, including what he described  later as “a terrible, terrible plea sure. . . . 
You say, ‘now something is  going to be settled,’ ” he explained. “Compared to 
all the attempts to hold force back and to protect  people from the results of 
their actions, . . .  it was an unambiguous act. . . .  It was psychological relief. . . . 
I’m not happy with that [emotion] looking back on it,” Knight reflected, “but 
that’s how it was.”75 Knight’s capacity to seek the “ middle ground” had clearly 
dis appeared.
Only when he learned of the administration’s late after noon refusal to ne-
gotiate did Hopkins realize how unbridgeable the gap had become between 
the Black students and the university. “We want to get  people’s attention, to get 
them to address  these issues,” he explained. “The administration [view] was, 
‘What have  these crazies done?’ So they brought the police down on us. We 
still saw ourselves as Duke students trying to get the attention of the adminis-
tration. They saw us as subversives who  were  going to tear down their campus. 
Allen [Building] was a confirmation of something they had in the back of 
their heads already,” Hopkins now understood. “That we  were destructive- 
oriented, that we  weren’t talking about anything serious.”76
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By now, the scene on the quad had become surreal. “I remember standing 
 there thinking this  really  isn’t happening,” student eyewitness Harry DeMik 
described. He explained,
If you walked between the Allen Building and Social Sciences Building, 
you could see the police assembling down in the gardens. You could see 
the Black students inside [the Allen Building]. It was starting to get a  little 
dark. . . .  You could see the real radical white kids up against the doors 
of Allen Building with Vaseline and towels. . . .  There was a Black student 
with a megaphone . . .  reading off the demands. . . .  The kas  were on the 
other side of the quadrangle . . .  waving the Confederate flag and singing 
“ Dixie.” A lot of white students  were just milling around . . .  just to see what 
was  going to happen.77
Around this time, Cell spoke to Knight. “I knew the cops  were coming,” 
he described, “and I’m afraid somebody is  going to get killed.” “It’s out of my 
hands,” Knight responded. Cell warned the Duke president that police action 
on campus was  going to “blow the university up.” According to Cell, Knight 
responded, “Yes, I know.”78
At approximately 5:15 p.m., Fairbank and Wilson left to deliver the second 
message to the students. Knight called the mayor. H. Franklin Bowers, Duke’s 
man ag er of operations and point of contact with police during the takeover, 
left to talk to T. B. Seagroves, captain in charge of the Durham police detail 
now on the Duke campus. The administrators acknowledged that from this 
point forward, they would have  little say about how events unfolded. They 
agreed that “the question of action at this hour [was] up to the Durham Po-
lice,” meeting minutes rec ord. “We knew in advance that once the police came 
on campus,” Griffith recounted, “they  were in control and we had no control.”79
Fairbank and Wilson handed copies of the second statement to the students 
through the same Allen Building win dow they had used before. “We request 
that you leave this building peacefully,” the brief statement said, “and to do so 
immediately. . . .  You are now suspended pending due pro cess, and if you do 
not vacate the building immediately, all who are pre sent  will be deemed to be 
trespassers and  will be subject to criminal charges for trespassing and other 
violations of law which may occur.”  After reading the statement, a student 
inside the Allen Building said in a loud voice, “Let it be known for the rec ord 
that we have offered to meet and talk with the Administration, and now they 
refuse to do this.” Without any further discussion, Fairbank and Wilson left, 
entering a nearby building to phone the group in the development office to 
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“let them know that the documents had been received by the students and 
read by them.”80
At 5:40 p.m. Hobbs told his colleagues, “It is on.” The police  were on the 
move. A wdbs reporter described a “mass [of] troopers starting to march 
through the gardens. They are all armed with clubs, three tear gas guns. A 
 couple of riot guns. Each man of course has his pistol, and  they’re all equipped 
with a gas mask.” The Black students learned of the police activity from spot-
ters on the outside of the building and a police scanner they had brought with 
them. Ashmore reported that Chief William Pleasants had offered assurances 
“that  there  were enough men to  handle the task.”81
Inside the Allen Building, an intense debate was taking place over  whether 
to stay or leave. Some  were daring and unafraid. “Come on baby,” one stu-
dent commented to wdbs at this dangerous moment, “ because  we’re ready 
for you.” Asked if he thought the student demands would be met, another 
student said, “We  can’t say we are  going to get ’em. But I can say this much— 
we’re  going to fight it all the way to the end.” When the reporter wanted to 
know what the students would use to fight the police, he responded: “What-
ever we can get our hands on. . . .  There’s plenty in the rec ords office that 
you can use to beat  people with when  you’re being struck.” Aware that the 
university’s one- hour ultimatum had passed, the student had a message for 
police. “Do me a  favor,” he told the reporter. “Tell the pigs if  they’re gonna 
attack, we’d appreciate if  they’d be on time.  Because  they’re already fifteen or 
twenty minutes overdue.”82
William Turner explained the genesis of provocative statements such as 
 these years  later. “You are part of the vanguard of a revolution,” he recalled. 
“Fear and risk take on diff er ent proportions. . . .  It’s a  whole diff er ent  mental 
state. Your cause is noble. . . .  You  don’t have a choice. . . .  People  were aware 
of the fact that they could have been hurt, or injured, or killed. But it  wasn’t 
something that stood out in your mind.” That students  were being killed on 
other campuses, Turner explained, “served to intensify your zeal.” Michael 
McBride had a simpler explanation. “We  were young and so naive,” he said. 
“We  were too young to be afraid.”83
Not every one, however, was feeling defiant. “The resolve of some of the stu-
dents appeared to be weakening,” Fuller wrote. “A few of them grew quiet and 
somber. . . .  ‘My parents did not send me to Duke to go to jail,’ ” one student 
told the Black Power leader.84
At this point, Fuller assumed a critical role. “He’s the one who said we 
need to take a vote about  whether or not we  were  going to go or stay,” Becton 
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recalled. “He put the options on the  table of what could happen,” Hopkins 
remembered. The “stay” option, as Fuller described it, was grim. According 
to Williams, Fuller said, “Look— these walls— nobody can see through them. 
The guard’s  going to come in  here,  they’ve got weapons. . . .  You are  going to 
be a bunch of dead  people.  Because their adrenaline is pumping and they are 
armed for combat. They are  going to come in  here to fight. They  don’t care 
what you do. It’s  going to be your word against theirs as to what happened 
inside this building.”85
“We gathered together in one of the rooms in Allen Building and took 
a vote,” Hopkins remembered. “The first vote was  whether to send the fe-
male students out so they  wouldn’t get hurt.” “The men took over,” Williams 
remembered. The men said, “The  women have to leave. Get out.” “If  we’re 
gonna die, or  we’re gonna be hurt, or we gotta fight,” Williams recalled the 
men saying, “Y’all gotta go.” This sparked what Howard described as “a  really 
big  battle.” “I was a stay person,” she remembered. Howard told the men, “I 
can prob ably do more than half of you- all.” Despite this intense disagreement, 
all but three of the  women left the Allen Building through a win dow. “We  were 
real chauvinists at that time,” Hopkins acknowledged years  later. “We  were 
being Duke gentlemen in spite of ourselves.”86
“When I went out the win dow” of the Allen Building, Williams re-
membered, “you are  going across a moat. . . .  The men helped us . . .  out 
from the inside [of the building], and the community . . .  grabbed [us] and 
helped [us] come . . .  out. I was terrified.” All of us “are kind of frightened, 
kind of scared, kind of upset,” Armstrong told a reporter from outside the 
Allen Building. “We’ve been  going through all kinds of  mental pressure all 
day long.”87
The group remaining in the Allen Building now voted on what they should 
do. “Every body voted to stay,” Hopkins related. “ People started bracing them-
selves to fight the cops.” To help deal with tear gas, “we started to put [cigarette 
filters] in our noses,” Catherine LeBlanc recalled. “We had been told that if 
we put lemon juice in our eyes it would [also] help us . . .  with the tear gas.” 
Some students also placed ashtray lids on their heads for protection. “We had 
filters coming out of our noses, lemon in our eyes, crying, and a silver ash tray 
on top,” Michael LeBlanc described. “We  were ready to fight the man . . .  and 
thinking that that was  going to work.”88
The  women who had left the building  were frantic. “We  were all outside 
crying,” Williams recounted, “saying, ‘You all have to come out.’ ” Asked by a 
reporter if they  were  going to “stick around,” several of the  women responded 
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with disbelief. “I wanna see  those men come out of  there,” Armstrong said. 
“ They’re our  brothers. . . .  What ever happens to them happens to us.”89
With the police drawing closer, Fuller again intervened. “I wanted to help 
them leave the building with a feeling of triumph,” he wrote  later, “even though 
their demands had not been met.” The group was unan i mous that exiting the 
Allen Building through a win dow would send the wrong message. Instead, the 
students discussed leaving the building through the front door with “our fists 
raised high.” “If you leave as a group protected by the community,” Armstrong 
recounted Fuller arguing, “it  will [show] that the community has a vested in-
terest in you and that you left with your heads up. You  will have accomplished 
what you came  here to do,” he said, and that was to “bring the university to 
its knees.”90
“Shortly before the cops got  there,” Hopkins recalled, “somebody shouted, 
‘Let’s take another vote.’ ” Becton counted the tally. This time the vote was 
close and difficult to count. “ People would raise their hands, take them 
down, raise them back up,” he recalled. Although the group had de cided—by 
a single vote—to remain in the Allen Building, Becton was determined to 
avoid a bloodbath. The group turned to him for the final count. “I said ‘thir-
teen to twelve to go,’ ” Becton recounted. “Becton lied to save us from  dying,” 
Michael LeBlanc said five de cades  later. “I am so glad he lied.”91
“We had just de cided we had done all we could,” Turner recalled. “I  don’t 
think we  really expected to accomplish that much by staying and getting our 
heads whipped.” “We  were not interested in any violent confrontation,” Brown 
explained. “We saw that we  weren’t  going to get what we wanted right then, 
and if we wanted to avoid  people getting physically hurt and beat up, . . .  it 
would be better to leave.” “None of us wanted to be martyrs,” Howard com-
mented. Fuller was central to the group’s decision to avoid a  battle with police. 
He said, according to Armstrong, “ there is just no reason to [stay], it  will turn 
into a melee and  people  will get hurt.”  People who favored staying “de cided to 
leave”  after Fuller spoke. “Howard Fuller came in and actually saved our lives,” 
Williams recounted  later.92
Even with their decision to leave, however, the students  were not out of 
danger. Griffith heard from the Black students that they had de cided to exit 
the Allen Building. He also learned, likely from the students, that the police 
 were moving  toward the Allen Building. “I  didn’t know the police had been 
called initially,” he recalled. “I ran to the telephone [and] called Knight and 
said, ‘Stop the police  because they are coming out! They are coming out, stop 
the police!’ ” Griffith learned that his call had come too late. “Once [the police] 
No Option to Negotiate 233
had been put in motion,” Griffith was told, “our  people had no control over 
them. They  were subject to the control of their officers.”93
The students now moved to the front door of the Allen Building. “They 
had chained us in the building for some reason,” Hopkins recalled. “They had 
this chain around the front door of Allen Building and this lock on it. We told 
the campus cop [standing just outside] that we  were coming out,” Hopkins 
remembered. “The campus cop said, ‘I  don’t have a key.’ ”94
A good- sized crowd had assembled in a tightly packed group at the two 
basement entrances of the Allen Building. Campus police “quietly moved 
into position near the crowd,” and  people “pressed more closely together and 
locked arms singing ‘We  Shall Overcome.’ ”95
Meanwhile, the police had reached the back door of the Allen Building. 
“It was real tense  because we  were all crowded at the front door,” Hopkins 
described. “We had voted to come out. And the cops  were coming in the back 
way.” At the very last moment, a key was found. “He fi nally got the door open,” 
Hopkins recalled with relief. “We almost got caught in  there in spite of our-
selves.” Although reports on the precise timing of the arrival of the police 
differ slightly, Becton also recalled that “we went out the front door [as] po-
lice  were . . .  breaking down the back door.” As they left, some students held 
coats over their heads to prevent being photographed. They raised clenched 
fists. They walked out between groups of white students and faculty who had 
assembled to protect them. This was critical. “If they had not linked arms to 
protect us,” Michael LeBlanc described  later, “we might be  here, but I  don’t 
know if all of our limbs would be working the same way.”96
Turner had what he described as “an in ter est ing conversation” years  later 
with a member of the Durham police force who had been called to campus 
during the takeover. The officer described to Turner “how pumped up and 
primed the police  were” when they reached the Allen Building. “They had 
been waiting down [in Duke Gardens] all day. They  were  going to whip some 
heads and get this  thing in order. They  were pounding their billy clubs in their 
hands. . . .  By the time they came to flush us out, we  were gone. But they  were 
ready to crack some heads.”97
At this point, the occupation was over. The Black students had departed 
and  were marching down Chapel Drive, away from the Allen Building, joined 
by about 250 supporters. They carried the Malcolm X Liberation School ban-
ner that had hung from the Allen Building throughout the day. The group 
shouted, “Hell no, it  ain’t over.” Campus security entered the Allen Building 
offices just vacated by the students. Without further intervention, students 
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and other onlookers on campus, including  those surrounding the Allen Build-
ing, planned to disperse. But then, tragically, police action began. Once un-
derway, the police would not turn back without a confrontation.98
On Chapel Drive, “police cars . . .  started driving through the crowd” of 
marchers, Williams recounted. “They  were not stopping for anybody. White 
students as well as Black students  were having to be pulled out from in front of 
the cars. . . .  You could see even the white students getting mad, saying, ‘What 
have we done to make you treat us like that?’ ” she recalled, saying, “ ‘We are 
just out  here looking.’ ”99
A similar scene played out on the quad. Students and other onlookers  were 
milling around the Allen Building when “approximately five or six patrol 
cars” arrived, joining  those police who had come on foot from Duke Gardens. 
“ There’s a bunch of cops all over the place,” a wdbs reporter commented. 
The arrival of the police cars drew more students  toward the Allen Building, 
including some who had left with the Black students. “With helmets, tear gas, 
and what some  people refer to as  cattle prods,” wdbs reported, police “are now 
standing at the doorway of Allen Building, completely surrounding it.” Police 
had also encircled students at the two back doors, Griffith told administra-
tors, holding them in place with billy clubs. Students started shouting “Sieg 
Heil,” “fascist,” and “Nazi” at the police, some throwing their arms upward 
in the Nazi salute. Observing the scene, Martin called the advancement of-
fice around 6:00 p.m., suggesting to Ashmore that “if we could get the po-
lice moved, we could avert a confrontation.” Ashmore responded, “All right, 
I have Frank Bowers right  here.” But although Bowers had been designated 
university liaison with the police, no effective line of communication had been 
established. The se nior administrators in the advancement office  were unable 
to control the police who  were now on campus.100
The exact precipitating event for what came next is still in dispute. Many 
reports cite rocks or other projectiles thrown by students at the police. What 
is clear, however, is that the police now determined it was necessary to dis-
perse the crowd. “Oh boy,” a wdbs reporter said, gasping for breath, “cops 
started throwing tear gas grenades into the students.” Students  were “ running 
away, . . .  throwing anything they can get their hands on” at the police. Po-
lice  were “ running around tear gassing every thing in sight,” one student was 
overheard commenting on wdbs. “One demonstrator picked up a [tear gas] 
grenade,” another reporter described, and “threw it at the police still smoking. 
That evoked a  great cheer from the crowd and the spectators surrounding 
them.”101
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“It was like a war broke out on the quad,” DeMik recounted. “Tear gas was 
flying everywhere. . . .  The police ran out of tear gas and they  were beaten back 
 towards [the Allen] Building. . . .  When the police came out, . . .  they started 
hitting  people with billy clubs and tear gas started  going through the air. [It] lit 
a fuse among [the] students . . .  and a lot of them fought back.” A number  were 
catching tear gas canisters in towels and throwing them back at police. Foot-
ball players, who had been on the quad to taunt white supporters of the Black 
students, got caught up in events. They “ended up involved in the riot,” Camp-
bell recalled. “All of a sudden [they]  were getting tear gassed and clubbed.” 
Each time the police ran out of tear gas, DeMik reported, “they started to 
retreat back  towards Allen Building.” As “the police retreated  toward Allen 
Building,” the Duke Chronicle reported, “the crowds of students followed at a 
distance. The police charged again, and the crowd retreated again. The police 
retreated again and the crowd moved in again.” This continued for more than 
an hour. Many students sought refuge in the chapel. Police chased them into 
the chapel, spraying tear gas in the building. “Go Home, Go Home,” students 
 were shouting at the police. “It was all pretty ludicrous,” Griffith commented 
 later.102
Soon, police brought out a pepper gas machine, which Martin described as 
looking like “a combination- vacuum- cleaner- ray- gun.” “Clouds of . . .  pepper 
gas would just billow out,” DeMik recounted. Martin at one point saw “two po-
licemen, one carry ing the smoke- spewing machine, chasing one lone person 
across the lawn.” Another student reported seeing police “striking anything in 
their path, including a dog that  later died and several students and at least one 
adult.” “One policeman tripped a student with his club,” he wrote, “and then 
struck him  after he had fallen.” Students started “taking out their frustrations,” 
DeMik commented. “They  were breaking the win dows [of a police car]; they 
 were breaking the headlights.”103 Soon the police car went up in flames.
During the chaos, Fairbank and Wilson saw fires erupting in the woods 
between the chapel and the physics building. Soon, “ten or more fires [ were 
burning], each of which  were confined to an area of about 100 square feet or 
less.”104
Cook witnessed the scene on the quad from the front of the Allen Build-
ing. The police “ were just brutal,” he described, “knocking folks down and . . . 
screaming . . .  ‘Move, move, move, move! Get out of  here!’ . . .  Those police-
men  were rough. . . .  One guy, they hit him on the head and [he] had to go to 
the hospital. . . .  Someone said to me, ‘This is like Nazi Germany.’ Well, you 
know, the harsh brutality.” Marjorie Becker, a student, was standing near Cook 
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watching the melee. She grabbed him and said, “Oh, Dr. Cook!” the professor 
recalled. “I was her protector.” Trying to break the tension with humor, Cook 
told the student he was “protecting,” “ You’re  going to have me lynched out 
 here!”105
Cell recalled feeling “absolutely helpless” watching events unfold. Campbell 
was “very frightened. . . .  Here  were a hundred or so police in full riot gear,” he 
recounted, “with tear gas cannons and all that.” “I remember thinking at the 
time that I  wouldn’t be surprised if the police actually started shooting  people. 
They  were so angry.” “A Durham police officer drew his gun and pointed it at 
me and some of the [other] students,” Wib Gulley recalled, “and I was very 
concerned about what was  going to happen.” “Kent State could very well have 
happened at Duke,” Howard thought  later. “I think the potential was  there.”106
Throughout much of this time, Cahow reported, Duke administrators in 
the development office “ didn’t know what was  going on. . . .  They  were isolated 
down  there. It was amazing,” the assistant registrar thought. “Absolutely amaz-
ing.” “We should have had complete control and communication between the 
police and the persons who  were serving as communication links,” Hobbs 
acknowledged. “That was the crazy part of it,” he explained. “The Black stu-
dents got out of the building before all of this other mess developed. . . .  Had 
 there been proper communication between the  people who  were serving as 
a communication link and the police, the police [could] have  stopped at a 
totally diff er ent location.”107 In effect, the melee on the quad would have been 
avoided altogether.
One administrator who was not isolated from the crisis was Griffith. He 
remained in the  middle of events, urgently attempting to get the police off 
campus. The officers had retreated into the Allen Building. “It seemed to me,” 
Griffith reasoned, “that if we got rid of the police,  there would be no prob lem.” 
At 6:45 p.m., Powell’s minutes indicate, Griffith called the advancement office 
“suggesting police be called off campus without attracting attention.” The feel-
ing of se nior administrators, Griffith recalled, “was that if the police left the 
building, it would be re- occupied by Blacks.”  After he was able to show se nior 
administrators and the police that no reoccupation would occur, the order 
came for the police to leave. They withdrew in stages, the first group depart-
ing campus at around 7:45. “Within twenty minutes,” Griffith remembered, 
“the campus was quiet.” “A  great deal of credit . . .  needs to go to Bill Griffith,” 
Cahow thought. “He stayed in the  middle, and he’s the only one that did.”108
An initial sweep through the registrar’s office showed that no rec ords had 
been destroyed and  little damage had occurred. “ There was no real damage 
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to the office,” Cahow commented. “They  didn’t disturb anything from what I 
could tell that belonged to the university.” “We  were relieved that nobody had 
been killed in the building,” Cell recounted. He also recalled feeling “very very 
depressed, very numb, defeated. . . .  It felt like hell,” he said. “It was a bad day.”109
Nineteen  people  were admitted to the Duke hospital emergency room on 
the eve ning of February 13 with injuries “related to the disturbance on cam-
pus.” Injuries included hematoma to the temporal scalp, a mild concussion, 
laceration to the scalp, a sprained ankle, and third- degree burns on a hand. 
Two police  were treated, including one listed as a “25 year old male struck on 
[the] back of [a] helmet with [an] unknown object” with “brief loss of con-
sciousness.” Five students  were arrested.110
The Black students who participated in the takeover went in vari ous direc-
tions. Some walked to a Black church to discuss what to do next. Another 
group went to the aas office to confirm that they could account for  every 
Black student who had participated. McBride called his parents: “I knew they 
would see this on the news,” he recalled, “and I wanted them to know I was 
OK.”  Others returned to their dorms. “I remember it was 6:30 and Walter 
Cronkite was on,” Armstrong recounted, “and all of a sudden we hear all this 
noise and  people  were screaming. Chuck said, ‘What is  going on?’ And that is 
when the tear gas got started. . . .  It was so ironic  because all of us  were inside 
and safe.”111
Howard thought the fact that few, if any, Blacks remained on the quad when 
the confrontation between the police and students erupted was illustrative of 
diff er ent attitudes  toward law enforcement. White students, she believed, “had 
this feeling ‘the police would not do this to us,’ ” and thought, “ ‘ They’re bluff-
ing.’ ” Black students “had just the opposite” reaction, she explained. Many in 
the Allen Building believed the police would “shoot us down, [and] burn the 
building down with us in it.” “I voted that we should stay” in the Allen Build-
ing, Hopkins acknowledged. “But  after I got out  there and saw what the police 
had done, I was glad we voted again.”112
A forum attended by more than one thousand students, faculty, and mem-
bers of the administration was held at Page Auditorium that eve ning. Hopkins 
described the takeover as “one  battle . . .  in [our] strug gle to gain our human-
ity at this university. . . .  Our main aim,” he told the cheering crowd, “is to 
intensify the strug gle we have begun.” “So I say that this university should be 
 stopped and the  people should decide how it’s  going to be run,” Hopkins im-
plored. “We’ve got to get them pigs out of Allen Building . . . ’cause . . .  they’ve 
lost their place in humanity.”113
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Hobbs and Cartwright also appeared at the forum. They announced the 
formation of the Kerckhoff Committee and said the president would address 
the university community on Saturday at 1:00 p.m. in the indoor stadium. To 
angry shouts, Cartwright insisted, “We cannot operate a university  unless we 
can operate it with rational discourse.”114
At the end of the forum, the group voted overwhelmingly to declare a 
three- day boycott of classes and to establish a “ free university” to operate dur-
ing the boycott. It also called for amnesty for the Black student protesters and 
reinstatement for Blacks forced to leave the university in the fall  because of 
their academic standing.115
Students returned to their dorms. Hobbs made it home around 10:30 p.m. 
The events of February 13, 1969, at Duke  were now over. But the university’s 
efforts to grapple with the fallout from the Allen Building takeover  were only 
just beginning.
The events of February 13, 1969, at Duke University represented the culmina-
tion of racial and interpersonal dynamics that had existed from the moment 
of desegregation. The university failed completely to anticipate the needs of 
Black undergraduates or to plan for their adjustment to a previously all- white 
campus. No effort was made to get to know the students or to learn about the 
communities and families from which they had come.
As a result, it was left to the students to “assimilate.” Most officials at Duke 
believed that the new students  were fortunate simply to have the chance to 
attend the school. They felt that no changes  were necessary to create an aca-
demic environment where Black students could learn and grow. In the ab-
sence of any initiative by the university, relationships between Black and white 
students— and with faculty and administrators— were left to chance. In almost 
all instances, Duke’s response to its Black students was  shaped by Jim Crow 
racial views still held by many trustees and alumni. Put simply, Black students 
 were not viewed as part of the Duke University “ family.” Rather, as President 
Knight explained  later, they  were regarded as “intruders.”116
Black students thus encountered a hostile environment when they arrived 
at Duke. Their feelings of isolation and alienation grew. As they became more 
or ga nized, the Black students demanded changes. They sought a university 
able to provide a meaningful academic, social, and cultural experience for 
both white and Black students. Change came very slowly, and only in response 
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to government directives or escalating pressure from the students. Frustration 
and anger increased. Notwithstanding enormous risks, members of the aas 
fi nally de cided to occupy the Allen Building. Their goal was to force change 
at the university.
This was the context for Duke’s response to the Allen Building takeover. 
When University House was occupied on April 5, 1968, by a group consisting 
primarily of white students, the protesters  were called “guests” and allowed to 
remain for more than thirty- six hours.  Women  were given permission by the 
president himself to stay overnight and thus escape punishment for violating 
dorm rules. Griffith explained that administrators believed that the university 
should refrain from using force to clear University House. Despite repeated 
shouts of “hell no, we  won’t go,” protesters, according to Griffith,  were “our 
students, they  weren’t our enemies. They  were part of our university  family.” 
Asked afterward by a faculty member why the  Silent Vigil protesters who oc-
cupied the quad for four days  were not arrested, Huestis was direct. “Well, you 
know, I  don’t think I could quite bring myself to do that,” he told his faculty 
colleague. “I had too many friends out  there.”117
Black student protesters enjoyed no such deference. The university’s re-
sponse to them was dismissive, condescending, and arbitrary. While the take-
over differed from the occupation of University House and the  Silent Vigil in 
impor tant re spects, all three protests resulted in only minimal destruction of 
property and no injury to persons. Both the Allen Building takeover and the 
 Silent Vigil disrupted university operations. Unlike the takeover, however, the 
 Silent Vigil— with its concurrent boycott and strike— effectively shut down 
the university.  Because university decision makers had few, if any, personal 
relationships with the Allen Building protesters, they could only view them 
as outsiders. Race made it almost impossible for  those in power at Duke to 
establish close connections with  these students. In stark contrast to the oc-
cupation and  Silent Vigil, just over one hour from the time they learned of the 
takeover, university officials drew a “line in the sand.” Black students would 
receive an ultimatum from the university, then face what ever force was neces-
sary to eject them.118
The university could envision only two pos si ble responses to the Allen 
Building takeover. The first was conducting substantive negotiations on Black 
student demands while protesters occupied the building. This was po liti cally 
untenable. The second was the deployment of overwhelming force to clear the 
building by nightfall. No serious consideration was ever given to maintaining 
the status quo long enough for a peaceful way out of the standoff to emerge.
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Knight would explain  later that speed in deploying force was necessary to 
protect the Black students from white vigilantes who  were waiting for nightfall 
to attack. Few, including the Black students, shared this concern.  Silent Vigil 
participants on the quad received bomb and other threats of physical vio lence 
from  those who opposed their protest. In that instance, Durham police  were 
also summoned to campus. Their job, however, was to protect the protesters 
from threats, not clear the quadrangle.  There is no indication that Knight or 
his colleagues ever considered using the police to protect the Allen Building 
protesters from threats they might face.
Unlike the ongoing contacts between administrators, faculty, and protest 
leaders that occurred throughout the University House occupation and the 
 Silent Vigil, no such interactions occurred during the Allen Building takeover. 
Hobbs, who had never previously met with the Black students, tried only once 
to engage directly with the protesters. When he issued the university’s ultima-
tum to the Black students, he refused to answer questions. Once back in Dur-
ham, Knight was offered the chance to call the protesters. Only ten months 
 earlier, the Duke president had invited a group of predominantly white stu-
dents into his home for what became a thirty- six- hour occupation  because, 
he explained, “he wanted as  little distance as pos si ble between [students and 
himself] when the impor tant questions turned up.” Given the chance to call 
the Black students in the Allen Building, however, he declined, concluding 
that such a call would be pointless. No one ever asked Cook or Cell— the 
professors closest to the Black students—to reach out to them on behalf of the 
university. That Hobbs considered one effort at communication a sufficient 
precursor to invoking force is telling. He did not know  these students, and 
they did not know him. How could Hobbs even imagine that further out-
reach might defuse an escalating situation? In the end, Hobbs seemed more 
interested in creating a rec ord that he had made an attempt to contact the 
protesters than in actually engaging with them. Even  after the Black students 
expressed a willingness to negotiate a resolution, confrontation by force re-
mained the university’s preferred option. Duke “was willing to go to the brink 
of disaster by bringing police on the campus,” Becton summarized correctly, 
“but unwilling,  after Blacks had occupied Allen Building for six hours, to talk 
to  those students who occupied the building.”119
 Because university officials focused almost entirely on regaining control, 
they failed to fully consider the risks associated with bringing police onto 
campus. Hobbs, among  others, appears to have been unconcerned about the 
possibility that police might use excessive force against the Black student 
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protesters. Even with 1,500 students, faculty, and members of the community 
gathered on the quad, university leaders hesitated in using force only long 
enough to mobilize the National Guard. Without effective communication 
among administrators, or the ability of university officials to direct police ac-
tivity, it is not surprising that the introduction of police to an already vola-
tile campus situation led to chaos and vio lence. Black protesters  were lucky 
enough to escape physical harm  because trusted advisers and historical expe-
rience made them aware of the peril they faced. Many  others at Duke that day 
 were not so fortunate.
If the Black students had vacated the Allen Building when first asked to 
do so, the day of the takeover would have ended differently. Yet the more 
challenging question is  whether the use of force by the university against its 
students had to happen once the takeover occurred. Knight, for one, saw race 
playing a role in the crucial decisions made that day. Asked if it was “easier” 
for the university to use force against Black students than white students, the 
Duke president was candid. “Of course. . . .  That  isn’t a difficult question to 
answer, that’s just how it is,” Knight said. “That’s just the nature of  things.”120
CHAPTER 9
We  Shall Have Cocktails in the Gloaming
Aftermath
The Allen Building takeover and the ensuing melee on the quad triggered 
intense reactions among all segments of the Duke community. Letters poured 
in to Knight and other members of his administration. Differences of opinion 
 were stark. “Every body had an idea about what to do,” Knight wrote to one 
alumnus, “but naturally the ideas  were in violent conflict with one another.” 
As a result, the takeover and the events that followed  were, according to the 
Duke president, “as strenuous an experience as I can remember.”1
Trustees  were pleased that the police had been called in. “I have heard 
nothing but praise from  those I have talked with for this prompt and firm 
action,” trustee and Executive Committee member Henry Rauch wrote to pro-
vost Marcus Hobbs. Tom Finch, president of Thomasville Furniture Industries, 
commended Knight for his “firmness.” He likened the takeover to “sit down 
strikes” in an industrial plant. “If management does not act promptly . . .  and 
with extreme firmness,” he told Knight, “management loses control of the situ-
ation,” warning that “it may be as many as 10 years before any semblance of 
proper order can be restored.”2
Faculty  were also mainly supportive of the administration. In response 
to a questionnaire circulated by sociologists Allan Kornberg and Kurt Black, 
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87  percent called the occupation “unjustified” and fewer than 25  percent called 
the administration’s  handling of the occupation “bad.” “A considerable num-
ber [of faculty] felt that the black students had a more than ordinary duty to 
conform,” Knight explained, “to be good ‘white’ students.” He saw a “lively 
sense of outrage” among faculty over the takeover. “ There can be no compro-
mise what ever with vio lence and destruction,” faculty member and nuclear 
physicist Lawrence Biedenharn wrote. “When students perform criminal acts, 
they must be treated as criminals,” biochemistry professor Irwin Fridovich 
commented. He called for the expulsion and criminal prosecution of the pro-
testers and opposed any form of amnesty for students he called “outlaws.” Fac-
ulty who opposed the administration’s  handling of the takeover felt strongly as 
well. “I am ashamed of what you have done  today,” assistant professor Robert 
Jackson wrote to Knight in a tele gram. “This should be a community of reason, 
not of force.”3
Student opinion was divided. As many as 56  percent of undergraduates and 
68  percent of gradu ate and professional students called the takeover “unjusti-
fied.” But 51  percent in each group described the administration’s  handling of 
the event “bad.” In an editorial, the Duke Chronicle called the administration’s 
decision to call in the police “reprehensible and immoral” and “stupid in the 
extreme.” Gradu ate student James Huntley Grayson wrote to Knight just  after 
he was released from the hospital following the melee on the quad. Grayson 
protested the “completely irresponsible action of the police,” saying he “was 
beaten for no other reason . . .  than the fact that I did not move fast enough.” 
Student Ray Winton objected to the takeover. “As a fellow student of [ those] 
students who took over the offices in Allen Building,” he wrote, “I am in  favor 
of nothing less than their expulsion from Duke University.”4
Not surprisingly, the Kornberg and Black questionnaire found that the in-
tervention of police on campus made students more sympathetic to the occu-
pation and increasingly likely to consider the administration’s  handling of the 
protest “bad.” Cook observed the unfolding of this dynamic,  going so far as to 
call the police “the  great evangelicals.” The police, Cook believed, “did more 
to help the blacks’ cause at Duke than almost all the liberals who had ever 
been  there.” “For that brief moment,” Brenda Armstrong explained, “every-
body [on the quad] understood the desperation, the feeling of not having any 
options. . . .  They felt what it was like to not be heard.”5
Alumni reactions  were the most negative. With few exceptions, Duke 
gradu ates  were profoundly disturbed by the takeover and angry that Duke 
administrators had allowed  matters to reach this point. “We are waiting to see 
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who is in control of Duke University,” one wrote. “Duke is too  great a school 
to be dragged down by a bunch of punks.” William J. Massey, a 1962 gradu ate, 
urged “maintenance of administrative control by what ever means necessary.” 
“Trespass and destruction of private property are as wrong in 1969,” an alum-
nus from Florida wrote, “as they  were when the Goths overran Rome, and 
when Nazi legions pillaged Poland and France.” “If  there must be a war on the 
Duke University campus,” another said, “let it be said that Duke fought for the 
aims for which it was created.”6
A number of alumni used racially charged language to express their con-
cern. “Expel the Black Bastards,” one alumnus wrote. “Expel ’em all and admit 
no more of them,” a double- degree gradu ate from Asheville urged. “Other-
wise, they  will expel you.” “Your first  mistake was to enroll them,” a class of ’49 
gradu ate wrote to Knight. “Or ga nize Duke grads all over the world if need be 
not only to drive the animals out but keep them out.” One alumnus from Gas-
tonia, North Carolina, drew on his sense of Duke history to make his point. 
James Duke’s sole purpose in setting up the Duke Indenture, he said, “was to 
provide for the education of the young  people of the South. I do not believe 
that he intended the school to be established for the purpose of integration. It 
is a shame to permit a handful of burr- heads to disrupt . . .  Duke University,” 
he concluded.7
Such comments, according to Knight, “ weren’t just reflecting the feeling of 
the moment. They  were reflecting feelings that  were years long.” “The assump-
tion was that once a commitment had been made to accept black students, 
that was all we needed to do,” Knight recounted. “The fact that Ralph Ellison’s 
‘invisible men’  were still invisible was of no concern.” In this context, demands 
by the Black students for changes to university policy, curriculum, and culture 
seemed unfathomable. “It was only [ after the Allen Building takeover] that I 
found out how deep the racist convictions went,” Knight reflected. “Then the 
requirement to bow to racial equality would evaporate.”8 Challenged from all 
sides, Knight would strug gle to find a path forward for the university— and 
himself.
In the days following the takeover, tensions on campus remained high. Fol-
lowing up on a request from Knight, Durham mayor Robert Wensell “Wense” 
Grabarek sent a tele gram to Governor Scott on February 14. “Due to uncer-
tainty of existing conditions and pos si ble attendant repercussions,” the mayor 
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requested that “National Guard troops remain available for immediate call 
through the weekend of February 15 and 16.” Acting at the request of the state 
adjutant general, Knight’s previously announced speech on February 15 in the 
indoor stadium was canceled. A statement by the university said that the ac-
tion was taken “in order to avoid a large gathering during a time of tension 
on the campus.” The Duke president “feared that with a number of polarized 
groups  there might be disruption.”9
The administration’s attempts to avoid a “large gathering” on campus 
 were unsuccessful. On Saturday at 12:30 p.m., the time of Knight’s scheduled 
speech, a crowd of two thousand packed Page Auditorium for a community 
“convocation” to discuss events since the takeover and the student response. 
When Black students arrived minutes  later, led by Howard Fuller, they  were 
greeted with a standing ovation.10
Michael McBride, president of the aas, spoke first. He emphasized the im-
portance of Black student control over  matters that involved them. On Black 
studies, for example, McBride argued that “white  people cannot objectively set 
up a program about Black  people.” Accordingly, he said, “Black  people  will set up 
the program; Black  people  will control the program; Black  people  will teach the 
courses.” McBride also made clear that any Black student adviser must be selected 
“in direct consultation” with the Black students. “How in the hell,” he said, “are 
them white  people over in Allen Building  going to select a Black adviser for 
me? They  don’t know what Black  people are. They  don’t know who can relate 
to us.”11
 After other speakers, including Fuller and William Griffith, addressed the 
gathering, someone suggested that a group march to Knight’s  house to ask 
the Duke president “for a just redress of our grievances.”  After Fuller “sec-
onded the motion,” the march began. Just  after a crowd of about one thou-
sand arrived at University House, what the Duke Chronicle described as “a 
tired, frightened Douglas Knight” met them outside.12 A chaotic, combative 
exchange followed.
“ You’ve never  really shown good faith,” one student charged. Claiming 
that steps taken by the university thus far  were only  those necessary to “pla-
cate a few  people,” the student demanded that Knight “do a lot of  things right 
now.” “We have met several of  those demands . . .  and you know it,” Knight 
responded. “And we  will work with the  others as fast as we can if we have that 
chance.” “We want some action!” a student shouted. “I’m sorry that the  things 
that have been done . . .  fit your idea of nothing at all,” Knight said, “ because 
they have been considerable.”13
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Knight thought he could demonstrate the university’s good faith by dis-
cussing pro gress on a Black studies program. Presumably referring to the 
work of the Proctor Committee appointed in early November, he told the 
group about a department of Afro- American studies that “respected mem-
bers of the faculty” had “recommended . . .  to us.” The department would 
“take some time to put . . .  together,” he explained, and “has to be approved 
by the entire faculty.” Continuing, Knight described how “a  great many of the 
courses that made the best sense in that department are already being taught 
in the university. . . .  There  will be  others,” he said, “that I’m sure  we’ll want to 
work out together.”  These facts, Knight said, showed that the university had 
“honestly, in good faith . . .  worked  toward this department. Is that an unfair 
statement?” Knight asked.14
“Yes,” Chuck Hopkins responded, “it’s unfair.” In fact, the university had 
never announced the formation of the Proctor Committee and students  were 
unaware that specific planning for a Black studies program for undergraduates 
had started. Far from confirming that the university was working “honestly” 
and in “good faith,” Knight’s reference to a faculty recommendation on Black 
studies only confirmed the Black students’ fear that they would have  little, if 
any, input into the program. “Who developed this program?” Hopkins asked. 
“We had no part in developing it.” As to Knight’s assertion that many courses 
in Duke’s Black studies program were already being taught at the university, 
Hopkins was incredulous. “The  people who run  these departments are old 
and are not qualified to deal with what we are talking about,” he told Knight. 
“They are not qualified to relate to Black  people.  They’re not qualified to relate 
to a Black studies program. We  will not accept such a program being forced 
down our throats. You can name it a Black studies program, but it’s not a Black 
studies program. It’s something  you’ve thrown together to appease  people.”15
For Fuller, student involvement— from the outset— was the key issue. “Are 
you prepared,” he asked Knight, “to give Black students the voice and control 
of vari ous aspects of the Afro studies program? Who’s  going to write up the 
 whole Afro studies program to start with?” he asked. “ We’re saying Black stu-
dents are the ones who’ve got to be involved with it.” Knight was willing to 
concede some student participation but only to a point. Students would be 
“involved” but not “controlling all by themselves,” he clarified. “I’m not say-
ing that any one group controls it.”16 Black students took Knight’s response 
to mean that since “control” of Black studies was shared among groups, they 
would have the power to block any proposal they did not endorse. In truth, 
the university had no intention of ceding this level of control over the devel-
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opment of a university academic program. The stage was thus set for further 
conflict in the coming days.
 After more back- and- forth, Knight and the students agreed to hold a 
follow-up meeting to discuss the Black students’ demands. Attended by aas 
representatives, faculty, and administrators, the meeting would convene at 
University House at 8:00 p.m. that eve ning.17
Early Saturday eve ning, Knight’s first public comments on the takeover 
 were broadcast over wdbs.  After providing reassurance of his “longstanding 
and deep concern for the position of black students on the Duke campus,” the 
Duke president said that police  were called to campus only as a last option. “I 
regret more than I can ever tell any one of you, that it was necessary to bring 
police onto the campus,” he said. “But no honest choice was made evident to 
us during the ten hours . . .  in which we proposed a  great variety of pos si ble 
solutions to  those occupying the building.”18 The fact that the university had 
made only one attempt to speak directly with the Black students and that it 
had refused a late after noon offer by students to negotiate seemed to directly 
contradict the “ great variety of pos si ble solutions” that Knight mentioned.
Following his remarks on wdbs, the 8:00 p.m. meeting at Knight’s  house 
was productive. Board chair Charles “Wade was  there, Knight was  there. How-
ard Fuller was  there and a half a dozen Black students, all dressed in black,” 
Richard Watson recalled. Joining them  were three members of the Kerckhoff 
Committee and Hobbs. “Howard Fuller was very eloquent in outlining the 
so- called demands,” Watson noted. “In almost  every instance, Knight seemed 
to give assurance that  there was no real prob lem in working them out.”  After 
three hours, an agreement “in concept” was reached on all but one of the 
issues— amnesty for the Black student protesters. The group agreed that the 
Kerckhoff Committee and the aas would work on a “joint statement” setting 
forth the points addressed at that eve ning’s meeting. The statement would be 
presented to the Duke community in Page Auditorium at 2:30 p.m. on Sun-
day. The Duke Chronicle reported that before the Black students left, Knight 
counseled them “not to act victorious” and “not to boast that they gained con-
cessions from him and  others attending the meeting.” The students agreed. “It 
was a very congenial affair,” Watson said  later of the meeting.19
Hopkins was the first to speak at the Sunday after noon meeting in Page 
Auditorium, confirming that the Black students had agreed to the statement 
Kerckhoff would be reading. The students hoped, Hopkins said, “that the 
constructive results obtained [at the Saturday night meeting]  will make Duke 
University more relevant to the needs and aspirations of black  people.”20
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The “statement of understandings” Kerckhoff read was promising. At the 
Saturday night meeting, the discussion was “at a level of specificity and depth of 
meaning that was most impressive,” he noted. “A  great deal of information was 
exchanged” and “some real understanding was achieved.” Kerckhoff reviewed the 
issues in three categories. The first  were actions that had been taken by the uni-
versity “about which the Afro- American students had not been fully informed.” 
As an example, Kerckhoff pointed to the “felt need for an advisor for black stu-
dents.”  Here he reiterated the university’s commitment to hire such a person but 
added that the individual selected “ will be (must be) mutually acceptable to the 
students and the administration.” Applause greeted this clarification.21
The second category involved issues on which “tangible pro gress has been 
made and on which  future plans have been made.” By far, the most impor tant 
item in this category was Black studies. Referring to the funding proposal 
prepared by Professor Cell in late 1968 and the more recent work of the Proc-
tor Committee, Kerckhoff characterized both as merely a “rough outline” for 
a Black studies program. He announced that an intensive multiday retreat 
would be scheduled in the near  future “to move forward [on a Black studies 
program] at a rapid pace.” Black student representatives would attend the re-
treat, along with Duke faculty, members of the Kerckhoff Committee, and one 
or two outside con sul tants. A deadline of April 15 was established for comple-
tion of a Black studies proposal with at least some parts to be implemented by 
the start of the fall semester.22
This sounded positive. Not only would Black students participate in a re-
treat to plan the Black studies program at Duke, but the university had agreed 
to consult outsiders with deep experience in the area. Moreover, the dead-
lines Kerckhoff announced showed a sense of urgency. The crowd once again 
applauded.23
This positive response, however, turned out to be premature. The issue 
of how much control Black students would have over the development and 
implementation of the Black studies program remained unresolved. Asked if 
Black students would have “some sort of voting power in the hiring or firing 
of professors in the program,” Kerckhoff was ambiguous. He pointed to the 
upcoming retreat. “Where it goes from  there depends on the outcome of that 
meeting,” Kerckhoff explained.24 What ever his intention, Black students heard 
this statement as confirmation that no framework for a Black studies program 
would emerge from the retreat without their agreement.
The final category involved issues about which “the expression of need 
by the [Black] students was not clearly understood.”  These items included 
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grading, the formation of a committee on Black activities within the student 
 union, a reconsideration of admissions criteria, an increase in the number of 
Black students on campus, and prob lems of police harassment. Without being 
specific, Kerckhoff had acknowledged that each issue required attention and 
agreed, in most instances, that his committee would help facilitate further 
discussions.25
 Those in attendance felt that some pro gress had been made.  After a brief 
question- and- answer session, the group voted to suspend the class boycott 
originally scheduled to run through Monday. The university  later made clear 
that, notwithstanding their suspension “pending due pro cess,” takeover par-
ticipants could continue to attend classes, at least  until a disciplinary hearing 
was held.
On Sunday eve ning, Knight again broadcast remarks over wdbs. The items 
covered in the “statement of understandings” read at Page in the after noon 
 were not “major new decisions,” Knight told the Duke community. Rather, 
they  were “ matters which actually have been concerns of the University for 
months or even years.” The results achieved “ were not brought about by con-
frontation,” the Duke president insisted. Rather, “they  were brought about . . . 
by  human beings who met in mutual faith and true desire for the understand-
ing of one another’s points of view.” In comments to the press, Frank Ash-
more was even more direct. “The only  thing [the protesters] accomplished,” 
he said, “was a recapitulation of what is being done or previously has been 
announced.”26
The university’s claim that no concessions had been made to the Black 
students was lost in the press coverage of the meeting. “University to Meet 
Most Afro Demands,” the Duke Chronicle announced in a large front- page 
headline. “We got more done in that three hours” at Knight’s  house, McBride 
commented to the paper, “than we ever have before. . . .  It’s amazing what they 
can do when they realize they have to do it.” As to Knight’s protestation that 
the items announced  were already in the works, McBride was skeptical. “No 
 matter what they want to say,” he commented, “we now have some specific 
answers we  didn’t have before.”27
Newspapers throughout the South described the statement of understand-
ings as capitulation by the university. “Stripped of its camouflage of mislead-
ing academic language,” the Charleston Eve ning Post editorialized, the “ ‘peace 
settlement’ arrived at by Duke University administrators and dissident Negro 
students boils down to one  thing: abject surrender by the administration.” 
“The concessions which Duke University granted this weekend to a handful of 
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black militant students are a sell- out to vio lence,” the Richmond News Leader 
wrote. “When confronted by campus revolutionaries, Duke president Doug-
las M. Knight demonstrated weak- kneed ambivalence.”28
Letters and tele grams, most of them furious, again flooded in from alumni. 
Some blamed events on broader changes they had seen at Duke during the 
1960s. “I have not approved of the growing liberal policy at Duke,” one wrote, 
“and feel sure that the pre sent ultra- liberal policy is the reason students felt 
they could get by with revolution.” Another alumnus claimed that “Duke has 
let the character of the student body deteriorate” and argued that it was “in the 
name of liberalization” that the university “did not take a strong stand against 
the rebels.”29
Many alumni responded to news reports by withdrawing their financial 
support from the university. “Your capitulation in the face of most unreason-
able demands by Duke’s Negro students has assured the University a  future of 
mediocrity,” a member of the class of 1962 wrote. “In the past, I have regretted 
that I was unable to contribute more to Duke’s  future. Now, I regret that I have 
contributed at all.” Another was “ashamed” at the university’s response to the 
“black militants.” “In the  future,” he said, “do not send me any further requests 
from the Alumni Association for loyalty fund pledges. You can get money from 
the naacp or  others.”30
By far, the greatest anger was directed personally  toward Knight. He was 
seen as weak for failing to control events on campus and giving in to Black 
student demands. “If the Board of Trustees had hired you for the sole purpose 
of wrecking Duke University,” one wrote to Knight, “you  couldn’t have done 
a better job.” Citing Knight’s “complete lack of courage in  every crisis you 
have faced,” this alumnus said the Duke president had “destroyed our repu-
tation among  those who love this university.” “So you fi nally gave in to the 
bastards, eh?” an alumnus asked rhetorically. “ Brother, are you  really chicken.” 
An alumnus from Raleigh, North Carolina, communicated his concerns di-
rectly to the chairman of the board. “It is the consensus of  those to whom 
I have talked that Dr. Knight has fi nally brought complete chaos, embarrass-
ment, and total failure of the University.” The Duke president had “recruited, 
coddled and cajoled a group of neurotic mal- contents,” this alumnus wrote, 
“whose only interests are disruption, contempt and ridicule.” He implored the 
chairman to “remove the blight which has smitten an outstanding [university] 
and to restore some degree of leadership and be hav ior.”31
Inevitably,  these concerns became a primary topic of discussion at the 
March 7, 1969, meeting of the board of trustees. At that meeting, Wade pro-
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vided copies of an alumni petition to board members. The document “ex-
pressed profound dissatisfaction with the administration of the University.” 
It also “expressed . . .  the hope that the Board would take action to prevent 
wrongful, unwarranted and unlawful acts on the part of students and  others.” 
The minutes of the meeting do not document what response, if any, the Duke 
president had to the petition.32
Knight left most letters from alumni unanswered but did respond to 
Alexander T. Davison, who wrote that he had “come to the reluctant conclu-
sion that [Knight had] abdicated the office of the President, and become a 
conciliator.” Knight was angered by this characterization. “Why do you think 
I have become a conciliator,” he asked, “when I am the only man who, within 
a radius of 500 miles, has called in the police to stop student interference with 
the ordinary and  free operation of the University?”33
In response to the avalanche of comments, Knight de cided to issue a public 
statement “to correct the rather widespread impression that Duke Univer-
sity capitulated on most, if not all, of the 13 demands made . . .  by a group of 
our black students.” Knight again declared that the university “already was 
working very hard to overcome prob lems which  were included among the 
demands of the black students, and  those demands which had no merit  were 
rejected.” The Kerckhoff Committee issued a separate statement repudiating 
“the view that the use of force is an effective means of accomplishing goals in 
a university community.”34
It is not known  whether the clarifying statements by Knight and the Kerck-
hoff Committee satisfied unhappy alumni, but it was clear that Duke’s Black 
students considered them “irresponsible.” “I  don’t care what Knight called the 
school’s action,” McBride told the Duke Chronicle. “He is trying to save face for 
the school and he is  doing it in a manner which provokes bad feeling [among] 
black students.”35
Just as Knight was being attacked as a “conciliator,” he was forced to re-
spond to criticism from the city of Durham. Watching the national news on 
Friday, February 14, Durham city man ag er I. Harding Hughes was upset to 
hear university spokesperson Clarence Whitfield comment that “we  were hor-
rified at the use of tear gas.” Hughes reminded Knight in a letter that it had 
been the university’s decision to summon the police to campus and that it 
did so “with the express understanding that the police would come prepared 
with such equipment necessary to discharge their duties.” Tear gas was used, 
Hughes wrote, “only  after the police had been assaulted with objects capable 
of causing serious injury or death.”  Under  these circumstances, Whitfield’s 
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comments  were, according to Hughes, “a hard  thing for the policemen to 
take.” Warning that the “morale” of police personnel would be impor tant 
in any “ future incident,” Hughes told Knight that a “forthright, unequivocal 
statement now by Duke University would clear the air and contribute to the 
good morale of the police personnel.”  Going further, he said a “commenda-
tion of the good work of the police  under trying circumstances would seem 
to be in order.”36
Knight responded to Harding on the same day he received his letter. Whit-
field’s comments, he said,  were not a criticism of the police. What the univer-
sity regretted, he explained, was “the necessity for the use of tear gas, harmless 
as it is.” Knight expressed “the gratitude of the University for the prompt and 
full cooperation which [it] received from the civil authorities.” Knight went 
much further in a letter to the chief of the Durham Police Department. He 
offered the Durham police and State Highway Patrol the university’s “most 
sincere commendation.  Because of the proficiency of  these two groups,” he 
wrote, “order was quickly restored” and “National Guard troops which  were 
on standby  were never needed.” Members of the Duke community, Knight 
told Chief Pleasants, are “indebted to your men and the State Police for your 
assistance last Thursday.”37
Knight’s letters satisfied Harding and Pleasants. When they became public, 
however, many in the Duke community reacted with disbelief that Knight 
would “commend” police who only days  earlier had clubbed and gassed Duke 
students on the main quadrangle. In an editorial, the Duke Chronicle called 
Knight’s commendation “an aggravation of the offense he committed” when 
he called police to campus and “a foolish provocation to  those who are al-
ready disgusted by his recent be hav ior.” In a joint letter, the asdu and wsga 
presidents, the executive editor of the Duke Chronicle, the chair of the Uni-
versity Christian Movement, and the president of the ju nior class of the 
divinity school  were equally critical. The student leaders protested Knight’s 
praise for “what was felt by  those pre sent to be [an] unwarranted and brutal 
overreaction to a situation that need not have occurred at all.” They warned 
the president that his statements “served only to antagonize increasingly large 
segments of the student body.” Black students  were among  those most upset. 
“ There would have been no trou ble had it not been for the cops,” McBride 
told the Duke Chronicle. “This is the sort of statement which makes us distrust 
the University’s motives.” Even the Kerckhoff Committee wrote to Knight to 
say that it considered his statements about the police “unfortunate from the 
point of view of the campus situation which the Committee is attempting to 
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confront and deal with. . . .  We are concerned,” the committee told the Duke 
president, “with the erosion of faculty support for and student body confi-
dence in the University.”38
Knight must have felt the walls closing in on him as he strug gled to defend 
his position and retain his job. In a response to an alumnus who wrote to 
congratulate him on his actions following the takeover, Knight wrote, “We 
have moved, I think, as best we can, as far as we can, as fast as we can.” Fearing 
backlash, he commented that “ there are men like myself who  will be caught 
right in the  middle of it, and  there is absolutely nothing we can do to protect 
ourselves.” In his report to the board at its March 7, 1969, meeting, Knight de-
scribed his situation. “The president of Duke has been a college and university 
president for nearly sixteen years,” he said.
At some point, . . .  I think I  ought to say to you that I’ve done my job as 
president of the University  because I  don’t think any one man . . .  is the 
right man . . .  for the long history of a place  these days. . . .  People get worn 
out and worn down. . . .  I  wouldn’t be honest with you . . .  if I  didn’t say that 
the point has to come where this kind of job must change for me.39
Almost a prediction of his demise as Duke president, the statement was 
full of foreboding. Events would further unravel for Knight as the semester 
continued.
For the remainder of the spring semester, negotiations over who would con-
trol any Black studies program at Duke became a flash point. “We want an 
education which  will sustain the culture of Black  people,” the aas demanded 
during Black Week, “while . . .  allowing us to develop skills which  will satisfy 
the needs of our  people in this racist society.” Lacking evidence that the Duke 
faculty was capable of developing a program that met their needs, Black stu-
dents demanded a central role in shaping Black studies at Duke. “We want the 
power to determine . . .  our educational environment,” the students insisted. 
Such power would enable them to “engage in a meaningful educational pro-
cess” that was “relevant.” Failing this purpose, any course of study, Black stu-
dents believed, “is not education, but indoctrination.”40
In stark contrast, the university “ wasn’t enthusiastic about Black studies 
at all,” according to Cook. Harold Lewis, vice provost and dean of faculty, 
was to have a central role in developing any program, but En glish professor 
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Louis Budd, who would soon head a Black studies committee, did not believe 
that Lewis “himself had any commitment to Black studies.” Budd described 
this as a “difficulty.” Cell was more direct, saying that Lewis “was reluctant to 
do anything.” Kerckhoff was also skeptical. Some had the perception that the 
Black studies curriculum might include “how to make a Molotov cocktail.” 
Acknowledging that the premise sounds “absolutely outrageous,” Kerckhoff 
believed that such a prospect was “not too far from what some  people would 
define as the outer fringe of what . . .  a [Black studies] program would do.” 
Kerckhoff thought that the goal of a Black studies program “as some  people 
saw it . . .  was to teach Blacks how to bring about social change in society.” 
It was “a way of mobilizing educated Blacks to take part in the revolution.”41
 These profoundly diff er ent perspectives played out at the planning retreat 
held during the first weekend in March. The goal of the meeting, as Kerckhoff 
described it, was to “attempt to establish a framework for a specific [Black 
studies] program which  will be developed in the next few months.” Attendees 
at the weekend retreat included the eleven members of the Proctor Commit-
tee, four representatives of the Kerckhoff Committee, and five representatives 
of the aas. Four con sul tants also participated. Selected by the university  were 
Martin Kilson, head of Harvard’s African American studies program, and Roy 
Bryce- Laporte, who would lead Yale’s program the following year. At the Black 
students’ suggestion, William Couch Jr. and Andres Taylor from historically 
Black Federal City College in Washington, DC,  were also included.42
Although discussions at the meeting lasted a total of eigh teen hours, the 
retreat was a “fiasco,” according to Cell. The issue, not surprisingly, was con-
trol. “We got hung up all day,” Cell recalled, on  whether “students [should] 
be on [the committee] and how many.” What the students wanted, according 
to student Adrenée Glover, one of the aas representatives, “was a . . .  mutual 
consensus,” to avoid “decisions that would be totally unacceptable to  either 
group.”  Those speaking on behalf of the university saw  matters differently. 
Martin Kilson’s comments to the aas representatives  were particularly rigid. 
“He told them,” Cell recounted, “that students are at a university to learn, 
teachers to teach, and administrators to administer.” Kilson “was so conserva-
tive,” Cook remembered, “he  didn’t want to see students on committees.” For 
Cook, Kilson’s view was that “students  don’t know anything. That’s why they 
come to college.” Cook disagreed. “You  couldn’t be serious,” he told Kilson. 
“One  thing they do know is how they feel, what’s inside them. What’s bugging 
them.” Unmoved, Kilson “thought every thing the students said was supercil-
ious,” according to Cook.43
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Discussions of content  were equally problematic. For example, Charles 
Becton reported that when asked what materials the library had that would be 
useful in a Black studies program, a faculty member responded, “The Library 
has many collections on the Plantation System.”44
Inflaming  matters further, it soon became apparent that the Proctor Com-
mittee was already well along in finalizing its proposal on Black studies. Black 
students believed they had been promised the opportunity to participate in 
a “meaningful dialogue [on Black studies] among vari ous [retreat] partici-
pants.” They also believed that their consent would be obtained before any 
proposal on Black studies was released following the retreat. Now they saw 
themselves “relegated to . . .  ‘advising’ the Proctor Committee,” which would 
“go off among themselves and decide what would be recommended.” “They 
listened politely,” Hopkins said of the Proctor Committee, “but they had al-
ready made up their minds.”45
The Kerckhoff Committee published a statement about the results of the re-
treat in the Duke Chronicle on March 4, 1969— the day  after the weekend meet-
ing. Highlighting areas of consensus, the statement reported that all retreat par-
ticipants agreed that  there would be a program in African and Afro- American 
(a&aa) studies at Duke starting in the fall and that a major in the area would 
be established. The statement was also clear, however, that Black students would 
not control the program. The statement outlined that a Supervisory Committee, 
consisting entirely of faculty, would be established. Students would have input 
into the se lection of faculty to serve on the committee but would not be included 
among its members. It would be “the first order of business” of the Supervisory 
Committee, the Kerckhoff Committee wrote, “to consider the role and function 
of the black students in decision- making concerned with the program.”46
As if to leave no doubt that the university was prepared to proceed without 
the consent of Black students, the Proctor Committee also issued its report 
on the day  after the retreat. Consisting of ten “recommendations,” the report 
said that Duke should establish an interdepartmental major in a&aa stud-
ies. New courses and other “learning experiences” in the discipline should 
be developed by vari ous academic departments. Departments should be 
“encouraged to make vigorous efforts to recruit additional faculty members 
competent to teach courses in the Program.” A committee consisting “exclu-
sively of faculty members” should initially supervise the program. The role 
of Black students would be  limited to providing input on the membership of 
the Supervisory Committee and serving on subcommittees regarding  matters 
such as curriculum, to be established in the  future.47
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Black students viewed  these developments as a complete breach of faith. In 
a separate statement, also published in the Duke Chronicle on March 4, they 
charged that the report produced by the Proctor Committee was not based on 
“give- and- take- discussion” at the retreat. Rather, “basic decisions concerning 
the [proposed] program had been made by the Proctor Committee during the 
week preceding the retreat.” Rather than provide input into the appointment 
of the faculty Supervisory Committee as recommended by the Proctor Com-
mittee, the Black students proposed that a ten- member committee composed 
of an equal number of students and faculty be established.  Because such a 
group would be “more representative of the vari ous groups and interests con-
cerned,” the aas said, it would be “more effective in implementing a program 
acceptable to all concerned.” The relationship between the university and “the 
students who have unwittingly served in the pre sent master- slave relationship 
has terminated as of now,” the students announced. “Public discourse between 
the Afro- American Society and the University” could resume, they said, only 
“when Black students are given equitable repre sen ta tion in the events that 
affect them.”48
Kerckhoff saw the statement from the aas in the Duke Chronicle.  There 
is no rec ord that he reached out to Black student representatives. Instead, 
Kerckhoff wrote Hobbs, urging the provost to act on the Proctor Committee’s 
recommendation that he invite the aas to appoint a committee of students to 
meet with him to discuss faculty membership of the Supervisory Committee. 
“ Today’s statement in the Chronicle,” Kerckhoff acknowledged, “would suggest 
that this request for their participation would be rejected. However, we are not 
certain that this would, in fact, occur. Even more impor tant,” Kerckhoff told 
the provost, “we think it is essential that the University move in good faith in 
the direction of establishing a Program and of  doing so with student participa-
tion. Should that prove impossible,” he said, “it should be perfectly clear that it 
resulted from the student rejection of the offer of joint action.”49
Kerckhoff appeared to have largely abandoned hope of finding a shared 
path forward with Black students. His concern now was assigning blame if 
they refused to accept the  limited role the Proctor Committee had assigned 
them.
Hobbs followed Kerckhoff ’s recommendation. On March 5 he wrote the 
aas, asking stiffly that “three bona fide student members” be selected to meet 
with three administrators to “effect the suggested consultation and discuss 
specifically the pos si ble membership of the Supervisory Committee.” Hobbs 
wanted  there to be no doubt about where control of the nascent a&aa studies 
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program resided. “It should be clearly understood,” he told the aas, that 
“implementation of the  adopted program is in the area of responsibility of 
the Undergraduate Faculty Council.”50 University faculty would control all 
decisions.
The aas responded to Hobbs immediately. Writing on behalf of the aas, 
McBride demanded “that the Proctor Committee be abolished.” Instead, a 
Supervisory Committee “composed of five black students and five faculty 
members” would be appointed to “work out the specific details relating to the 
departmental structure of the African–Afro- American Studies program.” “We 
would like to see positive action taken on fulfilling  these requests,” McBride 
wrote ominously, “by Monday, March 10, 1969.”51
That eve ning, a rally attended by seven hundred students was held at Baldwin 
Auditorium. “If the administration does not respond by Monday night,” Mc-
Bride told the rally, “further action  will be taken.” In his remarks, Howard Fuller 
implied that Black students  were considering withdrawing from the university. 
“Duke University has to decide,” he said, “if it wants to have black students or 
not.” “Knight says, ‘have faith,’ ” Fuller declared, “and I say, ‘In who?’ You are ask-
ing for us to have faith in  people who have already betrayed us.” Black student 
Vaughn Glapion dismissed the university’s proposed a&aa studies program as 
just a shell game. “ There is more interest in shifting existing courses at Duke, 
North Carolina College and the University of North Carolina,” he said, “than in 
creating meaningful courses for black students at Duke.”52
On the following eve ning, three hundred students marched in a torchlight 
parade to East Campus.  Those leading the march carried a banner that read, 
“Power to the Blacks, Power to the Students, Power to the  People.” One of the 
signs held above the crowd asked, “Do we beg for the right to live—or do we 
take it?” McBride and Tony Axam reported no pro gress on the development 
of a Black studies program or the inclusion of students on the Supervisory 
Committee. The Duke Chronicle commented correctly that “Duke University 
is once again rapidly approaching a crisis situation.”53
By this point, the composition of the Supervisory Committee had become 
the sole focus of discussions and the cause of the standoff. Having demanded 
equal repre sen ta tion on the Supervisory Committee, the aas did not respond 
to the provost’s invitation to consult on the composition of an all- faculty com-
mittee. Axam called it “a delaying tactic.”  Eager to finalize the membership 
of the Supervisory Committee and move forward, Lewis commented to the 
Duke Chronicle that “it  will be a question of how long we wait” before appoint-
ing the committee.54
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The answer was “not long.” On March 10, Lewis appointed five faculty 
members to serve on the Supervisory Committee, asking Professor Louis 
Budd to serve as chairman (Budd Committee). Lewis asked that the commit-
tee meet first “to determine the extent of any student participation.”55
The Budd Committee convened almost immediately. Deliberations on 
student committee participation did not take long. “We first agreed that 
we would have students on the committee,” Cell recalled, “and second 
that we would have three. . . .  The feeling” was, Cell explained, “that be-
tween five and none, three might be an acceptable compromise.” One rea-
son the members of the committee  were able to decide quickly was that 
they viewed the issue of student repre sen ta tion as having  little practical 
consequence. “It  didn’t make a damn bit of difference how many students 
we had on the committee,” Cell believed. “It was a symbol. . . .  Once you 
have any students on  there, it  doesn’t  matter” how many  there are. In Cell’s 
experience, committees do not resolve differences by voting— “you talk 
them out. . . .  I knew very well that once we got to substance, we  wouldn’t 
be voting. . . .  That’s the way committees work.”56 Students, however, did 
not view it this way.
Nine aas members joined the Budd Committee meeting  after about 
an hour. Kerckhoff described the encounter as a “ thing of won der.” He was 
shocked by the physical transformation the students had under gone. “They all 
came in with black leather jackets and shades, [and] caps with afros,” he de-
scribed.  These students “who had been wandering around looking like ordi-
nary students,” Kerckhoff recalled, “looked like something out of the East Side 
of New York.” The students had under gone “some degree of radicalization,” 
he realized. “The students . . .  weren’t  there to become friends with ‘whitey,’ ” 
Budd recounted. The students resisted attempts to hold the discussion “on a 
friendly basis.” Budd did not “think it was rudeness” but rather “very studied 
mock aggression.”57
The students presented a compromise proposal— a Supervisory Commit-
tee composed of five faculty, four students, and one member of the Duke com-
munity acceptable to both parties. This proposal was rejected. The Budd Com-
mittee “simply told the students, ‘This is the way it’s  going to be,’ ” Kerckhoff 
described. “That was not a smart  thing to do.” “In retrospect,” Cell thought, 
“we should have said, ‘We cannot decide this now. We  will make a decision 
 later.’ ” “The meeting was very brief,” Kerckhoff recounted, “and broke up with 
a real split.” Describing the meeting as a “final disastrous encounter,” Kerck-
hoff saw a lot of “hard work [go] down the drain in a very short period of 
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time.” “I guess I felt that we had failed about as badly as we could have  under 
the circumstances,” he said sadly.58
“We cannot participate  under the inhuman conditions we have been sub-
jected to,” Hopkins told a rally of three hundred students on the chapel steps 
just  after leaving the Budd Committee meeting. He then stunned the crowd 
by announcing that Black students would be withdrawing en masse from the 
university. Withdrawal, Hopkins told the rally, “ will put an end to the constant 
destruction of our minds and humanity.”  Later, the aas reported that twenty- 
three undergraduates would be withdrawing from Duke immediately, with 
another seventeen leaving Duke at the end of the semester. The Duke Chron-
icle calculated that when added to the fourteen Black students who had been 
dismissed for academic reasons at the end of the fall semester, “59  percent of 
Duke’s 91 black undergraduates  will have left the University by the end of the 
school year.”59
Following Hopkins’s announcement, Black students, along with supportive 
white students and faculty, led a torchlight pro cession to downtown Durham. 
At the same time, Fuller led hundreds of community members in a separate 
march, meeting the Black students at Five Points. From  there, the two groups 
marched together to St. Joseph’s ame Church for a rally. “The pro cession was 
intended to be symbolic,” Fuller wrote. “The black students  were in essence re-
turning home to their community with the support of their white peers from 
Duke.” A crowd of two thousand packed into the church, with Duke Black 
students “occupying honorary positions on the altar.” Hopkins announced 
the formation of a new Malcolm X Liberation School, asking the crowd for 
“support and solidarity.” A Chronicle reporter noted that a “strong feeling of 
brotherhood could be felt throughout the hall.”60
The decision to withdraw was the subject of intense debate within the aas. 
“We had a real strug gle amongst ourselves,” Hopkins recalled. “My position was 
that we had lost the  battle but not the war. And that it was just a  matter of get-
ting together, regrouping, and coming up with some new strategies. . . .  I argued 
down to the last breath,” Hopkins remembered, “but I lost out.” Cook thought 
the idea of withdrawing was “insane.” “I said, ‘You  don’t want to withdraw 
from the university,’ ” Cook remembered. “ ‘Look at what it would mean. You 
want to see this university become lily- white again?’ ”61
A majority of aas members saw it differently. By withdrawing, Becton ex-
plained in a statement published in the Duke Chronicle, “many Black students 
are . . . saying, ‘Duke University, at this stage of the  battle, you can keep your 
white system . . .  for it is morbidly masochistic at best for us to fight when you 
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have all the power and are unwilling to give it up.’ ” Why give up on Duke? 
“Duke has been de- segregated for the last seven years,” Becton answered. “It 
has never been integrated.” Becton wrote that he was “not aware of any pro-
gram Duke has implemented at its own initiative in regards to Black students 
save  those programs  under which Duke received monies for having black 
bodies  here.” Even Duke’s “talk- and- do- nothing committees,” he argued,  were 
formed only when “Black students had . . .  created such a crisis that Duke 
could no longer be insulated or unaware of distressing conditions.” Duke’s 
Black students had “petitioned; marched to the President’s  house; held ‘sit- ins’ 
and ‘study- ins’; liberated the first floor of Allen Building; and . . .  followed the 
ill- spun web of proper channels,” Becton recounted. Duke had shown itself 
unwilling to give the Black students even  limited control over the Black stud-
ies program that had become central to their identities and needs as Duke 
students. Black students, Becton explained, now faced only two choices— 
“destruction and withdrawal.”62
The Duke Chronicle supported the move. “Some of Duke’s most moral and 
courageous students walked out of the University Monday,” the paper editorial-
ized. “They did it,  because, after so much indifference, they  were too alienated 
from the white community to trust whites.”63
When students approached their deans about withdrawing, some encoun-
tered re sis tance. “We all went to Dean Bryant,” Howard recalled. “We wanted 
it to be a real  simple pro cess. . . .  She said, ‘I’ll have to see each one of you indi-
vidually.’ . . . And [when] I went in . . .  she just cried. And she cried. She knew 
me. She . . .  went on about how she  didn’t understand and how it was such a 
serious  mistake.” Howard remembered Dean Bryant asking, “ ‘What are you 
 going to do?’ . . .  It  doesn’t  matter,” Howard responded, “I just  don’t want to be 
 here.” Fi nally, the dean “very reluctantly” gave Howard the withdrawal form.64
Among se nior administrators, public opinion was the primary focus. 
Knight and newly designated interim chancellor Barnes Woodhall published 
a three- page statement to the Duke community commenting on the planned 
withdrawals. Noting that the Black students had accused “the University of 
bad faith and of an unwillingness to work with them in a meaningful way” in 
planning a Black studies program, Knight and Woodhall declared, “ There is 
simply no basis for this charge.” Knight and Woodhall then outlined, in  great 
detail, the university’s efforts  toward implementation of a Black studies pro-
gram at Duke. “Despite the reported plan of some black students to withdraw 
from Duke,” the statement said, the Supervisory Committee “ will continue 
to work— with students—to develop a program of academic integrity which 
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 will be both respected and respectable.”65 Within a  couple of days, the Under-
graduate Faculty Council voted to approve the Budd Committee’s recommen-
dation that three students be added to the committee.
Meanwhile, Kerckhoff reached out to the aas. In a letter to McBride, Kerck-
hoff expressed “regret” that Black students had announced plans to withdraw. 
“Although we understand the sources of strain,” Kerckhoff wrote, “much more 
of value can be gained by working together within the University than by 
leaving. We thus urge all of you to continue to work within the University.”66
McBride’s response was brief. “Although the Afro- American Society  will 
continue as an organ ization  until the end of the semester,” he wrote to Kerck-
hoff, “it  will in no way communicate with the University. In view of this,” 
McBride concluded, “your committee need not concern itself with the Afro- 
American Society.”67
Learning of McBride’s response, Hobbs wrote to Kerckhoff. “I was sorry 
to learn of the rejection of the Afro- American group,” the provost said paren-
thetically, “though I guess this has been [the] case all along.”68 Hobbs appeared 
to have blamed the Black students alone for the impasse.
The next week was eventful, to say the least. Discussions within the aas 
and between the aas and the university continued. A rally attended by eight 
hundred Duke, ncc, and Durham Business College students was held in 
downtown Durham. Although alluding to the possibility that the Black stu-
dents might revisit their decision to withdraw, McBride remained defiant. “We 
live what we believe,” he told the crowd. “We  won’t be messed over no more. 
I’d rather be a poor black than a rich nigger,” he declared.  After the rally, vio-
lence erupted. Durham police  were called in  after twenty- five downtown store 
win dows  were smashed. The mayor imposed a 7:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. nightly 
curfew in Durham. National Guard troops  were called in to help enforce the 
curfew. Several days  later, on March 17, the Malcolm X Liberation University 
opened with about forty students.69
During this week, no Black students completed the paperwork necessary 
to withdraw from the university, and only a handful notified Duke of their 
intent to leave the school. With support for the withdrawal strategy eroding, 
members of the aas released a statement reversing the decision announced 
only a week  earlier. “As revolutionary forces within one of the most conserva-
tive and oppressive institutions in Amer i ca,” the statement read, “we deem it 
necessary to remain  here and continue the strug gle.” Black students would be 
entering Duke in the  future, the statement explained, “making it imperative 
that the [aas] continue to exist to meet the needs and aspirations of black 
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 people.” Malcolm X Liberation University would meet the Black students’ im-
mediate needs. The statement concluded: “Power to the  people; student power 
to students; black power to black  people!”70
Reading in the Duke Chronicle that Black students would be staying, Budd 
wrote to McBride. “I hope that you  will feel inclined to get in touch with me,” 
he said. The Budd Committee “would like to have student members,” he re-
minded McBride, “and I am sure that the Committee would welcome your 
advice as to whom [Dean Lewis] should appoint as its student members.”71
The university’s position had prevailed. Students would serve on the Su-
pervisory Committee but would have no power to direct, or block, any action. 
Full control over the a&aa studies program would remain with the faculty. 
Not surprisingly, Hobbs commented  later, “we got  things  under reasonable 
control.”72
In early May, the Proctor Committee met with a member of the Budd 
Committee for a pro gress report on the proposed interdepartmental Black 
studies major.  After the meeting, Proctor wrote to Hobbs that the Proctor 
Committee was “distressed to learn that [the Budd Committee] has experi-
enced considerable difficulty in securing cooperation from the vari ous De-
partments in development of a curriculum” to support the major. “ There has 
clearly been a loss of the sense of urgency which prevailed in March,” Proctor 
wrote, “to say the least.” The Proctor Committee considered this state of af-
fairs “to be most unfortunate” and had agreed unanimously to tell Hobbs of 
its “grave concern.”73
It took Hobbs almost a month to respond, having met in the interim with 
Proctor and Cook. “It is next to impossible for us to deal with  these  matters 
rapidly,” he wrote, “but we can deal with them consistently.” In their meet-
ing, Cook had suggested that the university add “five or six” individuals with 
expertise in Black studies over a short time frame. Citing bud get constraints, 
Hobbs said the university could afford to add “occasional new  people,” but not 
the number suggested by Cook. As to finding a director for the Black studies 
program, Hobbs said he had been “totally immersed in bud getary prob lems” 
and had not gotten around to working specifically on the  matter. Calling it a 
“first priority,” Hobbs said that he “should get to it sometime within the next 
several weeks.” “We can, I hope, solve this prob lem at least,” he concluded, 
“and hopefully show good evidence of continued interest and high priority 
consideration to making a  viable Afro- American Studies Program.”74
Clearly, Hobbs was in no rush to move Black studies forward, notwith-
standing his statement that the  matter would be treated as a high priority. 
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Knight commented  later that the provost felt “ things  were moving too fast for 
his comfort.” This gradualist approach, of course, meant that the needs of the 
university’s Black students continued to be unaddressed.75
Ultimately, it was the Budd Committee that directed the university’s na-
scent Afro- American studies program during the 1969–70 school year. A 
search committee for a permanent director of the program was not appointed 
 until December 1969. As 1969 ended, a faculty committee found “few signs to 
indicate that the employment of black academics is a  matter [of] priority” at 
the university and highlighted “the critical need for more incisive commit-
ments and statements from [the university] on priorities in the area of black 
students and black studies.”76
As had been the case since desegregation,  these changes would occur very 
slowly.
In the midst of the turmoil, the university’s disciplinary hearing to consider 
punishment for participants in the Allen Building takeover was held on 
March 20, 1969. The outcome of the hearing carried enormous consequences 
for both the students and the university.
Knight was  under intense pressure to deal swiftly and decisively with the 
protesters. Calls and letters flooded in. “Smash student anarchy immediately 
and decisively,” an alumnus implored, “and expel the anarchist.” “ There is 
nothing like expulsion for what ails you,” Russell Price, a member of the class 
of 1952, wrote. “Stand fast.” An alumnus from Newport News,  Virginia, was 
most succinct. He wrote simply, “expel them!”77
Knight saw how racial attitudes informed many of the demands for 
strong action. “It was clear,” the Duke president observed, “that  people had 
been waiting for a moment where you could  really move in on the black situ-
ation.” “You have a God given chance,” one alumnus told Knight, “to rid the 
school of a number of  people who should not have been admitted.” Knight 
heard this type of refrain from board members, alumni, and many  others: 
“We  haven’t had a clear cut case, but now  you’ve got it.” “Wonderful— Now 
you have them where you want them; you must throw them all out.”  These 
comments, Knight said,  were repeated “just that nakedly.” “All the unspoken 
fears and resentments came into the open,” Knight wrote  later. “ These black 
students  were intruders; they should be intruders in the dust, cast down, 
cast out.”78
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The students  were also  under tremendous stress. “I think it was clear to all 
of us that  there  were a lot of  people asking for extreme mea sures to be taken 
to make an example” of us, Becton recounted. This prospect “was something 
that was thought about before we went into the building.” Even so, calls for 
the students’ suspension or expulsion  were frightening. Beyond academic and 
professional considerations, male students who fell out of good standing at the 
university faced the draft. So grave was this concern, Kerckhoff told Knight, 
that at other campuses “the popu lar characterization of suspension has been 
the ‘death penalty.’ ”79
Students also faced anguished parents. Among the “best and the bright-
est” of their generation, the Allen Building protesters arrived at Duke bearing 
the hopes and expectations of their families, communities, and race. Now, 
every thing they hoped to accomplish was in jeopardy. Howard remembered 
all the calls that flooded in from “moms,  grand moms, and aunties.” “All of 
us had turmoil within our families,” Armstrong remembered. The anguish 
many parents felt was expressed in a letter Tom and Ruth D. McBride wrote to 
Knight asking that their son, Michael, be allowed to complete his Duke edu-
cation. “We know  these young  people have disrupted the normal operation 
of the university,” they told Knight, “but . . .  we beg of you to ask that  these 
bright young black Americans be given both justice and mercy.” Promising 
to “do every thing that we can to prevent Michael from becoming involved in 
 future demonstrations,” they concluded by telling Knight that their son “is a 
good and kind boy who is active in the movement only  because he feels that 
Amer i ca must accept blacks and whites on an equal basis.” Knight acknowl-
edged receipt of the letter but told the McBrides that “the deeply saddening 
events of the last days make it difficult for me to answer you wisely at the 
moment. I . . . would do every thing I could for Mike,” he told the young man’s 
parents, “if he’d give me half a chance.”80
As the disciplinary pro cess moved forward, the university was unable 
to identify all the students who had occupied the Allen Building. Contact 
between Duke administrators and protesters during the takeover had been 
extremely  limited. The protesters emerged from the Allen Building to a cha-
otic scene and asked that no photo graphs be taken. Many covered their  faces 
to avoid being recognized. Complicating  matters further, according to C. G. 
Newsome, a significant number of Black students from ncc had come to the 
Duke campus to support the Allen Building protesters.  Because “you  couldn’t 
tell  whether they  were from Central or Duke,” the university could positively 
identify only twenty- five of the approximately fifty Allen Building protesters. 
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Duke de cided to proceed against  those students, who received papers charg-
ing them with violating the university’s regulations on pickets, protests, and 
demonstrations.81
Aware of the university’s prob lem identifying protesters, members of the 
aas took a profoundly dramatic and risky step. Writing in the Duke Chronicle 
on February 27 that “our strug gle is a group strug gle,” the aas petitioned the uni-
versity that “any so- called charges [it] wishes to bring against us . . .  be brought 
against the group as a  whole or not at all.” The petition listed the names of more 
than sixty aas members who demanded to stand trial for the takeover. “All 
of the work that had been done to make Black students into a cohesive force,” 
Armstrong explained, “came to fruition . . .  when we all de cided to surren-
der.” For the Black students who had not come into the Allen Building, she 
recounted, “this was their way of expressing their anger.” Moreover, the “sur-
render” by all sixty members of the aas put the university in what Armstrong 
called “a very precarious position.” “They  really  couldn’t put us all out,” Brenda 
Brown remembered thinking. Acting as a group, Brown believed, provided 
“protection” for  those students the university could positively identify as take-
over participants.82
The disciplinary hearing began at 9:00 a.m. and lasted nine hours. Law 
school dean Kenneth Pye, two professors, and two students made up the hear-
ing committee. Although only twenty- five Black students had been formally 
charged, forty- seven appeared at the hearing asking to be tried by the univer-
sity. The parents of many of the Black students attended the hearing. Both the 
university and students  were represented by outside counsel.83
The hearing began with the student defendants entering a plea of “nolo 
contendere” to the charge of violating the university’s regulations regarding 
pickets, protests, and demonstrations. Although not an admission of guilt, 
this meant that each defendant accepted conviction for violating the regula-
tions as though a guilty plea had been entered. In effect, the defendants would 
not dispute that the Allen Building takeover occurred or that each of the forty- 
seven defendants participated in the protest. With the plea, the hearing dealt 
exclusively with the appropriate sanction for the defendants. If the hearing 
committee determined that a sanction was called for, it could choose among 
only four options: reprimand, probation, suspension, or expulsion.84
The university’s case, presented by attorney Marshall Spears Jr., focused only 
on how disruptive the takeover had been for the university and its employees.85 
Frances Baker, an employee in the bursar’s office, testified that one Black student 
held a raised pipe in his hand when he told employees to “move out.” “I was 
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scared to death,” she told the committee. Bobbie Jean Day recalled being told, 
“Move it move, it. If you  don’t get out, some one’s  going to get hurt.” As she ex-
ited, Day passed a student with a pipe in his hand “who used profane language” 
as he demanded that she leave. Day testified that she was “very much afraid and 
very much shocked.” Day was among three employees who, it was alleged, quit 
their jobs at Duke  because of the takeover. University registrar Richard Tuthill 
described the condition of the registrar’s office  after the takeover and testified 
that the office was closed for two days as a result of the protest. Clark Cahow, 
assistant registrar, testified about the vari ous pipes, crowbars, chains, hammers, 
and other materials left in the Allen Building by the protesters  after the take-
over. Although the students testified that  these items  were carried in only to 
secure the building, witnesses for the university characterized them as “weap-
ons.” Griffith described the pro gress that had been made on the list of concerns 
presented to the ad hoc committee by the Black students in October 1968. He 
denied any “foot- dragging on the university’s part.”  Under questioning, Griffith 
acknowledged that the ad hoc committee had no jurisdiction to implement a 
Black studies program— the most impor tant issue for the Black students.
In their case, presented by J. W. Ferguson, the defendants focused entirely 
on the harsh conditions at Duke that had given rise to Black student activism 
at the university. They testified about the frustration they felt over the school’s 
inability to address their needs. Stef McLeod testified that “nothing major” 
had come from the extensive discussions with the university and described 
his feelings of deep alienation. Asked if any further recourse was available to 
Black students as of February 13, 1969, McLeod responded no. Bertie Howard 
testified to the hostile racial climate Black students endured at Duke, includ-
ing the long strug gle to force Duke to ban the use of segregated off-campus 
facilities by university groups. McLeod and Howard both refused to state 
unequivocally that Black students would never again violate the regulations 
regarding pickets, protests, and demonstrations. Asked if she felt the aas 
had “a right to take over control of an area of Duke University,” Howard an-
swered, “I think in this situation it was justified.”
In his closing statement, Spears argued for the university that the defendants 
had presented “testimony of motivation— but not justification.” He dismissed 
the students’ assertions that the history of their treatment by the university 
legitimized the takeover. “If we have any degree of maturity,” he said patroniz-
ingly, “we must realize that we  can’t have what we want when we want it.” The 
Black students “should not be excused or patted on the head.” The takeover, 
Spears concluded, “demands a serious punishment.”
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In his closing statement on behalf of the defendants, Ferguson spoke of the 
history of race relations at Duke and the events leading up to the protest. The 
occupation “did not begin when a group of students met and de cided to do 
this,” he said. Rather, it originated one hundred years ago when all- white Trin-
ity College was established. It began when Duke’s first Black undergraduates 
arrived in 1963 and realized that Duke was not equipped to deal with them. 
It moved closer when the university sponsored events at segregated facilities 
Black students could not attend and when fraternities said they “would like to 
have black members but  can’t.” It advanced each time a Black student “real-
ized [his] education was not relevant to his needs” and that requested changes 
 were “deferred to one committee or another.” Their protest was “a symbolic 
act to say listen to us and minister to our needs— give us a relevant experi-
ence at Duke.” “The way to deter further actions,” Ferguson told the hearing 
committee, “would not be to take serious action against  these students, but to 
take serious action on the needs of  these students.” He urged the members of 
the hearing committee to “open their hearts.” “Fifty black students went into 
Allen Building and said ‘somebody listen to us,’ ” Ferguson concluded. “ Today 
we ask the same.” Ferguson’s closing statement “had every one in tears,” Arm-
strong recalled.86
Before concluding the hearing, Pye asked if anyone had further comments 
for the committee to consider. Armstrong described what happened. “Most of 
us had one parent who was  there,” she recalled. “Parents got up [and spoke]. 
They  were just beautiful. All of that anger that our parents had lived with 
and had no way of expressing came out through their  children. I remember 
[parents] saying, ‘This is my child, and you are not  going to put my child out 
without me having something to say.’ It’s not that they understood or even 
condoned what we did. [But] parents  were  going to back their  children,” Arm-
strong remembered. “ There was absolutely no way they  were  going to leave 
that place with their  children being put out of school.”87
The disciplinary hearing was impor tant for many of the parents who at-
tended. “They had no idea of the pressure we  were  under; they certainly had 
no idea of how difficult it was socially to live at Duke,” Armstrong described. 
As a result of the hearing, attitudes  were transformed. “My  mother changed 
sitting  there,” Armstrong observed. “I could never talk to her about the take-
over; someone  else had to tell her.” But  after the hearing, Armstrong’s  mother 
said, “If you had to do it over again, I would support you.”88
In its decision, the hearing committee made clear that “a sentence of sus-
pension would be clearly appropriate for individuals who planned and led 
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the take- over of the building regardless of their motivations.” The committee 
was unable, however, “to determine relative degree of culpability among the 
[forty- seven] defendants. . . .  We are particularly concerned,” it stated, “that 
over one- half of the defendants before us appeared voluntarily to be tried in 
the absence of any charges brought against them by the University.” Treating 
 these individuals severely, the committee said, “might constitute a substan-
tial miscarriage of justice.” Accordingly, the committee placed “all persons 
charged on probation for the period of one year from this date.” Hopkins 
called this punishment “a tap on the back of our hands.”89
The Black students’ solidarity had protected them. “I was convinced,” Arm-
strong explained, “and no one  will convince me other wise, that we  were  going 
to be put out of school. It was the intention to make an example so it would 
not happen again.” By standing as one, Black students had made this impos-
sible. In Armstrong’s words, they had become “an undeniable force.”90
If parents  were relieved that their  children would be allowed to remain 
in school, many students  were unhappy with the outcome of the hearing. “If 
they think that in 1969 five whites can sit in judgment on 47 blacks,” Hopkins 
commented, “ they’re crazy.” Hopkins also made clear that probation would 
not deter the students from further protests if the university did not follow 
through on its commitments. “To get our demands,” he said, “we  won’t hesi-
tate to take another building.”91
The roiling conflicts Knight faced with trustees and alumni only intensi-
fied  after the hearing committee failed to suspend or expel the Allen Building 
takeover participants. “I  don’t know as a fact,” Pye recollected, “but it was my 
clear impression that when I notified the president of [the sanction] that he 
was shocked.”92 Knight likely sensed that any hope of remaining the president 
of Duke was disappearing.
In the aftermath of the Allen Building takeover, Douglas Knight feared for 
his physical safety and that of his  family. During the takeover, the Duke presi-
dent had been concerned about reports he received of vigilante forces cir-
cling campus and preparing to attack Black students in the Allen Building 
once night fell. Witnessing what he described  later as the “savage reaction 
of the regional community” to the takeover, Knight believed that  these same 
forces  were now targeting him and his  family. The location of University 
House— bordered in the rear by woods with easy access to a public road— 
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added to his alarm. “It was obvious,” he wrote, “that the threats against us 
could easily be carried out.”93
The Knight  family took steps to protect themselves. A security guard was 
posted at University House and the  family de cided that their youn gest son— 
twelve at the time— would sleep at a friend’s  house for a while. Most dramatic 
was a nightly routine the Duke president  adopted. At 1:00 a.m. each eve ning, 
Knight would slip a loaded pistol into the pocket of his dressing gown and 
take “a  little tour” of the University House grounds with the security guard.94
Fewer than six years had elapsed since the summer of 1963, when Knight 
had arrived at Duke to universal excitement and acclaim. Inaugurated presi-
dent at age forty- two, Knight’s  future seemed boundless. Now, in March 1969, 
he was wandering the grounds of his home each eve ning, carry ing a loaded 
gun. Peering into the woods and looking for signs of danger, Knight saw him-
self as a hunted— and haunted— man.
Opinions differ on how much  actual physical danger the Knight  family 
was exposed to during this traumatic time. Professionally, though, Knight was 
clearly in a situation of high risk. “ There was substantial agreement among 
Trustees, the Duke Endowment, the regional community, and a disturbing 
number of alumni,” Knight wrote, “that the situation was out of control and 
that I had failed to control it.” “ There was no support left in the situation,” 
Knight realized. “It was a dramatic example of watching the support cut away 
from you on  every pos si ble side. The meta phor I’ve used” to describe the situ-
ation, Knight commented poignantly, “is that of a man with a begging bowl, 
standing where the five roads intersect. Down the five roads,” the president 
related, “come not the  people he wants who  will put goodies into his bowl, 
but come the thundering herds. All opposed to one another and all intent on 
demolishing him.”95
With his Duke Endowment critics playing a central role, trustees began to 
press for a special meeting of the board where a formal demand for Knight’s 
resignation could be made. “This was vicious business,” Knight commented 
 later. The trustees conspiring to remove him  were “jungle fighters,” he said. 
“ These  were guys with knives in the dark. That was their basic nature. That’s 
how they got their other business done.”96
Board chair Charles Wade took on what historian Robert Durden de-
scribed as “the painful task of persuading Knight to resign before he could be 
formally asked to do so.” “A vote would have been forced on  whether to fire 
me,” Knight explained.  There  were “many trustees who had been whipped up 
to that.” Wade encouraged Knight to take the initiative. His resignation was 
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necessary “for the good of the university,” Knight recalled Wade saying. “It 
had to take place.”97
“I have conveyed to Chairman Wade my desire to be relieved of the office 
of president of Duke University,” Knight wrote to the board on March 27, 1969. 
“It is not easy for me to leave Duke University,” he explained, “but  after more 
than fifteen years as a college and university president, I have an obligation 
to protect my  family from the severe and sometimes savage demands of such 
a  career.” Knight asked to stay on  until June 30, 1969. The board accepted 
Knight’s resignation “with regret.” “Basically, Doug Knight has been a most 
generous man in allowing us to work this  thing out so that it does not reflect 
[badly] on him or the University,” Wade told Marshall Pickens, “and to him is 
due most of the credit for the way I was able to  handle it.”98
Many trustees and alumni  were relieved at the news that Knight had re-
signed. The Duke Chronicle, despite many conflicts with Knight over his ten-
ure, wrote that it was “deeply grieved” that the Duke president was stepping 
down. A number of trustees  were also dismayed. “Some trustees said to me 
the day I resigned,” Knight recounted, “ ‘You know, we want to apologize to 
you, we  weren’t  there when you needed us.’ And  there was nothing I could say 
except, ‘Yes, that’s true.’ ”99
For Knight, his resignation marked a professional and personal inflection 
point that permanently altered the course of his life. The academic world was 
what he knew and loved, and  until his time at Duke, he had encountered 
only approval and success.  After his Duke experience, however, Knight felt 
himself an outcast from the only professional world he had ever known. “The 
sequence of  those years [at Duke] just finished my academic  career,” he re-
flected. “I could never go back into the university world again.” “It was quite 
an experience to find that I’d been exiled from the [university] community 
where I’d made my  whole life,” he wrote almost two de cades  later. “I found the 
trauma so deep,” he commented, “that for several years I could not spend time 
on a university campus at all— even for the graduation of our third son.” He 
added: “Mine was certainly the wrong temperament to go through that with-
out some major destruction taking place. I can see that . . .  from a distance.”100
Knight deserves credit for the role he played in the transformation of Duke 
from the accomplished regional university it was when he took office into the 
preeminent international power house it  later became. “Doug Knight was a con-
summate gentleman and scholar,” Duke’s ninth president, Richard H. Brodhead, 
said  after Knight passed away in 2005. “Duke emerged from the tumultuous 
years during which he served as president as a stronger institution, and the 
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foundation Doug Knight laid enabled the university to rise in the ranks of 
the nation’s leading universities  today.” Duke’s eighth president, Nannerl O. 
Keohane, described Knight in 2003 as a “poet and scholar.” “The breadth 
and sensitivity of his thinking,” she said, “informed not only his public pro-
nouncements as the ceo of a rollicking, feisty, ambitious Southern institution 
of higher education, but also the work he undertook  behind the scenes as a 
collaborative leader and administrator.”101 To honor him, Duke renamed Uni-
versity House— the setting for so much of Knight’s anguish— the Douglas M. 
and Grace Knight House.
Without diminishing this legacy, Samuel DuBois Cook saw Knight’s tenure 
as more complicated. “In many ways, Dr. Knight was a tragic figure,” Cook 
commented. “I think he was caught up in forces over which he had no con-
trol.” Still, Cook saw Knight as at least partially responsible for the prob lems he 
encountered at Duke. “He had  great liberal credentials and tradition and com-
mitment,” Cook explained. “But . . .  when he got  here—it often happens—he 
[got] in an environment that’s conservative and he [was] inclined to forget 
the liberal issues. . . .  Perhaps, had he been more out spoken, more coura-
geous, more determined, he would have gotten much more done. . . .  But he 
would have encountered opposition and he would have had to fight for what 
he wanted. He  wasn’t willing to fight for it,” Cook concluded. “I  don’t think he 
was willing to pay the price for  doing it.”102
In his remaining months as Duke’s president, Knight acted as a caretaker. 
He spent most of his time answering correspondence and dealing with routine 
administrative  matters. Mindful of the toll his time at the university had taken 
on Knight, his colleagues took steps to celebrate the end of his tenure as Duke 
president. A group who worked with Knight on the second floor of the Allen 
Building presented him with a set of “Absolutely Non- Negotiable Demands.” 
Referring to themselves as the Continuing Sit- in— Second Floor Allen, they 
demanded that Knight “remember your many warm friends  here,” “sail often,” 
“create poems now and then,” and “keep in touch and come back to see us.”103
In early June, Frances and Barnes Woodhall, and a group they described as 
“your faithful staff and friends all,” held a farewell dinner in Knight’s honor. 
Most of Duke’s highest- ranking administrators and their wives  were invited— 
William Anlyan, Frank Ashmore, Edwin Bryson, William Cartwright, Frank 
de Vyver, William Griffith, Marcus Hobbs, Charles Huestis, Harold Lewis, 
and Rufus Powell. “We  shall have cocktails in the gloaming and dinner when 
we are relaxed,” the Woodhalls wrote to the Knights. As going- away gifts, the 
Knights  were presented with what the Duke president described in thank 
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you notes as “books and silver.” So where did this impressive group of se nior 
Duke leaders gather at 6:30 p.m. on June 4, 1969, to honor Douglas Knight? 
The French Room at the segregated Hope Valley Country Club.104 What ever 
changes in racial attitudes and practices had occurred at Duke during Knight’s 
tumultuous six years as president, se nior leadership held fast to the preroga-
tives white privilege afforded them.
 Until the fall of 1963, educational opportunities at Duke University  were only 
available to young white men and  women. Students would gradu ate having 
benefited from rigorous classroom instruction. In addition, attending events 
at Hope Valley Country Club and on campus, they would learn to move com-
fortably at the country clubs, office parties, neighborhood gatherings, and 
other social settings they would encounter  later in life. In this sense, Duke 
also operated as a finishing school for the attitudes and be hav iors that defined 
white privilege.
When Black undergraduates arrived on campus, Duke faced a historic 
challenge. Could a university that had previously catered only to the needs of 
white students extend the full benefits of a Duke education to Black students as 
well? The university’s bylaws set forth the values Duke sought to embody. Duke 
aimed “to assert a faith in the eternal  union of knowledge and religion; . . . 
promote a sincere spirit of tolerance; . . .  and to render the largest permanent 
ser vice to the individual, the state, the nation, and the church.”105 Would the 
university embrace its responsibility to make  these values real in the college 
experience of the Black undergraduates who joined the Duke community?
Duke University fell far short of meeting this moral imperative. In critical 
re spects, Duke was unable to manifest the values it held out as central to its 
mission. On  matters of racial pro gress, Duke was at best reactive and at worst 
highly resistant. It refused to devote finite university resources to creating 
an inclusive environment where both Black and white students could thrive. 
Only when pressure was brought to bear did racial change occur. Pro gress 
was at best sporadic. “The University must not continue to be in a defensive 
position,” the Faculty Committee on Student Concerns warned the provost 
in its final report in June 1969. “It must propose courses of action, actively seek 
student (and other) support for its actions, and take the initiative in the imple-
mentation of  those princi ples which all of us profess.” Concerned that the 
university had previously acted only when compelled to do so, the committee 
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cautioned that “it is all too easy to relax during a ‘quiet period’ and wait for 
the next explosion.”106
Black student activism was by far the key driver of racial change during this 
period. Yet even with their best efforts, Black students could only accomplish 
so much. White supremacist attitudes persisted among some university trust-
ees, administrators, and faculty, and the prerogatives of white privilege proved 
to be unshakable for many. This is no surprise. What is revealing, however, 
is the number of racial myths and justifications embraced by  those at Duke 
who found change in race relations abhorrent, impolitic, incon ve nient, or just 
uncomfortable. Few, if any, would identify as white supremacists. But racial 
pro gress stalled  because so many found a way to avoid meeting the challenge 
of desegregation.
Central to the university’s failure was ignorance of the background, goals, 
challenges, and strengths of the new Black students. The university did al-
most nothing to prepare for the arrival of  these students or to understand 
their distinctive needs. Having chosen to remain oblivious to the lived ex-
periences and strengths of its Black students, racial myths determined how 
they  were received. Professors assumed that even the most intellectually gifted 
among them  were deficient academically. Deans communicated that certain 
professions— such as medicine— were beyond their reach. Most fundamental, 
however, was the belief that Duke’s Black students should want to simply fit 
in to the Duke experience that had been crafted over generations to meet the 
needs of white students. Griffith, along with his colleagues, simply expected 
the Black students to take their place as members of the Duke community 
through a “natu ral kind of amalgamation.”107
The controversy over the use of segregated off- campus facilities by campus 
groups and Knight’s membership in one such fa cil i ty illuminated other atti-
tudes. Knight had initially assumed that  there was no substance to the dispute 
and that the controversy was being “fabricated” by internal factions.108 Once it 
became clear that the prob lem could not be wished away, vari ous justifications 
for the continued use of segregated facilities arose. Many believed that pro-
hibiting campus groups from using off- campus segregated facilities infringed 
on their freedom of choice. “Pragmatism” was another reason some resisted a 
ban, with university finances always a concern.
When pressed to resign his personal membership in Hope Valley, Knight 
added “gradualism” to the arsenal. Only by remaining a member, Knight ar-
gued, could he use his influence as an insider to effect a change in the club’s 
exclusionary racial policy. Any such change would take time.
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Escalating Black campus activism in 1968 and 1969 exposed still other at-
titudes. The university insisted that any change to university policies should 
come only through “proper channels,” and committees  were the decision- 
making forum of choice. Indeed, starting in late 1968, a dizzying array of 
committees  were formed to consider Black student demands and advance 
Black studies: an ad hoc committee of administrators, students, and faculty; 
subgroups of the ad hoc committee assigned to investigate specific issues; 
the Proctor Committee; the Kerckhoff Committee; and the Budd Commit-
tee. During this period, administrators and faculty remained convinced that 
they  were acting in “good faith” in responding to Black student demands. For 
administrators and faculty, formation of  these vari ous committees and atten-
dance at meetings  were proof of their good faith. But for students, such ac-
tions only signified delay. With rare exceptions, administrators and faculty 
 were unable or unwilling to respond to the profound urgency Black students 
 were communicating.
Furthermore, during meetings in late 1967 and early 1968, university offi-
cials developed a pattern of blaming the students for the slow pace of pro gress 
on their demands. As activism reached a crescendo in late 1968 and 1969, 
this thinking morphed into the belief that the demands students presented 
 were not real issues of legitimate concern but con ve nient means to provoke 
a confrontation. Black student activism was not considered to be a reaction 
to racial conditions at Duke but instead part of a national Black student con-
spiracy or a rite of passage. In this view, Duke students did not or ga nize and 
plan the Allen Building takeover. Rather, Howard Fuller pulled their strings 
or Dick Gregory lit the fuse. As ignorance interacted with misperception, the 
view of Black students as “intruders” solidified. Once the occupation of the 
Allen Building was underway, it became far too easy for university officials to 
use force against students they readily saw as trespassers operating outside the 
bounds of the Duke University  family.
The arrival of Black students at Duke was a first encounter between 
young  people who had grown up in segregated communities and white 
trustees, administrators, faculty, and students who had rarely, if ever, in-
teracted with a Black person other than across the “veil” created by Jim 
Crow. One can, perhaps, imagine a parallel universe where this encoun-
ter could have occurred unburdened by the racial dynamics that distorted 
how whites at Duke perceived, and responded to, the school’s new Black 
students. In that universe, desegregation would have played out very dif-
ferently. Faithful to the university’s values— the  union of knowledge and 
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religion, a spirit of tolerance, and a dedication to service— whites would 
have embraced the new students without the ignorance, racial myths, and 
self- serving justifications that  shaped desegregation. Such a world, how-
ever, required self- reflection, empathy, and a moral commitment to racial 
justice that  those who ran Duke could not entertain. Creating this world of 
racial inclusion and diversity at Duke University would remain an ongoing 
proj ect for de cades to come.
Epilogue
Something Has to Change—2019, Fifty Years  Later
More than fifty years have passed since the Allen Building takeover. Race re-
mains a flash point for conflict in our national politics, at Duke, and throughout 
higher education.
The Black students who participated in the takeover— now around seventy 
years old— went on to lead lives of remarkable accomplishment and ser vice. 
Janice Williams became a social worker, spending forty years focusing on 
 children in foster care. Charles Becton was a judge on the North Carolina 
Court of Appeals, became a law professor, and was the first African American 
to serve as president of the North Carolina Bar Association. William Turner 
served as dean of Black affairs at Duke, directed the Black studies program, 
was a professor in the divinity school for de cades, and served for many years 
as the pastor of Mt. Level Missionary Baptist Church in Durham. Joyce Hobson 
was a university professor and research director, serves as co- executive di-
rector of the Beloved Community Center in Greensboro, North Carolina, 
and is the director of the Jubilee Institute, a nonprofit focused on leadership 
development and training. Brenda Armstrong, the second Black  woman in 
the United States to become a board- certified pediatric cardiologist, was a 
professor in the Department of Pediatrics at Duke  until her death in 2018. As 
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dean of admissions at the Duke University School of Medicine for more than 
twenty years, she recruited the most diverse classes in the school’s history. 
Armstrong was a respected and beloved figure at Duke, and the Chapel was 
filled to overflowing for her 2018 memorial ser vice, and flags across campus 
 were lowered to half- staff.
Many former students see a cause- and- effect relationship between partici-
pation in the Allen Building takeover and the lives that unfolded for them. 
“ Those Blacks who went [into the Allen Building] have almost twice as many 
advanced degrees as the white student body,” Becton commented. Catherine 
LeBlanc recalled the day of the Allen Building takeover as one in which she 
was “bathed in the commitment [of] wanting to make a difference in my com-
munity.” The takeover, she said, gave her “a very strong sense of purpose about 
my life and what I do.” “It made a difference,” Armstrong said. “Allen Building 
represented the turning point in all of our lives, I know it did in mine. . . . 
Allen Building showed us  there was nothing we  couldn’t do.  There was noth-
ing that has matched it, and I’m sure  there never  will [be].”1
Although participation in campus activism caused conflict in the families 
of many of Duke’s Black students, the passage of time puts  these events in 
context. Far from representing a sudden break from the past, the bold ac-
tions  these students took  were a continuation of the strug gle for Black educa-
tion that had been ongoing since before emancipation. “It was almost like a 
mission,” Armstrong reflected, “and we  were the ones at the time— the right 
time—to carry it out.” Often, it was parents who inspired protest. “We saw 
the world through our parents’ eyes,” she explained, and “the pain that they 
experienced . . .  being segregated, but we also saw the hope. . . .  Because they 
 were willing to tell me their stories, I understood who I was supposed to be.” 
Even as events  were unfolding, Armstrong saw herself as part of a continuum 
of change. One older adviser told Armstrong and her fellow students, “ There 
 will be a time when  people  will . . .  talk about you- all like you-all talked about 
us.” She responded, “Well, I certainly hope so.”2
The takeover also changed Duke. “The occupation of Allen Building was 
one of the most pivotal moments in our university’s history,” Duke president 
Vincent E. Price told participants on the fiftieth anniversary of the protest. 
“In your actions on our campus and the lives of purpose you have lived 
since, you have forever changed this place for the better and improved the 
lives of many who followed.” “It was . . .  a dramatic, cataclysmic . . .  inter-
vention,” Armstrong reflected. “We helped Duke become the school it is 
 today.”3
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 After the resignation of Douglas Knight, Duke made an inspired choice for 
his replacement. Looking beyond the acad emy, it hired Terry Sanford, the pro-
gressive former governor of North Carolina, to be its sixth president. Sanford 
brought to campus stature, creativity, a willingness to take risks, and a deep 
commitment to the cause of racial justice. The head of the search committee 
accurately described Sanford’s rec ord as one of “integrity, honesty, vitality and 
verve.” In Samuel DuBois Cook’s words, Sanford was “a moral force” on racial 
 matters. He set a new tone and direction almost instantly. In his first public 
appearance  after being chosen president, Sanford commented that he was “cer-
tainly not against collective bargaining” and, in January 1972, Local 77 was rec-
ognized as the  union representative for Duke’s ser vice employees. “He had his 
creds” as a gradu ate of unc, Turner explained, “he had his creds from the gover-
nor’s office, and he had his creds from his work with John Kennedy.” In Turner’s 
view, Sanford’s background allowed him to give “permission slips” to the many 
at Duke who wanted the institution to move beyond the toxic conflicts over 
race and student activism that had ensnared his pre de ces sor.4 In Sanford, Duke 
fi nally found a leader able to unleash and harness the school’s  great potential.
 Under Sanford’s leadership, and that of the presidents who followed him, 
Duke has achieved a stature that even James B. Duke may never have dreamed 
of. For 2020, U.S. News and World Report ranked Duke tenth among national 
universities overall and eighth for providing the best value. The Wall Street 
Journal also ranked Duke tenth among national universities and tied for third 
in a mea sure of how much value a school adds to its students’  future financial 
lives. U.S. News and World Report ranked Duke the best hospital in North 
Carolina, and ten adult specialties and nine  children’s specialties  were nation-
ally ranked. It also ranked the Duke School of Law tenth in the country, the 
School of Nursing second, and the School of Medicine thirteenth. And then, 
of course,  there is the Duke men’s basketball team, a source of  great pride for 
the university, winning the coveted national championship five times between 
1991 and 2019.5
Over time, one constant has been the university’s deep financial resources. 
Initially entitled to a share of the $40 million Endowment James B. Duke cre-
ated in 1924, Duke University now has an endowment valued in 2019 at $8.6 
billion. On June 30, 2017, the university completed its most ambitious fund-
rais ing campaign ever, having raised $3.85 billion over the previous seven 
years. More than 315,000 donors participated. Admission to Duke is highly 
competitive. More than 41,000 applications  were received for the Duke class 
of 2023, and 7.8  percent of applicants  were accepted.6
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Over the years, Duke has made significant investments in becoming more di-
verse and inclusive.7 The school has an internationally recognized Department 
of African and African American Studies. In 1983, fourteen years following the 
Allen Building takeover, the Mary Lou Williams Center for Black Culture was 
opened.8 The Black Student Alliance, one of a number of affinity groups for stu-
dents of color, provides a cultural base for Black students at the university and a 
platform for continuing the strug gle for solutions to the prob lems faced by Black 
students on campus. The Center for Multicultural Affairs supports community 
engagement, multicultural education, leadership development, and social justice 
education. Through a partnership between the Center for Documentary Studies 
at Duke and the sncc Legacy Proj ect, Duke has become a center for civil rights 
scholarship. The Samuel DuBois Cook Society recognizes, celebrates, and affirms 
the presence of African American students, faculty, and staff at Duke University. 
The society held its 2019 awards ceremony at Hope Valley Country Club.
The composition of Duke’s student body reflects an institutional commit-
ment to diversity. In the class of 2023, 55  percent of students are nonwhite, 
12  percent are Black/African American, and 8  percent are first- generation 
college students. Admission is “need- blind.” Applicants are accepted based 
on their merits, regardless of their ability to pay for college.9 In part to foster 
communication and relationships among students of diverse backgrounds, all 
Duke freshmen live on East Campus.
The university has also taken impor tant symbolic actions. Its main quad 
has been renamed Abele Quad, to recognize the contributions of Julian 
Abele, the African American architect of Duke University’s original campus. 
The Sociology-Psychology Building on West Campus has been renamed the 
Wilhelmina Reuben-Cooke Building in honor of her many contributions to 
the university, including her role as one of the first five Black undergraduates. 
A statue of Confederate general Robert E. Lee was removed from the entrance 
to Duke University Chapel, a step taken to express the “abiding values” of the 
school. Most recently, the university announced that the Carr Building on 
East Campus  will be renamed. Despite Julian Carr’s philanthropic contribu-
tions to Trinity College, a committee determined that his “white supremacist 
actions . . .  , even when considered in light of the time in which they  were 
held, are inconsistent with the fundamental aspirations of this university.”10 
Other steps are  under consideration.
Still, even with  these initiatives and investments, Duke has yet to create a 
campus culture of inclusion and racial justice. Indeed, parallels to the issues 
and conflicts of the 1960s abound.
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The absence of interaction among students of diverse backgrounds is one 
issue. “I think if you did a dot map of color or socioeconomic status . . .  and 
you looked at East Campus,” 2019 gradu ate Trey Walk commented, “it would 
be super spread out in diversity.” But  after freshman year, students move to 
West Campus, where fraternities, sororities, and other selective living groups 
dominate. At that point, Walk— a Black student elected a “young” Duke 
trustee in 2019— observed, “enclaves of diff er ent groups” emerge. The amount 
of intergroup interaction drops significantly.11 One professor who leads a 
 DukeEngage proj ect in South Africa continues to be surprised that Black and 
white student participants had never engaged in discussions of race  until at-
tending a program located thousands of miles from campus.
Student activists continue to press many of the same issues that  were the 
focus of 1960s protest. The university’s treatment of its nonacademic employ-
ees and contract workers remains a central concern. In 2016 Duke executive 
vice president Tallman Trask hit a contract parking worker with his car and 
allegedly used a racial slur as he drove off.12 Workers  were furious. Then Duke 
president Brodhead received a report from a former special events man ag er at 
Parking and Transportation Ser vices describing a culture of “racism, harass-
ment, retaliation and bullying” in the department. The same person reported 
“innumerable” incidents in which members of the special events department 
 were called “n*****, coon, porch monkey, bull dagger and dyke while working 
Duke special events.”13
On April 1, 2016, nine Duke students occupied the second floor of the 
Allen Building, demanding better treatment for Duke workers. Among the 
demands  were that Duke commit to paying all its employees the current 
Durham living wage of $12.53 per hour and offer basic health care to  these 
employees. On April 6, the university announced that it refused to negotiate 
with the protesters  until they left the building. The sit-in ended  after seven 
days. “Though we have disagreed about . . .  their demands and their choice 
of means,” President Brodhead said, “I re spect their under lying passion for 
making Duke and the world a better place.” In 2017, Duke raised the mini-
mum wage for all employees to $13 per hour, with further increases to $14 in 
2018 and then to $15 per hour by July 1, 2019— a 37  percent increase in Duke’s 
minimum wage over four years.14
Student activists are convinced that the 2016 Allen Building takeover and 
other campus protests have forced the university to act on vari ous issues, even 
if Duke administrators refuse to acknowledge that fact. “ People always tell 
me, ‘You’d get stuff done if you just went through the right channels,’ ” activist 
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Sydney Roberts commented. They say, “ ‘That’s not how you talk to  people. 
 You’re just gonna make them angry.’ ” It is clear to Roberts, however, that only 
direct action gets the administration’s full attention and prompts action. “It 
has always been calculated, collective disruption that has made the university 
realize, ‘Oh, we have to actually pay attention to this,’ ” Roberts observed.15
Current activists see themselves as continuing work started during the 
1960s. “At some point we came together,” Roberts commented, “and we looked 
back and realized that a lot of concerns, grievances we had,  were actually the 
demands from 1969 that have not been fulfilled.”16
The hate and other racially charged incidents that occur at Duke are perhaps 
the most troubling echo of the 1960s. Such incidents are on the upswing on 
college campuses throughout the nation, and Duke has experienced numerous 
examples. In 2015 a noose was found hanging near the student center. Also in 
2015, a death threat was made against gay freshman Jack Donahue when “Death 
to all fags @Jack” was scrawled on a wall in his dorm. In October 2015, a Black 
Lives  Matter flyer posted in a Duke lecture hall was defaced with racial slurs.17
In November 2015, Duke convened a “community conversation” to discuss 
the racist and homophobic incidents. “I do not feel safe as a black female at 
Duke,” Katrina Miller told President Brodhead and other administrators in 
attendance. “I  shouldn’t have to feel obligated to call my  mother  every night to 
tell her that I survived another day at Duke.” “If every thing had gone accord-
ing to plan,” a female Asian American student said through tears, “I would 
have been another suicide  because I  don’t feel safe  here. I don’t feel that I be-
long  here.” “You have created a space for us to fear for our lives,” one hundred 
students said in unison. “Duke, you are guilty.”18
In 2017 npr reported that African American students matriculating at 
Duke’s divinity school felt that they have “entered a racial nightmare seem-
ingly from another era.” “One of my classmates . . .  texted me and asked me to 
come to her class,” Amber Burgin, president of the Black Seminarians Union, 
told npr, “ because a student was in her class saying, ‘N***** like you come 
 here and think that you can just change every thing.’ ” Burgin told of white 
students using slurs like “jigaboo” and calling a Black classmate “ghetto.” “I’ve 
had classmates who have left the program  because they  were tired of being 
treated in such a way,” Burgin said.19
In 2018 the incidents continued. In January a Black student said she was 
passed by two men who said, “F*** you, n*****” to her. During the last week 
of the spring semester, two Snapchats made by a Duke student using a racial 
epithet  were posted on the memes page and the racial epithet “n***** lover” 
282 Epilogue
was written on sophomore Cara Kim’s door. Just  after the Snapchat incident, 
Larry Moneta, vice president of student affairs, generated controversy when 
he tweeted that “freedom of expression protects the oppressed far more than 
the oppressors,” urging that  those who want to ban hate speech read “ Free 
Speech on Campus,” a book he found illuminating. “I think telling students 
who are asking you to do something about being targets of hate speech to 
‘go read a book’ is intellectually dishonest and ethically irresponsible,” Henry 
Washington, a former president of the Black Student Alliance, responded. 
 After the racial epithet was posted on a student’s door, Moneta commented, 
“I  don’t have a plan for a major initiative.” Saying, “You want to be careful,” he 
observed, “I think we need to just sit back and think about what is  going on 
that a few  people would feel like that was a good way to behave.” Students  were 
outraged. Ju nior Mumbi Kanyogo commented that the Duke administration 
is “more concerned with the  mental gymnastics of avoiding responsibility for 
policy failure” than ensuring that Black students at the university are safe.20
In April students circulated a petition demanding that the university “cre-
ate and enforce a standardized set of consequences for acts of hate and bias 
on campus.” They collected almost seven hundred signatures before present-
ing the petition to the university administration. The hate speech “is just a 
reminder,” Kim commented, “of the deep- rooted racism that still exists on 
this campus and through its students.” “I just want to see my university be the 
leaders they are hoping to produce,” Kim said. “A leader . . .  doesn’t just put 
out the fire, but stops it from even happening.” A  couple of weeks  later, pro-
vost Sally Kornbluth and Richard Riddell, se nior vice president and secretary 
to the board of trustees, told students that “when the fall semester begins, we 
 will re- engage with interested students with the goal of further clarifying our 
hate and bias policies.” “We fully understand the urgency of  these issues,” they 
said, “but also feel that careful consultation is imperative so that we, as a com-
munity, can understand the ramifications of any such policies.”21
Before the spring semester was over, Moneta was again in the  middle of 
controversy. A regular at the campus coffee shop Joe Van Gogh, Moneta vis-
ited the store on May 4, 2018. While inside, he heard the song “Get Paid,” 
by Young Dolph, playing over the store’s sound system. Hearing lyr ics that 
included “n*****” and “f***,” Moneta said he was “offended.” He told the Duke 
Chronicle he found the lyr ics “quite inappropriate for a working environment 
that serves  children, among  others.” Moneta asked barista Britni Brown, who 
is Black, to turn off the  music. She did so immediately. Apologizing profusely, 
Brown explained that the song had been streaming from a radio play list on 
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her phone.  Because she kept the volume low so she could hear customers’ 
 orders, Brown did not know what song had been playing.22
The episode did not end  there.  After leaving the store, Moneta immediately 
called Robert Coffey, head of Duke dining ser vices, to complain about the 
song he had heard in the coffee shop. Several days  later, on May 8, Brown, and 
Kevin Simmons, a second barista working during Moneta’s visit,  were sum-
moned to Joe Van Gogh corporate offices and  were told that they could no 
longer work for the chain. “We had gotten a call from Robert Coffey of Duke 
saying that the vp of the university had come into the shop and that  there 
was vulgar  music playing,” Joe Van Gogh’s head of  human resources, Amanda 
Wiley, explained. “Duke University has instructed us to terminate the employ-
ees that  were working that day.”23
Although Moneta told the Duke Chronicle that the decision to fire Brown 
and Simmons had been made by Joe Van Gogh, not Duke, protests soon fol-
lowed. The incident, many believed, reflected callous indifference to the em-
ployment security of two Duke workers. Protesters also pointed to Moneta’s 
 earlier statements defending “ free speech,” even in the face of hate incidents. 
 After protesters went to Moneta’s office to express their concerns to him di-
rectly, he issued a statement that “if my actions in any way led to [the workers’] 
dismissal, I apologize and hope that the jvg management consider ways to 
reinstate their employment.” Joe Van Gogh also apologized for its  handling of 
the situation and offered to reinstate Brown and Simmons. Both declined the 
offer. On May 11, the owner of Joe Van Gogh announced that the com pany was 
severing ties with Duke “to preserve Joe Van Gogh’s brand in de pen dence. . . . 
Joe Van Gogh has always been about bringing  people together, not driving 
them apart,” he said.24
In the fall, incidents of hate speech resumed. On August 25, 2018, the word 
Nigger was found scrawled over the word Black on a wall in the Mary Lou Wil-
liams Center for Black Culture. A mural celebrating Latinx Heritage Month 
was found defaced in September. In mid- October, a swastika was found carved 
into a stall in the bathroom of the Languages Building and, the day  after Hal-
loween, a pumpkin with a swastika carved into it was found on campus. In 
November 2018, a mural honoring the victims of the Tree of Life synagogue 
massacre in Pittsburgh was painted over by a swastika.25
Disturbing events continued in 2019. Duke garnered unfavorable world-
wide attention  after Megan Neely, the director of gradu ate studies in the De-
partment of Biostatistics, sent an email warning Asian gradu ate students in 
the program not to speak Chinese in social settings with other students. The 
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email was prompted by a report from two faculty members that they had heard 
two Chinese students speaking to each other in Chinese “very loudly” in a 
student lounge. They criticized the students for “being so impolite as to have a 
conversation that not every one on the floor could understand.”26
Racial incidents now occur at Duke so frequently that some students have 
become numb to them. “It’s in the  water,” Trey Walk said with resignation. 
“When they happen at this point,  we’re not surprised.”27
Neely stepped down as the biostatistics chair not long  after the incident. 
Duke leaders also issued a statement acknowledging the “exhausting and hurt-
ful” events that had taken place at the university. “ These events are not restricted 
to one school or group,” they stated, but “they are widespread on our campus.” 
As they had in the past, Duke leaders reiterated the university’s commitment to 
inclusion. “We emphatically affirm our promise to value the identities, heri-
tage, cultures, and languages of every individual at Duke,” they said.28
 After the incident, Nayoung Aimee Kwon, the director of Duke’s Asian 
American studies program, issued a statement. Acknowledging that  there 
is a “national and global uptick” in discriminatory incidents, she observed 
that Duke had experienced “more than our share.” Four task forces had been 
formed in the wake of prior incidents, Kwon said, but their recommenda-
tions “are still to be circulated widely or implemented in vis i ble ways, some-
times years  after . . .  the submission of their reports.” “The ongoing prob lem 
of racism in our campus community has reached a boiling point,” she warned. 
Kwon urged the university to “lead with a zero tolerance policy  toward any 
forms of bias and discrimination.” “Our students are watching us,” she said, 
“and now the world is watching us, to step up and take action now.”29
This returns us to the central question of this book: Is “inclusion” a core 
value of Duke University? Although Vincent Price, Duke’s current president, 
has identified “inclusion” as one of five core values at Duke, fifty years  after the 
Allen Building takeover, many think not. Even as a freshman, Walk witnessed 
hate incidents on campus that  were not dealt with effectively—if at all. He saw 
how poorly laborers on campus— still primarily Black Durham residents— 
were treated. Walk also noted how few Black professors he had had while a 
Duke undergraduate. He concluded that “ there was a commitment on paper 
and in words to [the idea of] inclusion,” but that “Duke’s money [and reputa-
tional] interests  were at the forefront, beyond  those  things.” Creating a culture 
of inclusion on campus was viewed by administrators, according to Walk, as 
“something that would be good to do” but was not “essential for Duke’s iden-
tity.” “Every body has a gift,” Armstrong observed, “and nobody’s gift is better 
Epilogue 285
than anyone  else’s. But that culture of sharing and appreciating each other’s 
gifts has not been achieved on the Duke campus.” “Duke is not what it once 
was,” Mark Anthony Neal, chair of the Department of African and African 
American Studies at Duke, commented, “but it certainly is not where it needs 
to be.” “The truth is,” Chandra Guinn commented in 2019, “the experience of 
black students at Duke is one that continues to need care.”30
In May 2018,  after the Joe Van Gogh incident, Price addressed the univer-
sity’s attempts to create a culture in which all members of the community felt 
safe and respected.
When we learn a racial slur has been scrawled on a dorm door, a social 
media posting has used abhorrent language, anti- Semitic posters have 
been distributed in Durham, or workers on our campus have been treated 
unfairly, we feel angry, discouraged, and disappointed. Duke should be a 
place where  these  things  don’t happen. They are a painful reminder that 
we have more work to do to make our Duke community the dynamic, 
diverse and welcoming community of students, faculty, and staff we aspire 
it to be. . . .
Something has to change.
I  will simply say that I am deeply sorry that we are not where we want 
to be as a university. . . .  We must do better.31
Still, Price urged patience: “We cannot and  will not succumb to a rush 
to judgment that demands instant retribution absent context and delib-
eration.” Duke’s prob lems of “basic decency, and our legacies of racism, 
intolerance and xenophobia, that continue to follow us, and indeed all of 
society . . .  do not lend themselves to easy answers or quick fixes,” the Duke 
president wrote. “But they  will continue to plague us,” he concluded, “ unless 
we address them directly, honestly, in good faith, and with a healthy dose 
of courage.”32
So the prob lem remains. Race is, and has always been, the core issue for 
Duke. Only  after Duke’s Black students forced the university to consider the 
implications of desegregation and the aftermath of Jim Crow could the insti-
tution achieve the national and international prominence to which it aspired. 
But true greatness  will only become pos si ble if the university is able to create 
the diverse and inclusive culture it seeks. To complete this proj ect, Duke lead-
ers will require self- reflection, empathy, and a moral commitment to racial 
justice that so many of their predecessors lacked. For now,  whether Duke can 
become an institution that achieves its lofty aims remains an open question.
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poSTScripT
In June 2020, not long before this book was published, Duke’s Black students, 
faculty, and staff spoke out about racism at the university during an all- day 
event, “Living while Black.” Soon thereafter, Duke president Vincent Price 
committed the university to taking “transformative action now  toward elimi-
nating the systems of racism and in equality that have  shaped the lived experi-
ences of too many members of the Duke community.” He acknowledged that 
members of the Duke community had “often not fully embraced” their mis-
sion of serving as “agents of pro gress in advancing racial equity and justice.” 
Price outlined a series of bold and specific actions that would “resolutely turn 
[the university’s] attention  toward the mission of anti- racism.”33 Though  these 
issues had confronted the university since the 1960s, both the tone and the 
substance of Price’s words conveyed new urgency.
The work of antiracism, Price recognized, would depend on sustained ef-
fort and deep engagement by  those not subject to racism “with humility, with 
humanity, and with honesty.”34 It would also require significant resources dur-
ing a very challenging time for higher education. Is change  really coming? 
Only time  will tell.
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